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1 Introduction 
Back in the old days, they called him ‘the Big Lad’, an epithet that referred 
to his physique as well as to his status in the movement. At the tender age 
of 21, he had already built a reputation as a commander whose 
considerable leadership skills were matched only by his ruthlessness. A 
clear demonstration of the latter trait occurred in 1971, when the 
community he lived in came under attack. He chose not to fight back, and 
ordered his unit to hold their fire. This was not because he feared that 
they could not hold their own against the British Army. The Provisional 
IRA, of which he was fast becoming a leading member, was emerging as 
the champion of the Catholic cause and would certainly have been 
capable of putting up a considerable fight. But instead, he let his people 
suffer a beating. Demonstrating his ability for cold-blooded Realpolitik, he 
calculated that the incident would enrage the people of Northern Ireland 
even further. These were the early days of the Northern Ireland conflict, 
and the Provisional IRA, so he believed, stood a serious chance at 
expelling the British from Northern Ireland. But for this to happen, he 
needed an escalation, and for that to happen, he needed the population to 
direct their anger against the British. The army raid that he left 
unopposed, would no doubt play into the hand of the Provos.1 Such, in 
1971, was his confidence in the armed struggle.  
By 1994, however, Gerry Adams – as was the Big Lad’s real name – 
realised how much things had changed. He once claimed that “[t]he 
British government has never listened to anything else but the use of 
force”2, but now he firmly believed that he had to reason with them. He 
fought hard, and sometimes dirty, to get the hardliners in the Provisional 
IRA to accept a ceasefire that would allow Sinn Féin, the political party of 
which he was the leader, to join the talks about a negotiated settlement of 
the Northern Ireland conflict. Eventually he got his way. On 31 August 
1994, the Provisional IRA announced that it would give the peace process 
                                                          
1 E. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 88. 
2 P. Hamann, At the Edge of the Union (BBC and Lionheart International Television, 1985), 
33:26 – 33:30, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NciY4S9YVW8. 
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a chance and that it would commit no more attacks for the time being. The 
statement in which the group informed the public about its decision 
showed the balancing act that Adams had to pull off. It praised the 
“courage, determination and sacrifice” of those who had been committing 
terrorist attacks for the last 25 years, but it also stated that “a solution will 
only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations”.3 By this latter phrase, 
the group acknowledged that the future of Northern Ireland was partially 
in the hands of parties that wanted the British to stay. Just five years 
earlier, it would have been impossible to wring such a concession from 
the Provisional IRA’s leadership. The ceasefire broke down in 1996, but 
was resumed after Adams again managed to convince the leadership of 
the Provisional IRA of the need of a ceasefire and negotiations. The peace 
process was concluded in 1998 by the Good Friday Agreement, in which 
the various parties involved committed themselves to a governance 
structure of Northern Ireland that is still in place today. 
After the Provisional IRA’s campaign had ended, the settlement of the 
Northern Ireland conflict became something of a model for how to deal 
with terrorist groups. The upbeat lesson was that even organisations that 
are strongly committed to political violence can be pacified when they are 
engaged in the working out of an acceptable compromise. This point was 
made not in the least by Gerry Adams himself. In the years after the Good 
Friday Agreement, he drew on his personal experience to comment 
extensively on the conflict in the Basque Country, and today he can still 
be booked as a speaker on such topics as ‘Engaging with Cuba’ and 
‘Making peace in the Middle East’.4 Other participants also suggested that 
what worked in the case of the Provisional IRA could work against other 
                                                          
3 “Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ceasefire Statement, 31 August 1994,” 1994, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira31894.htm. 
4 G. Adams, “An End to Violence for the Basque Country,” Guardian, February 27, 2010, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/feb/27/eta-basque-agreement-spain-
terror; G. Adams, “Eta’s Ceasefire Is a Political Shift,” Guardian, September 6, 2010, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/sep/06/eta-ceasefire-basque-group-
political-shift; G. Adams, “Basque Peace Move an Essential Step,” CNN, October 21, 2011, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/21/opinion/adams-basque-peace. See also Adams’ profile 




groups as well. Hugh Orde, the Police Chief of Northern Ireland, argued 
in 2008 that the British government should start negotiations with Al 
Qaeda, confident that the two sides would reach an agreement.5 The 
research community joined the fray by contributing such titles as When 
peace fails: lessons from Belfast for the Middle East and Making war on terror: 
global lessons from Northern Ireland.  
It is understandable and legitimate that scholars and researchers assess 
whether the defeat of the Provisional IRA and the settlement of the 
Northern Ireland conflict hold any generally applicable lessons, but for 
such exercises to make any sense at all, it should first be established 
whether the lessons from Northern Ireland are of any use outside of 
Northern Ireland. The truth is that we know very little about whether or 
to what extent the lessons that were learned in the fight against one 
terrorist group can be transferred to a different case. This dissertation will 
take a first step towards a more evidence-based understanding of the 
wider applicability of counterterrorism lessons by examining whether 
counterterrorism measures have different effects when applied against 
different types of terrorist organisations or movements. To draw on the 
example of the Provisional IRA, the question is essentially: do the lessons 
from Northern Ireland apply only to groups that are like the Provisional 
IRA, to all other terrorist groups, or to no other terrorist group at all?  
Regarding the general applicability of counterterrorism lessons, there is a 
strange inconsistency in the scholarly literature. On the one hand, many 
authors present their views on counterterrorism as pieces of advice on 
policies against terrorism in general, regardless of the nature of the 
problem, whereas, on the other hand, many authors argue for the need to 
tailor a counterterrorism approach to the terrorist organisation that is 
being confronted.6 This latter point, however, has rarely been taken up. 
                                                          
5 V. Dodd, “Time to Talk to Al-Qaida, Senior Police Chief Urges,” Guardian, May 30, 2008, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/30/alqaida.terrorism. 
6 See for example M. Crenshaw, “Terrorism, Strategy, and Grand Strategy,” in Attacking 
Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. A.K. Cronin and J.M. Ludes (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 78–79; and A.K. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: 
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There are very few examinations of which countermeasures are needed 
against which types of terrorist organisation.7 Therefore, this 
dissertation’s central research question is: 
Is there a relation between the type of terrorist organisation and the effectiveness 
of counterterrorism approaches that are applied against it? 
A relation between counterterrorism effectiveness and the nature of a 
terrorist actor can be established from two angles, i.e. from that of a type 
of terrorist actor and from that of a counterterrorism policy or measure. In 
the former case, we are interested in whether a range of counterterrorism 
measures or policies have similar effects when applied against similar 
terrorist actors. The answer to this question is crucial in counterterrorism 
policy making, as it would help policy makers and counterterrorism 
practitioners select the right measures for the right type of terrorist 
organisation. Ideally, it would help us draw up a ‘counterterrorism 
effectiveness profile’ for each type of terrorist actor, which would show 
what measures are effective against it. In the latter case, we are interested 
in whether the effect of a counterterrorism measure or policy depends on 
the nature of the terrorist actor it is applied against. Here, we are 
interested in types of terrorist actors that a certain counterterrorism 
measure or policy can effectively be applied against. Is it a measure or 
policy that can be effectively applied against a wide range of terrorist 
actors or only against a particular type of terrorist actor? As an analysis 
from both these angles can be made on the basis of the same dataset, the 
main research question will be answered using the following two sub-
questions: 
 Do counterterrorism measures and policies have similar effects against 
similar types of terrorist actors? 
                                                                                                                                    
Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 206. 
7 A notable, if at times methodologically questionable, exception is G.D. Miller, “Confronting 
Terrorisms: Group Motivation and Successful State Policies,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
19, no. 3 (2007): 331–50. 
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 Does the effect of counterterrorism measures or policies depend on the 
nature of the terrorist actor they are applied against? 
As these research questions are essentially about effectiveness, the second 
chapter will review the literature on counterterrorism effectiveness. In this 
chapter, it will be argued that the existing effectiveness measurement 
frameworks are insufficient to answer the research questions. The first 
part of the third chapter will outline a new way to measure 
counterterrorism effectiveness. The essence of this new approach is that 
counterterrorism is broken down in separate counterterrorism principles, 
the effectiveness of which will be evaluated separately. The second part of 
the third chapter will outline a framework for the categorisation of 
terrorist actors. On the basis of this framework, we will distinguish three 
types of terrorist actors: revolutionary, nationalist and jihadist terrorism. 
For each of these three types, two terrorist actors have been selected. In 
the chapters 4 to 9, we will examine for each of these six terrorist actors 
which counterterrorism principles were applied, and whether or not they 
were effective. The six terrorist actors that will be examined are the 
Weather Underground (chapter 4), the Red Army Faction (chapter 5), 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, chapter 6), the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (Provisional IRA, chapter 7), the jihadist movement in the 
Netherlands (chapter 8), and the jihadist movement in the UK (chapter 9). 
The six chapters on the various groups are structured in more or less the 
same way. The first part of the chapters will address the origins, ideology 
and modus operandi of the group or movement to familiarise the reader 
with people, events and organs that play a role in the second part of the 
chapter, where the actual tests of the counterterrorism principles take 
place. It should be noted that the background sections as well as the 
effectiveness assessments are not critical re-evaluations of the source 
material. While some debates or incongruities are noted, the chapters 
largely reflect a common ground that can be constructed on the basis of 
what governments, media, academia and the terrorists themselves have 
told us. Of course, if one would distinguish between these various kinds 
of sources or the views expressed in them, it would be possible to claim 
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that one view on the history of the group is more accurate or illuminating 
or than the others. This, however, was not the purpose of these six 
chapters. The source material was used rather than questioned, which 
means that the chapters 4 to 9 are based on the simple assumption that 
what governments, media, academia and the terrorists themselves have 
told us is true. To avoid inaccuracies, it has been attempted to find 
multiple and sources and multiple kinds of sources to substantiate each of 
the many claims and assessments about the nature of the terrorist actors 
and the way they were impacted by counterterrorism. However, as the 
four kinds of source material were not available in equal quantities for all 
six terrorist actors, it is possible that some of the case studies are biased in 
favour of the view of the actors (media, academia, government or 
terrorist) that did generate source materials. For instance, several 
members of the RAF and the Provisional IRA spoke out about their 
terrorist activities, whereas, at least so far, very few Dutch or British 
jihadists went public with their stories. Consequently, the view ‘from the 
inside’ has been taken into account in the chapters about the RAF and the 
Provisional IRA, but plays less of a role in the chapters on the Dutch and 
British jihadist movements. Instead, these chapters are based on 
government and media sources, which may constitute a bias. 
In order to keep this study, as well as the reader, focused on the 
overarching goal, each cluster will be wrapped up with an intermediate 
conclusion that refers to the first research subquestion, the one about 
whether counterterrorism principles have similar effects when applied 
against similar terrorist groups or movements. Then, in the conclusion, 
we will answer the main research question by analysing whether the 
application the counterterrorism principles have different effects when 
applied against different types of terrorist actors. Also, we hope to be able 
to answer the other sub-question and draw up a profile that shows which 
counterterrorism principles should be applied against which type of 
terrorist organisation. 
The groups that will be discussed in the coming chapters are very 
different from each other. For instance, they had widely different political 
Introduction 
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ambitions. Some wanted to nothing less than to change the world, 
whereas others would have settled for independence for their people or 
accession to another state. They also have different degrees of 
organisation: some were very organised, whereas others worked in a 
much less structured way. Further, some were deeply rooted in the 
community where they were active, whereas others were isolated and 
were left to their own devices. And yet, in spite of all these differences, 
they can all legitimately be labelled ‘terrorist’. How is this possible? What 
is it that such a diverse group of actors have in common? In order to give 
some conceptual clarity about the phenomenon that is the subject of much 
of this dissertation, a brief expansion on the definition of terrorism may be 
helpful. The literature on how to define terrorism is enormous, so there is 
no need to elaborate again on how difficult it is to define terrorism.8 For 
our purposes, it is sufficient to pick a definition that allows us to 
distinguish the actors that are subject to counterterrorism policies from 
actors that are in some ways related but are generally countered with 
different instruments. Examples include organised crime, hate crime, 
guerrilla, insurgency and violent political protest. A useful and workable 
description that sets terrorism apart from these other phenomena is the 
one formulated by Bruce Hoffman, who says that “terrorism is: 
 ineluctably political in aims and motives; 
 violent – or, equally important, threatens violence; 
 designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the 
immediate victim or target; 
 conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of 
command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no 
uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection 
of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the 
ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movements 
and/or its leaders; and 
                                                          
8 For two extremes in the debate on the definition of terrorism, the first arguing that it cannot 
be defined and should therefore not be studied as such, the second that a definition is not 
necessary to study it adequately, see respectively C. Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” 
Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 5–13; W. Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-
First Century (London, New York and Harrisburg: Continuum, 2004), 232–238. 
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 perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.”9 
The suggested motivation distinguishes terrorism from organised crime, 
where the main motive is financial gain, and hate crime, which has no 
political agenda in the sense that it is not intended to force a government 
or international organisation to adopt or abandon certain policies. The far-
reaching psychological impact that Hoffman refers to, constitutes a crucial 
difference between terrorism on the one hand and guerrilla warfare and 
insurgency on the other. It is true that a clear victory in guerrilla warfare 
and insurgency sends a message, for example about the strength of the 
insurgents, but guerrilla actions, unlike terrorist attacks, are not primarily 
intended to do that. Rather, they are intended to inflict an operational 
defeat on enemy forces. In terrorism, the signalling effect is more 
important than the damage done to the enemy. Many terrorist 
organisations have references to military action in their names, but the 
intensity of terrorist violence is too low for it to be perceived as military 
action aimed at conquering and holding territory. More so than in 
guerrilla warfare, terrorist success lies in the psychological impact. The 
third bullet, the point about the perpetrators, allows for a distinction 
between terrorism and violent protest along the lines of, for example, the 
1999 Battle of Seattle. Hoffman supposes a certain degree of 
organisational unity and clarity about the modus operandi, as opposed to 
the largely spontaneous rioting that regularly erupts around international 
summits. Another advantage of Hoffman’s definition is that it will be 
recognisable to many students of terrorism, as it contains all elements that 
experts mention most frequently as necessary components of a definition 
of terrorism and that are most often used by governments and 
international organisations.10 Put differently, it captures the essence of 
what people generally mean when they are talking about terrorism. 
                                                          
9 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised & enlarged (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 40. 
10 A. P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 5; 
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William C. Banks, Mitchel B. Wallerstein, and Renée de Nevers, Combating Terrorism: 







2 Literature review: the state of the art of 
research into counterterrorism effectiveness 
Given the topic’s unquestionable policy relevance, there is surprisingly 
little research into counterterrorism effectiveness. In 2006, an extensive 
study showed that research publications on counterterrorism 
effectiveness were rare.1 Not much appears to have changed since then. 
More than twelve years after 9/11, the field of terrorism and 
counterterrorism studies is still only beginning to address 
counterterrorism effectiveness: not many authors assess counterterrorism 
effectiveness, and those that do, often do so in a rather crude manner. This 
chapter will critique the ways in which the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism policies has been measured, and will conclude by 
drawing lessons for the construction of a new framework for the 
evaluation of counterterrorism policies.2 
2.1 Measures of effectiveness used in the literature 
2.1.1 Numbers of attacks 
When assessing the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies, it is 
tempting to look at statistics about terrorist attacks that have occurred in a 
certain country or region. They provide seemingly hard data, and 
increases and decreases can be clearly established. Numbers of terrorist 
attacks are fairly easy to count, and lend themselves to comparisons over 
time. Also, attack statistics seem to go to the heart of what terrorism is 
about. The ambition of all counterterrorism practitioners is to reduce as 
much as possible the risk of terrorist attacks and thus decrease the 
likelihood of victims. From this perspective, it makes intuitive sense to 
look at indicators like the numbers of terrorist attacks. Several authors 
have followed this approach in assessing counterterrorism effectiveness. 
                                                          
1 C. Lum, L. W. Kennedy, and A. Sherley, “Are Counter-Terrorism Strategies Effective? The 
Results of the Campbell Systematic Review on Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Research,” 
Journal of Experimental Criminology 2, no. 4 (2006): 489–516. 
2 Parts of this chapter have been published in T. van Dongen, “Break It down: An Alternative 
Approach to Measuring Effectiveness in Counterterrorism,” Journal of Applied Security 
Research 6, no. 3 (2011): 357–71. 
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Gary LaFree, for instance, examined the effect of some interventions by 
the British state against the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland by 
looking at the numbers of terrorist attacks that took place after the 
interventions had been placed.3 Similarly, Carlos Pestana Barros tried to 
establish the effects of the opening up by the Spanish state of political 
channels for the Basque separatist organisation Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(Freedom and Fatherland, ETA). He does so by comparing the numbers of 
attacks in periods in which the more conciliatory Partido Popular (People’s 
Party, PP) was in power to those in periods in which the more 
intransigent Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party, PSOE) held office.4 A third example is Hillel Frisch, who shows that 
the intensity of Palestinian violence decreases in periods when Israel uses 
massive force and offers no concessions.5 In their analysis of Turkish 
counterterrorism against the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), Kim and 
Yun, too, used attack statistics. Like Frisch, they found that harder 
measures (i.e. forced displacement of the population and leadership 
elimination) yield the best results.6 
Although terrorists need a certain level of violence to maintain their 
credibility, there are good reasons to be critical of the use of numbers of 
terrorist attacks as indicators of success of counterterrorism measures. 
First, it is not clear what increases and decreases say about the state of the 
                                                          
3 G. LaFree, Efficacy of Counterterrorism Approaches: Examining Northern Ireland, START 
Research Brief, (2006), 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/research_briefs/20061017_lafree.pdf. 
4 C.P. Barros, “An Intervention Analysis of Terrorism: The Spanish ETA Case,” Defence and 
Peace Economics 14, no. 6 (2003): 401–12. 
5 H. Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide 
Bombings and Violence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006): 866–867. Although they 
speak of counterterrorism effects, and not of effectiveness, one could also think of S.M. 
Shellman and V. Asal, “The Effects of Counterterrorism: Empirical Political Dynamics,” in 
Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-
Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-
Radicalization and Disengagement, 2010, 201–202, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/U_Counter_Terrorism_White_Paper_Final_
January_2010.pdf. 
6 E. Kim and M. Yun, “What Works? Countermeasures to Terrorism: A Case Study of PKK,” 
International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 32, no. 1 (2008): 74 and 79–81. 
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terrorist organisation committing the attacks. It is possible that a group in 
decline initiates a wave of terrorist attacks to send a message, both to its 
own members and to the public, that it is not finished yet. The Real IRA 
after the arrest of its leader Mickey McKevitt is a case in point.7 Coming 
from a group in this position, an increase in the numbers of attacks is 
certainly not a sign that a counterterrorism strategy is not working. An 
increase can also be the result of radicalisation of a movement in 
leadership transition, when the new leaders are vesting their authority by 
organising spectacular or large numbers of attacks. This, too, would shed 
doubt on the meaning of numbers of attacks as measures of effectiveness. 
A second problem with using numbers of attacks as indicators of success 
or effectiveness is that terrorist attacks are not equal units. The impact, 
material as well as psychological, of a large-scale attack like 9/11, one that 
requires much preparation, resources and operational capabilities, is 
likely to be bigger than the impact of a simple arson. Going purely by 
numbers of attacks means that these differences will be ignored. This can 
be especially confusing in dealing with terrorist organisations that are 
waiting for the right moment to carry out a large-scale, advanced attack.8  
To complicate matters further, the numbers of terrorist attacks do not 
necessarily correlate with impact favourable for a terrorist organisation. 
Research has shown that the psychological impact of Provisional IRA 
bombings was limited in parts of the United Kingdom that were often 
struck.9 Also, bombing campaigns can turn against the terrorists. Al 
Qaeda lost popular support in the Middle East because of the bloody 
attacks it committed.10 A terrorist group that increases the numbers of 
                                                          
7 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 78–79. Cronin also mentions the example of Abu Sayyaf.  
8 D. Byman, “Scoring the War on Terror,” The National Interest 72 (2003): 81. 
9 A. Silke, “The Psychological Impact of Terrorism: Lessons from the UK Experience,” in 
Meeting the Challenges of Global Terrorism: Prevention, Control, and Recovery (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2003), 189–202. 
10 P. Bergen and P. Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: The Jihadist Revolt against Bin Laden,” 
The New Republic, 2008, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=702bf6d5-a37a-4e3e-
a491-fd72bf6a9da1; A. Taher, “Al-Qaeda: The Cracks Begin to Show,” The Sunday Times, June 
8, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4087373.ece. 
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attacks may make it seem as if a counterterrorism policy is not working, 
but could in reality be digging its own grave. The population may turn 
against the terrorist group, for instance by providing intelligence about 
the group to the government’s security forces. In such cases, increasing 
numbers of attacks cannot be read as a sign of the ineffectiveness of state 
efforts to disrupt a terrorist campaign. They might just as well signal the 
beginning of the end of a terrorist group.  
It is clear that the use of numbers of terrorist attacks as indicators of 
success comes with severe difficulties. They carry no unequivocal 
meaning, as terrorists may hold back out of strategic considerations, or 
may go all out exactly because a counterterrorist policy is working. Some 
authors have tried to fix these interpretational problems by looking at 
numbers of victims instead. 
2.1.2 Numbers of victims 
Like numbers of attacks, numbers of victims hold an intuitive appeal as 
counterterrorism effectiveness indicators because they represent the core 
of the problem posed by terrorism. Put prosaically, the argument for 
using numbers of victims to measure counterterrorism effectiveness could 
go something like this: 1) people get hurt or killed in terrorist attacks, 2) 
that’s what we want to avoid, 3) so the fewer victims, the better the policy. 
Perhaps on the basis of such a line of thinking, Yonah Alexander, editor of 
two volumes of comparative counterterrorism studies, and Nadav Morag 
included numbers of casualties as a criterion that counterterrorist 
campaigns should be evaluated by, as did Christopher Hewitt.11 
However, many of the arguments that can be made against using 
numbers of terrorist attacks can also be made against the use of numbers 
of casualties.  
                                                          
11 Y. Alexander, “Introduction,” in Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, ed. Y. 
Alexander (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 1–23; N. Morag, “Measuring 
Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 4 
(2005): 310–311; C. Hewitt, The Effectivenes of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Washington, DC: 
Department of State, Office of Long Range Assesments and Research, 1982), 38 and 43.  
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For one, increases can be the result from radicalisation brought about by 
declining power or the eagerness of new leaders, populations can learn to 
accept victims of terrorist attacks as a fact of life and can even turn against 
terrorists for causing too many casualties. Regarding this latter point, it is 
interesting to note that some terrorist attacks, especially when there are 
children among the victims, can be operational successes but political 
disasters for terrorist organisations.12 The population will be outraged 
over the deaths over innocent victims and withdraw their support to the 
terrorists. An argument that can be made specifically against the use of 
numbers of victims is that an increase in the number of casualties can be 
the result of a substitution effect from hardened to softer targets.13 If a 
terrorist organisation finds itself unable to strike at hard targets, it may 
choose to direct its attacks at targets that are easier to attack.14 Schools and 
market squares may then have to bear the brunt of the terrorist attacks, 
which will lead to higher numbers of casualties but should not be 
interpreted as a sign that the terrorist organisation is getting stronger.  
It is even possible that the shift was triggered by a decreasing 
sophistication of the operational capabilities of a terrorist group. Limiting 
the numbers of victims of bomb attacks requires the ability to precisely 
direct the effects of explosions. Similarly, when handguns are used, the 
shooter must have the marksmanship needed to hit only the intended 
victims, and leave bystanders unharmed. This being the case, an increase 
in the numbers of victims can suggest a failure on the part of the group to 
                                                          
12 A. Silke, “Children, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Lessons in Policy and Practise,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 2 (2005): 201–13. 
13 There is a significant body of research that provides evidence of this so-called substitution 
effect, which means that terrorists will turn to other, ’softer’ targets once security around 
their targets of preference has been increased. See e.g. W. M. Landes, “An Economic Study of 
US Aircraft Hijacking, 1961-1976,” Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978): 1–31; J. Cauley and 
E.I. Im, “Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other Terrorist Incidents,” The 
American Economic Review 78, no. 2 (1988): 27–31; W. Enders, T. Sandier, and J. Cauley, “UN 
Conventions, Technology and Retaliation in the Fight against Terrorism: An Econometric 
Evaluation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 2, no. 1 (1990): 83–105. 
14 M. A. Sheehan, Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terror without Terrorizing Ourselves (New York: 
The Crown Publishing Group, 2007), 27–28; L. Dutter and O. Seliktar, “To Martyr or Not to 
Martyr: Jihad Is the Question, What Policy Is the Answer?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, 
no. 5 (2007): 439–440. 
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limit the colletaral damage, and does not necessarily mean that a terrorist 
organisation is getting stronger. For instance, several of the most deadly 
Provisional IRA attacks, such as the Enniskillen Bombing, the Shankill 
Road Bombing and the La Mon Bombing were operational failures, and 
were not intended to cause this many casualties. In the case of the 
Shankill Road Bombing, the explosives went off prematurely; in the case 
of the La Mon Bombing and the Enniskillen Bombing, the Provisional IRA 
operatives were unable to call in a warning in time.15 Thus, these spikes in 
the Provisional IRA’s casualty rates had little to do with the effectiveness 
of ineffectiveness of British counterterrorism. 
This is, of course, not to say that we should always interpret increasing 
numbers of victims as a sign of a weakening of the terrorist group. The 
point is rather that victim statistics can be interpreted in various – and 
even contradicting – ways. Like numbers of attacks, numbers of victims as 
such have no unambiguous meaning. 
2.1.3 Numbers of arrests 
This indicator is best known for its use by the US Government, which 
claimed in 2006 that the arrests of Al Qaeda leaders and cadres showed 
that the US was making progress in the War on Terror. The capture of Al 
Qaeda cadres, especially in Afghanistan in the wake of the overthrow of 
the Taliban, was hailed as a step towards paralysing the Al Qaeda 
network.16 Of course, the arrest of any criminal is to some extent always a 
success for a state, as it is a way of asserting its ability to enforce its rules. 
Having said that, one should be careful not to read too much into it.  
First, at least in the case of Al Qaeda, terrorists can easily be replaced. It 
has long been recognised that when Al Qaeda cadres are arrested or 
                                                          
15 A. Silke, “Beyond Horror: Terrorist Atrocity and the Search for Understanding -- the Case 
of the Shankill Bombing,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 1 (2003): 50; J. Bowyer Bell, 
The Secret Army: The IRA (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 440; E. 
Mallie and D. McKittrick, The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story behind the Irish Peace Process 
(London: Heinemann, 1996), 58. 
16 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges (US, 2006), 4 and 7. 
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eliminated, new recruits are eager to take their places.17 In this case, as 
other, similar ones, an ongoing stream of arrests may suggest not 
counterterrorism effectiveness, but rather a group’s ability to replace lost 
members. Put differently, a high number of arrests can just as easily be 
read as a sign of a terrorist group’s resilience in the face of government 
repression.  
Second, arrests, especially in large numbers, may have consequences that 
certainly do not qualify as success for the state. In some cases, the arrests 
themselves may draw people who were previously only sympathisers 
into the terrorist organisation. Infuriation over the treatment of friends 
and relatives by the state, including waves of arrests, has proven to be a 
powerful motive for joining a terrorist organisation, for example in the 
case of the Provisional IRA .18 Another way in which arrests can indirectly 
and inadvertently exacerbate the situation concerns the power vacuum 
that results from arrests of leading cadres. The new leaders may want to 
underline the credibility of their claims to dominance by advocating 
spectacular actions, which can then lead to radicalisation of the 
organisation.  
The third difficulty in using numbers of arrests is that they may very well 
be indicators of efficiency or resource allocation rather than effectiveness. 
The numbers of arrests may have gone up as a result of a re-orientation on 
the part of the police, which may have decided to put more pressure on 
the terrorists. Although an increase in the numbers of arrests can then be a 
goal in itself, it does not mean that that a policy has been successful. 
Another possibility is that the number of arrests has gone up as a result of 
an increase in terrorist activity. Arrests may go up simply as a result of 
the increase in the number of terrorists. This is not to say that changes in 
the numbers of arrests should necessarily be interpreted along these lines. 
The point here, too, is that numbers of arrests in themselves provide no 
                                                          
17 B.M. Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for 
Strategy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), 10. 
18 W.E. Cralley, A.J. Garfield, and C. Echeverria, Understanding Terrorism: Lessons of the Past - 
Indicators for the Future, IDA Paper (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2004), III–5. 
The science of fighting terrorism 
22 
basis to draw conclusions about success or effectiveness. The only 
situation in which numbers of arrests could be used as an indicator of 
success is a campaign against a declining organisation with a known size 
and little to no outside support. Only then, when one can be certain that 
arrested members will not be replaced and that arrests will not generate 
support for the terrorists, are numbers of arrests by themselves enough to 
conclude that the security forces are chipping away at the organisation. 
For instance, left-wing extremist groups in the 1980s, like the French 
organisation Action Directe (Direct Action), were quite isolated and were 
unable to replenish their ranks after waves of arrests.19 Only in such cases 
do high numbers of arrests suggest effectiveness.  
2.1.4 Indirect indicators 
Instead of focusing on data about the direct manifestations of terrorism, 
some authors have looked at indirect indicators, i.e. fluctuations in 
indicators of the general functioning of a society that are thought to be 
influenced by terrorist attacks. For example, it has been argued that 
domestic and international support for the government executing a 
counterterrorism policy could serve as an indicator of the success of that 
policy. Although the support of the population is crucial for the success of 
a counterterrorism strategy, using it as an indicator of success is difficult, 
as it may result from other policies than a counterterrorism policy. 
Regarding domestic support, it may even be the case that a generous 
welfare policy may provide the government with the support needed to 
implement a counterterrorism policy that would otherwise not have been 
accepted. As for international support, it may well be generated by skilful 
diplomacy rather than by counterterrorism. This is certainly not to 
question the importance of domestic and international support in 
counterterrorism. Quite the contrary, it is a sine qua non of success in both 
terrorism and counterterrorism, but it depends on so many other factors 
that it does not necessarily tell us much about the counterterrorism policy 
that was implemented. For example, a particularly brutal terrorist attack 
                                                          
19 M.Y. Dartnell, Action Directe: Ultra-Left Terrorism in France, 1979-1987 (London and 
Portland: Frank Cass, 1995), 90–91. 
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may convince a population of the need of certain controversial 
counterterrorism measures. Using support for the government as an 
indicator of effectiveness would give the impression that the 
counterterrorism policy was less effective on the day before the attack 
than on the day after, which is not a conclusion that most of us would be 
willing to accept. 
Another option is to establish the effectiveness of a counterterrorism on 
the basis of data on the functioning of the economy, e.g. growth of the 
GDP and fluctuations of the stock market.20 The assumption is here that, 
when the economy is thriving, the terrorists have not managed to severely 
disrupt the functioning of the country. The difficulties are obvious. First, 
fluctuations in the economy can be the result of many factors, most of 
which have nothing to with either terrorism or counterterrorism. Second, 
and this partly follows from the first point, terrorist attacks tend to have 
little impact on the economy.21 Even the 9/11 attacks, which took place at 
the heart of the American economy, were too small and too localised to 
have serious consequences for an economy as vast and diversified as the 
American.22 The limited effect on the economy of these attacks, which 
have had vast effects in other spheres, begs the question whether the 
economy is sensitive to terrorist attacks at all and suggests that the 
economy is not the right place to look for the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism measures. 
2.1.5 The end of terrorist campaigns 
A fourth way to examine counterterrorism effectiveness is by looking at 
the end of terrorist campaigns. Recently, a small group of scholars and 
researchers has carried out examinations of the effectiveness of the 
                                                          
20 Morag, “Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case”; A. Zussman and 
N. Zussman, “Assassinations: Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Israeli Counterterrorism 
Policy Using Stock Market Data,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 2 (2006): 193–206. 
21 T. Sandler, D. G. Arce, and W. Enders, Terrorism: Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge 
Paper (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus Center, 2008), 18–19. 
22 G. Makinen, The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment, Report for Congress 
(Congressional Research Service, 2002), 18–19. 
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elimination of leadership of terrorist groups. The dependent variables that 
have been used in these research projects include numbers of attacks, but 
also the duration of the terrorist life span after the leadership 
elimination.23 In other words, the effect of leadership elimination is 
supposed to be the dissolution or disintegration of the terrorist group. The 
outcomes of these assessments are mixed, probably as a result of the 
‘large n’-approach that many of the authors cited below have taken. 
Perhaps these research results will be more conclusive once more 
attention has been paid to the similarities of the cases in which leadership 
elimination was successful compared to the cases in which leadership 
elimination cannot be credibly linked to the end of a terrorist campaign.24 
But regardless of the ways in which this line of research can be taken 
forward, as an indicator of effectiveness, the end of a terrorist campaign 
has its difficulties. 
Taking the dissolution or disintegration of a terrorist group as a measure 
of effectiveness puts the bar needlessly high. It is true that, from a 
counterterrorism perspective, the end of a terrorist group is certainly a 
desirable outcome, but this way of working obscures the progress that is 
being made in the time period before the terrorist group ceases to exist. 
Evaluating the effectiveness should be an ongoing process, and that 
requires an approach that looks at more than simply the desired end state. 
Instead, it should show whether the state is on the right track. The fact 
that a terrorist group exists does not say much about its state. A terrorist 
group may still exist, but if it is clearly in decline or disarray, the mere fact 
that it is still operational should not be reason to discard the 
counterterrorism policy that is used against it. The exact state of affairs 
can only be established on the basis of more specific information, e.g. 
                                                          
23 P.B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership 
Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 47–79; J. 
Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security 
Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719–55; D. Rowlands and J. Kilberg, Organizational Structure and the 
Effects of Targeting Terrorist Leadership, Working Paper (Ottawa: CSDS, 2011); B.C. Price, 
“Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” 
International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 9–46. 
24 T. van Dongen, “Terrorist Leadership Elimination: When to Do It?,” The Polish Quarterly of 
International Affairs 22, no. 1 (2013): 106–15. 
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about the group’s relation to the support base, or about the group’s 
operational capabilities. 
Furthermore, research into the ways in which terrorist groups come to 
their ends has shown that there are many factors that play a role.25 Some 
groups are debilitated by arrests, whereas other are undermined by 
‘softer’ counterterrorism measures. Regarding the latter option, by 
offering alternative paths to a political solution of the conflict, addressing 
root causes and providing social reintegration programs, governments 
can dissuade members of terrorist organisations of the use of violence. 
With such tools, the perceived necessity of the use of terrorism can be 
lowered to a point where the movement disintegrates as a result of people 
leaving.26  
In yet other cases, the end of a terrorist group has little to do with 
counterterrorism whatsoever. More personal factors may be more 
important. People may reach a point where they no longer want to keep 
up the violent, dangerous and stressful life that comes with being a 
terrorist.27 Also, a lack of popular support can bring members of terrorist 
organisations to question the usefulness of their struggle. The members of 
the Red Brigades, for example, were dismayed to find out that the outside 
world was simply not warming up to their style of bringing about a 
revolution. The doubts that were caused by this realisation and the 
friction between members over how to proceed, were part of the 
                                                          
25 M. Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (1991): 81; 
J.I. Ross and T.R. Gurr, “Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the 
United States,” Comparative Politics 21, no. 4 (1989): 417; S. Jones and M. Libicki, How Terrorist 
Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 10–18; 
A.K. Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 
International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 18–19. 
26 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 13–14; Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends,” 25–27. 
27 Research has shown that this factor plays a part in the right-wing extremist movement. See 
T. Bjørgo, “Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right,” in 
Leaving Terrorism behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. T. Bjørgo and J. Horgan 
(New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 38. 
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downward spiral that led to the end of the organisation.28 Establishing 
mere correlations between counterterrorism and dissolution or 
disintegration of terrorist groups is not enough to demonstrate which of 
the factors listed above played a crucial role, and fails to further our 
understanding of the effects of counterterrorism. 
2.2 Towards a new approach 
Summing up the previous sections, there are several major factors that 
undermine the credibility of the indicators of success that have been used 
so far in counterterrorism effectiveness assessments. The most obvious 
one is the ambivalence regarding the meaning of an indicator. The 
problem with many of the indicators discussed above is that it is not clear 
whether increases or decreases can be interpreted as a success. There are a 
lot of possible causes for increases in numbers of terrorist attacks, as there 
are a lot of reasons why the numbers of arrested terrorists might go up. 
While increasing numbers of attacks and victims are certainly worrying, it 
would be overly simplistic to see them as evidence that a counterterrorist 
policy is failing. 
Related to the ambivalence regarding the meaning of shifts in indicators, 
is the attribution problem. One of the reasons why we cannot be sure 
about the meaning of shifts in the indicators discussed above is that we 
cannot be sure about what causes these shifts. Put differently, we cannot 
tell whether or not they can be perceived as success because we do not 
know to what they should be attributed. For a meaningful assessment of 
counterterrorism effectiveness, it must be clear that effectiveness 
indicators shift under the influence of counterterrorism. Given the many 
possible explanations, the mere occurrence of a shift – such as a decrease 
in numbers of terrorist attacks – says little about the effectiveness of a 
counterterrorism policy. 
                                                          
28 D. Della Porta, “Leaving Underground Organizations: A Sociological Analysis of the 
Italian Case,” in Leaving Terrorism behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. T. Bjørgo 
and J. Horgan (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 73–74. 
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Another major problem is that most of the indicators discussed in the 
previous sections is that they are used as representing a counterterrorism 
policy in its entirety. It is true that, at the very least, an increase in 
numbers of attacks or victims shows that a state has been unable to put a 
stop to the terrorist group’s violent activities. But an assessment of 
counterterrorism effectiveness should not end here. There is more to 
counterterrorism than undermining a terrorist group’s capabilities for 
violent action. It may very well be that a state is failing to dismantle a 
terrorist organisation’s operational network, but is doing very well in 
other respects, like the winning over of the population. In such a case, the 
terrorist group will survive, but the state will have won the political 
contest, as a result of which the terrorist group will not achieve its 
political goals. This outcome does not warrant the one-sided conclusion, 
which one would draw if only one indicator of effectiveness was chosen, 
that a counterterrorism policy has been ineffective. In sum, the use of only 
one indicator to represent the effectiveness of a wide range of instruments 
stands in the way of a more nuanced assessment of the effectiveness of a 
state’s counterterrorism policy. It obscures the successes and failures that 
have been yielded by tools that do not have a direct bearing on the one 
indicator that was selected. 
There is also the possibility that successes and failures even each other 
out. Suppose that a counterterrorism policy is made up of two tools that 
both have an impact on an indicator that is used to establish the policy’s 
effectiveness. If one works quite well, and the other does quite poorly, 
and if both tools have an equal impact, the indicator will not show a 
significant increase or decrease. However, the reliance on this one 
indicator does not show the difference in the effectiveness of the two 
tools. From merely reading the indicator, one might as well draw the 
conclusion that both are equally contributing to a stabilisation of the 
situation. Here, too, a more differentiated analysis, would lead to a very 
different conclusion. 
The preceding sections point to two main conclusions. First, existing ways 
of measuring counterterrorism effectiveness are flawed and cannot be 
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used to answer the research question formulated in the introduction. 
Second, there are two pitfalls that a framework to establish 
counterterrorism effectiveness, or lacks thereof, must avoid: it must do 
justice to the diversity of counterterrorism instruments, and it must 
establish clear cause-and-effect links between policies and indicators. 
With these concerns in mind, we now move on to the research design that 
will be used to examine the relation between the nature of terrorist threats 
and counterterrorism effectiveness. 
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3 Research design 
This chapter will outline a methodology for counterterrorism 
effectiveness measurement that will be applied to the six selected cases in 
the chapters 4 to 9. Essentially, in this chapter counterterrorism will be 
broken down into a series of counterterrorism principles, and for each of 
these principles, it will be explicated how they are supposed to lead to the 
desired outcome. In the chapters 4 to 9, it will be examined whether the 
counterterrorism principles have been applied and, if so, whether they 
indeed brought about the desired outcome. The approach described 
below will build on the critique in the previous chapter by addressing the 
major flaws that have been identified in section 2.2. 
3.1 Breaking down counterterrorism into separate 
components 
The discussion in the previous chapter is intended to make clear that the 
ways in which the success of counterterrorism has been measured so far 
are wrought with difficulties that undermine the credibility of exercises 
that rely on one of the indicators of success mentioned above. This 
chapter will argue a different approach and will outline a research design 
for an adequate assessment of counterterrorism effectiveness. A crucial 
element of this approach is that counterterrorism is broken down into 
separate components, which will be evaluated separately. Instead of 
relying on indicators that represent the effectiveness of a counterterrorism 
policy as a whole, one should first think of what elements constitute a 
counterterrorism policy. The next step is the identification of indicators of 
success for each individual principle. What does success in these various 
separate elements of counterterrorism look like and how can it be 
measured? This means that the success of a counterterrorism policy as a 
whole should be assessed using a list of indicators, each of which 
corresponds to a single component of that counterterrorism policy. This 
way of working does justice to the diversity of counterterrorism, and 
allows us to make differentiated assessments of a policy’s effectiveness. 
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Another advantage of this approach is that the link between policy and 
indicator is more plausible. Effectiveness indicators that have been 
specifically chosen for a sub-element of counterterrorism are more likely 
to be influenced by the policy elements they are meant represent than 
indicators that have to sum up an entire policy. Furthermore, the 
plausibility of the link between policy and indicator also reduces 
difficulties regarding the interpretation of the indicators. If a desired effect 
can be linked to an element of a counterterrorism policy, there is little 
doubt that the occurrence of that effect can be viewed as a success. The 
effectiveness indicators discussed in the previous chapter were 
problematic because there was such a wide variety of possible 
explanations for shifts in, for instance, numbers of attacks or numbers of 
victims, or for the end of a terrorist organisation. When cause-effect 
relations are unclear, it is hard to tell whether shifts in indicators are a 
good thing or not. Working with more specific indicators will go a long 
way to solving this problem, especially since the research design outlined 
below includes a framework to follow the causal chain from policy to 
effect. This will make the link between policy and effect even more 
credible. 
For the incorporation of the causal chain in the evaluation process, 
inspiration was drawn from theory-based evaluation and from the so-
called logical framework (logframe) approach. In theory-based 
evaluations, a policy evaluation is not limited to observing the occurrence 
of cause and effect, but also takes into account the intermediate steps in 
the causal chain that leads from cause to effect.1 By tracing the causal 
chain from cause to effect, one can show a causal relation, as opposed to 
merely a correlation. Authors and researchers who work according to this 
paradigm, map and spell out through which causal chain a policy is 
supposed to reach the desired effect. They do this in a so-called 
programme theory, which is based on the assumption that every policy is 
                                                          
1 S.I. Donaldson, “Using Program Theory-Driven Evaluation Science to Crack the Da Vinci 
Code,” New Directions for Evaluation 106 (2005): 65–84; F.L. Leeuw, “Trends and 
Developments in Program Evaluation in General and Criminal Justice Programs in 
Particular,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 11, no. 3 (2005): 233–58. 
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underpinned by a notion, however vague and implicit, of how the 
programme (the measure or intervention, which is the cause) will lead to 
a desired outcome (the effect). The actual policy evaluation is essentially a 
test of the programme theory: has the cause led to the effect in the way 
one would expect on the basis of the programme theory? A similar 
approach is taken in the planning and evaluation of development 
programs, particularly those of World Bank and the World Food 
Programme. Both organisations use the logframe approach, where the 
process from the deployment of resources to the desired outcome is 
broken down into several stages, each with their own indicators of 
progress.2 Many of the terms and concepts that are used in the framework 
outlined in the next section are taken from the theory based evaluation 
literature and the logframe approach. Together with a more differentiated 
operationalisation of counterterrorism, they will help us avoid the 
problems with the indicators that were discussed in the previous chapter. 
3.2 Programme theories and counterterrorism 
The effects of the application of counterterrorism principles will be 
examined on two levels. The first level is that of output. This is the level 
where the concrete, direct results of the policies will be addressed. For 
example, measures to reintegrate terrorists in society could be evaluated 
on the basis of the number of convicted terrorists that went through a 
programme and did not go back to the terrorist organisation. Taking this 
level into account will help us avoid the situation where non-effectiveness 
is erroneously ascribed to the measure as such when poor performance is 
really a matter of flawed implementation. However, the output generated 
for the application of a counterterrorism principle is not a goal in itself. 
Ultimately, counterterrorism measures should affect, for example, the 
motivation, popular support or operational capabilities of a terrorist 
organisation. That is why a second level is needed. This level consists of 
the second-order effects of the application of the principles, i.e. the ways 
in which the output impacts on the motivation, popular support or 
                                                          
2 Identifying M&E Indicators, Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines (Rome: United Nations 
World Food Programme, n.d.); The Logframe Handbook: A Logical Framework Approach to 
Project Cycle Management (Washington, DC: World Bank, n.d.). 
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operational capabilities of terrorist organisations. It is crucial that the 
source material allows for a demonstration of a link between the output 
and the effect. There should not only be a correlation between the 
application of one of the counterterrorism principles against a terrorist 
organisation and a desirable outcome afterwards. The literature and 
primary sources have to be rich enough for qualitative analysis and 
process tracing to find out whether or not the output actually contributed 
to the effect. The word ‘contributed’ is deliberately chosen here instead of 
‘caused’, because ‘caused’ would perhaps suggest that the effects we are 
looking for have single causes, whereas in most cases it will be the result 
of the interplay of several factors. 
Although there is some disagreement on definitions, most frameworks 
contain the comparable elements input (resources spent), output (result of 
activity) and effect (impact of the output).3 Similarly, we will for each 
counterterrorism principle formulate a causal chain containing the 
following elements: 
 the actual policies by which a principle was implemented (input) 
 the direct results of those policies (output) 
 the way to measure output (measures of performance, MoP) 
 the desired effect (impact) 
 the way to measure the impact (measures of effectiveness, MoE) 
Figure 1 visualises the five components and their relation to each other. 
                                                          









Figure 1. Components of the evaluation scheme 
The components are defined as follows: 
 Policies: the measures taken to implement a counterterrorism 
principle. Strictly speaking, this is something different than input, 
as input refers to the money, resources and man hours spent to 
execute a policy. This information is very relevant for calculations 
of returns on investments in security, but since we are primarily 
interested in effects of policy, regardless of the amounts of 
resources spent on it, we take the policies as such as the starting 
point. Another reason for doing so is that not all counterterrorism 
principles listed, especially ‘restraint in the use of force’ and 
‘long-term commitment’ lend themselves for an analysis starting 
out with input. 
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 Output: “achievements derived directly from the management of 
the inputs”.4 This result should in its turn function as a cause of a 
desirable change in the environment. In our case, given the 
possibility that two states have applied the same principle by 
somewhat different means, the output depends on the measures 
chosen to apply the principles. 
 Measure of performance: indicators of “how well a system utilises 
resources”.5 MoPs measure output, so unlike measures of 
effectiveness (see below), the formulation of MoPs depends on the 
nature of the policies.  
 Desired effect: effect that the measures are supposed to generate. 
 Measures of effectiveness: “standards against which the capability of 
a solution to meet the needs of a problem may be judged”.6 It has 
rightly been pointed out that the MoE, unlike the MoP, does not 
depend on the nature of the measure or system that is supposed 
to generate the desired effect.7 To take an example from our case, 
every possible way to pacify a terrorist organisation has to be 
evaluated on the same MoE, regardless of whether it was 
attempted through direct negotiations or through stimulating 
participation in regular political channels. One author aptly sums 
up the difference between MoEs and MoPs when he says that “a 
MoE determines if the right things are being done and a MoP 
determines if the things are being done right”.8 
Ideally, the MoPs and the MoEs would be the same for all cases examined 
in the chapters 4 to 9, as this would enhance their cross-comparability. 
                                                          
4 D. McLean, The Logical Framework Approach in Research Planning and Evaluation, Working 
Paper (ISNAR, 1988), 3; The Logframe Handbook: A Logical Framework Approach to Project Cycle 
Management, 16. See also R.K. Bullock, Theories of Effectiveness Measurement (Dayton: Air 
University, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2006), 19–20. 
5 Bullock, Theories of Effectiveness Measurement, 20. 
6 N. Sproles, “Coming to Grips with Measures of Effectiveness,” Systems Engineering 3, no. 1 
(2000): 54. 
7 N. Sproles, “The Difficult Problem of Establishing Measures of Effectiveness for Command 
and Control: A Systems Engineering Perspective,” Systems Engineering 4, no. 2 (2001): 146. 
8 N. Sproles, “Identifying Success through Measures,” PHALANX 30, no. 4 (1997): 31. 
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Unfortunately, this turned out to be impossible, as the exact 
implementation of the principles may differ from case to case. For 
instance, one can implement principle 4 (International cooperation, see 
paragraph 3.2.3) by closing rendition agreements as well as by 
intensifying the exchange of information between intelligence services 
and police of two or more states. Another caveat that needs to be spelled 
out is that every counterterrorism principle will be examined on only one 
outcome. Some have argued in favour of evaluating counterterrorism 
using multiple outcomes.9 However, as the variety of potential outcomes 
of a counterterrorism measure is quite wide, especially when second and 
third order consequences are taken into account, it was decided to focus 
on the most direct and plausible link between policy and outcome. 
3.3 Counterterrorism principles as programme theories 
In this section, we will bring together the output/outcome schemes and 
the notion that counterterrorism should be broken down in its separate 
components. To break down counterterrorism into separate components, 
an extensive literature review was carried out to identify the most 
common supposed success factors, i.e. the counterterrorism principles 
that are mentioned regularly as contributing to success in the fight against 
terrorism. Then, the eleven counterterrorism principles that stood out in 
the literature, were formulated as programme theories made up of the 
components listed in figure 1. For each of the counterterrorism principles 
(described in the sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.10), an output, MoP, outcome and 
MoE has been identified. The programme theories that are thus developed 
in the sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.10 will be tested in the chapters 4 to 9, where it 
will be examined whether they were effectively applied. 
When reading the remainder of this section, it is important to realise that 
the literature has been taken at face value. The paragraphs 3.3.1 to 3.3.10 
contain the arguments on the basis of which other authors claim that these 
principles are effective, or at least contribute to effectiveness. Whether 
                                                          
9 J. Horgan and K. Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the 
Effectiveness of de-Radicalization Programs,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (2010): 
282–285. 
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these arguments hold any water will be seen in the chapters 4 to 9, when 
the counterterrorism principle are being put to the test. As yet, the 
empirical basis of the claims regarding the effectiveness of the principles 
discussed below is rather flimsy, a longstanding problem in terrorism 
studies in general.10 Many publications contain recommendations or 
lessons learned, but the vast majority of those insights draw on the 
experiences of one case or are mere theoretical reflections and arguments. 
In the former case, the studies tend to be merely descriptive, without 
reference to a theoretical framework. In the latter case, it is explained how 
the application of a certain counterterrorism principle will lead to a 
desired effect, without empirical evidence that the argument laid out on 
paper actually materialises in practice. Effectiveness is argued, not 
proven.  
A final remark that should be made, concerns the reason why some 
counterterrorism principles that are often discussed in the literature have 
been left out. As we are interested in the relation between type of terrorist 
actor and counterterrorism effectiveness, we need counterterrorism 
principles that have a clear and preferably direct impact on terrorist 
actors. This means that some cross-cutting principles that pertain to the 
way the government implements its counterterrorism policy are of little 
use for the research question. There is hardly a publication on terrorism 
that does not stress the importance of coordination between the various 
actors that are involved. Coordination helps governments make sure their 
policies are implemented the right way, but says nothing about whether 
these policies are the right ones, and that is what this study’s main 
research question is all about. 
3.3.1 Restraint in the use of force 
One of the most widely shared assumptions regarding counterterrorism is 
that it is crucial that states exercise restraint in the use of force. If states 
react to terrorism with too much violence or repression, so the reasoning 
                                                          
10 L. Weinberg and W. Eubank, “Problems with the Critical Studies Approach to the Study of 
Terrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 2 (2008): 185–186. 
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goes, they will only exacerbate the situation. Many observers have argued 
that the US should not rely on military means alone in the War on Terror, 
and many have warned against an overly militaristic way of curbing the 
threat from Al Qaeda.11 Another notorious and oft-cited example is the 
way in which the British state handled the Troubles in Northern Ireland in 
the early 1970s. As we will see below, the Troubles started when the 
Catholic part of the population revolted against the violations of their civil 
rights. The crude response by the British Army, which tried to restore 
order through waves of arrests and the imposition of curfews, 
antagonised the Catholics in Northern Ireland, who then fully sided with 
the Provisional IRA, which grew considerably stronger as a result. The 
British had brought this escalation on themselves and got nowhere near 
their political goal, the restoration of order and the maintenance of the 
status quo in Northern Ireland (see also paragraph 4.3.1).12 Another well-
known case of overreaction that will be discussed below is the Grupos 
Antiterroristas de Liberaciòn (Anti-terrorist Liberation Group, GAL), the 
death squad set up by forces within the Spanish government to secretly 
liquidate leaders of ETA. The GAL’s campaign lasted from 1983 to 1987, 
during which time it killed several high ranking ETA members. When the 
involvement of government members with the liquidations became 
known, the reputation of the Spanish socialist party PSOE, which was 
involved in the GAL’s activities and later blocked all attempts to 
investigate what had happened, was badly tarnished. More 
fundamentally, the success of the post-Francoist democratisation process 
was called into question, especially by the younger generation in Basque 
society (see paragraph 6.3.1).13 Governments of countries as diverse as 
Spain, the UK, Peru, Sri Lanka and India tried the hard approach to 
counterterrorism and are all said by scholars and analysts to have failed to 
                                                          
11 A.K. Cronin, “Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism,” 
Survival 44, no. 2 (2002): 127; A. Faruqui, “Is the USA Fighting Terrorism with the Wrong 
Weapons?,” Security Dialogue 34, no. 1 (2003): 122; N. Dower, “Against War as a Response to 
Terrorism,” Philosophy & Geography 5, no. 1 (2002): 29–30; M. Howard, “What’s in a Name? 
How to Fight Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): 10–11. 
12 Cralley, Garfield, and Echeverria, Understanding Terrorism, II–4–5. 
13 P. Woodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy (Cork: Cork 
University Press, 2002), 408 and 412. 
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solve or contain the problem. In all these cases, the loss of support and the 
infuriation of the terrorists are cited as causes of the ineffectiveness of the 
hard approach.14 
What makes the risk of overly violent government responses to terrorism 
all the more pressing, is that terrorists know that it will cost the state the 
support of the population. Sometimes, their violence is even intended to 
provoke a violent response.15 In such cases, terrorists commit attacks in 
the hope that the state will react in a way that will turn the population 
against it. The expectation that underlies this strategy is that the state’s 
use of force will prove, to the constituency as well as to the terrorist group 
itself, that the terrorists are right to perceive the state as a repressive force. 
Further, by taking an antagonistic stance towards terrorists, the state turns 
the confrontation into a zero-sum game, which stimulates the 
radicalisation of the terrorist organisation. If the state takes a purely 
hostile stance, it signals that the only way for the terrorists to win any 
concessions is by through a victory over the state. This will make the 
terrorists even more determined to do whatever is necessary to win. 
As it is difficult to assess the effects of the absence of government action, 
the absence of excessive use of force in this case, this counterterrorism 
principle will be evaluated by examining the effects of instances in which 
it was violated. In other words, the effects that we will look for are those 
of actions that suggests a lack of restraint in the use of force. As it is widely 
assumed, as we have seen above, that overly repressive measures increase 
the support of terrorist groups, we will examine whether violations of the 
                                                          
14 J.J. Wattellier, “Comparative Legal Responses to Terrorism: Lessons from Europe,” 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 27 (2003): 401–403; P. Chalk, “The 
Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy,” The Australian Journal of Politics 
and History 44, no. 3 (1998): 383–386; C. van der Voorde, “Sri Lankan Terrorism and 
Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” Police Practice and 
Research 6, no. 2 (2005): 190–191; Y.S. Jafa, “Defeating Terrorism: A Study of Operational 
Strategy and Tactics of Police Forces in Jammu & Kashmir (India),” Police Practice and 
Research 6, no. 2 (2005): 155–157; R.J. Art and L. Richardson, “Conclusion,” in Democracy and 
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. R.J. Art and L. Richardson (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 571–572. 
15 P. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2nd ed. (New York and 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 7. 
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counterterrorism principle ‘restraint in the use of force’ can be linked to 
an increasing willingness of the population to provide shelter to terrorists, 
store their weapons, fund their actions and provide them with operational 
intelligence. By violations of the principle ‘restraint in the use of force’ we 
will mean such actions as curfews, mass arrests, violent dispersion of 
protesters, large-scale searches of houses, persons and vehicles, and 
torture and abuse of prisoners. This counterterrorism principle will be 
considered valid if the violations indeed prove counterproductive. 
Therefore, it will be examined whether violations like the ones just listed 
lead to an increase in the material support for the terrorist group. 
 
Figure 2. Programme theory for ‘restraint in the use of force’ 
3.3.2 Rule of law 
The overreaction described in the previous paragraph is not necessarily 
limited to the actual use of physical force. It can also manifest itself in the 
judicial sphere. Restraint applies to the use of violence and force as well as 
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to the introduction of special legislation that crosses a legal line. 
Legislative instruments, too, can contribute to the radicalisation of a 
terrorist organisation and its constituency. First, it can give law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies the right to take harsh and 
repressive measures that will antagonise the population. Second, verdicts 
and rulings by national or international courts that condemn 
counterterrorism laws or practices can contribute to the deligitimisation of 
the state. They can confirm the view, likely to be put forth by a terrorist 
organisation, that the state is indeed a repressive force with little regard 
for the law. At the very least, such rulings can provide terrorists with the 
ammunition they need to portray the state this way. Third, if a state 
criminalises too many kinds of behaviour, including activities that were 
previously considered loyal opposition, it may leave too little room for the 
legal expression of dissatisfaction and may push oppositional movements 
underground, where they are more likely to resort to terrorism.16 
Furthermore, the rule of law is important from a counterterrorism 
perspective because it helps the government maintain a state of normality. 
By respecting legal boundaries and maintaining the rule of law a 
government shows that it can counter a threat without having to go 
outside the legal framework. A state that does go outside the legal 
framework, shows weakness. Apparently, the terrorist threat is so severe 
that it needs more powers to fight it. In this sense, maintaining the rule of 
law is a way to deny terrorist groups an ‘ego boost’. This is important 
because terrorist organisations derive part of their status and their 
support from the notion that they are serious challengers to state power. 
The more they appear that way, the more likely people are to see them as 
serious alternatives to the state. Conversely, when the state is able to 
maintain order, provide security for its citizens, keep ‘business as usual’ 
and can do so without having to resort to measures that violate the rule of 
law, its authority will be unaffected by a terrorist campaign. 
                                                          
16 B. Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 196; R.D. Crelinsten, “The Discourse and Practice of 
Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies,” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, 
no. 3 (1998): 130–131. 
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Like the previous counterterrorism principle, the validity of the ‘rule of 
law’ principle will be tested by examining the effects of instances in which 
the principle is violated. Thus, we will not examine whether this principle 
is effective, but whether violations are counterproductive. The question is 
whether state actions that clearly fall outside of the legal framework lead 
to an increase in the material support for the terrorist group. Whether or 
not state actions fall outside of the legal framework has been determined 
on the basis of rulings by national and international courts. We will 
consider the ‘rule of law’ principle violated if a national court or an 
international court, like the European Court of Human Rights, declares a 
counterterrorism law or practice illegal. Ideally, we would have such 
court rulings as indicators for all violations of the rule of law that 
occurred in the fights against the six terrorist actors that will be examined 
below, but in some cases practices that were clearly illegal have been 
included in the analysis as well, even if they have never been condemned 
by a court. As for the effect, we are assuming that, if this counterterrorism 
principle is indeed valid, violations of the rule of law enrage the 
population in much the same way as lacks of restraint in the use of force. 
This means we are looking for illegal counterterrorism laws and practices 
that led to an increasing willingness on the part of the population to hide 
and transport terrorists and their weapons, inform them about police and 
military activity, and pay for their operations. 
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Figure 3. Programme theory for ‘rule of law’ 
3.3.3 International cooperation 
Many authors point out that the nature of modern terrorism, with its 
transnational dimension, clearly calls for international cooperation.17 With 
terrorists receiving training in one country, planning their attacks in the 
next, and executing them in yet another country, there appears to be a 
consensus that a state cannot effectively counter a terrorist threat without 
at least some assistance from other countries.18 This is not the place to 
present evidence to examine how international today’s terrorism is in 
comparison to earlier forms of terrorism, but the point that all varieties 
                                                          
17 Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, 274–275; Y. Alexander, “Counterterrorism Strategies: 
Summary and Conclusions,” in Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six 
Nations, ed. Y. Alexander (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2006), 215; Art and Richardson, 
“Conclusion,” 578–580. 
18 P.R. Pillar, “Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2004): 
106–107; C. de Jonge Oudraat, “Combating Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 
(2003): 163–164; A.K. Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International 
Terrorism,” International Security 27, no. 3 (2003): 30–58. 
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have some international element needs to be stressed. The leftist terrorist 
organisations from the 1970s, for instance, cooperated with cells from 
foreign organisations.19 Even nationalist terrorist sometimes have 
international networks. The cooperation between the Spanish and French 
authorities was instrumental in the curbing of ETA, which used France as 
an operational basis for the planning of attacks in Spain (see section 
6.2.3).20 In the same vein, the UK tried, albeit largely in vain, to enlist the 
support of Ireland as the Provisional IRA was preparing and launching 
attacks from Irish territory (see section 7.2.8).21 Another reason why states 
need other states to fight terrorism, is that terrorist organisations may 
receive funds from abroad, for example from migrant communities. The 
Tamil Tigers received considerable financial resources from the Tamil 
diaspora in the West, and the Provisional IRA could always count on the 
financial contributions of Irish communities in the US.22  
The importance of international cooperation against terrorism is not lost 
on policy makers, as is clear from the extensive efforts in various 
international organisations to find agreement on a common definition of 
terrorism. Such a definition stipulates what groups every signatory state 
has to take action against, and keeps terrorists from picking and choosing 
states whose legislation is most permissive vis-à-vis terrorist activities. It 
will help avoid the situation where some countries allow practices, for 
example regarding the preparation of terrorist acts, that are illegal in other 
countries. If these legal differences are left unaddressed, the loopholes 
that terrorists can use to their advantage will remain. 
                                                          
19 R. Clutterbuck, “Keeping Track of Terrorists after 1992,” in Western Responses to Terrorism, 
ed. A.P. Schmid and R. Crelinsten (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), 302. 
20 W.S. Shepard, “The ETA: Spain Fights Europe’s Last Active Terrorist Group,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 13, no. 1 (2002): 60. 
21 D. Bonner, “The United Kingdom,” in Western Responses to Terrorism, ed. A.P. Schmid and 
R. Crelinsten (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), 190–191. 
22 N. Manoharan, Counterterrorism Legislation in Sri Lanka: Evaluating Efficacy, Policy Studies 
(Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006), 19; R. Gunaratna, “The Lifeblood of Terrorist 
Organisations: Evolving Terrorist Financing Strategies,” in Countering Terrorism through 
International Cooperation. Proceedings of the International Conference on “Countering Terrorism 
through Enhanced International Cooperation” (Milan: ISPAC, 2001), 185–186. 
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The treaties and agreements, including less official ones, in which the 
international cooperation is arranged to make sure that terrorists cannot 
coordinate their actions internationally, constitute the output of this 
policy. The MoPs are the actually implemented efforts that follow from 
these agreements. It should be noted that we are only looking at 
international cooperation specifically targeted against one of the six 
terrorist actors that have been selected. For instance, the UK is involved in 
all kinds of international cooperation in the field of counterterrorism, but 
we are only interested in international cooperation insofar as it was meant 
to directly affect the terrorist threat to its own soil, i.e. any foreign 
branches of the Provisional IRA (chapter 7) and the British jihadist 
movement (chapter 8). Such efforts will differ from case to case and could 
concern the blocking of financial and material support, increased border 
control, increased information sharing and the elimination of safe havens. 
Either way, the intention behind these outputs is to deprive the terrorist 
organisation of the resources and freedom to plan and launch attacks. 
Therefore, we chose to include the cutting off of the ties with cells abroad 
as the effect. The measure of effectiveness is the state’s proven ability to 
dismantle arms depots, training facilities, command centres and funding 
apparatuses that a terrorist group maintains in a country other than the 





















Figure 4. Programme theory for ‘international cooperation’ 
3.3.4 Long-term commitment 
Research has shown that the vast majority of terrorist organisations exist 
for less than a year and that only very few organisations exist for more 
than ten years.23 For the few organisations that do exist for a longer period 
of time, the state has to be prepared for a long-term commitment. The 
Provisional IRA and ETA show that a terrorist campaign can last for 
decades, but their defeats show the merits of staying put. From these 
examples, is it clear that, as a terrorist campaign progresses, the 
population and even the group itself may become war-weary, and will 
turn away from terrorist violence (see the sections 6.2.7 and 7.2.7). As long 
                                                          
23 The most commonly used reference to back up this statement is D. Rapoport, “Terrorism,” 
in Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1992), 1067. 
For a more recent claim regarding terrorist longevity, see L. Dugan and J.K. Young, “Why 
Do Terrorist Groups Endure?,” in Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners 
(presented at the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 2010), 19. 
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as the state does not give in, it signals to its population and the terrorist 
group that it will not succumb to violence.24 In doing so, it makes the 
efforts of the terrorists seem futile. When it becomes clear that violence 
will not yield any results, terrorist attacks will never have the intended 
effect on the population, and the willingness of the members of terrorist 
organisations to keep taking risks and live underground will diminish. As 
the dismantling of the Red Brigades demonstrated, terrorists who have 
been waging a campaign for a fairly long time are open to ways out of the 
organisation when they feel that their struggle is going nowhere (see also 
principle 5.8).25 
If we accept the logic that non-compliance to terrorist demands can break 
the spirit of members of terrorist organisations, we can take non-
compliance over a longer period of time as an output and organisational 
fatigue as its effect. As organisational fatigue implies that armed struggle 
is losing its appeal, the numbers of members speaking out against or even 
abandoning the armed struggle can be used as indicators of the 
effectiveness of a non-compliance policy. It is true that members of 
terrorist organisations defect for all sorts of reasons, which makes it 
imperative that the link between the state’s long-term commitment and 
defections should be made plausible. 
                                                          
24 Alexander, “Counterterrorism Strategies: Summary and Conclusions,” 215. 
25 L. Weinberg, “The Red Brigades,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, 





Figure 5. Programme theory for ‘long-term commitment’ 
3.3.5 Addressing root causes 
Many authors have pointed out that addressing the underlying 
grievances from which a terrorist organisation derives its legitimacy 
should be part of a counterterrorism strategy.26 They view terrorism as a 
political problem, and stress that terrorist groups and their support bases 
turn to violence in order to bring about a change in state policy, or in the 
way a certain territory is being administered. From the inherently political 
nature of terrorism, they draw the conclusion that a counterterrorism 
strategy that relies only on protective and repressive measures will fail to 
curb terrorist violence. They argue that measures of this kind will at best 
                                                          
26 D. Byman, “US Counter–terrorism Options: A Taxonomy,” Survival 49, no. 3 (2007): 143–
144; Art and Richardson, “Conclusion,” 576–577. 
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fight the symptoms, but will never get to the core or the root of the 
problem.27  
It is certainly true that there are some examples of counterterrorism 
policies that quelled terrorist threats by addressing the issues underlying 
the terrorist campaigns. One concerns the way the Netherlands dealt with 
Moluccan terrorism in the 1970s. The approach taken by the Dutch 
government leaned heavily on measures to help the Moluccan minority in 
the Netherlands out of its poor social position. It included programs to 
counter unemployment of Moluccans in the Netherlands, as well as 
initiatives in the cultural sphere, intended primarily to acknowledge the 
dubious role the Dutch had played in Moluccan history.28 Another 
example that shows that violent campaigns can come to an end once an 
underlying grievance is removed, is the Weather Underground, an 
American leftist movement that gained momentum during the protests 
against the Vietnam War, in a way the organisation’s raison d’être. When 
the US pulled out of Vietnam, although certainly not a move intended to 
curb the activities of the Weather Underground, many of the members 
lost their sense of purpose. The lack of unity that emerged in the ensuing 
debates on the course that the movement should take, led to its demise 
(see also section 4.3.4).29 
It should be noted that addressing root causes does not necessarily mean 
giving the terrorists what they want. Rather, it is a ‘population-centred’ 
counterterrorism principle that is about taking measures to address the 
grievances that bring the population to support the terrorists. This means 
that we will understand this counterterrorism principle as addressing the 
grievances of the terrorist constituency, not necessarily those of the group 
itself. (It is also possible to specifically address the grievances of the 
                                                          
27 See e.g. R. Coolsaet, International Terrorism: Symptom of a “Sick” World Order (Brussels: IRRI-
KIIB and Clingendael, 2003), 12. 
28 M. Rasser, “The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 1970–1978,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 28, no. 6 (2005): 481–92. 
29 D. Berger, Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity 
(Oakland: AK Press, 2006), 228–233. 
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terrorists themselves, but that course of action will be discussed in section 
3.2.9.) In some cases, terrorists and their support base may take identical 
positions, but the demands from the population are usually less extreme 
than those of the terrorists. For example, many of those who supported 
and even joined the Provisional IRA did so not out of a deep sense of 
ideological commitment to a reunified Ireland, but because the group 
stood up for the Catholics and protected them against violence from 
Protestants and the security forces. This suggests that, at least initially, the 
demands of the Catholics in Northern Ireland could have been met 
without fulfilling the Provisional IRA’s vision of a united Ireland. 
Furthermore, addressing grievances that terrorists need for their popular 
support is also a way stimulate a larger role for more moderate actors that 
are focusing on thee same constituency as the terrorists.30  
To put the widespread assumption that the support base of terrorist 
groups can be eroded by addressing the root causes of terrorism to the 
test, the implementation of policies to address the population’s grievances 
must be seen as an intermediate step. In other words, successful state 
policies to reduce discrimination against or repression of social groups 
that a terrorist group is using as a potential support base, constitute the 
output of the counterterrorism principle ‘address root causes’. But this is 
only the first step. It is widely believed, as we have seen above, that 
improvement of the plight of a terrorist support base will weaken the 
terrorist group. To see whether this is true, we will examine whether such 
instances of successful policy implementation can be linked to decreases 
in public displays of allegiance to the terrorist group or their cause. By 
this we mean protest matches, riots and strikes, as well as electoral 
support for political parties that are clearly associated with terrorist a 
group or their cause. From such behaviours, one can read whether or not 
the population believes that the terrorists are right, and whether or not 
state power is widely accepted as legitimate.  
                                                          
30 F. Reinares, “Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism,” 
Australian Journal of Politics & History 44, no. 3 (1998): 353. 
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It should be noted, though, that this measurement is considerably easier 
when the measure is not intended to be preventive. When a public 
sympathy for a terrorist group already exists, one can observe increases 
and decreases, and perhaps make the case that these should be attributed 
to government policies. Should a government introduce a policy to 
address the root causes of a terrorist constituency, one can examine that 
constituency’s behaviour to see whether it was influenced in any way by 
the new policy. While by no means easy, this is more doable than 
preventive root cause policies, which are aimed at keeping people from 
supporting terrorists in the first place. Such policies cannot be evaluated 
on the basis of withdrawal if support, as this support does not exist. As 
the target group’s behaviour does not change when this policy is effective, 
assessing the effectiveness of preventive root cause approaches is very 
difficult, perhaps even impossible. Therefore, and because this study is 
focused on the effectiveness of policies against actually existing (as 
opposed to future) terrorist threats, the root causes approach will be 




















Figure 6. Programme theory for ‘address root causes’ 
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3.3.6 Law enforcement and direct action 
Law enforcement takes a prominent position in almost any 
counterterrorism strategy. Ever since 9/11, many countries invested 
resources in their police apparatuses, creating specialised antiterrorist 
units, widening powers for the investigation of terrorist offences and 
assigning more manpower to the job. The main reason behind measures 
along these lines is simply that arrests might disrupt terrorist 
organisations. As a result of the loss of manpower and expertise, terrorist 
groups will have a hard time maintaining their operational capabilities 
and will no longer be able to pose a serious security threat. And indeed, 
there have been numerous cases in which law enforcement pressure 
contributed to the demise of terrorist organisations.31 
The obvious futility of terrorism and the risk of capture that result from a 
state’s ability to uphold the law might also serve as a deterrent. If 
effective, it makes clear that terrorist attacks will not yield any positive 
results and are likely to lead to negative results, i.e. arrests and disruption 
of the terrorist group.32 It has been argued that deterrence cannot work 
against terrorists who are willing to give their lives to their cause. 
Supposedly, there are no consequences of terrorist attacks that are severe 
enough to persuade Al Qaeda terrorists, with their unshakeable faith in 
the righteousness of their cause and the rewards awaiting them after 
death, to cease terrorism.33 However, death is not a goal in itself, not even 
for a suicide bomber. A terrorist may not fear losing its life, but he can still 
fear being unsuccessful. Given the intense attachment to the political 
goals and the in-groups, even suicide bombers may be deterred from 
taking actions that will get their organisation nowhere and will only 
waste its resources. This being the case, a steady stream of arrests and the 
consequent disruption of a terrorist organisation may, especially when 
other, non-violent options are made more appealing, convince terrorists 
                                                          
31 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 18–19. 
32 R. Crelinsten, Counterterrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 125–127. 
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that violence and armed struggle are not the best ways to achieve their 
political goals. 
Given that the idea behind law enforcement efforts is to disrupt the 
terrorist organisation by taking terrorists out of their organisation, the 
output of law enforcement efforts is the terrorists that are arrested or 
otherwise removed from the terrorist organisation by force. Losses that 
terrorist groups suffer as a result of liquidations, shootings and other 
forms of direct action by security forces will be included here as well. 
Even though numbers like these are often used as measures of 
effectiveness in the evaluation of measures against various kinds of crime, 
we have seen above that in themselves they do not necessarily tell us 
much about whether or not the terrorist organisation is being defeated.34 
If, however, they can be linked to a decrease in the operational capabilities 
of a terrorist group, it is safe to say that law enforcement and direct action 
are doing what they are supposed to do: keeping terrorists from using 
violence, or at least limiting their ability to do so. Law enforcement and 
direct action, insofar as they are counterterrorism measures, are meant to 
incapacitate terrorist groups, so the effects of these efforts have to be 
reflected in the violence perpetrated by the terrorist group. As arrests 
deprive terrorist organisations of expertise and manpower, we will take 
the sophistication of the terrorist modus operandi as an indicator of 
effectiveness. More complex attacks, i.e. attacks that are more precisely 
targeted, are carried out against more difficult targets, or call for an 
elaborate division of labour, require manpower and expertise, typically 
things that terrorist organisations lose when their members are arrested or 
liquidated on a significant scale. 
                                                          
34 T. Gabor, Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies: A Review of the 



















Figure 7. Programme theory for ‘law enforcement and direct action’ 
3.3.7 Offering a counter narrative 
In order to get closer to its political goals, a terrorist organisation or 
movement needs a so-called narrative, essentially a summary of a 
worldview that is easy to grasp and digest. The narrative of a terrorist 
group offers the potential constituency an explanation for the current 
situation and proposes a way out. Many such narratives explain the world 
in terms of a Manichean clash between good and evil. This being the case, 
it should come as no surprise that many terrorist narratives contain a 
good degree of vilification and self-righteousness. The group’s enemies 
are one-sidedly depicted as evil, whereas the group’s members and allies 
are hailed for fighting the good fight.  
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A clear example of such a moral dichotomy is the struggle between 
proletariat and imperialist exploiters that played such a pivotal role in the 
worldview of the leftist terrorist groups of the 1970s. Governments and 
multinationals were held responsible for the world’s ills, whereas the 
group perceived itself as the proletariat’s vanguard, endowed with the 
task to lead the struggle against capitalist exploitation.35 A more recent 
example is the clash between believers and non-believers that is one of the 
cornerstones of the ideology propounded by Al Qaeda. This global 
jihadist ideology helps the ummah to connect the dots between Muslim 
unemployment and perceived discrimination in the West, repression of 
the Palestinians by Israel, the American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the Russian wars against the Chechnyans, and the publication of the 
Mohammed cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten. Al Qaeda 
explains all this by interpreting history as a clash between the Muslim 
world and the crusading West.36 It has often been argued that the US has 
failed to grasp the essence of this message and has consequently been 
unable to dispel the myth that the western world is engaged in a crusade 
against the Muslim world.37 A ‘counter-narrative’, a message explaining 
the value of democracy, praising its pluralism and openness to Islam and 
demonstrating the perniciousness of Al Qaeda’s ideology and actions, 
should, according to many counterterrorism experts, be part of the fight 
against terrorism.38 
As the goal of the counter narrative is to win what is sometimes labelled 
‘the battle of ideas’, this counterterrorism principle covers the propaganda 
                                                          
35 See for example Rote Armee Fraktion, “Das Konzept Stadtguerrilla,” in Texte Und 
Materialien Zur Geschichte Der RAF (Berlin: ID Verlag, 1997), 37–39; G. Kassimeris, “Last Act 
in a Violent Drama? The Trial of Greece’s Revolutionary Organization 17 November,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 144–145. 
36 C.M. Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, CRS Report for Congress 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 3–4. 
37 See e.g. S. Zuhur, Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims through the War of 
Ideas (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008). 
38 Byman, “US Counter–terrorism Options: A Taxonomy,” 141–142; D. Omand, “Countering 
International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy,” Survival 47, no. 4 (2005): 109–110; R. 
Gunaratna, “Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward,” in Terrorism: What’s Coming? 
The Mutating Threat (Oklahoma City: MIPT, 2007), 63–65. 
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efforts of the state to win over the actual and potential constituency of a 
terrorist organisation. There are several ways in which a counter narrative 
can help a state achieve this. It can, for instance, dispel the arguments of 
the terrorist organisation about the repressive nature of the state, it can 
throw doubt on the capabilities and noble intentions of the terrorists, and 
it can offer a message that serves as an alternative to the one spread by the 
terrorist organisation.39 The media can be used in many different ways, 
ranging from full-fledged media campaigns to more implicit ways of 
getting a message across. For instance, widely publicising the arrest and 
conviction of terrorists or engagement in dialogue with moderate 
elements of the terrorists’ constituency send messages about the futility of 
terrorism and the benevolence of the state, even though the messages are 
not explicitly formulated.  
Before the desired effect can be achieved, the message first has to be 
brought across. Therefore we have chosen publicly sent messages that are 
meant to undermine the terrorists’ narrative as the output. For a message 
to be considered a counter narrative, it is important that it can be 
realistically assumed that many people have encountered the message. As 
these campaigns are obviously meant to convince terrorists and potential 
recruits or supporters to turn their backs on extremist creeds, professed 
support for the government among such groups will be considered the 
desired effect. Depending on the kind of data that are available and 
applicable, we will take signs of participation in the democratic process to 
see whether the state’s propaganda efforts yielded any meaningful 
results. 
                                                          
39 W.D. Casebeer and J.A. Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 
‘Counter-Narrative Strategy,’” Strategic Insights 4, no. 3 (2005): 1–16. 













Figure 8. Programme theory for ‘offering a counter narrative’ 
3.3.8 Offering exits 
Terrorist organisations are, much like other clandestine organisations, 
very secretive and closed, and are consequently very sensitive to signs of 
betrayal. There are many stories about the brutal punishments meted out 
by terrorist organisations to defectors, infiltrators and informers. But in 
spite of the pressure that terrorist groups use to keep their members in 
line, the record shows that members can be lured out of their 
organisation, especially when they are having doubts about the lifestyle 
that is forced upon them or about the cause they are supposed to be 
fighting for.  
In recent years a growing sub-discipline in the field of terrorism studies 
has contributed significantly to our understanding of why some terrorists 
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leave their groups.40 We learned from this strand of research that there 
have been several successful – as well as less successful – attempts to 
make leaving a terrorist organisation more attractive than staying. While 
governments may face criticism for granting concessions to terrorists, 
there is some evidence that this approach can work.41 Some amnesty 
regulations and social reintegration programs, aimed at providing 
terrorists with the schooling and other preparation needed to resume a 
normal life, have convinced members of terrorist organisations to get out. 
A well-known example of a terrorist organisation that suffered heavily 
from the introduction of amnesty legislation is the Red Brigades, which 
lost many members who had started doubting the feasibility of the 
organisation’s mission and were open to the Italian government’s offer to 
impose less severe punishments in return for disengagement from the 
movement. In many cases the government also demanded information 
about other members. As a result, soon after the introduction of this 
legislation in the early 1980s, the police was able to round up enough 
Brigadiers to paralyse the organisation.42 More recently, the government 
of Saudi Arabia tried, successfully by some accounts, to turn terrorists by 
launching re-education programs aimed at teaching convicts that the 
perception of Islam that brought them to terrorism was a wrong one. 
Also, terrorist convicts get counselling to prepare them for their return to 
                                                          
40 J. Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and 
Extremist Movement (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); T. Bjørgo and J. Horgan, 
eds., Leaving Terrorism behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New York and 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); D.M.E. Noricks, “Disengagement and Deradicalization: 
Processes and Programs,” in Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together 
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 299–321. 
41 B. S. Frey and S. Luechinger, “How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence,” 
Defence and Peace Economics 44, no. 3 (2003): 245–247; D. Byman, “Talking with Insurgents: A 
Guide for the Perplexed,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009): 133. 
42 D. Della Porta, “Institutional Responses: The Italian Case,” in Western Responses to 
Terrorism, ed. A.P. Schmid and R. Crelinsten (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), 165–
166. 
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society. After their release from jail, the convicts stay in touch with their 
counsellors to get further guidance for their re-entry in society.43 
The reintegration programs and the amnesty regulations that states 
implement to persuade members of terrorist organisations to leave 
terrorism behind are the actual policies that are needed to draw terrorists, 
including terrorist convicts, out of their organisations. These policies can 
be said to perform well when many terrorists go through a programme 
and do not fall back into their old life-style. Therefore, the numbers of 
terrorists that use one of these options without falling back into the 
terrorist organisation afterwards can be considered the output of the 
efforts to implement this principle. This tactical success would constitute a 
strategic success if it would undermine an organisation as a whole. If 
large numbers of group members or perhaps even entire sections or 
wings of an organisation are drawn to the exit options and decide to cease 
the armed struggle, the terrorist group will have become much less 
dangerous. In such cases the group may still be active, but its membership 
will argue over the other options that are now available to them. This is 
why we have selected the undermining of the group’s cohesion as the 
desired effect, with the numbers of defectors and splits as the 
corresponding measures of effectiveness. It should be noted that, to bring 
about the desired effect, it is necessary that the measures are successfully 
implemented. The better the results of the reintegration programs or 
amnesties, the more attractive and credible they will be as alternatives for 
members who are still in the terrorist group. 
                                                          
43 C. Boucek, “Extremist Re-Education and Re-Habilitation in Saudi-Arabia,” in Leaving 
Terrorism behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. T. Bjørgo and J. Horgan (New 



















Figure 9. Programme theory for ‘offering exits’ 
3.3.9 Offering non-violent alternatives 
Democratisation is often seen as a way to address the root causes of 
terrorism. The idea put forth by some authors is that terrorists will choose 
other, less risky means to achieve their political goals if these means are 
available to them.44  
The relation between terrorism and democracy is a contradictory one. On 
the one hand, many terrorist campaigns arise when a repressed minority 
feels it lacks the electoral or otherwise non-violent means to help its cause. 
                                                          
44 J.L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” The Washington 
Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2003): 46–47; Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 49; P.C. Sederberg, 
“Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (1995): 295–
312. 
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The PKK, the Tamil Tigers and the Provisional IRA all started off as 
reactions to state repression of an ethnic, religious or political minority.45 
On the other hand, although terrorism can arise as a result of democratic 
defects, a certain degree of freedom, which one can find in democracies, is 
needed to wage a terrorist campaign. In totalitarian dictatorships like 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin, dissenters simply did 
not have the freedom needed to plan and execute terrorist attacks. As 
Martha Crenshaw has argued, terrorism is often the result of a 
combination of a perceived lack of regular channels to achieve political 
goals and too little repression to make violent campaigns against the state 
impossible.46 
Another link between terrorism and democracy is the possibility for 
people living in democratic states to take action and address their 
grievances. By speaking out and participating in the democratic process, 
minority groups in democracies can try to further their political agenda 
without having to resort to violence. Some authors have argued that, 
because of this trait, democracies are better equipped to deal with 
terrorism than more authoritarian regimes.47 But while this view, is far 
from uncontested48, it is beyond doubt, is that some terrorist organisations 
gave up violence and instead participated in non-violent, democratic 
political processes. The most famous example is the Provisional IRA, 
which, after a long and violent struggle, settled for disarmament in return 
for devolved autonomy under the British Crown (see section 7.3.6). 
Several years earlier, in 1993, the Oslo Agreements established the 
                                                          
45 H.J. Barkey, “Turkey and the PKK: A Pyrrhic Victory?,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: 
Lessons from the Past, ed. R.J. Art and L. Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2007), 346–347; Voorde, “Sri Lankan Terrorism and Responding to the Threat 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” 183. 
46 M. Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 382–383. 
47 M. Abrahms, “Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists,” Security Studies 16, no. 
2 (2007): 223–53; Q. Li, “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist 
Incidents?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (2005): 278–97. 
48 W.L. Eubank and L. Weinberg, “Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 6, no. 4 (1994): 417–35; T. Parker, “Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How 
Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 2 (2007): 155–79. 
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Palestinian Authority as an administrative body for the Palestinian 
territories, and at the same time completed the transition of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) from a terrorist organisation to a political 
party. These examples show that, somewhat contrary to the ‘long-term 
commitment’ principle, it may pay to try to offer terrorist organisations 
non-violent ways achieve their political goals. There is, however, also the 
possibility that only a part of a terrorist group or movement will be 
pacified. As the case of the Provisional IRA has shown, radical splinter 
groups, such as the Real IRA, may reject a peace process as a form of 
betrayal and carry on the armed struggle.49 
There are two main ways to offer a terrorist group a non-violent 
alternative: through negotiations and through providing the organisation 
with access to regular, democratic channels. Both these approaches serve 
a double function. First, and most obviously, they are attempts to pacify a 
terrorist group, but they also serve a more propagandistic function. By 
offering terrorists ways to redress their grievances, the state undermines 
notion that it is a repressive force and may convince the terrorists’ 
support base that force is no longer warranted. If there is a serious 
possibility that a constituency may get its way without the mayhem that 
comes with terrorist violations, the terrorist organisation might get out of 
touch with the population if it continues to use violence. 
The intention behind the application of this principle is that the terrorist 
group as a whole, as opposed to only individual members, move away 
.from terrorism. For this to happen, the first necessary step is to actively 
engage the terrorist organisation in non-violent contacts. The direct 
results of this policy are the non-violent options, including direct 
negotiations, offered by the state to the terrorist organisation. We will 
measure this output by listing the actual instances of (attempts at) 
negotiated agreements and participation in non-violent political channels. 
The ultimate goal of policies along these lines is the pacification of the 
terrorist organisation. Participation in non-violent politics should 
                                                          
49 J. Mooney and M. O’Toole, Black Operations: The Secret War against the Real IRA (Dunboyne: 
Maverick House, 2003), 38–39. 
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convince the organisation that violence is not the best option to pursue 
political goals. This is why we chose ‘pacification’ as the desired effect of 
this principle. ‘Pacification’ will be understood as a combination of a 
cessation of terrorist violence and a declaration by the terrorist 

















Figure 10. Programme theory for ‘offering violent alternatives’ 
3.3.10 Gathering intelligence 
The consensus on the importance for a counterterrorist campaign of 
adequate information on the terrorist foe is nearly complete.50 Intelligence 
                                                          
50 D.A. Charters, “Counterterrorism Intelligence: Resources, Methods, Process and 
Problems,” in Democratic Responses to International Terrorism: A Research Study, ed. D.A. 




helps a state predict the terrorists’ next move, foil their attacks, and cut off 
their resources.51 There are several cases that show the crippling effect 
that such inside information can have on a terrorist organisation. The 
Quebecois separatist group Front de libération du Québec (Liberation Front 
of Québec, FLQ), the Algerian Front de libération nationale (National 
Liberation Front, FLN) and the Abu Nidal Organisation all suffered 
greatly from infiltration by government spies, although the FLN is one of 
the few terrorist organisations to ever achieve their political goals.52 
The effects of successful intelligence operations on terrorist groups can be 
devastating. In the most practical sense, it helps the state disrupt attack 
plans. Actionable intelligence allows the police to make arrests, ideally 
when a plan is close to the execution phase, as that will make it easier to 
secure convictions of the perpetrators in court. But extensive infiltration of 
a terrorist group also affects the members’ morale. Members of terrorist 
groups that are extensively infiltrated have a hard time trusting each 
other. They may not know who the leak is, which makes them 
increasingly paranoid, to the point where they operationally paralyse 
parts of the movement by their distrustful behaviour.  
As success in getting to know one’s enemy most clearly manifests itself in 
the ability to predict the other’s moves, we will focus this principle on 
                                                          
51 While many governments, including the ones whose efforts will be assessed in the 
chapters 4 to 9, think of – and use – intelligence this way, it should be noted that one can 
dispute whether intelligence should have such investigative purposes and whether it should 
be used to gather hard evidence for terrorist or other kinds of plots. For an interesting 
reflection on this point, see B.D. Berkowitz, “The Big Difference between Intelligence and 
Evidence,” Washington Post, February 2, 2003, http://www.rand.org/blog/2003/02/the-big-
difference-between-intelligence-and-evidence.html. However, as this study will examine the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism policies on the basis of what policy makers hope and 
expect them to do, the effectiveness of the counterterrorism principle ‘gathering intelligence’ 
will be assessed at a rather operational level, focusing on the state’s ability to gather what I 
sometimes called ‘actionable intelligence’. This latter term refers to the kind of intelligence 
that strongly suggests an immediate course of action, such as, in our case, the dismantling of 
a terrorist plot or safehouse. 
52 S. Leman-Langlois and J. P. Brodeur, “Terrorism Old and New: Counterterrorism in 
Canada,” Police Practice and Research 6, no. 2 (2005): 134–135; M. Burleigh, Blood and Rage: A 
Cultural History of Terrorism (London: Harper Collins, 2008), 126; T. Naftali, “US 
Counterterrorism before Bin Laden,” International Journal 60, no. 1 (2005 2004): 29–32. 
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intelligence gathering disrupt terrorist plots. A state can rely on human 
intelligence, either by infiltrating the organisation, acquiring informers or 
close contacts with the population. Therefore, penetration of the group by 
informers and infiltrators, and actionable tips from the population are 
outputs for this principle. To account for reliance on technological means 
to gather intelligence about terrorist plots, we will also examine whether 
technological devices were used. All of these outputs are generated by the 
efforts to improve the state’s position vis-à-vis the terrorist organisation 
by trying to find out everything about it. It is unlikely that the exact 
numbers of informers, infiltrators and actionable tips will ever be found, 
but it may be possible to estimate how strongly the state relied on the 
various sources of intelligence and how that affected the terrorist 
organisation.  
To operationalise the effect of these intelligence efforts, we will look at the 
state’s ability to foil terrorist attacks. Intelligence services may have 
succeeded in placing informers and microphones, but does that help in 
thwarting attack plans? Data on the state’s ability disrupt terrorist plots 
are hard to come by, but news media do report on them, and various 
terrorists later reminisced about what government spying did to their 
organisations. There will be few exact numbers, but qualitative 
















Figure 11. Programme theory for ‘gathering intelligence’ 
3.4 A typology of terrorist actors 
So far we have been talking about the research methodology as it 
pertained to effectiveness measurement. This is, however, only one of the 
elements that are needed to examine the relation between the nature of a 
terrorist threat and counterterrorism effectiveness. Another important 
element is a typology to make a distinction between various types of 
terrorist actors, which will allow us to cluster the six terrorist actors that 
have been selected for examination in the chapters 4 to 9. The results of 
the effectiveness assessments can then be compared across the clusters, 
which will enable us to answer the main research question. 
Unfortunately, typologies of terrorism that are useful for the current 
study are not easy to come by. The two most ambitious frameworks 
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known to the current author contain extensive lists of characteristics that 
should be scored in order grasp the essence of a terrorist organisation and 
compare it to other terrorist organisations.53 Unfortumately, however, 
these lists lack a scoring mechanism, meaning that there is no 
predetermined set of possible scores for each characteristic, which makes 
it difficult to categorise organisations.54 Other, more recent typologies 
focus only on either organisational structure or on ideology, the latter 
sometimes formulated in terms of the organisation’s goals.55 Furthermore, 
recent typologies on the basis of organisational structure were not 
developed to understand terrorist groups in general. They were primarily 
attempts to grasp the nature of post-9/11 Al Qaeda, which, with its highly 
fluid and unstructured, ad hoc mode of cooperation between cells, could 
not be captured by the classic hierarchy-network dichotomy.56  
The major issue, however, is that there are more characteristics of terrorist 
groups for which it can be argued that they may have an impact on 
counterterrorism measures. There are some counterterrorism measures, 
leadership elimination for instance, where the organisational structure of 
a terrorist organisation can be expected to determine the outcome, but a 
classification on the basis of solely the organisational structure may be 
insufficient to account for differences in the effects of the application of 
                                                          
53 R. Shultz, “Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology,” Journal of International Affairs 
32, no. 1 (1978): 7–15; B.M. Jenkins, B. Cordes, and K. Kellen, A Conceptual Framework for 
Analyzing Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1985). For a more recent, but 
largely similar, list, see B. Ganor, “Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a 
Boomerang Effect,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 271–277. 
54 It may be difficult to make a structured assessment of the similarities and differences 
between terrorist organisations on the basis of open question such as 'Any evidence of 
cultural influences or national traits as they affect choice of tactic or target?' See Jenkins, 
Cordes, and Kellen, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups, 81. 
55 A. Zelinsky and M. Shubik, “Research Note - Terrorist Groups as Business Firms: A New 
Typological Framework,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 2 (2009): 328–329; J.N. 
Shapiro, “Organizing Terror: Hierarchy and Networks in Covert Organisations” (presented 
at the Annual meeting of the Political Science Association, Stanford University, 2005). 
56 B.A. Jackson, “Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven 
Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006): 241–62; S. Mishal and M. Rosenthal, “Al Qaeda as a 
Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 4 (2005): 275–93. 
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the broad range of principles identified above.57 There is simply no reason 
to suppose that the effects of, say, attempts to address the root causes of 
terrorism depend on whether the organisation is a network or a hierarchy. 
The same goes for ideology. A terrorist group’s intentions are obviously 
of some relevance for the likelihood of success of some counterterrorism 
policies, such as negotiations or addressing root causes, but are less 
relevant with regard to other policies. 
Thus, the problem with the classification schemes that have been 
developed so far is either that they distinguish terrorist organisations on 
the basis of only one element, or that they are too elaborate and do not 
allow for the actual act of classifying a terrorist organisation. In order to 
do justice to the variety of characteristics on the basis of which terrorist 
organisations can be categorised while at the same time keeping in mind 
that a framework for our purposes should be structured and simple 
enough to allow for a categorisation of terrorist organisations, we have 
drawn up a classification scheme that takes into account five 
characteristics that may have a bearing on the effect of counterterrorism 
measures.  
The framework has been constructed with three important considerations 
in mind. First, the number of variables cannot be too high, as that might 
well make it impossible to find clusters of similar groups. Therefore, the 
framework below is limited to characteristics that, according to the 
literature on counterterrorism, have some explanatory value vis-à-vis the 
outcomes of counterterrorism measures. Gender balance may be an 
interesting characteristic of terrorist groups, but it is not a factor that is 
likely to help us understand why a certain counterterrorism measure 
works in some cases, but not in others. For this reason, such 
characteristics have been left out of the framework. Second, to keep the 
comparison structured, the scores per variable are the same for all 
terrorist organisations. In other words, the answer to the question of, for 
instance, how a terrorist group is organised, will be a multiple choice 
                                                          
57 For the notion that the effects of leadership elimination depend on the organisation’s 
structure, see Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends,” 18. 
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question rather than an open one. All characteristics have three possible 
ordinal-level scores. It is clear that the differences between the scores are 
in almost all cases gradual, but for the sake of the cross-comparability it 
has been decided to identify three qualifications for each characteristic to 
roughly indicate where that organisation is on each scale. Third, the 
variables in the framework should not correlate by definition. For 
example, if we would include both ‘specificity of division of labour within 
the organisation’ and ‘specialisation in skill sets of individual members’ 
we would be including the same characteristic twice, as it is safe to 
assume that members in organisations with an elaborate division of 
labour will specialise in the tasks they have been assigned. This would 
create a false sense of similarity between organisations that have in fact 
less in common than the outcome of this exercise would suggest.  
With these considerations in mind, the characteristics on the basis of 
which the terrorist organisations will be clustered are ‘relation to the 
governance system’, ‘group size’, ‘embeddedness’, ‘degree of 
centralisation’, and ‘inclusion of the population’. To demonstrate the 
wider applicability of this framework and avoid the impression that the 
classification was conveniently based on the cases selected in the next 
section, we will only illustrate the variables and the scores using examples 
of organisations that are not in the sample set. 
1. Relation to the governance system: this variable concerns the way the state 
governance system fits into the political views and ambitions of the 
terrorist group. Some political goals can be reached without destroying 
the administrative structure of the state that the violence is directed 
against. Terrorist groups that are fighting for such goals, such as 
separatist or irredentist groups, are located more towards the ‘status quo’ 
end of the spectrum. There are also groups for which the governance 
system they encounter is an obstacle, and which cannot achieve their 
political goals without overthrowing the existing political order. Their 
intention is to wipe the slate clean and, in Thomas Jefferson’s words, 
“start the world over again”. Such eschatological views can, for instance, 
be found in terrorist groups on the far-left. The Red Brigades tried to 
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bring about the collapse of the capitalist system and make a decisive and 
definite break with the past. Only then, so the Brigadiers believed, would 
it be possible to move on to a better and purer world, one without 
exploitation and repression of the proletariat.58 The importance of this 
characteristic for counterterrorism becomes clear when considering 
negotiations or other ways to accommodate the terrorist organisations. A 
terrorist group will not be open to such approaches when it denies the 
other party’s right to exist.59 Success is more likely when the organisation 
falls into one of the other two scores formulated below. 
It is important to note that the intentions behind terrorist attacks cannot 
be derived directly from the attacks themselves. Groups such as Action 
Directe and the Greek 17 November group (N17) spent much of their time 
committing attacks over fairly mundane issues such as increases of 
defence budgets, cuts in social security and unfair tax policies.60 However, 
as they were not concerned about those issues as goals in themselves but 
were involved in propaganda by the deed, i.e. tried to unleash the 
revolutionary energy of the working class by showing them the way, they 
would have to be placed on the more radical end of the spectrum.  
 Maintain status quo: most terrorists fight to change or overthrow a 
governance structure, but there are also groups and organisations that 
fight to maintain a governance structure. Examples include the 
various loyalist militias that were fighting against Republican groups 
in Northern Ireland, such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), 
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Red Hand Commando. All 
these groups fought to maintain a status quo, i.e. British rule over 
Northern Ireland. 
                                                          
58 A. Orsini, Anatomy of the Red Brigades (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 
26–29. 
59 Byman, “Talking with Insurgents,” 132–133. 
60 A. Curson, “Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November in Greece (1975-
1991),” in European Terrorism: Today and Tomorrow (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1992), 104–
105; M. Dartnell, “France’s Action Directe: Terrorists in Search of a Revolution,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 2, no. 4 (1990): 466 and 469–470. 
The science of fighting terrorism 
70 
 System reform: the terrorist organisation is trying to achieve political 
change, but is trying to achieve this change within the existing 
political structures. Organisations operating along these lines include 
irredentist and separatist organisations. An example is the FLQ, 
which sought to achieve independence for their ethnic or cultural in-
group. The group became more leftist during its bombing campaign 
in the 1960s, but even then their political objective could be achieved 
without the collapse or overthrow of the Canadian government.61 
 System replacement: the terrorist organisation is committing attacks in 
an attempt to overthrow an existing order. This is the case if attacks 
are expected to lead to a revolution or collapse of a political structure. 
An example of a group that raised the bar this high is Aum Shinrikyo, 
whose 1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway were supposed to 
be the prelude to an apocalyptic end to the world as it had existed 
until then.62 
2. Group size is probably the most self-evident of all characteristics, but, 
unfortunately, that does not make it easy to determine. However, as the 
size of a terrorist organisation determines its operational and logistical 
capacities and makes some counterterrorism measures more feasible, it 
has been included as a variable in our classification scheme. For example, 
law enforcement pressure may have a different effect on smaller groups 
than on bigger ones. As it takes fewer arrests and liquidations to disrupt 
smaller groups, law enforcement pressure is more likely to yield 
beneficial results when applied to smaller groups.63 Also, it may be easier 
to gather intelligence about larger groups, which inevitably leave more 
traces. The possible scores on this variable are very rough but 
nevertheless allow us to distinguish splinter groups from larger 
movements. It should be noted that they refer to the terrorist core, not the 
support network. This distinction may not always be easy to make, but it 
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is conceptually meaningful, as a support network is engaged in very 
different activities than the core of a terrorist group. 
 Tens 
 Hundreds 
 More than 1000 
3. Embeddedness concerns the extent to which a terrorist group is in contact 
with, or even part of, its social environment. Some groups are closely in 
touch with the population and receive help in the acquisition of funds, 
weapons, transportation, recruits and safe havens. This characteristic is 
important to take into account when it comes to the exact targeting of 
counterterrorism measures. ‘Population centred’ approaches, such as 
addressing the root causes or exercising restraint in the use of force may 
be more useful against terrorist organisations that are firmly embedded 
within the population. ‘Group centred’ approaches, such as offering exits 
and the direct use of force, are possibly more effective against terrorist 
groups that have few ties with the population. The three scores that will 
be used are the following: 
 Isolated/alienated: the terrorist organisation has little to no contact with 
its social environment and has to be largely self-sufficient. Most leftist 
terrorist organisations from the 1970s and 1980s, especially in the last 
years before their disbandment, fall into this category. Groups like 
Action Directe and the Cellules Communistes Combattantes (Communist 
Combat Cells, CCC), a Belgian leftist terrorist group, had no support 
base to speak of.64 
 Support network: the terrorist organisation can count on some outside 
individuals and organisations for supporting activities that help the 
terrorist group acquire fake IDs and stolen vehicles or get access to 
training facilities and contacts with other terrorist groups.  
                                                          
64 Dartnell, “France’s Action Directe,” 462 and 469; P. Jenkins, “Strategy of Tension: The 
Belgian Terrorist Crisis 1982–1986,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 13, no. 4 (1990): 307. 
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 Popular resistance: the terrorist organisation can count on the active 
help of the population in the execution of terrorist attacks. The 
difference with a support network, while admittedly largely a matter 
of degree, is that in that category, the population does not contribute 
to the terrorist group’s actual attacks. We made this distinction 
because a population that is willing to store and transport weapons, 
hide and transport terrorists and gather operational intelligence is 
arguably more deeply involved in terrorism than a population that 
merely helps members of a terrorist group avoid arrest and get in 
touch with other people who can help them along the way. 
4. Degree of centralisation is a characteristic that allows us to make a 
distinction between more hierarchically structured organisations and 
organisations that leave their cadres more operational autonomy. It is a 
widely-held assumption that the organisational structure of modern-day 
Islamist terrorism differs from more traditional organisational forms in 
this respect.65 But whether or not modern-day terrorism is new or unique 
in its organisational structure, there is little doubt that the organisational 
structure of a terrorist organisation has to be taken into account in 
attempts to counter them.66 More centralised organisations are more 
reliable in negotiations, may be more sensitive to leadership eliminations 
and are believed to be more vulnerable to infiltration efforts.67  
                                                          
65 For the arguments that post-9/11 terrorism is new, see B. Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism 
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Research, ed. A.P. Schmid (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011), 186–187. 
67 G. Weimann, “Virtual Training Camps: Terrorists’ Use of the Internet,” in Teaching Terror: 
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 Network: the least hierarchically organised form of terrorist 
organisation is the network. The centre has very little operational 
control, as the initiation, planning and execution of attacks are left to 
the cadres. In terrorist networks, the leadership offers little beyond 
ideological and strategic guidance. Prominent examples include 
Islamist terrorist groups active in post-9/11 Europe.68 Examples of 
movements, although admittedly not necessarily terrorist ones, with 
even less central guidance are the animal rights extremist movement 
in the US and Europe and the militia movement in the US. They 
operate according to the ‘leaderless resistance’ model, meaning that 
every cell and all lone operatives work autonomously, seeks no 
contact with other cells and have nothing but a shared idea to bind 
them to other members of the movement.69 
 Hub: this is the organisational type where there is a centre that is in 
touch with the separate cells and cadres. These separate cells and 
cadres depend on the centre for funding and other means of 
facilitation of attacks.70 Examples are Hamas, if only for a short while, 
the Indonesian jihadist group Jemaah Islamiyyah, and Al Qaeda 
around the time of 9/11, when it solicited other groups to carry out 
attacks that were financed out of Bin Laden’s coffers.71 
 Pyramid: this is the most elaborately organised form of terrorism, 
where the centre issues orders that reach the lowest level cadres 
through an established chain of command. Hezbollah is an example 
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of an organisation that resembles this organisational model.72 The 
advantage of the pyramid structure is that it allows for coordination, 
a division of labour, and cooperation between specialised units. At 
the same time, this dependence of cells on orders or input from other 
parts of the organisation suggests that pyramid-shaped terrorist 
organisations are vulnerable to disruption.73 
5. Inclusion of the population is the variable that takes into account the 
strategy of the terrorist organisation, and more in particular the role that 
the population plays in this strategy. The continuum for this variable runs 
from an indifferent or even hostile attitude towards anyone who is not 
part of the group (exclusion) to the desire to actively engage the 
population, or at least large segments of it, in the fulfilment of the 
ideological visions, for example in a popular uprising (inclusive). 
Terrorist organisations that are counting on the active cooperation of the 
population are likely to be more vulnerable to ‘population centred’ 
counterterrorism. When they lose the support of the population, their 
strategy is in shambles. Groups with more autarchic strategies will be less 
vulnerable to the state’s attempts to win over the population. It should be 
noted that there is no necessary overlap between this variable and 
variable 3, as it is possible that a terrorist group wants to unleash a 
revolution, yet is isolated from the population. 
 Sectarian: the terrorist organisation largely excludes the population 
from its activities. This attitude can stem from the organisation’s self-
perception as a group of enlightened, chosen ones, which translates 
into a disdain to everyone who is not a member of the group. Aum 
Shinrikyo, whose members thought that only the ones that had 
achieved spiritual enlightenment should be saved in the apocalyptic 
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end of the world that it wanted to bring about, is a good example of a 
terrorist organisation on the sectarian side of the continuum.74 
 Representative: the terrorist organisation needs the approval of the 
population, as it does claim that it is acting on behalf of the people. 
Terrorist organisations in this category act on behalf of, not with, its 
constituency. The activities of the terrorist organisation by itself are 
expected to suffice for the achievement of the political goals. Most 
terrorist groups that strive for national liberation would fall into this 
category. 
 Revolutionary vanguard: the terrorist organisation sees itself as the 
leader of some form of mass action. The active participation of the 
population is needed for the achievement of the political goals of the 
terrorist organisation. As the term ‘revolutionary vanguard’ is 
strongly associated with the role of the Leninist party, it should come 
as no surprise that left-wing extremist groups like Action Directe and 
the November 17 group fall in this category.75 
Figure 12 shows the continuums and the three scores for each of the five 
characteristics. 
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Figure 12. Classification framework for terrorist actors 
3.5 Case selection 
To adequately answer the research question, it is important to make a 
selection of cases that are different on the independent variable (nature of 
the terrorist organisation), but similar on other factors that may explain 
the outcome of the application of the counterterrorism principles listed in 
section 3.2. The differences on the independent variable will be explained 
in section 3.5.1; the similarity regarding contextual factors in section 3.5.2. 
3.5.1 Variation in types of terrorist organisations 
The selection consists of three clusters of two similar terrorist actors. If 
there is indeed a relation between the nature of a terrorist actors and 
counterterrorism effectiveness, the outcomes of the application of the 
counterterrorism principles will be similar within, but different across the 
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clusters. As the terrorist actors that share many organisational 
characteristics turned out to have the same ideology, they have been 
named ‘revolutionary terrorism’, ‘nationalist terrorism’, and ‘jihadist 
terrorism’. 
The three clusters may be very different from each other, but all six 
terrorist actors meet the definition of terrorism quoted in the introduction. 
They were all non-state actors that used – or still use – violence to 
influence an audience beyond the immediate victims, and did so in order 
to achieve certain political goals.  
Cluster 1: Revolutionary terrorism. The two organisations in this cluster, 
the Red Army Faction and the Weather Underground, were both out to 
overthrow capitalism, and they believed it was their task to act as the 
revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. This puts the two groups at the 
right-end of the spectrum on ‘radicalism of ultimate political goals’ and 
‘inclusion of the population’. They were also similar in size. According to 
various estimates, both groups fall into the category ‘tens’. As for the 
degree of centralisation, both groups were quite hierarchical, but did not 
have an elaborate organisational structure. The leadership of both groups 
can be perceived as a hub that issued orders to the various cells, which 
knew little about each other’s activities. At the heights of their popularity, 
both groups had a support network, groups of people helping them out 
and providing small services and favours, but as the years wore on, both 
the Weather Underground and the RAF moved more toward the ‘isolated’ 
end of the continuum. 
Cluster 2: Nationalist terrorism. The second cluster is made up of ETA 
and the Provisional IRA, two groups that are considered similar by 
several other authors as well.76 Although neither of the two groups were 
devoid of leftist leanings, their political ambitions could well be achieved 
within the existing state systems. The Spanish and British governments, 
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and any other government for that matter could govern their own 
countries the way they saw fit, as long as they pulled out of respectively 
the Basque Country and Northern Ireland. This being the case, they fall 
into the category ‘system reform’. As for the degree of centralisation, ETA 
and the Provisional IRA are often mentioned as representatives of the 
‘old’ terrorism. Whether or not this a feature that is unique to ‘old’ 
terrorism is up for debate, but it is true that ETA and the Provisional IRA 
were pyramid shaped organisations, with the top leadership guiding the 
work of a multi-layered organisation with various functional departments 
and regional operational units. This elaborate division of labour and 
operational territory was possible because of the large numbers of fighters 
that both organisations could bring into the field. The Provisional IRA 
and ETA are both estimated to have consisted of several hundred 
members. Also, they had the active support of at least a part of the 
population in the execution of terrorist attacks. In the Basque Country as 
in Northern Ireland, there was a certain willingness in some segments of 
the population. Therefore, both organisations fall in the category ‘popular 
resistance’ for the characteristic ‘contact with the support base’, although 
it is probably fair to say that ETA moved towards the ‘support network’ 
category in the 1990s and 2000s. With regard to the characteristic 
‘inclusion of the population’, it is important to note that, for a large part of 
their existence, ETA and the Provisional IRA tried to force the 
government out of the Basque Country and Northern Ireland by inflicting 
damage and casualties on the Spanish and British state. This strategy 
suggests that the work of the terrorist groups themselves was considered 
enough to achieve the political goals. The population could remain in a 
supporting role, and did not have to rise up in a revolution to sweep the 
oppressors out. As ETA and the Provisional IRA were still fighting to 
liberate their people, both are placed in the ‘representative’ category on 
the characteristic ‘inclusion of the population’. 
Cluster 3: Jihadist terrorism. Of the six terrorist actors that were selected, 
the jihadist movements in the Netherlands and the UK are probably the 
ones with the least fixed organisational structure. In the Netherlands as 
well as in the UK, jihadist terrorists acted on their own initiative, and 
were not ordered to carry out terrorist attacks by a leadership of an 
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organisation to which they belonged. It is true that, especially in the UK, 
home-grown fighters sought the guidance and support of experienced 
jihadists with connections in Afghanistan or Pakistan, but these contacts 
were largely ad hoc, and did not in any way suggest a fixed 
organisational structure. As there was no clear organisation, there can also 
be no centralisation, which is why we will consider both jihadist 
movements ‘networks’. 
While the contacts that various members of both jihadist movements had 
with mentors and guides were not permanent or institutionalised, they do 
show that there was a support network on which the jihadist operatives 
could rely during the early stages of the planning of their attacks. As most 
cells were self-sufficient in the gathering of operational intelligence, the 
fabrication of the bombs and the execution of the attacks, we chose 
‘support network’ as the appropriate way to characterise the 
‘embeddedness’ of both jihadist movements. With regard to size, the lack 
of organisational structure of jihadist movements makes it difficult to 
gauge the numbers of members, but, given the available government 
estimates, it is probably safe to put the Dutch jihadist movement in the 
‘hundreds’ category, and assign the ‘more than thousand’ score to the 
British jihadist movement. As for the role that the Dutch and British 
jihadist movements had in mind for the population, it is clear that both 
were decidedly sectarian. They despised what they perceived as the 
religious impurity non-Muslims and were even hostile towards most 
people who were Muslims. They did not involve any outsiders in their 
plans, and had no qualms about killing both Muslims and non-Muslims 
in mass-casualty terrorist attacks. It can be argued that the ummah, the 
global community of Muslims, is the real constituency of the jihadist 
movements in the Netherlands and the UK. But while perhaps true, this 
observation is of little practical value in the state’s efforts to fight these 
movements. For counterterrorism purposes, the inclusion of the 
population in the countries where they were active is more important, 
since it may, as we have seen above, determine a movement’s 
susceptibility to ‘population centred’ counterterrorism. 
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3.5.2 Similarity in context 
It is important to take into account the possibility that the outcomes of 
counterterrorism policies are influenced by contextual factors. To enhance 
the explanatory value of the nature of the terrorist actors, the six cases 
have been selected on the similarity of two crucial contextual factors, 
namely, first, the government’s possession of adequate resources and, 
second, its ability to use them when and how they pleased. 
1. Adequate state resources. Obviously, fighting terrorism is hard for 
states that lack the means to do so. A lack of equipment and manpower to 
track down and arrest terrorist units makes it difficult to repress a 
terrorist threat. Similarly, insufficiency in funding and expertise can also 
stand in the way of the effective application of more accommodating 
approaches, such as those that were addressed in section 3.3.5 and 3.3.8. 
Also, populations in weak and failing states have a stronger incentive to 
side with the state’s challengers. They have less reason to count on the 
state as the provider of security, so it will be harder to persuade them to 
withdraw their support to the terrorist organisation. Consequently, 
attempts to undermine the terrorist support base are more likely to be 
ineffective than in strong states. Furthermore, terrorist groups that are in 
conflict with weak states will be heartened by the notion that they actually 
have a chance at realising its political goals. This makes them less 
vulnerable to counterterrorism measures, be they hard or 
accommodating. For the current study, it has been decided to focus on 
wealthy states that can be assumed to have the resources necessary to 
implement the policies they had in mind. This means that in the six case 
studies below, policy failures cannot be attributed to a lack of means or 
trained government officials. 
2. Government control over resources. To effectively fight terrorism, a 
government must have full control over the state’s resources, which 
means that the government’s policies must be more or less loyally 
implemented by the officials receiving the orders from the national 
government. While most Western governments do have such control, it is 
not self-evident. Some governments see their efforts undermined by so-
Research design 
81 
called ‘states within states’, government organs – usually armies or 
intelligence services – that can follow their own agendas regardless of the 
will of the central or national government. Such intra-state power blocks 
can severely undermine the effectiveness of a government’s 
counterterrorism policies, as they can ignore the wishes of the leaders 
they are supposed to serve. As this study concerns national level 
counterterrorism policies, cases in which a policy fails because of a 
government organ’s refusal or unwillingness to implement that policy 
should be avoided. The selection contains only cases of counterterrorism 
by governments who were in more or less full control of the state’s 
resources. 
3.6 Structured, focused comparison 
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett describe a structured, focused 
comparison as ‘structured’ because “the researcher writes general 
questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are 
asked of each case under study to guide and standardise data 
collection”.77 The following six chapters are structured, focused 
comparisons in this sense, as for each of the six cases, the same set of 
questions will be asked: which of the counterterrorism principles were 
applied, and, for the ones that were, were they effective? For each of the 
six cases it will be examined whether the programme theories outlined in 
the sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.10 hold any water. By using the same set of 
counterterrorism principles for all six cases, we will get a clear idea about 
what works against what kind of terrorist actor, provided that the 
principles were applied in a sufficient number of cases. Regarding the 
focus, the second element in the structured, focused comparison, George 
and Bennett state that “[t]he method is ‘focused’ in the sense that it deals 
only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined”.78 In this sense, 
too, the six case studies are structured, focused comparisons. The histories 
of the terrorist actors to be examined in the next chapters are quite rich 
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and beg all sorts of relevant and stimulating questions, but only those 
events, people and developments that are relevant for counterterrorism 
effectiveness will be highlighted. 
3.7 Limitations 
While the research design described in this chapter allows for a thorough, 
structured and wide-ranging effectiveness assessment, there are 
inevitably some limitations that must be mentioned. First, as much and 
detailed information is needed to adequately test the various programme 
theories, this study has to rely on cases that are well-documented. 
Consequently, the selection of cases includes groups that some may 
consider ‘usual suspects’ or over-studied. The clearest example is the 
Provisional IRA, which has generated an inordinate amount of secondary 
sources. It is true that we should be careful not to base our knowledge on 
terrorism and counterterrorism on a handful of well-known cases, but the 
current author’s contribution lies in the development and application of 
the method rather than in the digging up of new information about 
terrorist groups. Unearthing new data would gone beyond the time and 
resources available for the current study. Furthermore, one can claim that 
the Provisional IRA is overstudied, but the same cannot be said about the 
Weather Underground and the jihadist movements in the UK and the 
Netherlands. Regarding the RAF, one could consider this group 
overstudied, too, but the vast majority of the sources and literature are in 
German. The group has occasionally been included in English-language 
studies, but not recently and not very often, so one of the contributions of 
this dissertation is therefore that it presents the case of the RAF, using the 
most recent source material, to an English-speaking audience. 
The second point that should be mentioned, regards the conclusiveness of 
the evidence for relations between counterterrorism principles and effects. 
One of the strengths of the approach outlined in this chapter is that the 
MoPs and MoEs have been chosen in such a way that the link between 
measure (cause) and outcome (effect) is at the very least plausible. 
Moreover, the cases that have been selected are well-documented, which 
makes it possible to show that measures and outcomes do not merely 
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correlate, but are also related as cause and effect. Nevertheless, even with 
the current selection of cases, it may in some cases still be difficult to 
ascribe an effect definitively and exclusively to the application of a 
counterterrorism principle. Especially in cases where the available 
evidence is scant, there are factors other than the policy interventions for 
which it can be speculated that they impacted on the outcome as well. The 
less evidence there is that the shift in the MoE was indeed caused by the 
policy intervention, and not by something else, the more we have to rely 
on correlations and the more we are forced to leave open the possibility 
that the shift was brought about by other factors. In all chapters below, it 
has been tried to prove the link between cause and effect, and thereby the 
irrelevance of other possible explanations, as thoroughly as possible, but 
in some cases this proved to be challenging. In such cases the link is 
argued on the basis of correlation and the plausibility of a causal relation 
rather than unequivocally proven. 
Another limitation of the way of working laid down in the previous 
sections, is that the evidence for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
certain principles may be patchy. The findings and conclusion are based 
on a limited number of case studies, and not all principles have been 
applied in all cases, which makes the evidence base even slimmer. The 
conclusion is formulated in a way that does justice to the variation in the 
robustness of the evidence, but larger number of cases may be needed to 
further substantiate some of the research results of the current exercise. 
Unfortunately, as there are no structured overviews of what 
counterterrorism instruments have been used against which terrorist 
actors, doing the case studies was the only way to find out what 
principles have been applied against which groups and movements. It 
was not possible to take this into account beforehand and select cases in 
which the same principles were applied. 
On a more methodological note, it is possible to object to the research 
design that will be used in subsequent chapters on the grounds that a 
failure of a policy will be taken as a failure of a principle, regardless of the 
way it was carried out or implemented. Flawed implementation will not 
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count as a refutation of a principle, but the research design does not 
account for different ways in which the principles were implemented. For 
example, the outcomes of negotiations between states and terrorist 
organisations depend, at least to an extent, on the negotiating skills of the 
people involved. Should negotiations have failed in one of the cases 
discussed below as a result of the mistakes of a negotiator on either side, 
this will be perceived as ineffectiveness of the principle, while one might 
argue that this failure is not due to the inapplicability of the principle as 
such, but rather to the negotiators involved. Similarly, there are many 
ways in which to address the root cause of a terrorist threat. A failure to 
adequately do so, might have to be attributed to the way the root causes 
were addressed, and not to the principle of addressing root causes as 
such. One could still claim that another form of addressing root causes 
would have worked. 
Especially when using only a limited number of cases, this is a pitfall to 
keep in mind. At the same time, given that this is a meta-analysis of 
counterterrorism effectiveness, it is crucial to keep an eye on the bigger 
picture. Specifying all the different forms that the implementation of the 
principles can take, would get us bogged down in details of questionable 
importance, and would also undermine the comparability of the six cases. 
No two policy measures are ever implemented the exact same way, so, 
taken to its extreme, this argument would hold that comparing the 
effectiveness of two policies or measures is pointless. This would amount 
to an argument against policy studies in general, and maybe even against 
social science. As any comparative analysis has to ignore at least some 
differences between the units that are being compared, and as the field of 
counterterrorism studies is in need of new and more ambitious theorising, 
it has been decided to paint the stories below in strokes that some may 
perhaps consider somewhat broad. 
Another issue that must be addressed, concerns the somewhat tentative 
nature of the research results. While we can, even in the face of some of 
the limitations just mentioned, demonstrate that a counterterrorism 
principle was effective, we cannot demonstrate that it was the most 
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effective of all the available options. Counterfactuality is clearly an issue 
in policy evaluation, as can be demonstrated using the example of 
containment. As will be shown in chapter 7, repressive measures played a 
major part in the containment and eventual demise of the Provisional 
IRA. As the containment of the Provisional IRA, that is, the limitation of 
the group’s ability to use violence, can be considered a sign of 
effectiveness, we do not know what would have happened if another 
approach would have been tried. Perhaps the campaign could have been 
ended long before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement if the British 
government had chosen a different strategy. In other words, while one 
can demonstrate that the Provisional IRA was contained and can claim 
that that was a desirable policy outcome, it is imposible to rule out the 
possibility that better results would have been achieved by other means. 
Moreover, approaches that are applied more often than others are more 
likely to generate outcomes that can be considered effective. This might 
lead to a ‘counterterrorism paradigm’ that exists only because more 
effective approaches have not been tried and tested. At the same time, 
empirical research into counterterrorism effectiveness can only take into 
account strategies and policies that were applied, and one can hardly 
expect the current author to base his analysis on strategies that were not 
applied. Rather, this point should be taken as an encouragement for 
further research into other, less common counterterrorism approaches.  
A final point that should be borne in mind, is perhaps not so much a 
limitation as a disclaimer regarding some relevant issues that this study 
does not address. As one can surmise from the programme theories listed 
in paragraph 3.3, effectiveness is understood as an impact that is desirable 
in the eyes of the state applying the counterterrorism measures and can be 
observed in the terrorist actor that is being fought. In other words, 
effectiveness is understood as direct effect on the terrorist actor or its 
support base. More societal effects, such as the securitisation or even 
militarisation of a society, or, perhaps through this, the sustainment of 
support for terrorist activities will not be addressed. The effectiveness of 
counterterrorism is also considered in isolation from the effectiveness of 
terrorism, or the extent to which terrorism helps terrorists achieve their 
political goals. A terrorist group may do very poorly in operational terms, 
The science of fighting terrorism 
86 
but may still be able to gain attention or even sympathy for a political 
cause, which, according to one author, is one of the most important ways 
in which terrorism actually helps its perpetrators.79 In other words, 
counterterrorism effectiveness as understood in the current study does 
not rule out the possibility that the terrorists are to some extent getting 
what they want as well.  
Such other factors have not been excluded because they are not important, 
but rather because they constitute separate kinds of counterterrorism 
effectiveness. One’s appreciation of counterterrorism measures should 
depend on what they do to a terrorist organisation (that is, on 
effectiveness as understood in the current study), but also on the effects it 
has outside of the terrorist group that is being fought. Repression, for 
instance, can be quite effective in containing a terrorist organisation, but 
can also feed the resentment against the state. Thus, while operationally 
effective, repression may fuel resistance, perhaps in the form of terrorism, 
or perhaps in the form of riots, sabotage and vandalism. Another effect on 
society that will not be addressed in the current study is the impact of 
preventive root cause approaches. While one can – and in the following 
chapters will – observe reductions of terrorist support bases and identify a 
plausible link between such reductions and government attempts to 
address a root cause, it is a lot harder to establish the effects of measures 
to keep people from supporting terrorism in the first place. In the former 
case, people withdraw their support, which is an observable effect. In the 
latter case, in which there was no link between population and terrorist 
group, the effects cannot be read from a behavioural change of the people 
who were subjected to the preventive measure. This suggests that 
preventive approaches that be effective in the sense of the current study, 
may at the same time have beneficial societal effects, difficult as these may 
be to establish.  
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With regard to the appreciation of the principles that will be discussed 
and evaluated in the next chapters, this means that any claims regarding 
the advisibility on the basis of this study should be considered 
preliminary. The operational effectiveness that will be examined below is 
only one side of the coin. The other should be examined as well before 















4 Accidental counterterrorism: the role of the 
state in the demise of the Weather 
Underground 
At the pinnacle of their revolutionary career the Weather Underground 
was making the headlines with bombings of targets as prominent as the 
Pentagon and the Capitol.1 Acknowledging the group’s audacity, FBI-
director J. Edgar Hoover once called the Weather Underground “the most 
violent, persistent and pernicious of revolutionary groups”.2 For a while 
the group rode the waves of widespread protests against the war in 
Vietnam and found a receptive audience amongst the many young 
Americans who were interested in anti-establishment ideas. The Weather 
Underground was clearly a product of its time, but is also a clear example 
of what happens to terrorist groups that are out of touch with their social 
environment. As Audrey Kurth Cronin has argued, the inability to pass 
on a message to a next generation of supporters was an important factor 
in the demise of many leftist terrorist groups.3 The Weather Underground 
illustrates her point, as we can reconstruct the group’s struggle for 
purpose and direction after its anti-imperialist message had lost its 
appeal.  
Another interesting aspect of the history of the Weather Underground is 
that the impact of the US government’s counterterrorism efforts was often 
unintended, or intended in a different way. For instance, the attempts by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to infiltrate the group and arrest 
its members were generally unsuccessful, but they did, as will be argued 
below, contribute to the group’s demise. And this was by no means the 
government’s only fluke. The title of this chapter is ‘Accidental 
counterterrorism’ because the measures that will be discussed below were 
                                                          
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in T. van Dongen, “Law Enforcement as Politics 
by Other Means: Lessons from Countering Revolutionary Terrorism,” Police Practice and 
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taken with a different effect in mind or were not even intended as 
counterterrorism measures at all. 
So while there are several interesting angles from which to study the 
Weather Underground, there is not a large body of research into the 
functioning of the organisation or the attempts of the US government to 
counter it. There is little scholarly work about the group beyond two 
volumes that sympathetically but adequately chronicle the history of the 
movement, one comparative analysis of the Weather Underground and 
the Red Army Faction and an analysis of the media coverage of the Days 
of Rage, a violent demonstration the group organised in 1969.4 None of 
these publications pay much attention to the role of the state in the 
expiration of the group in the mid- to late seventies. In their analyses of 
the way the Weather Underground fell apart, they rather focus internal 
discord.5 In doing so, they are overlooking a major factor in the group’s 
downfall. The group’s internal dynamics certainly played a major role, 
but we should not be impervious to the state actions that created an 
atmosphere in which this discord could arise. This chapter will argue that 
the state did play a crucial role in the demise of the Weather 
Underground, albeit in unsuspected ways.  
4.1 The Weather Underground 
4.1.1 Ideology 
The Weather Underground was a left-wing extremist group that operated 
in the US from the late sixties to the mid-seventies.6 It started out as the 
                                                          
4 R. Boyd, “Representing Political Violence: The Mainstream Media and the Weatherman 
‘Days of Rage,’” American Studies 41, no. 4 (2000): 141–64; Berger, Outlaws of America; R. 
Jacobs, The Way the Wind Blew: A History of the Weather Underground (London and New York: 
Verso, 1997); J. Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, 
and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004). 
5 Berger, Outlaws of America, 232–234; Jacobs, The Way the Wind Blew, 174–175. 
6 During this period, the group changed its name twice. It started out as the Weatherman, 
then called itself Weather Underground and later Weather Underground Organization. In 
this chapter, we will stick to the most commonly used name, the Weather Underground. 
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militant wing of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the leftist 
student organisation that was deeply involved in protests against the war 
in Vietnam. SDS had been founded in 1962, when it issued the Port Huron 
Statement, in which it criticised the US government for its militarised 
foreign policy and the build-up of its nuclear arsenal as well as for such 
social ills as discrimination, economic exploitation and political elitism.7 It 
was not, however, until the Vietnam War that the organisation attracted a 
mass following. The ranks swelled as a result of its nationwide grassroots 
resistance against the war, and SDS managed to mobilise some 20,000 
people for a protest march in Washington, DC.8 At SDS’ 1969 National 
Convention, the organisation’s radical wing, which would later become 
the Weather Underground, forced their more traditionally communist 
opponents of the Progressive Labor Party (PL) out of the organisation. PL 
was joined by other ‘Old Left’ wings of the SDS. Less orthodox sections 
went with the Weathermen. Others left the movement in disillusion.9  
The Weather Underground, initially named the Weathermen, took its 
name from the Bob Dylan song Subterranean homesick blues, which has a 
line that goes ‘You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the 
wind blows’.10 The group’s name thus suggested the dawning of a new 
era, and the Weathermen’s had objectives to match. The group’s ultimate 
political goal was nothing less than the overthrow of the capitalist and 
imperialist political system and the establishment of socialism in the US, 
although what united group members was more the notion that 
something had to change than a clear vision about were things should be 
headed.11 This ambition has to be placed in the political context of the late 
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sixties. In 1967, shortly before embarking on his ill-conceived mission in 
Bolivia, Che Guevara famously called for the creation of “two, three, 
many Vietnams”, meaning that all around the world national resistance 
groups should take up arms to fight US imperialism.12 Together, they 
would increase the costs of US imperialism to the point where the US 
would be so overburdened that its capitalist system would collapse. The 
Weather Underground, whose members worshipped Che as a demi-god, 
perceived itself as part of this international movement. It viewed the fight 
of African-American militant organisations, such as the Black Panthers, as 
an internal anti-colonial struggle, and by supporting this struggle in the 
heart of US imperialism, the Weather Underground felt that it was 
contributing to the fight waged abroad by, among others, the Tupamaros 
in Uruguay and the Vietcong.13 
But while the Weather Underground was unassuming in the definition of 
its own place in the anti-imperialist struggle, the relations with their 
American comrades-in-arms were not always easy, mostly as the result of 
another of the movement’s ideological traits. The group’s reluctance to 
claim a leading role was greatly appreciated among the radical black civil 
rights movement, but there was also a hedonistic twist to the 
Weathermen’s world view, and that went down less favourably. The 
Weather Underground had arisen from the student movement, which 
was strongly under the influence of the then prevailing counterculture. In 
this scene, people cultivated free sex and liberal drug use. The 
Weathermen had internalised these views and practices and saw the 
counterculture as a way to shed bourgeois values. This meant, very 
practically, that smoking marihuana became a revolutionary act, a 
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Jacobs (Ramparts Press, 1970), 60; B. Dohrn, B. Ayers, and J. Jones, eds., “Prairie Fire: The 
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Statements, and Communiqués of the Weather Underground (New York, Toronto, London and 
Melbourne: Seven Stories Press, 2006), 239–240. 
Accidental counterterrorism 
95 
conclusion that the Weather Underground was all too willing to accept. 
The group always openly associated itself with the counterculture, for 
instance in the declaration of war that Weather leader Bernardine Dohrn 
issued against the US. In this document, she wrote: “Dope is one of our 
weapons”, and “If you want to find us, this is where we are. In every 
tribe, commune, dormitory, farmhouse, barracks and townhouse where 
kids are making love, smoking dope and loading guns.”14 Following up 
on its commitment to the counterculture, one of the Weather 
Underground’s most remarkable actions was the jailbreak and transfer to 
Algeria of LSD-guru and counterculture-icon Timothy Leary.15 Such 
moves were appreciated by the white middle class youths from which the 
group had originated, but the Black Panthers, a group that the 
Weathermen were eager to impress, were less enthusiastic. They 
witnessed the devastating effects of drug addiction on black communities 
every day, and took offence at the Weather Underground’s cultivation of 
drug use, which became one of the causes of the strains on their relations 
with the Weathermen.16 
4.1.2 Organisational culture and structure 
Terrorism is sometimes seen as a weapon of the weak. The case of the 
Weather Underground lends credence to this interpretation, as the 
group’s underground existence was not entirely a mode of choice. 
Initially, the plan was to spark mass uprisings to overthrow the 
government. Their most ambitious attempt to this effect took place in 
October 1969, when the Weathermen organised a manifestation they 
called the Days of Rage. After they had broken with the less radical 
segments of the SDS, but before they went underground, the group 
organised the Days of Rage in an attempt to “bring the war home”. The 
                                                          
14 B. Dohrn, “A Declaration of a State of War,” in Sing a Battle Song: The Revolutionary 
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idea behind this initiative was that the opening of a front on American 
soil would help bring the US’ imperialist regime to its knees.17 In the 
weeks preceding the event, the Weathermen gathered as many people as 
they could for violent demonstrations in Chicago. October 8 to October 11 
saw several hundreds of protesters roaming the streets of Chicago, 
destroying property and provoking violent confrontations with the police. 
Each day, the demonstration ended in street fights with the police. Many 
Weathermen were wounded or arrested, or both.18 The leadership 
afterwards tried to sell the Days of Rage as a success, but there was no 
escaping the fact that the turn-out had been disappointing. On the eve of 
the demonstrations, the leadership had predicted that tens of thousands 
of angry protesters would join, but only several hundred turned up, 
which convinced the leadership that American society was not yet ready 
for a mass movement.19 This brought the Weathermen to consider 
alternative courses of action and was one of the factors that led to the 
decision to take the organisation underground. Another consideration 
was the fact that the FBI had deeply penetrated the SDS, making it 
virtually impossible for the radicals to function outside of the scrutiny of 
the federal police.20 
The immediate trigger for the move underground, however, was the 
police murder of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, both members of the 
Black Panthers. The death of Hampton and Clark was by all accounts a 
watershed event in the history of the Weather Underground. Although 
under no illusions about the nature and role of the FBI, the Weathermen 
were nevertheless deeply shocked when they heard the news. In the 
recollection of many Weathermen, the murders revealed the cruelty and 
ruthlessness of the foe they were up against. It was now clearer than ever 
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18 T. Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (Bantam Books, 1987), 393–394; N.L. 
Zaroulis and G. Sullivan, Who Spoke up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963-
1975 (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 262. 
19 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 109. 
20 Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI’s 
Secret Wars against Dissent in the United States (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002), 172–
173 and 225. 
Accidental counterterrorism 
97 
that the revolutionary struggle was a fight to the death and that 
compromise was out of the question.21 The possibility that they might be 
the Bureau’s next victims convinced many in the group of the necessity of 
a move underground. As former member Cathy Wilkerson recalls 
thinking: “This really is war. I would do anything, I vowed, anything not 
to let this murder be in vain.”22 
Before the Weather Underground abandoned the aboveground SDS head 
office, which it controlled after it had expelled all dissident members of 
the SDS, it spent several months steeling its membership for life as an 
illicit organisation.23 The failure of the Days of Rage and the death of 
Clark and Hampton drove home the need for special preparation to 
transform the Weathermen into hardened cadres that could adequately 
function under difficult circumstances as an illegal, underground urban 
guerrilla group. This meant that all members had to be moved around the 
country to take them away from their regular lives and break the ties to 
their former, bourgeois existence.24 The preparation for the underground 
struggle also included long and intense criticism/self-criticism sessions to 
stamp out individualism and remnants of the bourgeois lifestyle. During 
these sessions, modelled after the practice of the Red Guards in 
communist China, the collective singled out one member for fierce 
criticism about his or her shortcomings as a revolutionary.25 This practice 
fed a certain in-group competition, in which all group members were 
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forced to show they were more radical than the others.26 On a yet more 
intimate level, the leadership started the ‘smash monogamy’ campaign. In 
order to eradicate monogamy, which was considered selfish, bourgeois 
and therefore unbecoming of a revolutionary, the Weather Underground 
collectives engaged in bizarre group sex sessions, during which the 
members were forced to show their dedication to the collective by having 
sex with all other members of the group, male and female.27 The idea 
behind these rituals was that they would bring the members of the 
collectives to let go of their individuality and to become totally committed 
to the movement and the revolution.28 Many members left the movement 
at this point, repelled by the group pressure.29 Furthermore, newcomers 
were subjected to so-called acid tests. Weatherman Linda Evans described 
in a letter to the movement how FBI infiltrator Larry Grathwohl, who 
supplied the information that lead to her arrest, was forced to take acid 
before undergoing cross-examination about his background, as some in 
the movement already had their suspicions about him.30 Through 
measures like these, the various collectives of the Weather Underground 
were made into closely-knit units, which made it difficult for the FBI to 
infiltrate. 
The Weather Underground consisted of three major collectives, one in 
New York, one in San Francisco and one in Seattle. These collectives were 
guided by an organisational centre, initially called the Weather Bureau, 
later the Central Committee.31 The three collectives each consisted of 
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several dozens of members, divided in small cells that planned and 
carried out their own operations, independently from other cells.32 The 
cells knew little about each other’s attacks, and only the members in the 
Weather Underground’s leadership knew about the activities of all cells 
and collectives.33 As one member recalls: “There was a leadership which 
was the Weather Bureau that circulated around the country and would 
visit various collectives. I was in one of the groups, so they would visit us 
occasionally. I didn’t know what was going on in other areas of the 
country, ‘cause we had a need-to-know principle, right? If you didn’t 
have to know it, you didn’t know it, and you didn’t ask.”34 The existing 
accounts convey the impression that the Weather Bureau’s leadership was 
unassailed. It travelled from collective to collective to be personally 
involved in the day-to-day business of the organisation, for instance to 
purge unreliable members.35 The instructions of the leadership were 
rarely questioned: “If we heard rumors that the Weatherbureau was 
eating steak and flying first class while we in Seattle were eating rice and 
spaghetti and hitchhiking, we ignored them. Our leadership was 
infallible. Our leadership was our source of inspiration. They were the 
creators of Weatherman. They took the most chances and thought the 
most seriously. If they have steak every now and then, didn’t they deserve 
it? There was nothing our leadership could do that they could not 
justify.”36 
4.1.3 Modus operandi 
The Weathermen never believed that they themselves could generate 
enough violence to beat the US government. Instead, its violence was 
exemplary in the sense that they showed the people that the state was not 
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all-powerful and that resistance was possible.37 As David Gilbert 
explained, the group’s attacks were “actions to educate about the 
oppressor and to show that there are ways to fight back without being 
crushed”.38 They were provocations, meant to taunt and ridicule the US 
government. This being the group’s strategy, the Weathermen chose their 
targets on the basis of their value as symbols of US power. In the planning 
phase, much care was taken to select a target that could easily be 
associated with the anti-imperialist struggle. A failure to do so would 
mean that an attack would not have the mobilising effect that the group 
was aiming for.39 In this respect, the group was largely successful, as their 
targets were indeed easy to reconcile with its political goals. Targets of 
Weathermen bombings included police stations, army bases, a military 
research centre, courthouses and, later on, major corporations. 
Undoubtedly the group’s most iconoclastic attacks were those on the 
Pentagon and the Capitol. 
Another demand that the Weathermen applied to their attack plans was 
that the risk of casualties had to be minimal. Their restraint in this respect 
was largely the result of a traumatic event in 1970, often referred to as the 
‘townhouse explosion’ after the Greenwich Village townhouse where it 
took place. In March 1970, Weatherman Terry Robbins, clearly with the 
intention to kill people, was putting together a bomb that was meant to be 
used against a dance for soldiers at a New Jersey army base.40 However, 
the bomb accidentally went off, killing Robbins and two other 
Weathermen. Shocked by the impact of the explosion and the death of 
their three comrades, the movement decided to only detonate its bombs at 
night and only after a warning had been given over the phone.41 Another 
reason for the group’s restraint was its political agenda. Like most left-
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wing terrorist groups of the 1970s, the Weather Underground took care 
not to victimise its potential constituency.  
Before placing a bomb, members of the group would carry out extensive 
surveillances, scanning the target buildings for escape routes and feasible 
places to hide a bomb. The low-level security measures around most 
office buildings in the 1970s allowed the members of the group to enter a 
building in the morning pretending to be employees and then wonder the 
hallways to learn the best way to commit an attack. When cell members 
found that an attack was possible, they went into the buildings they had 
selected, and placed an improvised explosive device (IED) with a timer. 
The timer was set to make the IED go off at a time when there was little 
chance that anyone would get hurt. 
Overall, the Weather Underground managed to keep its body count low. 
The Global Terrorism Database has no record of a Weathermen attack in 
which anyone got wounded, and it lists only one attack in which someone 
was killed.42 Moreover, it appears that this one attack was not a terrorist 
attack by the Weather Underground, but rather a bank robbery by five 
anti-war activists in need of money for their campaign.43 While two of the 
perpetrators may have been members of the Weather Underground, it is 
far from certain that they were, nor that the robbery was a Weathermen 
action instead of an isolated initiative. This being the case, we can assume 
that the Weather Underground did only material damage in the attacks it 
carried out. 
4.1.4 Aftermath 
In recent years, a group of scholars, most prominently John Horgan, have 
introduced a strand of counterterrorism research that addresses the ways 
                                                          




43 D. Abel, “Apologetic in the End, William Gilday Dies,” Boston Globe, September 16, 2011, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/09/16/william_lefty_gi
lday_dies_at_82/?page=1. 
The science of fighting terrorism 
102 
in which members of a terrorist organisation can be lured out of the 
terrorist organisation and into a normal life.44 These policies closely 
correspond to counterterrorism principle ‘offer exits’ explained in chapter 
1. In his analyses, Horgan argues for a distinction between 
deradicalisation and disengagement. Ideally, terrorists are deradicalised, 
meaning that they change their minds about the group’s ideas and 
assume political views that are more in line with what is considered 
socially acceptable. Disengagement is a more modest policy objective in 
the sense that it does not require that the terrorists cease to be radicals, but 
merely that they cease to be terrorists. In a case of disengagement, a 
terrorist has not distanced him- or herself from the organisation’s ideas, 
but no longer takes part in its activities. Horgan argues that most 
withdrawals from terrorist organisations constitute cases of 
disengagement, not deradicalisation.45 Speaking from its experience in 
countering home-grown terrorism, the Dutch Algemene Inlichtingen- en 
Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service, AIVD) made a 
similar observation in a 2010 report on jihadist terrorism in the 
Netherlands.46 Although the evidence is anecdotal and strongly biased 
towards the leading members of the movement, the Weather 
Underground appears to confirm this notion as well. 
The former leadership of the Weather Underground have changed their 
methods, but not their ideas. All leaders discussed in this chapter are still 
committed to activism. Bernardine Dohrn and Bill Ayers, now a married 
couple, have chosen academic careers to fight for their cause. Neither of 
the two ever rejected the objectives of the Weather Underground, stating, 
on the contrary, that they still hold radical views.47 David Gilbert, who 
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continued the armed struggle into the early 1980s, until he was arrested 
for shooting a guard during an armed robbery, publishes radical writings 
from prison.48 Similarly, although not from prison, former Weather 
Bureau member Mark Rudd spreads ideas about anti-imperialism and 
activism by giving lectures around the US.49 Grass-roots movements that 
need help in building their support base can hire former Weather leader 
Jeff Jones, who runs a consultancy firm that advises progressive 
organisations.50 Even Brian Flanagan, who went on to become a 
professional billiards player and later a New York bar-owner, professions 
that hardly suggest political radicalism of any kind, never essentially 
changed the ideas he had as a Weatherman. In fact, several decades after 
the highlight of his participation in radical politics, his bar still sported 
several SDS posters and a statuette of Lenin.51 Although, as these 
examples show, many Weathermen did not change their minds, the group 
did fall apart in the mid-1970s. How did this happen? The next sections 
will make clear that state actions played a crucial role. 
4.2 Counterterrorism principles and the Weather 
Underground 
4.2.1 Restraint in the use of force and the rule of law 
Chapter 1 noted the risks involved in the use of excessive force, which 
might well increase the terrorists’ willingness to use violence. The case of 
the Weather Underground is a clear example of this dynamic. In its 
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reaction to the domestic turmoil of the late 1960s, the US government 
relied primarily on its secret services, especially the FBI. In the mid-50s, 
the FBI, which also had the lead in the efforts to capture the Weather 
Underground, had initiated the Counter Intelligence Program 
(COINTELPRO), which consisted of a string of mostly illegal operations 
to disrupt a wide variety of opposition groups. COINTELPRO campaigns 
usually comprised four main elements: infiltration, psychological warfare 
(which included spreading false rumours within movement and to the 
press), harassment through the legal system (false arrests, misuse of grand 
juries) and extra-legal force and violence (burglaries, beatings, 
vandalism).52 COINTELPRO was officially recognised only in 1971 and 
was ended in the same year, but by then it had done much to confirm the 
perception of the state that was prevalent among the Weathermen. Leftist 
groups that the Weather Underground associated with, as well as the 
Weathermen themselves and their lawyers and family members 
experienced various forms of state harassment, such as burglaries by FBI 
agents looking for clues about the group’s whereabouts.53 Furthermore, 
the memories of the way the police handled the anti-war protests at the 
National Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968 were still fresh. 
Several groups, including SDS, had planned protests outside of the 
Convention, where George McGovern was making a bid for the 
presidential candidacy for the Democratic Party. The protests were meant 
to be peaceful, but massive riots broke out, and lasted for five days. Many 
protesters were clubbed, tear gassed or arrested.54 Having participated in 
these or similar protests, several members of the Weather Underground 
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had personal experience with and were radicalised by police violence.55 
But the most important event, as we have seen above, was the brutal 
police murder of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. This shocked the 
Weathermen, but also hardened their resolve. The Weather Underground 
started out from the assumption that the US was an imperialist state, bent 
on the repression of dissent and the exploitation of its black internal 
colony. The methods used by the FBI and the police confirmed this notion 
of US state power, and gave the Weathermen an enemy to fight.  
The FBI’s heavy-handed approach was not only counterproductive 
directly with regard to the Weather Underground, but also resulted in 
hostility from the social environment in which the Weather Underground 
operated. In order to acquire the intelligence needed to curb a violent 
non-state actor, the state must be on good terms with those who can 
provide intelligence. Generally speaking, the population will not serve as 
a source of information unless it has sufficient trust in the state. This rule 
also held in the case of the Weather Underground, which grew out of the 
student movement. As the student movement had arisen to protest 
against state repression, it will come as no surprise that few in the student 
movement, the social environment of the Weather Underground, 
sympathised with the FBI. In a way, they were a protective shield around 
the Weather Underground, which could count on their unwillingness to 
help the Bureau, even in the face of severe harassment.56 With the help of 
the support network, the Weather Underground could acquire financial 
resources, arrange means of transportation and obtain false passports and 
driver’s licences, all of which were crucial to the group’s survival.57 
Thus, the case of the Weather Underground shows that, as the 
programme theory in section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 would predict, the excessive 
use of force and violations of the rule of law was indeed 
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counterproductive. Ignoring the risks involved in taking an overly 
repressive approach to countering domestic opposition, the FBI had no 
qualms about intimidating or physically attacking members of the New 
Left and the black resistance movement. This approach, which reached its 
climax in the liquidation of Clark and Hampton, was one of the factors 
that gave rise to the Weather Underground as a terrorist organisation. 
Also, the Umfeld of the Weather Underground grew hostile toward the 
state and therefore refused to cooperate with the FBI in tracking down the 
Weathermen. 
4.2.2 Intelligence gathering 
In 1970, J. Edgar Hoover announced “the largest manhunt in FBI history” 
to catch the Weather Underground.58 This approach was largely 
unsuccessful, as the FBI appears to have lost its grip on its nemesis after 
1969. Initially, however, the picture did not look this bleak. The FBI had 
extensively infiltrated SDS, to which the members of the Weather 
Underground still belonged for most of 1969.59 Also, in the months 
immediately after the Weathermen took over SDS, the FBI managed to get 
a fairly accurate idea of what was going on within the movement. The 
FBI-files accurately report what was discussed at the SDS National 
Convention in late 1969 and what positions were taken by the various 
leading members.60 But the stream of information was reduced to a trickle 
after the leadership decided in December 1969 to take the organisation 
underground. In its communiqués, the Weather Underground rightfully 
boasted about the FBI’s inability to penetrate the movement.61 Several FBI 
agents involved later expressed their frustration at their inability to get a 
hold of the movement. Larry Grathwohl was one of the few successful 
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infiltrators, but the FBI had to blow his cover at an early stage, as the need 
to show some results became so pressing that it was decided to take the 
opportunity to arrest two Weathermen, thereby sacrificing Grathwohl as a 
source of information.62 As Grathwohl’s handler bluntly put it: “[T]his 
decision came from the man in Washington. We need an arrest.”63 The 
arrests were made, but the FBI’s intelligence position deteriorated. 
In a telling illustration of the level of knowledge about the workings of 
the Weather Underground, the FBI, after having infiltrated the so-called 
Revolutionary Committee of the Weather Underground, thought it had 
finally gotten to the group’s leading centre, the Central Committee, only 
to find out that the Revolutionary Committee was a mere splinter that had 
gone its own way after the organisation had started to fall apart.64 The 
impotence of the FBI vis-à-vis the Weather Underground is also clear 
from the chart below, which indicates per year how many members of the 
Weather Underground were arrested. The numbers are drawn from a 
report from the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of 
the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws. This report 
contains a list of brief biographies of all known Weathermen, including 
information about if and when they were arrested.65 The chart shows that 
the vast majority of arrests took place in 1969, that is, before the decision 
to go underground was taken. The chart indicates the numbers of arrests, 
not the numbers of arrested individuals. Some members were arrested 
more than once in one year, with leading member Jeff Jones scoring a 
record setting number of six arrests in 1969. 
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Figure 13. Pattern of arrests of members of the Weather Underground over time 
From the Subcommittee report it is clear that the Days of Rage account for 
the lion’s share of the arrests in 1969. After the group went underground, 
the numbers of arrests decreased dramatically, which suggests that by this 
move the Weather Underground effectively shielded itself from 
interference by law enforcement agencies. The explanation for the FBI’s 
failure to curb the Weather Underground by infiltration and other 
intelligence instruments is threefold. 
First, as we have seen above, the FBI had alienated the social circles 
around the Weathermen. Their hostility kept them from providing the 
Bureau with the information it needed. Second, there was the 
transformation that the organisation went through during the period of 
preparation that preceded the move underground. In the previous 
sections it was described how the leadership forged unity among the 
membership to make sure they were all able to handle life underground. 
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infiltration could easily be picked up.66 The third explanation for the FBI’s 
lack of success in tracking down and apprehending members of the 
Weather Underground is the organisational culture of the FBI in the first 
half of the seventies. J. Edgar Hoover had introduced high standards of 
appropriate dress and behaviour for an FBI-agent. As Special Agent Wes 
Swearingen was instructed after he first joined the Bureau: “Y’all will 
always present the appearance of a successful businessman. Mr. Hoover 
expects each of his Special Agents to wear a dark business suit, a white 
shirt, a dark conservative tie, dark socks, and black shoes. Argyle socks 
and colored socks are strictly forbidden.”67 This culture of slickly combed 
hair and dark grey suits was so deeply engrained in the organisation that 
many FBI-agents found it difficult and at times even objectionable to act 
like members of groups like the Weather Underground, who were in 
many ways the direct opposite of FBI personnel.68 As Linda Evans 
rightfully observed at the time, if not without a certain conceit: “The FBI is 
not exactly the most competent organisation to direct itself against us, 
because our styles are so completely different that it’s hard for them to 
understand us.”69 
There were even some moral concerns about what it would take to get an 
undercover agent into the Weather Underground. In the opinion of a New 
York district attorney involved in the hunt for the Weathermen, “[i]t 
would be unconscionable to ask a policeman to infiltrate such a group. He 
would have to start popping pills, smoking grass and live in a 
commune”.70 This moral abhorrence of the decadent, out-of-control 
hippies of the Weather Underground was shared by the FBI and stood in 
the way of its success in its attempts to infiltrate the group. Cril Payne, an 
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FBI-agent who had been assigned to the investigation of the Weather 
Underground, actually remembers being frowned upon by colleagues for 
acting like a Weatherman, even though they knew it was part of the job he 
had been assigned.71 Other FBI-agents who were involved in attempts to 
track down the Weather Underground questioned the Bureau’s expertise 
on different grounds. Special Agent Don Strickland later admitted that the 
FBI standard approach to tracking down and capturing fugitives did not 
work.72 Wes Swearingen, another FBI-agent that had been tasked to 
capture the Weathermen, lamented this lack of expertise even more 
explicitly: “The problem was not that the Weathermen had college 
degrees, but that the majority of the agents in charge and supervisors had 
no experience in locating and apprehending fugitives. It was much like 
the blind leading the blind.”73 
In sum, the combination of indoctrination and isolation of the 
Weathermen and the lack of expertise on the part of the FBI allowed the 
collectives of the Weather Underground to remain at large. In terms of the 
program theory on intelligence gathering in chapter 1, the failure to 
infiltrate the movement indicates that things went wrong in the output 
phase. It was the way the principle was implemented that accounts for its 
lack of success, not the principle as such. The explanation lies in the FBI’s 
reluctance to act like members of the Weather Underground, the Bureau’s 
its lack of experience in dealing with fully underground opponents and 
with the adaptation of the Weather Underground after 1969, when the 
organisation went into hiding and took on some sectarian qualities that 
made it practically impenetrable. However, this immunity to the FBI’s 
efforts at disruption and debilitation cannot be perceived as an 
unqualified success for the Weather Underground. It was able to avoid 
infiltration, detection and arrest, but only at a considerable price, which 
brings us to the next section. 
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4.2.3 Law enforcement and direct action 
We have seen above how the FBI failed to infiltrate the Weather 
Underground and arrest more than a handful of its members. However, 
the pressure was kept high, and it was this pressure, together with the 
loss of political momentum after the end of the war in Vietnam (as 
discussed below), that contributed significantly to the unravelling of the 
Weather Underground. 
The FBI never dismantled the Weather Underground, but on several 
occasions came close. The group’s most important narrow-escape 
occurred in 1971, when the Bureau had tracked down the Weather 
collective in San Francisco. The San Francisco Weathermen were forced to 
leave all their belongings behind and only escaped after they managed to 
shake the police in a brief car chase.74 Even though the Weathermen got 
away, the incident showed that they always had to reckon with the police 
and the FBI, and could never let their guard down. The effect this had on 
the organisation shows that law enforcement pressure does not 
necessarily have to result in arrests in order to be successful. An illicit 
organisation that is forced to spend a lot of time and resources on 
avoiding arrest has little opportunity left for political action, which is 
essentially what happened to the Weather Underground. The constant 
need to acquire new false IDs and safehouses and to buy and get rid of 
cars drained the movement of many resources that could otherwise have 
been spent on violent political action.75 Also, the material living 
conditions were less than luxurious, as is clear from the accounts of 
several former members, who remember poor food and frequent illness.76 
FBI informer Larry Grathwohl took note of the hardship of life 
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underground as well: “It is not unusual for them to go for days without 
eating. To live in dirt and filth is rule rather than exception.”77  
Initially the Weathermen could bear the revolutionary lifestyle. They even 
described their constant vigilance as a form of spiritual and mental 
growth. In one of their communiqués, they spoke of “a yoga of alertness, a 
heightened awareness of activities and vibrations around us – almost a 
new set of eyes and ears”.78 Bill Ayers, a member of the Weather 
Underground’s central leadership, recalled the exhilaration and intensity 
of living up to the ideal of the revolutionary and claimed that he felt 
“born again” after the movement went underground.79 The tolerance for 
the burdens of life underground decreased, however, after it became clear 
that the revolutionary potential was fading, largely as a result of the end 
of the Vietnam War. 
With the ebbing of the revolutionary tide and the subsequent internal 
quarrelling about the new course, members began to see the efforts to 
hide from the FBI in a different light. Survival and avoiding arrest had 
become more important than revolutionary politics, which made clear the 
futility of their efforts and undercut group members’ willingness to 
participate in illicit activities.80 At the same time, the yearning for a more 
normal life was growing, not in the least because some members wanted 
to raise a family or already had children, whom they wanted to have a 
regular life.81 Even the fiery Bernardine Dohrn, the leader of the Weather 
Underground, dubbed “La Pasionara of the lunatic left” by J. Edgar 
Hoover, decided to surface for such mundane reasons. After they had 
their first child, she and her husband Bill Ayers realised that underground 
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life was becoming untenable.82 The combination of the pressure, the wish 
for a life aboveground, and the lack of responsiveness of the constituency 
broke the spirit of the Weather Underground, whose members began to 
question whether there was much point in carrying on the armed 
struggle. The mood was perfectly, if prosaically, summed up by former 
member Brian Flanagan, who said: “I thought we were being reduced to a 
group that just put a bomb here and then a few months later put a bomb 
here and then put a bomb there. That seemed to me to be sort of played 
out. How much further could we go with that? And we were increasingly 
being thought of as sort of an isolated cult. I was feeling lonely and 
alienated and I missed my girlfriend and I just wasn’t having a very good 
time.”83 
When examining the effects of law enforcement and direct action, it is 
tempting to point out that the output identified in the program theory 
was falling short, as the FBI rarely managed to arrest a member of the 
Weather Underground and the group retained the capability to carry out 
bombings. Even though this is true, the Bureau’s efforts did nevertheless 
bear some fruit, although in a different way than one might expect. The 
case of the Weather Underground shows that the mere presence of law 
enforcement pressure, regardless of any arrests it results in, can by itself 
be a factor that leads to the incapacitation of a terrorist organisation. 
Always under law enforcement pressure, the Weathermen constantly had 
to be on guard. To this mental strain were added the time and resources 
that went into surviving as fugitives, to the point where the membership 
felt that outsmarting the FBI went at the expense of political action, the 
reason why they had gone underground in the first place. The FBI’s 
ambition was undoubtedly to dismantle the Weather Underground by 
apprehending its members, but its success was political rather than 
operational in nature: the group was not dismantled, but was cut off from 
its support base and consequently condemned to political irrelevance. 
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4.2.4 Addressing root causes 
In chapter 1, we recounted the argument that addressing root causes, 
including political grievances, may be a way to deprive a terrorist 
organisation of its support base. There is no way to argue that the Nixon 
administration ended the war in Vietnam in an attempt to put an end to 
the Weather Underground, but the effect of this move made it a de facto 
counterterrorism measure. It affected the unity of the movement and 
added to the desperation that many members felt as a result of the 
burdens of the revolutionary lifestyle. The Weather Underground had 
grown out of the anti-war movement and while the war went on, there 
was a clear cause célèbre around which the radical left, including the 
Weather Underground, could rally. After the war ended, debates ensued 
about the new course, and they were never adequately resolved. This lack 
of a clear political purpose can be read from the pattern of the Weather 
Underground attacks in figure 14.  
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To gather the data for figure 14, all attacks by the Weather Underground 
have been scored on the political cause they served.84 In most cases, the 
Weather Underground itself explained the political cause that was served 
by an attack in an accompanying communiqué.85 In cases where there was 
no communiqué, the political cause was deduced from the target choice. 
For instance, an attack on a police station without a communiqué has been 
placed in the category ‘Police violence / repression’, because it was 
interpreted it as a protest against certain law enforcement practices.  
Figure 14 shows a widening of the focus of the Weather Underground 
after the Paris Peace Accords of January 1973, which officially ended the 
Vietnam War. From 1969 till 1973, all attacks were either a protest against 
US involvement in the war in Vietnam or a protest against the repression 
of domestic opposition. In 1973, 1974 and 1975, the variety of causes that 
the Weathermen wanted to serve by their bombings was wider. One 
attack was meant to contribute to the liberation of women, another 
expressed support for a strike in Puerto Rico and yet others were meant to 
punish companies for doing business in Chile, which was then ruled by 
the junta of Augusto Pinochet, who had come to power after the US-
backed toppling of the socialist government led by Salvador Allende. This 
widening of the scope of the target selection matches the impressions of 
the movement’s memoirists, many of whom stated that with the end of 
the war in Vietnam, the Weather Underground failed to adopt a cause 
dramatic and pressing enough to preserve the movement’s momentum.86  
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This process eventually led to the disintegration of the Weather 
Underground, as there was no political agenda or course of action that all 
members could agree on. Instead, the group fell prey to internal division 
and bickering, leading to fractionalisation and disintegration. The 
Weather leadership tried to save the day by attempting to turn the 
Weather Underground in a more conventional communist party and put 
more effort into generating mass support. In a demonstration of 
decreased militancy, the leadership decided to spread its views by 
releasing a book (Prairie fire), a magazine (Osawatomie), and a movie 
(Underground). Not all members appreciated this return to the tactics of 
the ‘Old Left’ and some questioned the need to stay underground if the 
focus was going to be on perfectly legal activities like publishing books 
and magazines.87 In the end, this solution only accelerated the 
disintegration that was already underway. 
When seen as a way to address the root causes of terrorism, the end of the 
Vietnam War quite closely follows the program theory on addressing root 
causes in chapter 1. The atrocities in Vietnam came to an end, so the anti-
war movement, the constituency from which the Weather Underground 
had to draw their support, effectively got what it wanted. Consequently, 
the support for radical action dwindled and the time of mass rallies in 
Washington, DC was over. This forced the Weather Underground to find 
a new course to attract popular support. As we have seen, they failed to 
do so.88 If anything, it turned out that the Vietnam War had covered up 
many differences of opinion that the organisation proved unable to 
handle. 
4.2.5 Offer exits 
Given the hard feelings of the US government towards the Weather 
Underground, it is difficult to see how they could have offered them a 
way out of the underground, yet they inadvertently did. The FBI had used 
every method available to build a case against members of the Weather 
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Underground, but when it came to the legal prosecution, the Bureau 
flinched. There were conspiracy charges and charges for battery and 
assault out against some of the Weathermen, but much of the evidence 
was obtained by illegal means, for instance burglaries, unwarranted 
phone taps and the unlawful use of grand juries.89 To avoid 
embarrassment in court, the charges against the leading Weathermen 
were dropped under the pretext that the use of this evidence in court 
would endanger national security and foreign intelligence sources.90  
For the Weathermen concerned, this meant that suddenly they were no 
longer fugitives. Even though the dropping of the charges was not meant 
as a counterterrorism measure in the way described in section 3.3.8, it did 
function that way. With the end of the Vietnam War, the confusion among 
the radical left in general and the disintegration of the Weather 
Underground, the Weathermen were susceptible to the idea of going back 
to their normal lives. The dropping of the charges against them allowed 
them to do so with little risk of having to stand trial for their actions of the 
previous years. Further, the sentences that were handed out for charges 
that hadn’t been dropped, were mild, so here too, the aboveground 
became a viable alternative to the pressure and marginalisation of staying 
underground.91 The Weathermen perceived this as a sign that the state 
wanted to make amends.92 Also, in January 1977 President Jimmy Carter 
introduced an unconditional amnesty for draft dodgers, after Ford had 
already granted a conditional amnesty in September 1974. Before 1975, the 
Weathermen thought the US was turning into a fascist dictatorship, but 
Presidential decisions like these, the aftermath of the Watergate affair and 
the leniency shown by judges for surfacing Weathermen showed that 
times had changed. By 1980, almost all members of the Weather 
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Underground had left the underground, facing fines and probations at 
most.93 
Like ‘addressing root causes’, the ‘offer exits’ principle applies to this case 
in an atypical way, as it is another example of ‘accidental 
counterterrorism’. Amnesty regulations and reintegration programmes 
are usually applied to detainees. In the case of the Weather Underground, 
however, there was no consciously applied measure or programme. 
Rather, the state was forced to drop the charges against the Weathermen. 
Nevertheless, the effect was similar to the one outlined in the program 
theory. By dropping the charges, the state offered the Weathermen a 
viable alternative to life underground. By the time this happened, the 
radical left was on the decline, it was clear that the Vietnam War was 
going to end and many among the Weathermen wanted to lead normal 
lives. The dropping of the charges thus ws instrumental in the lowering 
morale of the movement and provided incentives for underground 
members to surface. It is interesting, though, that the abandonment of 
terrorism occurred in the absence of a significant change of heart on the 
part of the members. Many former Weathermen stick to their radical ideas 
to this day, which suggests that disengagement can be realised in the 
absence of deradicalisation. 
4.3 Conclusion 
Although the role of the state in the demise of the Weather Underground 
is a peculiar one, given that some of the actions that severely affected the 
group’s cohesion and fighting spirit were not intended as 
counterterrorism measures, this case does provide some relevant insights 
regarding counterterrorism effectiveness (see figure 15 for an overview). 
First, it confirmed the widely shared assumption that excessive use of 
force and violations of the rule of law can exacerbate a terrorist threat. 
State violence against anti-war protesters and the Black Panthers did 
much to confirm the notion that the state was a dangerous and vicious 
                                                          
93 B. de Graaf, Theater van de Angst: de Strijd tegen Terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, 
Italië en Amerika (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2010), 89. 
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foe. The police murder of the Black Panthers and the harassment of 
people that were in some way, however tenuously, linked to the Weather 
Underground were important factors in the group’s decision to go 
underground and start a covert bombing campaign. 
Another important observation concerns the use of repressive means, i.e. 
law enforcement and intelligence, and the inadvertent successes they may 
yield. The FBI failed to get infiltrators or informers in the group, and 
arrested very few Weathermen after the movement had gone 
underground, but their efforts but did have a political impact. The case of 
the Weather Underground shows that there is a trade-off between 
organisational security, i.e. the ability to remain at large, and political 
impact. In terrorist campaigns, operational success and political success 
do not necessarily go together. Terrorist organisations only have a shot at 
political success if their attacks can be understood by their constituency as 
legitimate actions that serve the interests of the group that the collectives 
claim to be fighting for. In order to meet this requirement the terrorist 
organisation needs to be able to get in touch with its constituency, 
something that is not easy to do when constantly in hiding. In the case of 
the Weather Underground law enforcement pressure put such a burden 
on the organisation that meaningful political action became impossible, 
even though the FBI never managed to bring members of the Weathermen 
to trial and the group continued to carry out some bombings, albeit with 
decreasing frequency. The detachment from the support base, brought 
about by law enforcement pressure, turned the Weather Underground 
into a vanguard without a following. 
Another reason why the Weather Underground is interesting as a 
counterterrorism case study is that it shows the importance of the 
difference between the political demands of the terrorist group and those 
of the terrorist group’s support base. The Weather Underground was out 
to overthrow the capitalist and imperialist system in the US, but was 
badly affected when the government gave in on a much more modest 
demand that resonated with the group’s support base. Again, the end of 
the war in Vietnam was not meant to end terrorism, but it did lead to a 
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decline of peace activism. Many in the protest movement who 
sympathised with the Weather Underground did not move on to other 
anti-capitalist struggles after it became clear that the Vietnam War would 
come to an end. They abandoned the protest movement altogether, which 
obviously dampened their enthusiasm for the armed struggle waged by 
the Weather Underground. The Weather Underground’s constituency got 
what it wanted, and that was much less than what the Weathermen 
themselves were aiming for. The group was more radical than its support 
base and wanted to carry on the fight against capitalism, but found that 
the end of the Vietnam War had taken the spirit out of the movement on 
which they relied to bring about the actual revolution. The Weathermen’s 
days were numbered when members came to realise that their attacks 
were pointless in the absene of a protest movement or support base to 
pick up the bat. Finding themselves fighting for a lost cause, group 
members were more inclined to take the opportunity to surface when it 
became clear that the state’s retribution would be minimal. Many were no 
longer willing to carry the burden of life as an urban guerrilla, and took 
the opportunity to leave.  
Outcome Explanation
Weather Underground




Lacks of restraint in the use of force gained the Weather Underground the sympathy and 




The FBI’s illegal actions (e.g. the black bag jobs) convinced the Weather Underground of the 




Long-term commitment Not applied
Addressing root causes Effective
The end of the Vietnam War was not a counterterrorism measure, but did remove one of the 
main grievances of the Weather Underground’s constituency and undercut its support base
Law enforcement and 
direct action
Effective
Very few members were arrested, but the group had to put so much efforts into escaping the 
police that they became isolated and could not reach out to their support base




When the charges against the Weathermen were dropped because the evidence had been 







The FBI agent’s inability to act as Weathermen and the secretive nature of the Weather
Underground stood in the way of intelligence gathering efforts; only one mole was placed
 
Figure 15. Counterterrorism principles as applied against the Weather Underground
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5 Vendetta: the Red Army Faction against the 
West German state 
The Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF) was responsible for the 
most turbulent episode of West-German history.1 During the so-called 
Deutsche Herbst (German Autumn) of 1977 the group managed to capture 
the attention of the entire nation when, after having committed a string of 
assassinations, they kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer, chairman of the 
Confederation of German Employers’ Associations and the Federation of 
German Industries. The group demanded the liberation from prison of 
RAF-members who had been arrested in 1972, among them the illustrious 
leaders Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe and Irmgard 
Möller (Ulrike Meinhof, another leading member, had committed suicide 
in 1976).2 In the ensuing weeks, Germany witnessed a stand-off between 
the RAF and the state, neither of which wanted to flinch.3 What made 
these events even more dramatic was that they took place against the 
background of a country that was still coming to terms with a troubled 
history of political violence. The RAF and its supporters claimed that the 
West-German state was a fascist regime in disguise, and that the group’s 
killings and kidnappings of the preceding years could be justified as 
legitimate acts of resistance. On the other hand, though, there were those 
who felt that the RAF’s ruthlessness and absolutist mind-set was similar 
to that of the Nazis. This perceived similarity led some to unflatteringly 
label the RAF ‘Hitler’s Children’.4 
The crisis reached its climax in October 1977. To back up the RAF’s 
demands while simultaneously pressing for the liberation of their own 
members, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
hijacked the Landshut, a plane with German tourists on 13 October. The 
                                                          
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in Van Dongen, “Law Enforcement as Politics by 
Other Means: Lessons from Countering Revolutionary Terrorism.” 
2 Rote Armee Fraktion, “Die Schleyer-Entführung,” in Texte Und Materialien Zur Geschichte 
Der RAF (Berlin: ID Verlag, 1997), 270–271. 
3 K. Hanshew, Terror and Democracy in West Germany (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 217. 
4 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 200. 
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plane eventually landed in Mogadishu, where all passengers were held 
hostage. After a prolonged siege German Special Forces stormed the 
plane on 18 October. The passengers were saved, and three of the four 
hijackers were killed.5 On hearing that the attempt to liberate them had 
failed, the four incarcerated RAF leaders killed themselves, with the 
exception of Möller, who tried but failed. Schleyer did not survive either. 
His kidnappers had made good on their threat to kill him if they would 
not get their way. Before the German Autumn, the RAF had ardent 
supporters as well as vehement opponents, but the outcome of the 
kidnapping of Schleyer and the hijacking of the Landshut changed this. 
Public opinion turned against the RAF, which survived as an 
organisation, but only to commit occasional assassinations with little 
impact - except the personal tragedies they caused - before it disbanded 
itself in 1998. 
Possibly as a result of the drama involved in the RAF’s operations and the 
polarisation of West-German society over the RAF and its message, the 
country never ceased to be interested in the history of its most notorious 
terrorist organisation. This became clear in 2008, at the release of Der 
Baader-Meinhof Komplex, a movie about the group. With an audience of 
almost 2.5 million viewers, the movie roused considerable debate, as some 
felt that it glorified the terrorists and others complained about the 
graphically displayed violence.6 Given this ongoing fascination with the 
events surrounding the RAF, especially the German Autumn, it should 
come as no surprise that many German journalists and historians have 
                                                          
5 B. Peters, “Die RAF Erleidet Ihre Grösste Niederlage,” Welt Online, October 14, 2007, 
http://www.welt.de/politik/article1263664/Die-RAF-erleidet-ihre-groesste-
Niederlage.html. 
6 “Baader Meinhof Film Stirs Controversy in Germany,” Telegraph, September 20, 2008, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/3024047/Baader-
Meinhof-film-stirs-controversy-in-Germany.html; “Baader-Meinhof: The Truth behind the 
Twisted Myth,” Times Online, December 11, 2008, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5133354.ece. The movie 
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written extensively about the self-styled ‘urban guerrillas’.7 Although 
these publications are generally thoroughly researched and in some cases 
take the shape of massive volumes, they tend to remain descriptive, 
containing little analysis of the facts that are being presented. This gap is 
not filled by the more academic literature, where the RAF is notably 
absent. For instance, the academic journals Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
and Terrorism and Political Violence combined contain only two articles on 
the RAF in the issues that have been released after the group’s dissolution 
in 1998.8 This chapter will draw on the more descriptive literature about 
the RAF to draw the group’s history into the academic debate about 
counterterrorism effectiveness. On the basis of the secondary sources just 
mentioned, but also using primary sources like communiqués, group 
correspondence and interviews and memoirs of former members, it will 
be shown how both the state and the RAF got so caught up in their 
confrontation, that both lost track of the importance of popular support, 
with the RAF eventually losing the political battle as a result.  
5.1 The Red Army Faction 
5.1.1 Ideology 
Like the Weather Underground, the RAF grew out of the protest 
movement of the late 1960s. In Germany as well as in the US, students 
adopted themes imperialism, sexism and racism, and created a wave of 
demonstrations, sometimes resulting in violent clashes with the police.9 A 
                                                          
7 See e.g. S. Aust, Der Baader-Meinhof Komplex, 2nd ed. (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe 
Verlag, 1997); W. Kraushaar, ed., Die RAF Und Der Linke Terrorismus (Hamburg: Institut 
für Sozialforschung, 2006); K. Pflieger, Die Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF). 14.5.1970 Bis 
20.4.1998 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007); B. Peters, Tödlicher Irrtum: Die Geschichte Der RAF 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007). See also Der Spiegel's collection of 
articles on the RAF: http://www.spiegel.de/thema/rote_armee_fraktion/, accessed 12 
October 2010. 
8 M. Gutmann, “Notable Literature on Germany’s Red Army Faction within the Context of 
‘Die RAF Und Der Linke Terrorismus,’” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 371–
75; A. Moghadam, “Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 35, no. 2 (2012): 156–81. 
9 G. Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968 (Cambridge, MA: 
South End Press, 1987), 23–29. 
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particularly German twist to the social turmoil was added by the 
country’s Nazi-past. The younger generation in West-German society was 
becoming increasingly critical of the older generation, which had 
contributed to the Nazi atrocities yet still held important positions in the 
economy and public administration of the country.10 This suggested 
continuity between Nazi Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), a view which profoundly influenced the RAF and would become 
one of the major arguments it used to justify the use of violence.11 
In spite of the similarity of their views, it would not be fully accurate to 
say that the RAF grew out of the student movement. None of the 
founding and leading members of the RAF were students. Rather, they 
were part of the so-called Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (APO, Extra-
Parliamentary Opposition), a loosely affiliated movement that included 
not only students, but also peace activists, and people who were 
concerned about government repression.12 The RAF can be understood as 
one of the radical spin-offs of this movement after it had started its 
decline. Where most protesters abandoned the movement after it fell prey 
to internal discord, the RAF was made up of activists who, fearing that 
the rebellious spirit of ’68 might get lost, felt that fighting on was now 
more important than ever.13  
Disappointed by the results of the largely non-violent actions of the 
sixties, the RAF decided in 1970 to up the ante and announce the 
beginning of the armed struggle. The occasion was the freeing of Andreas 
Baader. In 1968 Baader and three other members of the APO had set fire 
                                                          
10 P. Groenewold, “Deutscher Frühling - Deutscher Herbst: De Mediastrijd Om de Culturele 
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145 (1999): 410–411. 
11 “Ich Bin Nicht Bereit, Die RAF Als Kriminalfall Zu Besprechen,” Der Freitag, December 21, 
2007, http://www.freitag.de/2007/51/07511801.php. 
12 P.A. Richter, “Die Außerparlamentarische Opposition in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1966 Bis 1968,” Geschichte Und Gesellschaft 17 (1998): 35–55. 
13 P. Melzer, “Maternal Ethics and Political Violence: The ‘betrayal’ of Motherhood among 
the Women of the RAF and June 2 Movement,” Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies 47, no. 
1 (2011): 88–89. 
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to a magazine store in Frankfurt, for which he was sentenced to three 
years in prison.14 He appealed against this verdict and took the 
opportunity to flee abroad, but was arrested when he came back to 
Germany.15 In 1970, some friends of Baader’s, including the radical leftist 
journalist Ulrike Meinhof, decided to liberate him. On the pretext that 
Baader had been working on a book with Meinhof before his arrest, she 
managed to persuade the authorities to allow Baader to go to a library to 
study some materials for their research project. The group members then 
entered the building, overpowered the guards and liberated Baader.16 
Afterwards, the RAF published its first communiqué, called Building the 
Red Army (Die Rote Armee aufbauen), which proclaimed the foundation of 
an urban guerrilla force to overthrow the existing order.17 
Several more position papers followed, as the RAF initially put a lot of 
effort in explaining its position and strategy to the public. The most 
important were Das Konzept Stadtguerilla (The urban guerrilla concept), Über 
den bewaffneten Kampf in Westeuropa (On the armed struggle in Western 
Europe) and Dem Volk dienen. Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf (Serving the 
people: urban guerrilla and class struggle). Although they did spell out the 
RAF’s political rationale, it is questionable whether these papers yielded 
the RAF much working class support, as they were long, pretentious, and 
drawn up in tiresome and at times impenetrable prose, which included 
sentences like: “It is not about going it alone, but about creating out of the 
daily struggle, mobilisations and organisational processes of the legal left 
a political-military vanguard, a political-military core that has to develop 
an illegal infrastructure - which is a precondition, a necessity for the 
ability to act - under the conditions of repression, of illegality, of practice 
and that can give the legal struggle in the factory, in the neighbourhood, 
                                                          
14 “Die Frankfurter Brandstifter,” Zeit, November 8, 1968, 
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on the streets, at the universities continuity, orientation, strength and 
purpose to that, which the development of the political and economic 
crisis in the imperialist system will be all about: the conquest of political 
power.”18  
The political logic that arose out of these papers was twofold. First, the 
RAF saw itself as part of an international anti-imperialist struggle that 
was primarily waged by national liberation movements in the Third 
World. It felt that Germany was an important ally of the US, and often 
underlined West-German complicity in the Vietnam War by pointing to 
the fact that American planes left for Vietnam from German airbases.19 By 
waging an urban guerrilla against the West-German state, the RAF tried 
to bring the imperialist machine to a halt.20 That the group did not see its 
own armed struggle as a solely German matter is also clear from their 
ambition to win over Kim Il Sung, the North Korean dictator, to their 
cause. In a 1971 draft letter to ‘the Great Leader’, Ulrike Meinhof 
explained the RAF’s position in the fight against imperialism and 
requested assistance in building and training RAF-cadres.21  
                                                          
18 “‘Wir Werden in Den Durststreik Treten’: Spiegel-Fragen an Andreas Baader, Ulrike 
Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin Und Jan-Carl Raspe,” Spiegel, 1976, 53. The original sentence is 
“Es geht nicht um den Alleingang, sondern darum, aus den Tageskämpfen, Mobilisierungen 
und Organizationsprozessen der legalen Linken eine politisch-militärische Avantgarde, einen 
politisch-militärischen Kern zu schaffen, der eine illegale Infrastruktur – die Voraussetzung, 
Bedingung von Handlungsfähigkeit ist – unter den Bedingungen des Verfolgung, der 
Illegalität, der Praxis entwickeln muss und der den legalen Kämpfen in der Fabrik, im 
Stadtteil, auf den Strasse, an den Universitäten erst Kontinuität, Orientierung, Stärke, Ziel 
geben kann, zu dem, worum es in der Entwicklung der ökonomischen und politischen Krise 
des imperialistischen System gehen wird: der Eroberung der politischen Macht.” 
19 O. Tolmein, “RAF - Das War Für Uns Befreiung”: Ein Gespräch Über Bewaffneten Kampf, 
Knast Und Die Linke Mit Irmgard Möller, Aktualisierte und erweiterte Neuauflage 
(Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 2005), 41. 
20 Rote Armee Fraktion, “Das Konzept Stadtguerrilla,” 31; Rote Armee Fraktion, “Dem Volk 
Dienen. Stadtguerilla Und Klassenkampf,” in Texte Und Materialien Zur Geschichte Der RAF 
(Berlin: ID Verlag, 1997), 116. 
21 U. Meinhof, “Brief Der Rote Armee Fraktion in Der Bundesrepublik Und Westberlin an 
Die Partei Der Arbeit Der Volksrepublik Korea Mit Der Bitte Um Unterstützung Durch 




The second main component of the RAF’s strategy was ‘propaganda of 
the deed’, that is, the creation of revolutionary spirit by violent action. In 
The urban guerrilla concept, the RAF admitted that the revolutionary forces 
in Germany were weak, but at the same time the group stressed the 
possibility that violent action would show the working class that the state 
was not as strong as many assumed. By simultaneously unveiling the 
state’s weaknesses and demonstrating the determination of the 
revolutionaries, the RAF wanted to stir the masses into action. The state 
had to bear the brunt of the attacks not only because of the support and 
alliance to the US, but also because it was inherently evil. Again, the RAF 
saw continuity between Nazi Germany and the FRG and believed that the 
FRG’s true nature - a fascist dictatorship - was hidden behind a mask of 
political and economic concessions. This view would lead the group to 
interpret many of the counterterrorism measures discussed below as signs 
that the mask was slipping and that the armed struggle had forced the 
FRG to show its true colours. Such policies, so the RAF believed, would 
only accelerate the downfall of the capitalist system. The RAF was 
convinced that the masses would rally around them to stand up against 
the state and the agents of repression.22 
But outspoken and elaborate as the RAF may have been, there were limits 
to the group’s writings. First, the RAF’s main papers contained lengthy 
sections of social analysis and strategic reflection, but, even by the 
members’ own admission, offered no clues about what would happen 
once the capitalist system had been overthrown.23 The group’s communist 
affiliation was clear, if only from its name, but there was no mention of a 
council or soviet system, a dictatorship of the proletariat or any other kind 
of post-revolutionary order. The RAF leadership saw themselves as 
destroyers only, and did not feel responsible for ideas about what to do 
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after the fall of the capitalist system.24 What is more, the strong emphasis 
on the articulation of the group’s ideology did not survive the initial stage 
of group’s existence. After the strategy papers mentioned above had been 
published in the early seventies, it took the RAF a decade before it came 
up with another one. As the group got deeper and deeper involved in 
armed struggle, it paid less attention to the explanation of the ideological 
foundations of its attacks. The papers from the early seventies were, 
however flawed, richer in analysis than the group’s later writings, which, 
for instance, contained no examinations of the revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary forces in society. Instead, they vaguely stated the 
need to fight for human self-determination and dignity.25 (The decreasing 
articulacy of the RAF’s writings and the meaning of that development will 
be explained below in the section on law enforcement.) 
5.1.2 Organisational structure and culture 
The RAF is often used as an example of ‘old’ terrorism and in that 
capacity contrasted with ‘new’, Al Qaeda-style terrorism. One of the main 
arguments for this distinction is the organisational structure of terrorist 
groups. ‘Old’ terrorist groups are supposed to be more hierarchically 
structured than their recent and more loosely organised counterparts.26 
While the RAF should not be understood to have had a military-like 
organisation with an elaborate division of labour, it is true that it had a 
leading centre that guided the cells functioning below it and constantly 
questioned whether group members were worthy of RAF-membership.27 
Many cadres admired the founding core of the RAF because of their 
                                                          
24 M. Schiller, “Es War Ein Harter Kampf Um Meiner Erinnerung”: Ein Lebensbericht Aus Der 
RAF (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 2007), 143; see also Karl-Heinz Dellwo’s similar 
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26 M. Crenshaw, The Debate over “Old” Vs.’new’ Terrorism, Prepared for presentation at the 
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27 Moghadam, “Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction,” 161–162. 
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determination, perceived political sophistication and their ability to get 
under the skin of the authorities.28 Ulrike Meinhof had built a reputation 
for herself as a journalist for the left-wing magazine konkret, whereas the 
others had drawn attention by prominent roles in radical and violent 
actions of the late sixties. Many looked up to them as true challengers of 
dictatorial state power. As we will see below, the imprisonment of the 
leaders of the first generation added an element of martyrdom to their 
outlaw status. 
The most important factor, however, was the authority exuded by 
Andreas Baader. While Ulrike Meinhof was the voice of the RAF, Baader 
was its undisputed leader.29 According to first-generation member Astrid 
Proll, “[e]verything in the RAF centred around Baader.”30 With his street 
urchin-image, his car stealing skills and his undisguised contempt for 
intellectual prowess, he seemed to derive his status from his credibility as 
a man of action rather than from his deep understanding of the group’s 
ideology. An important element of his charisma was the swagger he 
portrayed. Baader was a vain man, craving female attention, fast cars and 
stylish outfits, the latter to the point where he refused to wear a uniform 
instead of his trademark jeans and leather jacket during drilling exercises 
in a PFLP-training camp (on which more below). His confidence and 
defiant attitude had already gained him some notoriety during the trial 
for the 1968 arson and later made him by all accounts an appealing figure 
to many people in the RAF and its support groups.31 
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Baader, to whom other group members referred as ‘the general-director’ 
(Generaldirektor), also used bullying manners and fits of rage to vest his 
authority. He was very hard on people whom he felt had failed in their 
tasks. In this he spared no one, reportedly calling Ensslin “silly bitch” and 
Meinhof “fat cow”.32 Other members of the group, even those who were 
part of the leading core, tolerated this behaviour and accepted Baader’s 
scoldings.33 In 1976, during the trials for the RAF attacks from 1971 and 
1972, the public prosecutor had a stake in demonstrating that the RAF 
was a centrally guided organisation, as that would allow him to pin the 
blame on the captured leaders. A RAF-member who acted as a crown 
witness had testified that Baader was the leading figure, but four other 
RAF-members that were called on as witnesses denied this, claiming that 
Baader was not a leader in the conventional sense, but rather inspired 
others to independently maximise their own potential. Ironically, in doing 
so they only confirmed Baader’s status, as their statements about the 
functioning of the RAF closely followed instructions from a note that he 
had sent them several weeks earlier.34 
A particularly interesting feature of the RAF’s leadership is that they 
could play their leading role even after they had been incarcerated. 
Crucial to this ability to maintain their leadership was the so-called ‘info-
system’. The lawyers of the imprisoned leaders took written messages 
from their clients to other imprisoned RAF-leaders and to the RAF-
members outside prison. This way, the leadership managed to coordinate 
the activities from the cadres that were still at large. After the arrests of 
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the leaders of the first generation in 1972, the membership organised 
around the lawyers’ offices, which served as coordinating centres for the 
RAF’s activities.35 When preparing or carrying out violent actions, the 
cells acted on a need-to-know principle, and not all cells knew what other 
cells were doing.36 Only the leadership had full situational awareness. 
With such an organisational structure, it was possible that some RAF-
members were surprised by the group’s most spectacular actions, such as 
the hijacking of the Landshut, the plane that was supposed to take German 
tourists to Mallorca but was captured by the PFLP to help the RAF free its 
imprisoned leaders. 
The compliance of the RAF’s cadres was further cemented by severe 
group pressure. The RAF-leadership demanded from its members a clear 
and decisive break with the past. Shortly after she joined the group, first-
generation member Margrit Schiller was told: "With the decision for the 
underground struggle, our personal lives are now at the service of this 
struggle. What was before, no longer counts."37 With nowhere else to go, it 
was difficult for individual members to go against the prevailing 
consensus on major issues. Loyalty to the group was thus guaranteed. 
Former members recall how the atmosphere discouraged the airing of 
dissenting views stifled fundamental discussion.38 Political views that 
differed from the consensus in the group were considered betrayal, and 
were often ascribed to personal shortcomings of those who held them.39  
Even members in the leading circles were not safe from severe criticism 
and expulsion. After their incarceration in 1972, tensions among the RAF’s 
leaders ran high. First, Ulrike Meinhof had an axe to grind with Horst 
Mahler, who joined the RAF after having been Baader’s lawyer during the 
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trial for the 1968 arson in the department store. Meinhof and Mahler had 
different perceptions of the role of the German masses, to which Mahler 
felt the RAF owed some accountability. Meinhof on the other hand, 
believed that the fascist nature of the FRG called for violent action, 
regardless of what the working class was thinking.40 In 1974, Mahler was 
expelled from the RAF. The accompanying statement was an example of 
how political differences of opinion were made personal. In it, the RAF 
claimed that Mahler was an egotist who only worked for the RAF to make 
a name for himself as one of the main publicists of the radical left. The 
statement further accused him of bossing people around and said that 
Mahler had never understood what the RAF was about. The core of the 
problem was formulated as follows: “The problem with Horst Mahler is 
and always has been that he has remained a dirty, bourgeois 
chauvinist.”41 The next victim was Ulrike Meinhof herself. She was facing 
strong criticism from Baader and especially Ensslin, both of whom 
claimed that Meinhof was still too bourgeois and betrayed the RAF by 
behaving the way she did, thus explaining their differences of opinion 
with Meinhof by her personal flaws.42 She became increasingly isolated 
from the other imprisoned RAF-members and no longer took part in the 
group’s common statements in the court room. Also, during one of the 
court sessions, the other leaders distanced themselves from a RAF attack 
that was widely known within the group to have been organised by 
Meinhof.43 As a prison guard at Stammheim observed: “Night after night 
Meinhof wrote political communiqués in her cell, only for Baader to tear 
them to pieces, unread. Ensslin detested her, Raspe ignored her.”44 
Probably as a result of the rejection by her former comrades, Meinhof 
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committed suicide on 9 May 1976. The other imprisoned leaders claimed 
that she was murdered.45 
5.1.3 Modus operandi 
Having few members with previous experience in waging armed 
struggle, the RAF decided after the liberation of Andreas Baader to take 
some time to prepare and build the necessary expertise for armed attacks. 
The first priority was the acquisition of IDs, cars and money needed for 
the terrorist campaign. The Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella 
authored the widely-influential Mini-manual of the urban guerrilla, in which 
he argued that bank robberies were good opportunities for a beginning 
group to train and prepare for real operations.46 The leadership of the 
RAF were among Marighella’s many followers, and they, too, saw such 
relatively low-key operations as a crucial part of the preparation for the 
actual confrontation with the armed representatives of the capitalist 
system.47 That preparation was needed, is clear from the wrap-up of one 
burglary, when Meinhof decoded her instructions wrongly and 
consequently sent a package containing stolen passports to the wrong 
address.48 
As one of the goals of their attacks was to generate mass support, the RAF 
was careful not to hurt innocent bystanders. Generally, the RAF’s attacks 
had specific targets, such as the police and the military, which allowed 
them to spare the uninvolved. Figure 15 shows that the casualty rates of 
the attacks of the RAF’s first two generations were generally low. One 
exception was the bombing of the building of Springer Publishers 
(Springer Verlag), where 24 employees got injured. In the communiqué 
that explained this attack, the RAF pinned the blame on Springer 
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Publishers, stating that the company’s management cared so little about 
their personnel that they had not found it necessary to clear the building 
after the RAF had warned them that there was a bomb inside.49 
Nevertheless, there were limits to the RAF’s consideration. For instance, 
the category ‘innocent bystanders’ did not extend to bodyguards and 
drivers. The RAF considered staff complicit in the crimes of their bosses, 
arguing that those in supporting roles could know about the activities 
their bosses were involved in. For instance, drivers were shot both in the 
operation to assassinate federal prosecutor-general Siegfried Buback and 
the kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer.50 
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Figure 16. Numbers of dead and wounded as a result of attacks of the RAF’s first two 
generations 
The first attacks of the RAF were aimed against military or police targets. 
After the 1972 wave of arrests, it took the organisation some time before 
the capacities needed for violent action were restored. The second phase 
consisted of assassinations and hostage takings that were meant to force 
the authorities to free the imprisoned leaders. This phase culminated in 
the German Autumn. The combined kidnapping of Schleyer and the 
PFLP’s hijacking of a plane with German tourists on board was supposed 
to force the German government to set the RAF-prisoners free, but failed 
miserably, ending with the collective suicide of the RAF-leadership. The 
group took a while to recover from this blow, but then went back to the 
type of attack that had been committed by the first generation in the early 
seventies. RAF-attacks after 1979 were mostly assassinations of military 
officers or businessmen who supposedly played an important role in the 
military-industrial complex. 
In considering the violence committed by the RAF, it should be noted that 
it did not owe its reputation to its planned attacks alone. On several 
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occasions, RAF-members were involved in shoot-outs with the police. In 
some of these cases the police was closing in on the RAF, in others they 
stumbled more or less by accident on some RAF members during an 
ordinary traffic control. These confrontations resulted in casualties on 
both sides, when RAF members tried to escape or prevent the arrest of 
one of their own by opening fire.51 
5.1.4 Decline and aftermath 
The RAF’s 1977 offensive was an unmitigated disaster for the group. The 
assassinations of Buback, the hijacking of the Landshut and the 
kidnapping of Schleyer had failed to liberate the group’s leaders, leaving 
the second generation heavily demoralised.52 Also, the brutality of the 
actions had alienated the RAF from its support base. The widely-shared 
perception, also among the radical left, was that the RAF had gone too far. 
As time went by, the RAF became more and more out of touch with the 
leftist protest movement, which moved on to new issues, such as nuclear 
weapons and the environment. The RAF failed to incorporate new themes 
like these in its agenda, and stuck to its resistance against the military-
industrial complex.53  
This lack of connection to a constituency became even more of a problem 
after 1982, when the leadership of the RAF’s second generation were 
arrested, the RAF was taken over by a third generation. This generation, 
even more so than the first and the second one, failed to link its attacks to 
a revolutionary strategy. It was quite successful in staying out of the 
hands of the police, and to this day it is unknown who were in the RAF’s 
third generation, but its attacks on the military-industrial complex stood 
on their own, leaving the public in the dark as to the logic behind the 
RAF’s violence. As a result, the group became more and more isolated 
from its potential support base.  
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In addition to this isolation, the RAF faced some internal problems as 
well. Some in the RAF were unhappy about its actions, especially the 
murder of the 19-year-old soldier Edward Pimental, who was lured out of 
a bar and killed, only because the RAF needed his ID to enter the US army 
base where he was stationed.54 Several group members, including some 
imprisoned veterans from earlier generations, felt that the group had 
crossed a line. They even had a hard time believing that the murder was 
committed by the RAF, and entertained the possibility that it was the 
work of forces that wanted to tarnish the RAF’s reputation.55 The discord 
and confusion became especially obvious after a RAF communiqué 
stating that an attack against the German minister of agriculture had been 
called off because innocent bystanders might get hurt, was followed by 
another communiqué saying that the first communiqué was 
disinformation spread by the German security service.56 The RAF was 
further embarrassed when the Provisional IRA distanced itself in 1985 
from the RAF’s Patsy O’Hara Commando. To underline its solidarity with 
other groups, the RAF had taken to naming its operational units after 
deceased members of foreign terrorist groups. For the murder of Ernst 
Zimmerman, the director of a company that supplied parts of fighter jets 
to the German air force, the RAF had assembled a cell named after Patsy 
O’Hara, a Provisional IRA-member who died in a hunger strike in 1981. 
The Provisional IRA, however, did not appreciate the gesture and said in 
a reaction to the assassination that the RAF had blemished O’Hara’s 
name.57 
Geopolitics did not work in favour of the RAF either. The fall of 
communism dealt the group a severe blow. Not only had its proclaimed 
ideology lost all credibility as a viable alternative to the existing order it 
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was fighting, the group was also discredited by former members who had 
fled to the GDR after leaving the RAF and were now arrested. They 
admitted that the leaders of the RAF had killed themselves in 1977, that 
the murder allegations were meant to create a myth to discredit the 
German state and that the detention of the leaders of the RAF had not 
been as brutal as they had made it out to be.58 In 1993, the group 
committed its last attack and in 1998 released a lengthy communiqué in 
which it announced its dissolution, unequivocally stating that “the urban 
guerrilla in the form of the RAF is now history”.59 
When looking back on their past in the RAF, former members differ in the 
extent to which they still embrace the ideas they held then. Most of them 
served long prison sentences, but several spoke to the press after their 
release. As has just been mentioned, some members were critical about 
the RAF and rejected its killings and group pressure. For example, Brigitte 
Mohnhaupt, formerly known as the group’s hard core ideologue, had 
abandoned her radical views by the time she was released from prison in 
2007.60 Others, even though they may have been critical of the way the 
RAF had operated, were less willing to distance themselves from their 
terrorist past. For instance, Margrit Schiller named her children after 
Ulrike Meinhof and Holger Meins, a RAF member who died in a hunger 
strike. Karl-Heinz Dellwo, involved in the occupation of the German 
embassy in Stockholm in 1975, later said in an interview about his time in 
the RAF: “I cannot simply say I regret it.”61 Similarly, former RAF-
member Christian Klar said: “I am unwilling to discuss the RAF as a case 
of crime.”62 Like Klar, Astrid Proll refused to doubt the group’s intentions: 
“Those who died in Stammheim were people who committed inhuman 
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acts not because they were criminals, evil or monstrous, but because they 
could not endure the unfairness and oppression in the world.”63 The most 
ardent believer of the former RAF-members is probably Irmgard Möller, a 
leading member of the first generation. She always kept insisting that 
Meinhof, Baader and the other RAF-leaders had been murdered, that the 
RAF had contributed to the US defeat in Vietnam and that its terrorist 
attacks were justified. Her views, which she summed up in the confident 
claim that “[t]here is nothing to regret”, have not essentially changed 
since the Stammheim trial.64 
5.2 Counterterrorism principles and the Rote Armee 
Fraktion 
5.2.1 Restraint in the use of force 
In the years preceding the founding of the RAF, there were two incidents 
that particularly contributed to the radicalisation of the parts of the 
protest scene that would later spawn the RAF and other terrorist groups. 
First, there was the death of Benno Ohnesorg, who was shot in the head 
for unknown reasons by a police officer during a demonstration against 
the shah of Persia on 2 June 1967.65 A pacifist and a member of an 
evangelical student union, Ohnesorg was a poor fit with the profile of the 
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dangerous radical out to overthrow the state.66 Perhaps because of his 
clear commitment to non-violent action, his death sent shockwaves 
through the protest movement. Gudrun Ensslin, then member of the 
Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and later one of the leading members of 
the RAF, attended a meeting of the SDS Sozialistischen Deutschen 
Studentenbund (SDS, Socialist German Student Union) on the night of 
Ohnesorg’s death, at which she allegedly cried out: “You can’t argue with 
them - this is the Auschwitz-generation!”67 Already at this early stage, 
Ensslin seemed to adhere to the view that the FRG was the continuation 
of the Nazi regime with other means. In her view, the state had shown its 
true colours by killing Ohnesorg.  
The second main incident that radicalised the student movement was the 
attempt on the life of Rudi Dutschke, the iconic leader of the student 
movement. On 11 April 1968, Dutschke, a leading member of the SDS, 
was shot near his house in West-Berlin. He was hit in the head twice, and 
survived the attack only with severe brain damage. He died in 1979 after a 
fit of epilepsy which was the direct result of his injuries from 1968.68 
Although the perpetrator was not operating on orders from the 
authorities, the protest movement held them morally responsible, 
claiming that the perpetrator was enticed to his act by the media and the 
government, which had demonised Dutschke and depicted him as a 
danger to German society.69 While it is true that the state had nothing to 
do with the shooting of Dutschke and that the RAF did not yet exist when 
these incidents took place, the harsh state measures against the student 
protests contributed to the formation of the RAF and its view on the state 
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in the sense that they brought about a realisation that non-violent means 
had run their course. The deaths of Ohnesorg and Dutschke had 
convinced the radical fringe of the protest movement that harder 
measures were needed. In fact, in a piece on the Black September, a 
Palestinian terrorist group that took eleven Israeli athletes hostage during 
the 1972 Olympics, the RAF criticised the protest movement’s 
unwillingness to fight on. The group took their former allies to task for 
retreating to a petty bourgeois position immediately after state repression 
- the attack on Dutschke was explicitly mentioned - had become serious.70 
Police repression remained a problem after the RAF had been founded. 
Crucially, the group could feed off the state’s overly heavy-handed 
approach during the period when the leaders of the first generation were 
in prison, that is, from 1972 to 1977. Their protest against the conditions 
under which they were held in custody is often associated with the 
Stammheim prison in Stuttgart, but started earlier, when the members 
were still in different prisons across Germany. The key to the increase in 
the group’s support was the publicity the leaders successfully sought for 
their allegedly bad treatment. In the communiqués they sent from prison 
during their imprisonment and in an interview with Der Spiegel in 1976, 
they claimed the German government tried to break them psychologically 
by keeping them in isolation, forcefeeding them, harassing their lawyers 
and forging and stealing documents that the defence lawyers could use in 
court.71 On several occasions, the RAF went on a hunger strike to protest 
against this maltreatment. One of their members, Holger Meins, died 
during the third hunger strike, but in the interview with Der Spiegel in 
1976, the remaining members claimed that the authorities had killed him. 
They asserted that Meins’ will had been crushed by brutal and violent 
force-feeding and that the portions he had been given after his resistance 
had been broken, were not enough to survive. Thus, the police and prison 
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guards could act as if they had done everything they could, while they 
had in fact put in a conscious effort to let Meins die. In the RAF’s reading 
of events, the media were in on the plot as well. Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof 
and Raspe took the fact that no media outlet had published this version of 
events as a sign of the high extent to which the media and the state were 
intertwined.72 
Far-fetched as these allegations may sound, the RAF’s narrative did 
resonate with certain segments of the German population. Part of the 
explanation for the public’s openness to these suggestions can be found in 
the heavy-handed ways in which the state tried to track down and 
capture the RAF. Particularly important in this campaign was the newly 
energised Bundeskriminalamt (BKA, Federal Criminal Office). Until the 
early seventies, law enforcement had primarily been the prerogative of 
the West-German states (Länder), but the challenge posed by the RAF led 
to a widening of the mandate of the BKA, which operated on the federal 
level and was assigned the responsibility for the apprehension and 
bringing to justice of those involved in the urban guerrilla.73 In its 
attempts to crush the RAF, however, the BKA alienated the public 
through deliberately planned shows of force. At an early stage, it was 
decided to make clear to the RAF that the BKA had superior operational 
capabilities and that the RAF could never win this confrontation. West-
German counterterrorism was in that way meant to send a massage, but 
was also a reflection of how serious the police took the situation. As has 
already been mentioned, the RAF engaged on several occasions in shoot-
outs with the police, which was as a result extra cautious in dealing with 
“the number 1 enemy of the state”. It used extensive manpower to set up 
roadblocks to check all cars for RAF-members or sympathisers, and 
policemen openly carried machine guns when they were on the job. The 
BKA also made extensive use of helicopters and did searches in houses, 
especially in the commune scene where the RAF originated and where 
many of its supporters were. In one of these raids, 175 people were 
                                                          
72 “Wir Werden in Den Durststreik Treten,” 53. 
73 Aust, Der Baader-Meinhof Komplex, 214. 
Vendetta 
143 
arrested, only to be released the next day.74 As even BKA-chief Horst 
Herold himself later conceded, measures like these turned parts of the 
population against the state and boosted the image of the RAF.75 The fact 
that the authorities had to go to such lengths to quell the RAF’s resistance 
made the group seem more powerful and dangerous than it really was. 
The lacks of restraint in the use of force and the media coverage around 
the treatment of RAF prisoners had a strong influence on various support 
groups that bought into the RAF’s narrative. At this point, in the early 
1970s, the RAF still managed to send a message that appealed to a variety 
of groups and organisations in its Umfeld. These groups took up the RAF’s 
cause and protested on its behalf, and some members moved 
underground to join the urban guerrillas. First, the RAF could count on 
the support of a group of lawyers who were sympathetic to their cause. 
These lawyers shared the RAF’s perception of continuity between Nazi 
Germany and the FRG, pointing out that many judges and law professors 
had fulfilled similar roles in the Third Reich. The younger generation of 
lawyers wanted to distance themselves from the older generation and did 
so by positioning themselves as challengers of state power rather than 
contributors to it, the latter attitude being customary throughout the 
fifties and much of the sixties. Also, the younger lawyers had long hair, 
wore jeans in courtrooms and accused judges and other lawyers of fascist 
sympathies, thus openly dissociating themselves from the code of 
behaviour that was customary in German courtrooms at the time.76 Some 
of these lawyers, such as Klaus Croissant, had important roles to play in 
the second generation of the RAF. Not only were they instrumental in 
running the info-system that kept the RAF-prisoners in touch with each 
other and with the members outside, they also set up the Komitees gegen 
Isolationsfolter (Committees against Isolation Torture), groups of 
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sympathisers, both in Germany and abroad, that organised rallies and 
demonstrations urging for better treatment of the RAF-prisoners. These 
groups became hotbeds of RAF-sympathisers, and proved a fertile 
recruiting ground for radicals who wanted to take up arms to continue 
the fight of the imprisoned leaders. For instance, Karl-Heinz Dellwo and 
Stefan Wisniewski, both of whom wrote memoirs that are referred to in 
this chapter, joined the RAF after having worked in a Komitee gegen 
Isolationsfolter, as did Christian Klar and Susanne Albrecht, both of whom 
were involved in the failed kidnapping of banker Jürgen Ponto in 1977.77 
Some of the lawyers around whom these groups were organised even 
joined the armed struggle themselves. A prominent example is Siegfried 
Haag, who had defended Andreas Baader and Holger Meins in court 
before going underground and recruiting several other members of the 
RAF’s second generation. In 1975 Haag was involved in the planning of 
the hostage taking at the German embassy in Stockholm, one of the RAF’s 
most infamous actions.78 
Another stronghold of support for the RAF was the Sozialistisches 
Patientenkollektiv (SPK, Socialist Patients Collective). This group originated 
in the anti-psychiatry movement, which denounced psychiatry as a 
control mechanism in the hands of the ruling classes to maintain the 
capitalist order.79 With this anti-authoritarian background, the 
organisation enthusiastically supported the RAF’s challenge to the state. 
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Several SPK-members joined the RAF in the mid-seventies and became 
part of the RAF’s second generation, among them Margrit Schiller.80 The 
RAF could further count on the support of the Rote Hilfe (Red Help), 
which provided legal assistance to left-wing extremists who were 
standing trial. In the case of the RAF, the Rote Hilfe was involved in 
drawing up reports about the mistreatment of the prisoners and the 
unfairness of their trial.81 Rote Hilfe-member Volker Speitel and his wife 
Angelika joined the RAF after the death of Holger Meins.82 
The imprisonment of the leaders was thus by no means the end of the 
organisation. The RAF, with the help of their lawyers, managed to 
generate the support of various elements in the radical leftist scene. They 
did so by using the counterterrorism policy against them to discredit the 
FRG. Part of the RAF’s appeal was provided by the confirmation that the 
state’s policy seemed to give to the RAF’s narrative. The RAF deeply 
distrusted the state apparatus, which it suspected of hiding a dictatorial, 
fascist face behind a democratic mask. The state measures to restore order 
seemed to confirm this view. On the radical left, many interpreted the 
measures discussed above as a sign that the FRG was turning back into a 
police state. This perceived severity of the problem also boosted the image 
of the RAF, not only because they were fighting the good fight, but also 
because they were up against a formidable and ruthless enemy, which 
lent a degree of heroism to their efforts. They were revered as martyrs to 
their cause.83 Several members who of the RAF’s second generation later 
explained that they were drawn into the group by the example that was 
set by the incarcerated leaders of the first generation. The first generation 
had fallen into the hands of the powerful, fascist enemy, which put a 
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moral obligation on other radicals to continue the fight. This self-sacrifice, 
especially poignant in the cases of Ulrike Meinhof and Holger Meins, who 
were both perceived to have given their life to the cause, gave some 
activists in the RAF’s support groups the idea that they could no longer 
stand by and refuse to take up the gun.84 Even some on the left who were 
initially critical of the RAF joined the fight after Meins’ death, feeling that 
other means to help the prisoners had failed.85 Many felt that they were 
morally obliged to dedicate their lives to the fight against the state the 
way Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin, Meins and the others had done before 
them. Feelings of guilt towards the imprisoned fighters are frequently 
mentioned by second-generation members as a reason to go underground 
and carry on the fight the RAF was waging.86 
The RAF is thus a clear case of how a counterterrorism policy can turn the 
population, or at least certain segments of it, against the state. Part of the 
explanation in this case was that West-German counterterrorism neatly 
fitted the RAF’s narrative. The RAF-leadership managed to spin the 
heavy-handed policing, the allegedly bad treatment in prison and the 
harassment of the lawyers in its favour. The result was a replenishment of 
the ranks of the RAF by members of the support groups mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs. These recruits teamed up with the remains of the 
RAF to commit attacks that had more impact than the attacks of the first 
generation. Thus, this is a confirmation of the program theory formulated 
in chapter 1: the excessive use of force will escalate the conflict by 
increasing the support base of the terrorist group and can consequently 
considered counterproductive. The West-German government took 
measures that in effect strengthened the position of the RAF, which got 
more political support and recruits as a result of the government’s heavy-
handedness. 
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In fairness, though, this case also demonstrates the importance of the 
perception of the use of force over the actual use of force. While it is true 
that the BKA operated visibly and at times intrusively, the complaints 
about the penitentiary conditions in Stammheim prison, where the RAF-
members were held after 1974, were grossly exaggerated. The group 
members were allowed to spend eight hours a day together, could read 
books and newspapers, watch TV and play records, and had access to 
cooking facilities.87 Some of the lawyers had taken their complaints about 
the treatment of the RAF-leadership to the European Court of Human 
Rights, but lost their case. The Court examined the situation and, having 
noted that the prisoners were not in isolation and that there were various 
ways in which they could occupy themselves, ruled that the complaints 
were unfounded.88 The verdict was of little use to the German 
government, however, as it was not issued until after the collective 
suicide of the leaders in 1977. As for the fate of the leaders, Meinhof and 
Meins were not murdered, and neither were Baader, Raspe and Ensslin. 
Nevertheless, the RAF was able, at least with regard to Meinhof and 
Meins, to present their deaths in a way that gained them both popular 
support and new recruits. This became significantly harder when the RAF 
had lost its popular support after the Schleyer kidnapping. In the early 
1980s, imprisoned RAF-members played the same card, complaining 
about the penitentiary conditions and depicting the state as fascist. By that 
time, though, the RAF had lost much credit as a result of the brutal 
murders it committed, so there was hardly any reaction to their outreach 
efforts at all, not even when Sigurd Debus died in 1981 as a result of a 
hunger strike.89 
5.2.2 Rule of law 
Some of the state actions that antagonised the population and allowed the 
RAF to play their role as heroic freedom fighters were not instances of the 
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use of force, but were taken in the legal sphere. After an initial reluctance 
to take legal measures and widen the legally defined powers of the 
organisations dealing with the RAF, the German government took some 
far-reaching steps to facilitate its fight against the self-proclaimed urban 
guerrillas. 
First, there were the sections 129 and 129a of the Criminal Code, which 
penalised founding, being a member of, recruiting for and supporting of a 
terrorist organisation, with the term ‘terrorist’ explicitly used in section 
129a. These laws, to which the ‘terrorist’ clause was added in 1976, were 
formulated broadly, as the government wanted it to apply not only to the 
RAF itself, but also to its support base, for which it used the term 
‘sympathisers’.90 The sections 129 and 129a could be - and were - applied 
liberally, and cast suspicion on the entire leftist, countercultural scene 
from which the RAF originated. People could go to prison for carrying 
banners with texts suggesting that the FRG was an imperialist state or that 
the Stammheim prisoners were murdered.91 Also, the police used this law 
as a pretext for performing the intrusive and frequently violent house 
searches discussed in the previous paragraph. By introducing and 
applying this law, the state had defined as an enemy anyone who 
expressed the slightest criticism that was in line with the message of the 
RAF. This, too, contributed to the impression that the FRG was a 
dictatorship in disguise.92 
The second set of controversial laws concerned the legal procedures 
during a trial, more specifically the role of lawyers. The ties that bound 
the RAF and their lawyers had not escaped the authorities. They knew 
about the lawyers’ complicity in the info-system, and from the conduct of 
the legal defence in the courtroom it was clear that they sympathised with 
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their clients. The lawyers tried to disrupt the trial by questioning the 
legitimacy of the court and allowed Ensslin, Raspe, Baader and, before her 
suicide, Meinhof to play on the media and air their political views.93 
Sabotaging the trial was made easier by the fact that the RAF was 
defended by a large group of lawyers, which slowed down the trial 
significantly. To put an end to this so-called block defence, the 
government introduced a law that put a maximum of three on the number 
of lawyers that could defend one suspect and stipulated that a lawyer 
could only represent one client per trial.94 Also, it was now allowed to 
continue a trial in the absence of the suspects. The members of the RAF 
frequently misbehaved to the point where they had to be removed from 
the courtroom, and their hunger strikes did not help the swiftness of the 
trial either. To keep the delays to a minimum, it was decided that the 
physical presence of the suspects was no longer necessary.95 In a letter to 
the chairperson of the Dutch social-democratic party PvdA, Ien van den 
Heuvel, Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt defended these measures by 
pointing out that they only served the purpose of avoiding that suspects 
disrupted their own trials and were not specifically aimed at the RAF.96 
The latter part of Brandt’s explanation lacked credibility, as the new legal 
procedures were clearly adopted in response to the RAF’s behaviour in 
prison and the court room.97 
To further undermine the RAF’s legal defence, it was decided to ban 
lawyers from cases in which they themselves were suspected to have 
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taken part. As all Baader’s lawyers were suspected of violations of article 
129a, they were taken off the case at the beginning of the Stammheim 
trial.98 The complicity of the lawyers in the activities of the RAF was also 
the reason behind the 1977 Contact Ban (Kontaktsperre), which outlawed 
all contact between the RAF-prisoners and their lawyers. Previously, 
another law had allowed prison authorities to read correspondence and 
listen in on conversations between lawyers and prisoners, but after 
Schleyer had been kidnapped, contact was banned altogether. The West-
German government feared that the operation would be led from the 
prison cells of Stammheim, and in a testament to the unity across political 
parties in dealing with the crisis, the West-German parliament, the 
Bundestag, swiftly accepted this law, which became active in a mere two 
weeks after it had been introduced by the government.99 
Finally, there were the increased powers that the BKA had been granted 
in the fight against the RAF. In order to get the job done, the BKA 
received material and technological resources, including the means and 
legal powers to engage in ‘dragnet policing’ (Rasterfahndung).100 
Introduced by Horst Herold, the BKA director responsible for the 
organisation’s increasing prominence in the 1970s, Rasterfahndung was the 
name for the BKA’s profile-based searches in a wide variety of public and 
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private databases. The BKA drew up a profile, made up of certain 
behavioural patterns, of a RAF-activist or sympathiser and then went 
through all these databases looking for people who matched this 
profile.101 This suggested that the presumption of innocence was 
suspended, as the mere correspondence to a certain profile was enough to 
raise suspicion. Also, Rasterfahndung meant a violation of citizens’ 
privacy, as data that were collected for very different reasons were now 
used for internal security. For instance, the BKA had noticed that RAF-
members often paid the rent for their safehouses in cash. To further its 
Rasterfahndung efforts, it received access to electronic data showing which 
renters had been paying in cash instead of by money transfer.102 That the 
BKA preferred to err on the safe side is clear from the numbers of entries 
in the database. In 1979, it contained the names of 4.7 million people and 
3100 organisations.103 The results, however, were marginal, since only one 
RAF-member (Rolf Heissler, in 1979) was arrested after having been 
identified on the basis of a Rasterfahndung-profile.104 
All these legal measures antagonised the RAF and its support base in 
much the same way as the applications of force discussed in the previous 
paragraph. As it was clear that the adjustments of the legal and 
procedural rules were a reaction to the threat posed by the RAF105, they 
gave the impression that the state was not in control and had to resort to 
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extraordinary instruments. This confirmed the perception of the state as a 
fascist state whose mask was about to slip. Also, it fed a notion of the 
inherent untrustworthiness of the state. If it kept violating its own rules, 
for instance by introducing the Kontaktsperregesetz, there was no telling 
how far it would go.106 These legal measures added to the use of force in 
the previous paragraph in alienating the population and can similarly be 
considered the opposite of its program theory: the new laws were another 
form of counterproductive overreaction that affected the rule of law and 
gained the RAF sympathy and support. 
5.2.3 Long-term commitment 
On two occasions, the RAF tried to blackmail the West-German 
government into releasing the imprisoned leaders. In 1975, a RAF-cell 
named the Holger Meins Commando occupied the German embassy in 
Stockholm. They held the embassy personnel hostage and demanded the 
release and safe exit of a string of RAF-members. The operation ended in 
a miserable failure for the group: one of the operatives accidentally set off 
an explosive, and all hostage takers were either shot or arrested in the 
ensuing chaos.107 Two years later, the RAF’s second generation kidnapped 
Hanns-Martin Schleyer to use him as a bargaining chip. During the 
German Autumn, the pressure on the West-German government was 
further increased by the PFLP, which hijacked the Landshut and 
demanded the release of the RAF leadership.  
The RAF felt encouraged by the success that the Bewegung 2. Juni (2 June 
Movement B2J) had gained by carrying out operations of this kind.108 In 
February 1975, the B2J had kidnapped the prominent Christian-democrat 
Peter Lorenz. The group threatened to kill Lorenz unless the government 
agreed to the release from prison of several B2J members. On this 
occasion, the government gave in. The prisoners were, in accordance with 
the B2J’s demands, put on a plane to Aden, at which the B2J released 
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Lorenz unharmed in a park in Berlin.109 Inspired by this example, the RAF 
occupied the German embassy in Stockholm, but this time the 
government refused to give in. Later, during the Schleyer kidnapping, the 
government did talk to the kidnappers, but never negotiated any terms 
for Schleyer’s release. Instead, the government kept buying time by 
insisting at various stages that the kidnappers provide evidence that 
Schleyer was still alive. The BKA had started an extensive search for the 
kidnappers and their hostage, and the idea was that buying time would 
allow the BKA to get to Schleyer before it was too late. Schleyer was never 
found, however, as the kidnappers managed to frequently move him from 
one safehouse to another. Only after his death did it transpire that the 
kidnappers had taken him to the Dutch seaside town of Scheveningen and 
later to Brussels.110 
The 1977 crisis was handled by the Crisis Staff (Krisenstab), a two-level 
platform presided by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and intended to 
facilitate consultation between all major players involved. The Crisis Staff, 
which consisted of Chancellor Schmidt, several federal and state level 
ministers, the leaders of the main opposition parties and BKA-chief Horst 
Herold, was an informal body with a secret decision making process and 
no parliamentary oversight. Due to its secretive and informal nature, it is 
still not fully known what went on in the Crisis Staff, but it is clear that 
there was little challenge to the hard line advocated by Schmidt. On the 
contrary, the group discussed the possibility of killing RAF-prisoners in 
retaliation.111 These extreme measures were never carried out, but the 
Crisis Staff did act on its strong determination not to give in to terrorist 
demands. As will be demonstrated in the section on the counter narrative, 
Schmidt saw the RAF as a gang of cruel, ruthless murderers and was little 
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inclined to accommodate them. He was unwavering in his intention not to 
repeat the events of 1975, when the B2J had effectuated the release of its 
prisoners by kidnapping Lorenz.112 The Crisis Staff did not give in and 
chose to stick to the hard line, fearing that new concessions would lead to 
similar incidents and the liberation of RAF-prisoners to an upsurge in 
terrorist activity. It decided to deploy the Special Forces to storm the 
Landshut and free the hostages. 
The absence of concessions to the RAF (measures of performance), which 
constituted the West-German government’s non-compliance with terrorist 
demands (output), was in accordance with the program theory from 
chapter 1. It also achieved its desired effect: the outcome of the Schleyer 
kidnapping and the hijacking of the Landshut dealt a heavy blow to the 
RAF’s morale.113 The combination of the failure of the operation of 1977 
and the deaths of the leaders dealt a heavy blow to the group’s fighting 
spirit. Many members found it difficult to stomach the fact that they had 
failed to achieve the objective of liberating the prisoners, whom they felt 
were needed for a resumption of the campaign against imperialism. There 
was widespread feeling that the efforts of the preceding years had been in 
vain and the group was unsure about how to continue.114 Also, the state’s 
performance dispelled the myth of the weak state. Despite the perceived 
state cruelty, the RAF believed that the FRG was weak-kneed and would 
give in once it got threatened by the death of one of its citizens.115 The 
state-induced failure of 1977 left the RAF in disarray (outcome) as a result 
of which several members left the group in disillusion (measure of 
effectiveness). 
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5.2.4 Law enforcement and direct action 
The FRG’s fight against the RAF was to a large extent based on law 
enforcement. Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt explained the logic 
behind this approach in a 1975 government statement. He claimed that 
force did not help against terrorists who were willing to risk their lives. 
The only viable option was to rid society of terrorism by arresting 
terrorists.116 (Schmidt strangely ignored the necessity of force in this 
approach.) As we have seen in the section ‘Restraint in the use of force’, 
he made good on his words, making extensive use of the police to track 
down and apprehend the members of the RAF. The RAF remained active 
for a long time, managed to avoid arrests, especially the third generation, 
and carried out terrorist attacks until the group dissolved in 1998. There 
is, therefore, much ground to claim that the BKA failed to confirm the 
programme theory for ‘law enforcement and direct action’. But German 
law enforcement efforts did have an effect that hurt the RAF, albeit not in 
a way that was intended. 
As Schmidt made clear in the statement referred to above, his idea was to 
debilitate the organisation by getting as many RAF-members as possible 
behind bars. However, the first thing that should be noted when 
examining the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts against the RAF is 
the group’s resilience in the face of these arrests. The arrest in 1972 of the 
leaders and many cadres of the first generation seemed to seal the group’s 
fate, but at that time the worst was yet to come. Through the info-system 
the imprisoned leaders could communicate with the underground 
members. These messages included orders on how to organise the 
campaign against the treatment of the RAF prisoners. This campaign 
gained the RAF the support it needed to win new recruits that could carry 
on the armed struggle. Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin and Raspe functioned as 
a strategic command, outlining the general direction of the RAF’s 
activities. Especially important in this regard was Brigitte Mohnhaupt, 
who was among the cadres who got arrested in 1972. Immediately after 
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her release in 1977, she went underground to join the RAF’s second 
generation. The leadership had extensively instructed her on how to carry 
the campaign forward, pressing hard for actions that would lead to their 
liberation. Her close connections to Baader and the others and her status 
as a former inhabitant of the Stammheim prison helped her become the 
leader of the RAF’s second generation. She gave an impulse to a group 
that was adrift and steered it in the direction the imprisoned leaders 
wanted. After her arrival the RAF started planning actions to force the 
German government to liberate the imprisoned RAF-leaders and 
cadres.117 These efforts culminated in the German Autumn, when 
Germany was the kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer and the hijacking 
of the Landshut. Clearly, the arrests had failed to eliminate the terrorist 
threat. 
Several years later, in 1982, this pattern of arrests and group renewal 
repeated itself, albeit with less dramatic consequences. The leadership of 
the second generation, including Brigitte Mohnhaupt, Adelheid Schulz, 
and Christian Klar, were arrested and the police confiscated a large arms 
cache.118 However, the fight then carried on by the RAF’s third generation. 
To this day the third generation of the RAF is shrouded in mystery and it 
is not yet fully clear who its members were.119 Some have even argued 
that the third generation should not be considered part of the RAF 
because there was no personal overlap between the third generation and 
the previous ones.120 Regardless of the validity of this argument, the 1982 
arrests of the leading members of the second generation did not put an 
end to the RAF and gave rise to a new generation, which was able to 
remain at large until its dissolution in 1998. 
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From these resurgences of the RAF it is clear that the BKA’s law 
enforcement efforts were not successful in the conventional sense: the 
arrest, trial and detention of the RAF-members did not lead to a 
disruption of the organisation. The state did generate the output of the 
program theory on law enforcement efforts and direct action formulated 
in chapter 1, as it managed to arrest RAF-members, including those from 
the leading circles. But these arrests did not lead to the desired outcome, 
with the RAF re-establishing itself after the waves of arrests of 1972 and 
1982. The arrests did, however, contribute to the political defeat of the 
RAF, which saw its support base decline from the mid-seventies on and 
was an isolated splinter group for the larger part of its existence. 
Although the group certainly had itself to blame for its increasing 
isolation, the role of the state should not be overlooked. 
Although the group’s chances for political success depended on the 
willingness of the population to make a revolution, the RAF increasingly 
seemed to fight for the group’s own personal interests rather than for the 
bigger cause they outlined in their strategy papers. In response to the state 
interventions against the group, the RAF let itself to be dragged down in a 
vendetta against the FRG, with the public in the role of passive - and 
increasingly uncomprehending - bystanders. The government’s attempts 
to stop the RAF deflected the group’s attention from political action and 
brought about a focus on the plight of the group members. As much of 
the RAF’s activities were aimed at the liberation of its leaders, former B2J 
member Gerald Klöpper, mockingly referred to the RAF as “free-the-
guerrilla guerrillas”.121 This perception is lent credence by the RAF’s 
communiqués from the seventies. The strategy papers from the early 
seventies, such as The urban guerrilla concept and On the armed struggle in 
Western Europe, were quite political writings. They were underpinned by 
quotes from and references to Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, and 
contained lengthy sections explaining the current situation in Germany 
and the role of the urban guerrilla. The terrorist attacks that the RAF 
committed in the subsequent years, however, were never explicitly 
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related to the social analysis in the early papers or explained as necessary 
parts of a strategy to achieve a political goal. 
To further underline this point, it is instructive to look at the motivations 
of the RAF’s attacks before 1978. The table below shows the attacks and 
the reasons for the target selection as laid down in the communiqués 
explaining the attacks. The justifications have been put in the category 
‘political’ (the attack served a political goal) or ‘personal’ (the attack is an 
act of revenge, an attempt to free RAF-members or in another way serves 
the direct, personal interests of the RAF). The page numbers refer to the 
pages in Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF, a volume containing 
all of the RAF’s communiqués.122 From looking at this table, it is clear that 
there was little altruism in the RAF’s use of violence. Most attacks were 
about perceived wrongs that had been done to their own members. The 
confrontation with the state had become personal. 
                                                          




Title communiqué Date Page Reason Politics Personal
Anschlag auf das Hauptquartier der US 
Army in Frankfurt/Main
14-5-1972 145 Protest against the war in Vietnam
Anschläge in Augsburg und München (1) 16-5-1972 145 Revenge for death Thomas 
Weisbecker (RAF-member)
Anschläge in Augsburg und München (2) 16-5-1972 145 Revenge for death Thomas 
Weisbecker (RAF-member)
Anschlag auf den BHG-Richter 
Buddenberg in Karlsruhe
20-5-1972 146 Revenge for alleged mistreatment
of Manfred Grashof (RAF-member)
Sprengstoffenanschlag auf das Springer-
Hochhaus in Hamburg
20-5-1972 147 Attempt to stop alleged anti-
communist smear-campaign
Bombenanschlag auf das Hauptquartier 
der US-Army in Europa in Heidelberg
25-5-1972 147-148 Protest against the war in Vietnam
Besetzung der deutsche Botschaft in 
Stockholm
24-4-1975 193-196 Liberation of prisoners
Erschiessung des Generalbundesanwalts
Buback
7-4-1977 267-268 Revenge for deaths of Meins, 
Meinhof and Hausner
Erschiessung von Jürgen Ponto und 
Anschlag auf die Bundesanwalt in 
Karlsruhe (1)
14-8-1977 269 Protest against alleged
mistreatment of prisoners
Erschiessung von Jürgen Ponto und 
Anschlag auf die Bundesanwalt in 
Karlsruhe (2)
14-8-1977 269 Attempted kidnap of Ponto to use
him as a hostage in the campaign
to free the imprisoned leaders
Entführung von Hanns-Martin Schleyer 5-7-1977 
to 18-10-
1977
270-273 Liberation of prisoners
 
Figure 17. Motivations behind RAF attacks 
Until the German Autumn, the RAF still managed to generate support by 
presenting itself as selfless freedom fighters against a covertly fascist state. 
The events of 1975 and especially 1977, however, undermined that image, 
as the violence committed by the RAF was not clearly part of a campaign 
that was waged on behalf of a constituency.123 To outsiders the RAF’s 
assassinations and kidnappings looked like random acts of brutal 
violence, not like painful but necessary steps toward a higher goal. The 
German Autumn was followed by an outpour of sympathy and support 
for the state in its fight against the RAF. Churches, universities, trade 
unions and other civil society organisations condemned the approach of 
the RAF and rallied behind the government’s attempts to put an end to 
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the bloodletting.124 This was a crucial factor in the deterioration of the 
RAF’s public image. In a rare moment of critical reflection on the group’s 
history, Stammheim-survivor Irmgard Möller later freely admitted that 
the group had not pitched their violent actions the right way and that 
their political intentions were lost on the general public.125 In the same 
vein, several members later regretted their failure to make clear why 
Schleyer - and not someone else - had been kidnapped, adding that they 
easily could have explained this by pointing at their victim’s history in the 
SS.126 
In order to explain why law enforcement pressure had this effect on the 
RAF, we have to turn to the organisational structure and culture as 
outlined in section 5.1.2. As has been discussed there, the RAF depended 
on loyalty to the group and the leadership. The leaders were revered as 
martyrs, members were expected to give up their lives to participate in 
the group and it was impossible to make suggestions for shifts in strategy. 
This organisational culture made the RAF insensitive to the ideas and 
views of anyone else but the leadership. As a result, the group, after it had 
been decapitated, acted on the loyalty towards and the need for the 
leadership, ignoring beliefs and perceptions among the group’s 
constituency. In the words of former member Dellwo: “We lost the feeling 
for where the others in society were that we wanted to reach and had to 
reach if the cause was to have any success at all.”127 As a result of the 
RAF’s organisational introversion and the rank-and-file’s devotion to the 
leadership rather than to the downtrodden masses or the proletariat, the 
German government, by directly engaging the RAF, managed to bring the 
group to the point where fighting off the challenge posed by the state 
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became the most important goal. In doing so, the RAF scored some 
operational successes, but lost sight of what was needed to achieve 
political success.  
Instead of fighting against imperialism and oppression, the RAF became 
reactive, and related the state’s countermeasures only to itself: group 
survival and restoration of the leadership became the principal goals. As 
the table above shows, the RAF had lost the initiative to the state. After 
1972 the RAF’s actions were almost exclusively reactions to arrests, 
detentions, shoot-outs and manhunts. The group never restored the 
connection with its support base and was forced to operate more and 
more as an underground, secretive cult. If anything, the group further 
alienated the German left and even its own imprisoned members by such 
actions as the murder of Edward Pimental. As a result of the group’s 
increasingy sectarian nature the RAF became increasingly difficult to 
understand for outsiders. The group’s writings were became more and 
more arcane, there was no real contact with the leftist protest scene.128 
Moreover, the group dynamics, unchecked by any outside influence, 
made the need for violence a foregone conclusion. Rather than working to 
regain popular support, the RAF became increasingly self-referential, and 
seemed to care less and less about what its ideas and actions meant to 
anyone outside the group.129 Some have argued that the group 
depoliticised in the later stages of its existence and became solely about 
violence. Horst Herold was among those who noticed an increasing lack 
of political sensitivity on the part of the RAF. Taking note of the fact that 
the RAF’s final communiqué had been issued on Adolf Hitler’s birthday, 
he remarked: “A RAF in the way I know them, would not disband on a 
day like this.”130 
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5.2.5 International cooperation 
We have seen above that one of the reasons why the RAF is often seen an 
example of ‘old’ terrorism, is its organisational structure. Another reason 
is its supposedly ‘national’ character, that is, the group’s tendency to limit 
their activities to one country. The RAF, however, did have some 
connections abroad, the most important of which were the Deutsche 
Democratische Republik (German Democratic Republic, GDR) and the 
PFLP.131 It has never been established exactly what material support the 
GDR provided, but it is safe to say that it primarily functioned as a transit 
route and a safe haven. The GDR was engaged in detente politics at the 
time and kept somewhat aloof. It could not afford to openly support the 
RAF.132 According to one former member, the GDR facilitated the RAF’s 
activities, but did not try to control it: “There were no dependencies, 
orders or jobs at all.”133 Already in 1970, Meinhof had contacted the 
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry of State Security, MfS), hoping 
that they would allow the RAF to practise and train in the GDR. She was 
turned down, but nonetheless the MfS was interested in the West-German 
radical left and had some grudging respect for the urban guerrillas. MfS-
officials arranged the contacts of the RAF with terrorist groups in the 
Middle East. In later years, the GDR was a safe haven for terrorist drop-
outs. The RAF got in touch with the MfS in order to work out a solution 
for some group members who wanted out, but could not stay in West-
Germany. The outcome was that the GDR adopted the former RAF-
members, providing housing and false identities. They lived there low-
key until the collapse of the communist regime in East-Germany.134 As 
has already been mentioned, some former RAF-members were arrested 
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and brought to trial after the dissolution of the state that had hidden 
them. 
That international cooperation was important to the RAF became clear 
during the climax of the German Autumn, when the PFLP hijacked the 
Landshut on the RAF’s behalf, although it also demanded the liberation of 
two PFLP-members who were in custody in Turkey. In the early 
seventies, the RAF had undergone some training in a PFLP training camp. 
This was not an unqualified success, as the RAF questioned the relevance 
of many of the exercises for the urban guerrilla and the PFLP took offence 
at the obnoxious attitude of their German guests.135 In 1976 however, 
relations improved. Several RAF-members again underwent training in a 
Palestinian training camp, and the two groups decided to undertake joint 
action to liberate their imprisoned members. After her release from 
prison, Brigitte Mohnhaupt took the lead in the organisation of this 
operation and met with her Palestinian colleagues to discuss the 
specifics.136 The operation was intensely coordinated, as one participant 
later recalled, with the RAF providing the PFLP with the grenades they 
could use during the hijacking.137 The decision to kill Schleyer after the 
Landshut had been stormed by German Special Forces, was a joint one.138 
The RAF is also associated with so-called euroterrorism, an ill-fated 
initiative to create a front of radical leftist terrorist groups in Europe that 
rarely went beyond words. The partnership between the RAF and the 
radical-leftist French group Action Directe was the only one that involved 
operational cooperation. The bombing of the American army base where 
Edward Pimental had been stationed, was followed by a joint 
                                                          
135 Becker, Hitler’s Children, 219–220. 
136 T. Skelton-Robinson, “Im Netz Verheddert: Die Beziehungen Des Bundesdeutschen 
Linksterrorismus Zur Volksfront Für Die Befreiung Palästinas (1969-1980),” in Die RAF Und 
Der Linke Terrorismus, ed. W. Kraushaar (Hamburg: Institut für Sozialforschung, 2006), 884–
885. 
137 “Ein Ehrenvoller Auftrag,” Spiegel, January 16, 1995. 
138 Skelton-Robinson, “Im Netz Verheddert,” 889. 
The science of fighting terrorism 
164 
communiqué of the RAF and Action Directe.139 The two groups hailed their 
team work as the hallmark of a new phase of anti-imperialist cooperation, 
but soon afterwards Action Directe fell apart as a result of the arrest of 
their leading core.140 Other connections were even more modest in scope. 
The Catalan First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups (Grupos de 
Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre, GRAPO) showed some 
solidarity with the RAF’s hunger strikes, and there was some logistical 
cooperation with the Belgian CCC. The Brigate Rosse, or Red Brigades, the 
Italian left-wing terrorist group, was less than enthusiastic about 
cooperation with their German comrades. They always kept the RAF at 
bay and were not open to German overtures.141 
The West-German government did participate in some policy initiatives 
to enhance cooperation between countries in the fight against terrorism. 
Most notably, there was the Trevi group, where European Community 
member states exchanged information and intelligence on terrorism and 
related topics. This forum had grown out of meetings in response to 
several terrorist incidents on European soil in the late sixties and early 
seventies.142 Although the Trevi group rightly acknowledged the 
international dimension of terrorism, the consequent intelligence 
exchange had no noticeable effect on the RAF, as the latter’s international 
contacts took place in countries outside of the EU. The members of the 
Trevi group simply had no knowledge of the activities of RAF members 
in Yemen, Libya and the GDR, countries where the preparation of the 
1977 offensive took place. 
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5.2.6 Offering a counter-narrative 
We have seen above that the RAF had a narrative that would help its 
constituency understand what the armed struggle was about. The FRG, so 
the RAF believed, was in essence a fascist state that thrived on the 
exploitation of the masses, both in Germany and abroad. It would take 
any measure necessary to put an end to internal opposition, by which the 
RAF primarily meant itself. The perceived maltreatment of the RAF-
members in the Stammheim prison was, not without success, used to 
underscore the dictatorial nature of the FRG. Federal Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt, however, gave his own reading of events in an attempt to 
discredit the RAF and its actions. In his public statements, he never failed 
to play on the disgust that his audience might feel towards the RAF’s 
killings. He stressed the criminal nature of the RAF’s actions, referring to 
them as “murderers” and “criminals”, qualifications that were a far cry 
from the image of the brave, selfless guerrilla fighters that the RAF 
wanted to put across.143 To these accusations, Schmidt regularly added 
allusions to insanity on the part of the RAF. He called the group and its 
ideology “blind with rage” (“blindwütig”) and averred that its motivations 
were “criminal delusions” (“verbrecherischen Wahn”).144 Another rhetorical 
weapon Schmidt used was the emphasis on the futility of the RAF’s 
violence. The Chancellor claimed that there was a strong unity among 
democratic forces to stand up against the RAF’s attempts to bring about 
change in unconstitutional ways. He and other government officials also 
highlighted that the FRG had enough tools at its disposal and was not 
afraid to use them, as long as the response to the terrorist threat remained 
within the framework of the constitutional order.145 This so-called 
‘militant democracy’, so Schmidt claimed, had enough support and 
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resolve to make the RAF’s attempt at revolution futile, which he 
expressed when he addressed the RAF directly in one of his speeches: 
“You are wrong: the masses are against you.”146 One particularly 
impressive instance of the government’s use of a counter-narrative took 
place at the funeral of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, when Federal President 
Walter Scheel took the opportunity to not only discredit the RAF, but also 
praise the freedom, democracy and pluralism of the Federal Republic. In 
his speech, he portrayed Schleyer as an exponent of German democracy 
and pluralism, and said that his death had been a sacrifice, as it showed 
terrorists and radicals that this line of action would get them nowhere.147 
Regarding the effectiveness of the West-German counter narrative, it 
should be noted that the RAF’s actions spoke louder than the 
government’s words. In terms of the program theory, the state did create 
the output, as Schmidt’s words were addressed to the nation in 
broadcasts on public television. However, the population only assented to 
the government’s counter narrative after the RAF had confirmed it by its 
brutal actions of especially 1977. Before 1977 the government’s counter 
narrative was the same, but failed to avoid polarisation. It was thus not 
the airing of the counter narrative that turned the population against the 
RAF, but the group’s callous use of violence. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The nature of West-German counterterrorism as applied against the RAF 
(see figure 18 for an overview) becomes clear when we consider which 
policy options were left out. Since Helmut Schmidt, Horst Herold and 
other major West-German administrators saw the RAF as a criminal gang 
and refused to interpret the threat as a political challenge, there were no 
attempts to address root causes, negotiations were out of the question and 
it was not until the early nineties, when the RAF had practically ceased to 
exist, that an amnesty regulation was implemented. The FRG’s hard line 
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against the RAF was also clear from Helmut Schmidt’s characterisations 
of the group mentioned in the section on counter-narratives. The attempts 
by the government to portray the RAF as a band of out-of-control 
criminals may not have been effective, but the uncompromising stances 
made it clear that the government would not be swayed into negotiations 
about the group’s demands. In this sense, Schmidt’s counter narratives 
can be viewed as an extension of the government’s long-term 
commitment. The government’s intransigence in the face of the RAF’s 
displayed the same distaste of the terrorist group. There was nothing that 
even hinted at the suggestion that the government might treat the RAF’s 
demands as legitimate. Overall, the West German government went all 
out and never gave an inch.  
The results of this approach are mixed. First, the perception of the RAF as 
a mortal enemy led to the adoption of measures and practices that could 
be characterised as overreaction. The house searches, the roadblocks, the 
Lex RAF and the Rasterfahndung were counterproductive in the sense that 
they seemed to confirm the RAF’s assessment of the state and 
consequently boosted the group’s image. In roughly the first half of the 
1970s, the RAF’s support base increased and the government’s counter 
narrative failed to convince at least parts of its target audience. The 
German response to the RAF’s terrorism clearly confirmed the notion that 
overly repressive countermeasures can fan the flame of a terrorist threat.  
What is interesting on the other hand, though, is that the law enforcement 
efforts were important in generating political success for the FRG, even if 
they were not an unqualified success in the conventional sense. Rather 
than operationally disrupting the RAF, the impact of the FRG’s repressive 
measures was enough to make the RAF to fight for its life as an 
organisation rather than for its political goals. Although the RAF’s 
reaction could have been different and depended on its own 
organisational make-up as much as on the state’s counterterrorism, the 
latter certainly played a role in the group’s political marginalisation. As 
the RAF’s struggle was increasingly seen as serving only the group’s own 
interests, the brutality of its actions became unacceptable to the public. 
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This started the RAF on the path to the political insignificance that 
characterised its position in the 1980s and 1990s. The case of the RAF thus 
shows that repressive measures can have political effects, even in the 
absence of clear operational success. The marginalising effect of the law 
enforcement pressure on the RAF was undoubtedly unintended, but it 
does shed an interesting light on the dynamic between repression and 
terrorism. It suggests that terrorist groups that struggle for their own 
survival fail to reach out to their constituency. In such cases, they may 
win a few battles, but they will certainly lose the war. 
Outcome Explanation
Red Army Faction




Lacks of restraint in the use of force gained the RAF the sympathy and support of the radical left in 




The controversial legislation that was clearly designed to fight the RAF, convinced the RAF’s 









During several hostage situations, the government refused to give in to the RAF’s demands, which 




Law enforcement and 
direct action
Effective
As a result of the arrests, especially those of the leadership, the RAF began to wage a violent 
campaign for its own survival, and consequently became detached from its support base
Offering a counter 
narrative
Ineffective
The government did try to depict the RAF as deluded criminals, but it was not until the RAF began 
to carry out callously violent actions that potential supporters turned against the group




Intelligence gathering Not applied
 
Figure 18. Counterterrorism principles as applied against the RAF
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Intermediate conclusion I: how to fight 
revolutionary terrorism 
Having applied the research design outlined in chapter 1 to the two cases 
in this cluster, one may ask if there indications that the counterterrorism 
principles have worked out similarly against both groups. For both cases 
it has been examined which counterterrorism principles have been 
applied and what effects they had. We should now be able to tell whether 
there are any similarities between the two cases. Unfortunately, as only a 
small number of counterterrorism principles have been applied in both 
cases, the case studies do not provide much evidence that 
counterterrorism principles have similar effects when applied against 
groups that resemble the Weather Underground and the RAF. At the 
same time, the evidence does not allow for the opposite conclusion either. 
As different counterterrorism principles were applied against the two 
groups, there is simply little material for comparison. If we would have to 
answer the research subquestion whether counterterrorism principles 
have similar effects when applied against similar terrorist groups or 
movements, the answer would be that, given the differences in 
counterterrorism approaches used by both states, we simply do not know. 
But although this cluster is of limited use in ascertaining whether there is 
a relation between counterterrorism effectiveness and terrorist actor type, 
it does vindicate certain counterterrorism principles. One of the things 
that this cluster does show, is that violations of the counterterrorism 
principles ‘restraint in the use of force’ and ‘rule of law’ can indeed be 
counterproductive in the fight against groups that have significant 
popular support. Both the RAF and the Weather Underground grew out 
of mass protest movements, and when they were still connected to those 
milieus, repressive measures were easily explained by the group’s 
constituency as dictatorial. Mass arrests, liquidation of radicals, and other 
crude measures turned the protest movements in both countries further 
against the state, and increased their willingness to support or even join 
the RAF or the Weather Underground. Furthermore, they contributed to 
the radicalisation of members of the terrorist groups. Clear examples are 
the shootings of Benno Ohnesorg and Rudi Dutschke in West Germany 
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and Mark Clark and Fred Hampton in the US. The deaths of these men 
gave the RAF and the Weather Underground the idea that they were up 
against a brutal and ruthless enemy and convinced both groups further of 
the legitimacy and necessity of violence. 
A second interesting finding pertains to the way in which both groups 
were distracted from their political goals as a result of law enforcement 
pressure. The dynamics were different, but in both cases, the police scored 
a political success that had little to do with any operational success. In the 
case of the Weather Underground, the group members had to put all their 
time and effort into staying out of the hands of the law, which left them 
unable to bring a political message across. Very few Weathermen were 
arrested after the activities had been moved underground, but in return 
for the hard-won organisational security, the group effectively sacrificed 
its political impact. Operationally successful terrorist attacks by the 
Weather Underground did occur, but they failed to spark the revolution 
that the Weathermen hoped would take place as a result of their 
‘propaganda by the deed’. In the case of the RAF, the group failed 
politically because it put its own interests before those of their 
constituency. Liberating incarcerated group members and avenging fallen 
comrades took precedence over actions that could convince the group’s 
support base that the RAF was truly fighting for the proletariat. The 
cruelty and self-centredness that the group displayed in these attacks 
estranged many potential supporters. Like the Weather Underground, the 
RAF was at times operationally successful in the sense that it managed to 
carry out attacks and get away with it, but it was no longer a political 
force to be reckoned with. It had become a mere nuisance, not a serious 












6 The long haul: Spanish counterterrorism and 
the throttling of ETA 
Few terrorist organisations have held out longer than Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (Basque for Fatherland and Freedom, ETA). From the 
inception of Spanish democracy in 1975 to the group’s permanent 
ceasefire declaration in 2012, ETA was the scourge of the Spanish 
government. According to statistics from the Spanish Interior Ministry, 
ETA is responsible for 829 deaths over the period 1968-2010, which makes 
it one of the most deadly terrorist organisations in European history.1 On 
top of this substantial body count came economic damage, especially in 
tourism, long one of the pillars of the Spanish economy. ETA threatened 
tour operators and even carried out bombings at tourist sites, and did so 
to considerable effect.2 According to econometric estimates, each ETA 
attack kept 140,000 potential tourists from coming to Spain.3 In a telling 
illustration of the fear ETA instilled on Spanish society, the Vuelta a 
España, the country’s main cycling race, stayed away from the Basque 
Country for 33 years. It was not until 2011 that the fear of attacks on the 
race had subsided to the point where officials felt it was safe enough to 
include the unruly province in the route again.4  
In a way, it is surprising that ETA had such a big impact for such a long 
time. The group’s history is littered with strategic and tactical defeats, its 
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popularity started to decline in the mid-1980s, and its violent campaign 
has not contributed significantly to the materialisation of the radical 
Basque nationalist agenda. Part of the explanation of ETA’s failure to 
achieve full independence for the Basque Country certainly lies in the 
Spanish government’s wide range of countermeasures. As will be shown 
below, Spanish counterterrorism covered the entire spectrum from 
political reforms and reintegration measures to repressive legislation, law 
enforcement pressure and even the deployment of death squads. 
Furthermore, ETA’s longevity makes it possible to examine the longer-
term effects of counterterrorism interventions. Some of the discussions in 
the second section of this chapter show how certain measures take some 
time to kick in, and how others wear off after a while. Thus, the fight 
against ETA is a rich case in more than one respect and should be very 
instructive for our understanding of counterterrorism effectiveness. 
6.1 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
6.1.1 Origins 
Although this chapter focuses on counterterrorism in post-Francoist 
Spain, a brief description of ETA’s antecedents under Franco is necessary 
for a full understanding of the group’s political views. ETA grew out of 
the Basque frustration with the repression under the regime of Francisco 
Franco, the general who had emerged from the Spanish Civil War as the 
head of the new right-wing, nationalist and Catholic autocracy. 
Expressions of Basque national identity, such as waving the flag and 
using the Basque language, were repressed as part of the regime’s 
strongly nationalist agenda, although less emphatically so as the years 
wore on.5 Basque nationalism had always been an important factor in 
Spanish politics, but was dealt a heavy blow by the repression under the 
Franco regime, not in the least through the marginalisation of the Basque 
Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV), the champion of the 
Basque cause. With the PNV’s leadership jailed or in exile and unable to 
take a meaningful stand against the regime, many Basque youths, 
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including members of the PNV’s youth wing, lost their confidence in the 
party and started their own protest movement.  
The response of the younger generation came in 1959, with the founding 
of ETA, which was made up of radical elements of the PNV’s youth wing 
and members of radical nationalist study groups that had been debating 
and writing about the oppression of the Basque people for some years.6 
Initially, ETA was a primarily non-violent movement, focused on 
spreading its ideas through underground newsletters and other means of 
propaganda. It undertook its first violent action in July 1961, when it tried 
to derail a train that was taking Franco supporters to a party rally. The 
attempt was a dismal failure, as not a single carriage went off the rails and 
none of the passengers got hurt.7 After a lull of several years, the group 
resumed its violent activities in 1968 with the shooting of a police officer 
who was trying to arrest ETA-leader Txabi Etxebarrieta, and the 
assassination of Méliton Manzanas, a high-ranking police officer with a 
reputation for torturing political prisoners. The subsequent trials, which 
were held in Burgos, generated considerable media attention and 
inadvertently brought ETA the reputation of fearless freedom fighters. 
Several contemporaries who would later become ETA members even 
compared the worship of the defendants to the kind of adoration that is 
usually reserved for movie stars and football players.8 The impact was 
increased by the fact that this was the first time that Spain - not just the 
Basque Country - could believe in the electrifying notion that were groups 
out there who were willing to take up arms against the oppressor. ETA 
further cemented its reputation in 1973, when, after months of 
painstaking preparation, they managed to kill Prime Minister Luis 
Carrero Blanco, Franco’s right-hand man and heir apparent. The group 
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still benefited from that popular appeal when Franco died and Spain 
started its democratic transition process.9 
6.1.2 Ideology 
As a result of the group’s heterogeneity in the early days, the etarras 
(members of ETA) initially had little in common but a notion that the 
Basque people needed to be saved from the yoke of the Franco regime. 
ETA’s membership was quite diverse, as it included former seminarians 
as well as orthodox socialists. Unsurprisingly, ETA’s founding was 
followed by lengthy debates about what to achieve, who to cooperate 
with and what methods to use. Under Franco, ETA consisted, broadly 
speaking, of three main strands: the nationalists, the socialists and the 
anti-imperialists.10 The nationalists perceived the difficult position of the 
Basques as a cultural issue: the Basques were being put down because 
they were Basque, and the regime’s goal was the extermination of the 
Basque way of life. Since the fight was thus one for the restoration of the 
Basque culture, only Basque parties and organisations could be involved. 
The socialists on the other hand, interpreted the repression of the Basques 
in terms of class struggle. In their view the Basques were repressed not 
because they were Basque, but because they were working class. The 
Basque language and culture played a less prominent role in the socialists’ 
agenda. Unlike the nationalist wing, the socialists did not oppose 
cooperation with Spanish parties like the PSOE. The third wing was the 
anti-imperialist one, which strongly identified the Basque struggle with 
national liberation movements in the third world. This wing was mostly 
made up of younger members who aspired to follow the example of Fidel 
Castro’s and Che Guevara’s armed rebels and wanted to wage a guerrilla 
campaign against the Spanish state.11 
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In the sixties and seventies, ETA went through an extremely intricate 
series of feuds and splits. Few of these internal struggles were purely 
about politics, as the three factions were held together as much by 
personal loyalty as by agreement on a political or strategic vision on 
ETA’s future course.12 The first victims of ETA’s infighting were the 
socialists, some of whom were pushed out of ETA by an alliance of the 
orthodox nationalists and the anti-imperialists at the organisation’s Fifth 
Assembly, which was spread over two meetings, one in December 1966, 
the other in March 1967.13 The socialists went on to form ETA-Berri (New 
ETA), a radical leftist group that completely distanced itself from any 
form of nationalism.14 The enmity, however, did not end here. The next 
confrontation took place at the Sixth Assembly, at which the nationalist 
wing broke away from the anti-imperialists. For a long time, the latter had 
been more numerous and more powerful than their nationalist rivals, but 
the repression hit them harder and they lacked strong leadership. By the 
beginning of the 1970s the nationalists had ousted the anti-imperialists 
and had turned the tables on the socialists to become the strongest wing, 
eventually taking over the name ETA.15 
The most important factor that contributed to the defeat of the socialists 
was that their political vision was alien to many in their target audience. 
Basque nationalism, on the other hand, had deep roots in the Basque 
political tradition. The notion that the Basques were culturally, 
linguistically and even racially unique, and certainly superior to the 
Spaniards, had been a powerful theme in Basque politics ever since 
Sabino Arana founded the PNV in 1895.16 The Basque identity was further 
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strengthened by the repression under the Franco regime and the influx of 
Spaniards into the Basque Country in the 1960s. As a result of the latter 
development, health care, education, the labour market and the housing 
market in the Basque Country became overburdened, convincing many 
Basques that Spain was economically exploiting the Basque Country.17 It 
is against this background that their openness towards ETA’s ideology of 
Basque nationalism must be understood. Thus, ETA’s ideology developed 
into a predominantly nationalist-separatist one, but the defeats of the 
socialists did not mean that ETA totally shed its leftist aspirations 
regarding the liberation of the Basque people. ETA explicitly stressed this 
point in the choice of their victims, for instance when the group 
kidnapped Lorenzo Zabala, a Basque businessman and factory owner.18 
The message was that ETA did not shy away from targeting Basques who 
were acting against the interests of the Basque working people. A more 
recent example of the group’s socialist roots can be found in its 2011 
declaration of a permanent cease-fire, the first line of which has ETA 
describing itself as “the socialist revolutionary Basque organisation for 
national liberation”.19 The group was thus never without its leftist 
leanings, but it was the nationalist strand that eventually prevailed. 
ETA’s ultimate goal was total independence for the Basque people, but 
the group recognised that that ambition would be difficult to achieve. 
Therefore, it translated its political ideals into a series of concrete, short-
terms demands on the Spanish government, the fulfilment of which 
would complete the first step towards ETA’s long-term objective. ETA 
calculated that the Basque people, after ETA’s demands had been met, 
would realise that full independence was needed and would support 
ETA’s efforts to take the fight for Basque independence to the next level.20 
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ETA’s short-term demands, named the KAS Alternative after the platform 
of organisations that subscribed to these demands, were the following21: 
 Amnesty for all Basque political prisoners 
 Legalisation of all political parties, including those that favoured 
Basque independence 
 A new autonomy statute that, unlike the officially approved 
Autonomy Statute from 1978, would grant the Basque people the 
right to self-determination 
 Withdrawal of all Spanish police from Basque territory  
 Inclusion of the Spanish province of Navarra in the Basque 
Autonomous Region 
 Recognition of Basque as the first language in the Basque Country 
 Basque control over Spanish armed forces on Basque territory 
 Improvement of the working and living conditions of the Basque 
working class 
These eight demands made up ETA’s political agenda from 1978 until 
1995, when the group came up with the more modest Democratic 
Alternative, in which ETA offered the Spanish government a cease-fire in 
return for Basque self-determination.  
6.1.3 Organisational structure and culture 
Under the Franco regime, ETA’s organisational structure changed 
regularly, depending on which faction was gaining the upper hand in the 
group’s internal feuding. It was not until the Spanish transition to 
democracy that ETA’s structure became more stable. After the mid-1970s, 
ETA was a hierarchical but flat organisation, made up of a leadership 
layer and a layer of activist cells. The latter operated independently of 
each other and knew little about each other’s activities.22 The 
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organisation’s top leadership resided in the French part of the Basque 
Country, where it could operate freely until the mid-1980s, when, as will 
be discussed in more detail below, the French government began to 
harden its stance towards the group. ETA’s size - difficult to establish but 
estimated at some five hundred operatives in 1981, less than one hundred 
operatives in the late 1980s and several hundred in the 1990s - allowed for 
an elaborate division of labour, which was reflected in the composition of 
the top leadership.23 There were about twelve leaders at the group’s top, 
each of whom bore the responsibility for a particular part of ETA’s 
operations. For instance, one leader was in charge of the group’s finances, 
another led ETA’s intelligence gathering efforts and yet another directed 
the group’s weapons acquisition.24 Each leader had one or two assistants 
and several staff members. Although the distance between the leadership 
in France and the rank-and-file membership in Spain at times made it 
difficult to control the organisation, the grasp of the higher echelons 
seems to have been quite firm. They decided on which actions to carry 
out, transferred the order to the cells involved and allocated the necessary 
resources. 
Under the central leadership functioned a layer made up of two types of 
activists, who operated in cells of no more than five members. First, there 
were the illegales, who were involved in the most dangerous activities, 
lived underground and were known to and wanted by the police as ETA 
activists. They were supported by the legales, who worked mostly part-
time for ETA. Their tasks typically included communication, intelligence 
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gathering and managing arms caches and money depots.25 The legales had 
regular jobs, lived with their families and were not known to the police.26  
In the course of the years, ETA’s membership has undergone some 
significant changes, all of which point to a growing detachment from the 
group’s support base and a diminishing ability to replenish its ranks with 
competent new members. First, ETA lost its Basque roots. In the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, the percentage of Basque speakers in ETA was 
significantly higher than that of the Basque Country as a whole. Also, 
many etarras had two parents with Basque names, and a disproportionally 
large part of the group’s membership came from the Guipúzcoa region, 
traditionally a stronghold of Basque culture and nationalism. All these 
factors indicate a certain attachment to the Basque cultural community. In 
later years, however, has shown that ETA’s Basque disposition has come 
under pressure: fewer ETA members speak Basque, fewer members have 
two parents with Basque family names and members from Guipúzcoa are 
no longer overrepresented.27 Former etarras have criticised newer 
generations for their lack of political awareness and dedication to the 
Basque people, claiming that their successors were motivated rather by 
selfish reasons, like private feuds with the police.28  
Second, the recruitment process became less demanding. In the group’s 
early days, recruits had to go through a lengthy vetting process, during 
which they had to prove their commitment to the organisation by 
carrying out a series of increasingly difficult tasks. It often took recruits 
some two years before they were accepted as full members.29 In the 1990s 
it became clear that this painstaking procedure was a luxury ETA could 
no longer afford. Instead, weapons were handed out to anyone who 
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claimed allegiance to the group and its goals.30 This lowering of the 
standards is also visible in the third change ETA’s membership went 
through: ETA’s recruits became younger and were often social misfits 
rather than dedicated militants with a clear sense of what Basque 
radicalism was about. This prompting one author to observe that ETA’s 
membership increasingly resembled that of Western European right-wing 
extremist groups.31 As will be discussed below, this shift had serious 
effects on the type of violence that ETA was able to carry out. The 
sophisticated assassinations of the 1970s and early 1980s made way for 
less complex attacks and simple street violence. 
In order to provide the illegales and the legales with the necessary support, 
there was a network made up of people who were sympathetic towards 
ETA, but were technically not etarras. For instance, ETA had a large 
network of couriers to transfer messages from the leaders to the cells or 
the other way around. There were also several front organisations, legal 
organisations which worked on behalf of ETA and which were 
collectively known as the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco (Basque 
National Liberation Movement, MLNV). The MLNV included youth 
clubs, organisations to promote the Basque language and culture, and 
groups that lobbied for better treatment and release of ETA-prisoners or 
organised pro-ETA protest marches.32 The most important organisation in 
the MLNV was the political party that was rightfully considered ETA’s 
political wing. Until it was banned in 2003 for supporting ETA, Herri 
Batasuna (Unity of the People), named Batasuna (Unity) after a 2001 
merger with Euskal Herritarok (We, the Basques), was the most radical 
Basque nationalist party in the Basque and Spanish parliaments. It spoke 
on ETA’s behalf during some of the negotiations with the Spanish 
government and occasionally had ETA members running for 
parliamentary seats. For these reasons, the EU list of designated terrorist 
organisations mentions Batasuna as part of ETA, stipulating that the 
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sanctions regime concerns not only ETA, but also the group’s political 
wing.33 
On the international level ETA could count on some support from other 
terrorist groups. In the late 1970s, a group of etarras travelled to the Irish 
county of Kerry to receive training in the use of mortar launchers. Groups 
that ETA had similar ties with, include the Latin American guerrilla 
organisations Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the Tupamaros, as well as 
European left-wing terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction and the 
Red Brigades. Carlos the Jackal, an infamous international terrorist, 
claimed during his trial that he had collaborated extensively with ETA 
during the 1980s, and that this cooperation was facilitated by the secret 
services of East Germany, Hungary and Rumania.34 
6.1.4 Modus operandi 
During Franco’s reign and in the first years of the democratic transition, 
ETA’s strategy was one of provocation. The idea behind the violent 
actions was that these would provoke a violent response from the regime. 
ETA estimated that this would prompt the Basque people, which would 
bear the brunt of the state’s repression, to start a revolution.35 The group 
was not blind, however, to the diminishing potential for mass 
mobilisation under the democratic constitution. In the first two years after 
Franco’s death, the Basque Country saw a large number of 
demonstrations for a variety of causes, including treatment of ETA 
prisoners and the rights of the Basque people, but after the consolidation 
of Spanish democracy, the Basques’ willingness to demonstrate decreased 
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quickly. This made it clear to ETA that the action-repression-action 
strategy would not work. Prompted by a realistic assessment of the power 
relations in the Basque Country, the group switched gears. Aware that the 
Basque people would not rise up and that their organisation did not stand 
a chance in an armed confrontation with the state, ETA decided to use 
violence to raise the costs of the status quo for the Spanish state to the 
point where the latter would be forced to give in to ETA’s demands.36 
This strategy of attrition would for decades be the underlying logic of 
ETA’s terrorist attacks. 
After the strategic shift the goal was to inflict damage on the state, which 
explains the restraint ETA observed in the use of violence.37 Anxious to 
avoid civilian casualties and consequent losses of popular support, the 
group initially committed terrorist attacks only against police forces and 
military personnel. Also, to further reduce the risk of collateral damage 
ETA operatives preferred to strike at their victims while there was no one 
nearby.38 ETA carried out most of their liquidations in public spaces, as 
that allowed them to kill without having to enter high-security 
government buildings or army barracks. This meant that most of their 
victims were out on patrol and, given that high-ranking police officers or 
security staff rarely engaged in such activities, were generally low in 
rank.39 However, the group's obvious penchant for targeting lower-level 
members of the security forces who were alone while on patrol would not 
last. The group’s modus operandi underwent three major changes. 
First, ETA expanded its range of victims. From the early 1990s on, ETA 
moved away from the victim profile outlined in the previous paragraph 
and started targeting journalists, politicians, academics and lawyers as 
well. In a move to “socialise the suffering”, which meant expanding the 
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group of people who had to pay the price for the perceived repression of 
the Basque people, ETA decided to target all those whom it considered 
traitors to the Basque cause.40 Previously, the police and the military had 
to bear the brunt of ETA’s violence, but now anyone who voiced an 
opinion that went against ETA had reason to fear for his or her life. Many 
journalists had to hire bodyguards and took driving lessons to learn how 
to shake off assassins in car chases. The newspapers they worked for took 
extensive security measures, including camera surveillance and metal 
detectors around their offices.41 The expansion of ETA’s violent campaign 
to civilian victims is clearly borne out by statistics. Before 1992, only 2.6% 
of all ETA deadly victims were government officials or politicians, 
whereas these categories together accounted for 21.7% of the deadly 
victims in the period 1992-2007.42 Another type of fatality that became 
more and more frequent in ETA attacks, is the unintentionally victimised 
bystander, which brings us to the next shift in ETA’s modus operandi. 
From the mid-1980s, ETA’s violence became less discriminate.43 Although 
the group sometimes still carried out precisely targeted assassinations in 
which the killers got close to their victims to avoid collateral damage, they 
now also started to make use of car bombs.44 Although this method 
reduced the risk of capture, it was a lot less precise45, and ETA’s public 
standing was severely undermined when innocent civilians got killed or 
injured. One of the most important examples of an indiscriminate attack 
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and the negative repercussions for the perpetrator was the 1987 bombing 
of a Hipercor supermarket in Barcelona. ETA-operatives had parked a car 
full of explosives in a parking garage under the supermarket and killed 
fifteen in the subsequent explosion. Thirty-eight people were wounded.46 
Although the bombing was operationally a success, it backfired badly 
against ETA: some 750,000 people took to the streets of Barcelona to 
condemn the attack, which forced ETA to issue one of its rare apologies. 
Herri Batasuna distanced itself from the operation as well.47  
Painful as the bad publicity may have been, it did not change the group’s 
mind regarding the use of the car bomb. Inevitably, car bombings went 
wrong again, and again caused much hostility among the Basque 
population. For instance, several months after the Hipercor car bombing, 
ETA crossed the line again when it bombed a compound where families 
of the Guardia Civil (Civil Guards, the Spanish military police) were being 
housed. Among the eleven fatalities were four children.48 In a similar 
incident in 1991, the group killed several children when it detonated a car 
bomb inside a Guardia Civil barracks in Vic, a village north of 
Barcelona.49 Another example of an attack that killed or injured civilians 
as opposed to only police and army personnel, occurred in 1990, when 
ETA operatives detonated a car bomb in Sabadell, a town near Barcelona. 
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Six police officers were killed, and two police officers and six civilians 
were wounded.50 
The third change in ETA’s modus operandi concerns kale borroka (street 
fighting), which emerged in the mid-nineties, when the numbers of 
terrorist attacks carried out by ETA were declining. Kale borroka is the 
Basque term for the low-intensity campaign waged by ETA sympathisers 
in their late teens or early twenties. The violence used by these youth 
groups consists of simple actions that can be carried out without much 
preparation or expertise, like vandalism, arson and physical assault. The 
damage was nevertheless considerable. For instance, the total damage of 
kale borroka in 2000 was estimated at some 9 million dollars.51 Another 
important element of kale borroka is intimidation. The perpetrators let 
people know that they are marked as potential victims, for instance by 
visibly carrying out surveillances around the victim’s house or putting up 
posters with a picture of the victim in a gun sight.52 Kale borroka has been 
dismissed by some as mindless hooliganism, but it did follow a political 
rationale and its perpetrators were politically committed.53 It emerged in 
the second half of the 1990s, when ETA was suffering from arrests and a 
decrease of its popular support. The group realised that it was becoming 
isolated and needed the cooperation of other political parties to have a 
realistic chance at achieving its political goals. During the kale borroka 
campaign ETA reached out to moderate political parties, mainly the PNV, 
but at the same time wanted to make them, as well as the population in 
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general, feel the consequences of their unwillingness to cooperate. Kale 
borroka should thus be understood as an instrument to silence and punish 
opposition, which came primarily from journalists and local politicians. 
While it is true that kale borroka was also a tool to select and vet new 
recruits, it served a clear political purpose and was consciously used by 
ETA as a way to ‘socialise the suffering’, and can therefore be considered 
part of ETA’s modus operandi.54 In this regard, it is interesting to see that 
it occurred most frequently in areas with strong polarisation about ETA’s 
goals and means, that is, in areas where ETA needed violence and 
intimidation to force the media and political parties into submission.55 The 
degree of control ETA had over kale borroka can be illustrated by the fact 
that attacks against the PNV ceased once the latter had signed the Pact of 
Lizarra. In this controversial deal, closed in 1998, the PNV put pressure on 
the Spanish government by joining Batasuna and several other parties and 
organisations in committing itself to the Basque right to self-
determination.56 
6.1.5 The end of the armed struggle 
In recent years, French and Spanish police have dealt ETA a series of 
heavy blows, from which Europe’s oldest terrorist organisation failed to 
recover. The group lost several prominent leaders in a relatively short 
period of time, which suggests that the Spanish and French police were 
closing in on the terrorist group. The damage done to ETA in these arrests 
does not only consist of the removal of leading figures, but also concerns 
the confiscation of arms caches and the seizing of laptops containing 
valuable information about the identity and whereabouts of the group 
members.57 Also, Spanish police forces apprehended ETA’s “most active, 
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most dynamic and of course most wanted” cell, which is thought to be 
responsible for 80 to 90% of ETA’s attacks in the period between the end 
of the 2006 ceasefire and their arrest in July 2008.58  
Weakened by these arrests and by the waning of its public support, the 
group started to lose the will to fight. The cracks were visible as early as 
2002, when Alfonso Etxegarai, an ETA member who had sent to exile in 
Africa, wrote an open letter in the Basque newspaper Gara. His 
assessment of the position ETA found itself in went as follows: “You have 
reached a stalemate when your dead and your prisoners increase while 
your actions decrease. The more vague and questionable your targets are, 
the less they are contributing to the internal and external recognition of 
your cause. They are perfectly aware of this. They know that in their ‘war’ 
we are not strong enough to beat them, and they know that we only 
barely maintain our right to armed resistance. By the way, our armed 
resistance is completely disfigured by the effects of the phenomenon 
known as ‘international terrorism’.”59 In 2004, a letter from a group of 
incarcerated leaders to ETA’s political chief Mikel Albizu was leaked to 
the press. In this letter, the prisoners suggested that perhaps it was time to 
admit that the armed struggle had failed and that ETA should consider 
switching to political action to generate popular support.60 In 2007, two 
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other prisoners wrote a letter to the same effect. They argued that the 
armed struggle had become an obstacle to the realisation of the radical 
Basque nationalist agenda. In their view, ETA’s political objectives could 
only be realised if the group would put a stop to its violent campaign.61  
At the time these letters were denounced as treason by the ETA 
leadership outside of prison, but in 2010 the group offered a ceasefire 
without asking anything in return, showing a flexibility that would have 
been unthinkable in the 1970s and 1980s.62 Probably in response to 
widespread scepticism about the sincerity of the announcement, ETA 
issued a declaration on 10 January 2011 stating that the abandonment of 
arms was permanent and “will be verifiable by the international 
community”.63 For some time observers were in some doubt as to whether 
ETA’s terrorist campaign was truly over, as it would not have been the 
first time the group would break a ceasefire it had declared to be 
permanent. Also, in 2010 the group was still actively recruiting new 
members and acquiring new funding, mostly through extortion.64 On the 
other hand, a Basque business association received a letter from ETA 
announcing the end of the extortion the group euphemistically named 
‘revolutionary taxes’.65 Either way, the ceasefire did not put an end to the 
law enforcement pressure, as 35 etarras were arrested in the three months 
after 10 January 2011.66 This same period also saw the dismantlement as 
several arms caches, one of which was reportedly the biggest ever found 
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by the police.67 Thus, the group was weakened further after the 
declaration of the ceasefire, and, contrary to some scholars’ expectations68, 
violence has not flared up as a result of the Spanish government’s hard 
line.  
The odds were heavily stacked against ETA, and on 20 October 2011 the 
group moved to put an end to any remaining uncertainty regarding the 
future of the armed struggle. The declaration that was released that day 
held that “a new political age is opening” and reconfirmed ETA's 
commitment to “the definitive cessation of its armed activity”.69 After 
having gone a year without attacks, the group communicated their 
willingness to get in touch with Spanish and French authorities to 
negotiate the decommissioning of their weapons and the dissolution of 
the organisation.70 But while ETA’s announcement amounts to a 
conditional surrender, the Spanish government is unmoved and claims 
that no dialogue is needed. Throughout 2012 and 2013, Spanish police 
kept rounding up suspected etarras. Although at the time of writing (June 
2013) ETA has yet to officially disband, but is being wiped out and no 
longer has a support base to speak of, which suggests that the oldest 
terrorist organisation in the world will soon be a thing of the past. 
6.2 Counterterrorism principles and ETA 
6.2.1 Restraint in the use of force 
Like many governments before and since, the governments of Prime 
Minister Adolfo Suárez (1976-1981) and his successors Leopoldo Sotelo 
(1981-1982) and Felipe González (1982-1996), when confronted with 
terrorist violence, made the mistake of using too much force in an attempt 
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to eliminate their terrorist opponent. ETA violence escalated in 1978, after 
the democratic constitution and the Basque Autonomy Statute (on which 
more below) had been accepted by referendum. The Guardia Civil and the 
Policia Nacional (National Police) responded to this violent upsurge with 
unwarranted searches, mass arrests, incommunicado detention of terrorist 
suspects and, according reports by Amnesty International and several 
Basque newspapers, torture.71 It has been argued that torture was not 
institutionalised in the Basque Country, but there is little doubt that 
during first years of Spain’s democratic transition many imprisoned 
etarras were subjected to sleep deprivation, isolation, threats and physical 
beatings.72 Furthermore, many of the detentions in this period were not 
even intended to build cases for prosecution. The police arrested people, 
including members of the moderate PNV, not so much to prosecute them, 
but rather to gather information about the functioning and membership of 
ETA. In the period 1977-1987 only one third of all arrested terrorist 
suspects were convicted for terrorism or a related crime.73 
Furthermore, in the early years of Spanish democracy, the police also 
reacted viciously against anti-government demonstrations. Easily 
resorting to tear gas and rubber bullets, the Guardia Civil and the Policia 
Nacional did little to avoid violent clashes with the demonstrators.74 
Another form of violent overreaction was the use of death squads to 
eliminate people thought to be ETA leaders. Right-wing, Franco-loyalist 
militias like the Batallón Vasco-Español (Basque-Spanish Battalion, BVE), 
Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista (Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance, 
AAA) and Antiterrorismo ETA (Antiterrorism ETA) intimidated, tortured 
and killed suspected etarras, often in collusion with, or at least with the 
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tacit support of, the police.75 The most infamous of these groups was the 
Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Antiterrorist Liberation Groups, GAL), 
which hunted down ETA leaders in the French part of the Basque 
Country from 1983 to 1987. The GAL was a motley crew of Italian neo-
fascists, Portuguese assassins, French ex-soldiers and Spanish police 
officers.76 They kidnapped and tortured suspected etarras and were 
responsible for 27 killings.77 The group also caused much collateral 
damage. Many of the victims of the GAL’s assassination attempts had 
nothing to do with ETA or terrorism.78 
What made the activities of the GAL even more shocking, especially in the 
perception of the Basque population, were the close ties the militia had 
with the government of Prime Minister Felipe González. The González 
administration was confronted with an upsurge of ETA violence 
immediately after it assumed office and was pressured by the security 
forces for a hard line against the terrorist organisation. Determined not to 
come across as ‘soft on terror’, Interior Minister José Barrionuevo agreed 
to start a ‘dirty war’ in France, where most of ETA’s leadership resided.79 
From the beginning of the GAL’s actions, many surmised that the 
government might be involved, and these suspicions were confirmed 
when arrested GAL-members confessed that they had two contacts in the 
Policía Nacional to whom they could turn for financial support for their 
operations.80 Subsequent criminal investigations found that the funding 
came from the highest levels of the Interior Ministry. The court imposed 
severe penalties on those involved, including the head of the Spanish 
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security service, several high-ranking police officers and the secretary-
general of the Basque branch of the PSOE. The most important culprit was 
Barrionuevo, who received a ten-year prison sentence for having 
personally ordered the liquidation of certain ETA leaders.81 
The Spanish heavy-handedness proved a valuable propaganda tool for 
ETA, which used the government’s hard approach to argue that the 
democratic institutions were just a thin veneer to hide what was in 
essence still a dictatorship repressing the Basque people.82 In the course of 
the 1980s however, the Spanish security forces became more discriminate 
in their actions. For instance, the numbers of terrorism-related arrests for 
the period 1988-1997 was only 20% of the number for the period 1978-
1987. This decrease was accompanied by a stark increase in the rate of 
arrestees that were brought to trial. Over the period 1988-1997, 60% of 
those charged with terrorism or a related offense, were brought to trial, 
compared to some 30% in the preceding decade.83 An important factor in 
this development was the belated reform of the Spanish security forces. 
The political structures had been thoroughly reformed by 1980, but the 
Guardia Civil, the Policia Nacional and the army remained largely 
untouched by the democratic transition. This changed in the mid-1980s, 
when Prime Minister González introduced Organic Law 2/1986 on the 
Security Corps and Forces. This law was drawn up to subordinate the 
Policia Nacional and the Guardia Civil to democratic control and 
accountability and thus to the principles laid down in the 1978 
Constitution, which stated that it was the task of the police to protect the 
“free exercise of rights and liberties and the guaranteeing of the safety of 
citizens”.84 Around the same time, the Spanish parliament had approved a 
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law to strengthen democratic and political control over the military.85 This 
does not mean that maltreatment and physical abuse were totally 
eradicated, as illustrated by instances of torture of ETA suspects as late as 
2009.86 Nevertheless, wrongs like these were minimised to a point where 
the Basque population ceased to see the police as their enemies. Polls 
show that the numbers of Basques who believe that violence is needed to 
bring about changes in the plight of the Basque people have decreased 
sharply. In one poll, even 67% of the respondents who voted for political 
parties that are affiliated with ETA were of the opinion that the Spanish 
state offers sufficient opportunities for political action and that the 
Basques do not have to resort to violent action.87  
As we have seen above, ETA initially had a support network of hundreds 
of sympathisers willing to provide small services or even join the group as 
full members, but this support was gradually withdrawn, reducing the 
group to a hard core of underground activists. Terrorist organisations 
with popular support manage the ‘security constraint’, that is, they can 
survive law enforcement pressure because of their ability to attract new 
recruits to replace group members who have been killed or arrested.88 
Initially, ETA could find replacements for arrested operatives, but in the 
long run could not to convince the Basque population of the need for 
armed struggle, let alone persuade them to actively cooperate. Violent 
state actions against friends, families or fellow Basques were for many the 
reason to join or support ETA89, and after that incentive faded, the group 
lost much of its appeal. As a result, the group has been increasingly 
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unable to gain recruits to replace arrested etarras. There are no hard data 
on numbers of people performing small tasks for ETA, but there are 
indications that the group found it difficult to maintain its support base in 
the face of more discriminate state repression. The coincidence of the 
Basques’ decreasing willingness to use or accept violence as a political 
instrument, the decline of ETA’s popular support (see the section 
‘Addressing root causes’ below) and the decline of the intensity of ETA’s 
violence after the 1980s seem to suggest that it was difficult for ETA to 
find the recruits needed to keep up the level of violence from the early 
1980s.90 
The initial overreaction of the Spanish state fed rather than curbed ETA 
violence, and thus proved counterproductive in the sense of the 
programme theory outlined in section 3.3.1. The maltreatment of ETA-
prisoners and the ruthless use of antiterrorist death squads reinforced the 
perception of the Spanish state as an oppressor, but in the mid-1980s the 
Spanish security forces became less brutal in their handling of the terrorist 
threat. Although it is difficult to distinguish the effect of the switch to a 
more discriminate use of violence from the impact of other 
counterterrorism interventions (see the sections ‘Rule of law’ and 
‘Addressing root causes’ below), there is little doubt that the restraint on 
the part of the Guardia Civil and Policia Nacional undermined ETA’s 
narrative about the dictatorial nature of the Spanish post-Francoist state. 
6.2.2 Rule of law 
Parallel to the hard approach described in the previous section, Spain also 
took a hard line in the legislation that was introduced in the late 1970s to 
curb the terrorist threat that emanated primarily from ETA. Organic Laws 
21/1978 and 56/1978 dramatically expanded the powers of the police, 
who were now allowed to keep terrorist suspects incommunicado and hold 
them for three days without pressing charges. Also, they were allowed to 
place phone taps, to open mail and to carry out house searches without 
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court orders.91 In March 1981 the administration of Prime Minister 
Leopoldo Sotelo added to the legal arsenal by introducing the Law for the 
Defence of the Constitution, which contained a broad definition of 
terrorism. Any attempts to affect the integrity of the Spanish state or the 
unity of its territory could now be legally considered acts of terrorism. 
This meant a severe curtailment of the freedom of speech, as the 
government intended to use the law not only against ETA and its 
operational supporters, but also against newspapers and other media that 
spread messages that could be considered separatist in tone.92 
In 1984 the González-administration introduced yet another law to widen 
the government's legal powers in the fight against terrorism. This law 
reaffirmed the powers from previous legislation and added the possibility 
for courts to ban political parties and other organisations, including 
newspapers and radio stations, if these were found guilty of supporting 
terrorism.93 Furthermore, the penalties for acts of terrorism became more 
severe.94 The fall-out of these proposals proved a turning point in Spanish 
counterterrorism legislation. The outrage, especially among Basque 
political parties, was huge and led to accusations that the Spanish state 
had matched the Franco regime in the intensity of its repression. A group 
of Basque political parties, not only radical ones, issued an appeal to the 
Spanish Constitutional Court to have eleven of the law’s twenty-two 
clauses declared unconstitutional. Four clauses in the 1984 law were 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Several other 
clauses, including the ones that stipulated the government’s right to arrest 
demonstrators shouting pro-ETA-slogans and to ban organisations which 
were found to support ETA, were abandoned in January 1987. These latter 
clauses were adopted as temporary measures and lapsed in the absence of 
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an attempt by the government to put their extension to the vote in 
parliament.95 In November 1987, the Spanish parliament voted in favour 
of the abandonment of the remainder of Organic Law 9/1984, transferring 
its components to regular legislation in a more moderate form. For 
instance, the time period that terrorist suspects could be held 
incommunicado was reduced from ten days to five, and it was also 
decided not to prosecute apologists of ETA’s violent campaigns. 
All in all, the laws and procedures that framed the state’s treatment of 
prisoners and demonstrators were counterproductive in the sense that 
they made many Basques in the early 1980s susceptible to the notion of 
the dictatorial nature of the Spanish state that was prevalent among the 
radicals. This was especially so since the antiterrorist laws were perceived 
to go hand in hand with the use of force described in the previous 
paragraph. To many Basques, the legal powers the state used against 
them were as much a sign of the essentially dictatorial nature of the 
Spanish state as the mass arrests and the torture of suspected Basque 
radicals. This correlation was not merely a figment of the radical 
imagination, since the moderation of the legislation took place in the 
second half of the 1980s, the same period that saw the scaling down of the 
use of force described in the previous section. Together with a more even-
handed bearing of the Guardia Civil and the Policia Nacional, the shift 
towards more moderate legislation contributed to the de-escalation of the 
Basque conflict. The increasing legitimacy of the Spanish state and the 
diminishing of the appeal of ETA’s narrative that is observable after the 
mid-1980s was the result of an easing of Spanish government policy, 
which included respect for the law and a reversal of legal overreaction. 
6.2.3 International cooperation, law enforcement and direct 
action 
Law enforcement has always been one of the main pillars of Spanish 
counterterrorism. Its results were initially mixed, but contributed 
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significantly to the group’s demise later on. The main factor that created 
the right conditions for the effectiveness of direct action against ETA was 
the hard-won cooperation of France. Since the international cooperation 
between France and Spain consisted mostly of French police actions that 
added to Spain’s campaign against ETA, the categories ‘law enforcement 
and direct action’ and ‘international cooperation’ have been merged in 
this chapter. 
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s crackdowns against ETA yielded 
little result, and the onset of the GAL campaign did little to change this. 
The GAL did manage to take out some ETA-leaders, but, as it often 
targeted the wrong victims, it had little impact on ETA’s functioning. If 
anything, the GAL’s operations served to confirm the notion of the 
dictatorial Spanish state and thus hardened ETA’s resolve.96 Throughout 
the GAL’s campaign, ETA’s violence remained at a constant level of about 
forty deadly victims per year.97 In fact, the GAL’s greatest achievement 
did not lie in the disruption of ETA, but, rather inadvertently, in securing 
the cooperation of France.  
As has been said above, ETA’s leadership resided mostly in the French 
part of the Basque Country, prompting Spain to deploy 2,000 soldiers on 
the Franco-Spanish border in the early 1980s to disrupt ETA’s cross-
border traffic.98 Until the mid-1980s, however, France was unwilling to 
assist its southern neighbour in the fight against terrorism. Instead, the 
French government stuck to a position of neutrality. Convinced that 
terrorist organisations would not target French citizens or interests as 
long as France would do nothing to antagonise them, the French 
government allowed terrorist organisations, including ETA, to use France 
as a sanctuary. France thus refused to crack down on the ETA leadership, 
let alone extradite ETA-prisoners to Spain. Respective French 
governments stuck to this so-called ‘sanctuary doctrine’ for quite some 
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time, but it began to fall apart when foreign terrorist groups broke the 
silent agreement and started committing attacks against French targets.99 
Another factor that contributed to the doctrine’s demise was the French 
unwillingness to put up with the GAL’s activities on French soil. The 
GAL’s violence was generally poorly targeted and many of its victims 
were innocent bystanders. As French citizens were now in direct danger 
of getting caught up in shoot-outs or misguided assassination attempts, 
the French government decided to end its lenience towards ETA.100 The 
hardening of the French position did not take place overnight and 
extradition remained out of the question until the late 1980s, with French 
officials preferring deportation to northern France or exile to third 
countries.101 Nevertheless, France’s volte-face signalled the beginning of a 
series of arrests that would shake ETA to its foundations. 
One of the first important blows was the arrest in April 1986 of Txomin 
Iturbe, ETA’s military leader. He was arrested in France and deported to 
Gabon and then to Algeria, where he would act as interlocutor for the 
Spanish government during the negotiation attempts of 1986 and 1987 
(see the section ‘Offer non-violent alternatives’).102 At the time of his 
arrest, Iturbe had held the position of military leader for more than ten 
years, during which he survived several attempts on his life by right-wing 
militias.103 His arrest hit ETA hard, as he was one of the group’s most 
important leaders. Several months later, in November 1986, the French 
police cracked down on an ETA-headquarters in Hendaye, a town in the 
south-western tip of France. In a raid against a furniture store that was set 
up to disguise an ETA command centre, police officers made eleven 
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arrests and seized considerable amounts of money and weapons.104 The 
French police scored a similar success in September 1987, when they 
arrested an ETA-leader and found documents that contained information 
that provided ground for the arrest of another 104 etarras. This same 
period also saw the arrest of ETA’s logistics and propaganda chiefs.105  
ETA suffered its most important loss, however, in 1992 in Bidart, a town 
some thirty kilometres north of Hendaye, where the French police struck 
at ETA’s nerve centre and captured José Luis Alvarez, Francisco Múdiga 
and José Arregui, the three most important ETA-leaders at the time.106 
Although the group survived, statistical analyses have shown that after 
the arrests in Bidart, ETA was no longer able to sustain the level of 
violence it had maintained since the early 1980s. The loss of leading 
members meant that a younger, less experienced and less competent 
generation was forced to take over, which was noticeable in the 
operational expertise ETA could bring to the table.107 The group’s 
operations became less and less skilful, and by the end of the 1990s, ETA 
had come a long way from the meticulously planned and skilfully 
executed assassination of Carrero Blanco to the plain vandalism that was 
kale borroka.  
The Carrero Blanco assassination, according to one historian “one of the 
most brilliantly planned in the history of terrorism”, was an intricate 
scheme that could have been upset by the slightest miscalculation or 
stroke of bad luck.108 The operatives involved in the operation hired a 
house from which they could dig a tunnel under the road along Carrero 
Blanco drove to mass every day. To explain the large piles of dust and 
gravel that were dug up during the digging of the tunnel, the etarras 
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involved in the operation told curious observers they were sculptors.109 
After they had reached the right spot, the operatives placed explosives at 
the end of the tunnel. If detonated at the right moment, the blast would 
certainly kill Carrero Blanco. The timing of the ignition of the explosives 
was crucial, as it had to take place at the exact moment when Carrero 
Blanco’s car drove across the end of the tunnel, where the explosives were 
hidden.110 The operation was successful, both operationally and 
politically. ETA managed to take out Franco's right-hand man, which, as 
we have seen above, gained them the admiration of many in the Basque 
Country as well as in the rest of Spain. Sheer luck may have played a role, 
but the completion of this complicated operation was all the more 
impressive given that it took place while Franco was still alive and his 
authoritarian regime intact.  
Although ETA never again pulled off a feat like the Carrero Blanco 
murder, ETA’s operations were still quite well targeted in the first years 
after the Caudillo’s death. Anxious to avoid killing innocent bystanders, 
the group tried to isolate its victims. During the wave of ETA violence of 
the late 1970s and the early 1980s, about half of ETA’s victims were 
targeted when they were alone. Also, some 65% of the fatalities were 
victims of shootings.111 The use of firearms suggests a degree of 
operational expertise, as it requires proximity to the target, a certain 
marksmanship and the ability to flee the scene without getting arrested. 
The preciseness of ETA’s violence decreased in the 1980s, which saw the 
emergence of the car bomb as part of ETA’s repertoire. Unlike an 
assassination by the use of firearms, a car bomb attack does not require 
the attacker to wait for the right moment to strike, to be near the victim or 
to aim the attack at a specific target. This shift thus hints at a decrease in 
operational capabilities. 
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In this respect, it is interesting to note that the shift towards the use of the 
car bomb coincided with the increase of France’s counterterrorism efforts. 
Although the arrests mentioned in previous paragraphs did not 
immediately paralyse ETA, they did have detrimental effects in the long 
run. It became more and more difficult for ETA to use its safe haven in 
France for the training of its operatives. Although the group did not 
possess permanent training camps like the ones Al Qaeda maintained in 
Afghanistan before 9/11, it did put some effort into improving its 
members’ operational skills. France was the place where ETA could do so, 
but only until the French government decided to put a stop to the 
sanctuary doctrine. Another problem that confronted ETA after France 
became serious about its counterterrorism policy was that the group was 
losing the ability to store large quantities of arms. Until the mid-1980s 
ETA also used France as a place to keep its arms caches, but these were 
now being dismantled during police raids.112 A third way in which the 
offensive of the French affected ETA’s operational capabilities was the 
decimation of the leadership. The many arrests of high-level etarras made 
it difficult for the central leadership to play its coordinating role. It 
became difficult to transfer money and resources around the organisation, 
thus leaving the individual cells more than previously to their own 
devices.113 Unsurprisingly, given the pace of the arrests, ETA’s 
operational capabilities continued to degenerate during the 1990s and into 
the twenty-first century. In this period the group’s bombs were generally 
small, did little material damage and caused few victims.114 In 2004 and 
2005, in spite of the continuance of the violent campaign, the group even 
failed to kill a single person.115 The rise of kale borroka should be 
understood in the context of ETA’s waning operational capabilities as 
well. ETA had planned an offensive in 1992, having cast its eye on the 
Olympics and the World Fair, events that would make Spain the centre of 
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the world’s attention.116 Calculating that the extensive media coverage 
would multiply the impact of its actions, ETA had started planning a 
bombing campaign, but was thwarted by the arrest of the leadership in 
Bidart. This failure was an important consideration in the launching of 
kale borroka. Aware that it would not be able to achieve its goals on its 
own, ETA tried to build a broad nationalist front and used kale borroka to 
force moderate nationalists, many of whom were PNV members, to 
cooperate. Thus, kale borroka grew diretly out of the notion that ETA’s  
ability to sustain a serious level of violent action was severely 
undermined.117  
The gradual degradation of ETA’s operational capabilities suggests that in 
the long term, law enforcement and direct action had the effect one would 
expect on the basis of the program theory in chapter 1. The ongoing 
stream of arrests (output) drained ETA of the manpower and expertise 
required to carry out sophisticated terrorist attacks (effect), and did so to 
the point where the group had to resort to vandalism and street fighting. 
Furthermore, the international cooperation between the Spanish and 
French police (output) deprived ETA of the safe haven it needed to direct 
its operations, train its members and store its weapons, thus forcing ETA’s 
activities back to Spain (effect). This latter effect took some years to 
materialise and the diminishing of ETA’s operational capabilities was not 
a matter of clearly demarcated steps, but the group’s shift from 
discriminate attacks to indiscriminate attacks to ineffectual attacks and 
vandalism shows that the police offensive, carried out in Spain as well as 
in France, took its toll. 
6.2.4 Addressing root causes 
ETA’s initial popularity owed much to the experience of the Basque 
people under the Franco regime, which repressed Basque culture and the 
Basque language, jailed and tortured members of the political opposition 
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and used education and the media to impose a purely Spanish identity on 
the Basque people. After Franco’s death, the government of Prime 
Minister Adolfo Suárez tried to move Spain away from dictatorship and 
introduced a package of wide-ranging reforms, the most important of 
which was the Constitution, approved in 1978 by the new parliament and 
then by the Spanish electorate in a referendum, and introduced in 
December of that year. The new Constitution turned Spain into a 
bicameral parliamentary democracy and, unlike most other constitutions, 
recognised the Spanish population’s right to housing, work, healthcare 
and pensions.118 Further, the ban on anti-regime political parties was 
lifted, which enabled Euskadiko Ezkerra (Left in the Basque Country, EE) 
and Herri Batasuna, closely allied to respectively the political and political-
military wing of ETA, to participate in the first elections for both the 
Spanish (1977 and 1979) and the Basque parliament (1980). Another 
measure that indicated a break with the past was the amnesty for all 
prisoners who had been convicted for acts of political insurrection 
committed before 1977. As a result of this latter measure, Spanish jails 
held no more than ten Basque political prisoners shortly afterwards. 
Particularly important for the Basque Country was the Basque Autonomy 
Statute, which was approved in a referendum in the Basque Country in 
October 1979 and granted the Basque Country a degree of freedom that 
has since been unmatched in Europe. The Basque Autonomous 
Community, as the administration of the Basque Country came to be 
called, had its own parliament and police force, could collect its own taxes 
and was granted the liberty to follow its own policies with regard to 
healthcare and education. 
In spite of these drastic reforms, it took some time before the Basque 
population lent its full support to the state, not in the least because the 
heavy-handed manner in which ETA was fought conveyed the 
impression that the democratic government would repress the Basques as 
hard as Franco’s dictatorship had done. Many had their doubts about 
Spain’s democratic transition, also because at the time Spain’s economy 
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was performing poorly.119 In this context, ETA could muster support for 
its armed struggle, using the police shootings and torture allegations to 
back up their claim that Spain’s democracy was nothing but veiled 
dictatorship. This became more difficult in the 1980s, when Spain’s 
democratic system consolidated and the state’s repression of ETA became 
more discriminate. Gradually convinced of the legitimacy of the state, the 
public became decidedly less susceptible to this line of reasoning and 
even developed an aversion against ETA and the way it operated. All 
indicators of support for ETA show a steady downward trend. 
An indicator that is often used to establish ETA’s popularity is the election 
result of political parties affiliated to ETA. The usefulness of these data is 
not undisputed, as Herri Batasuna attracted voters not only because of its 
ties to ETA, but also because of its stance on themes like nuclear energy 
and gay rights.120 Against this objection one could argue that voters for 
Herri Batasuna probably knew about the party’s ties with ETA and are 
thus unlikely to have been vehemently opposed to the group’s violent 
activities. The second problem is more serious: the comparison of results 
before and after the ban of Batasuna in 2003 is difficult. The party did not 
resign itself to the ban and, still able to lead a shady existence as an 
organisation, co-opted the until then marginal parties Euskal Herrialdeetako 
Alderdi Komunista (Communist Party of the Basque Homelands, EHAK) 
and Eusko Abertzale Ekintza (Basque Patriotic Action, EAE) to act as its 
representatives in elections. Although the party thus secured participation 
in the elections, it can be argued that, as neither the EHAK nor the ANV 
could use the full organisational muscle and resources of Batasuna, it was 
difficult for them to win the 15 to 20% of the vote that Herri Batasuna and 
later Batasuna usually scored. In any case, the elections results of ETA’s 
political branches show a slightly downward trend after 1990, but also an 
upswing at the end of the 1990s, when ETA announced a ceasefire. 
Shortly afterward, Batasuna was banned, meaning that we have to rely on 
the scores of other parties to get an impression of the trend in ETA’s 
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popularity. If the scores of EAE and EHAK are anything to go by, ETA’s 
popularity had dropped dramatically after the group had ended the 
ceasefire in 1999. EHAK did relatively well with 12.4% in the 2005 
elections for the Basque parliament, but EAE received only 3.1% of the 
vote in the 2007 regional elections and 7.6% in the municipal elections in 
the same year.121 Both satellite parties were later banned by the Spanish 
government on the grounds that they were parts of ETA.122 
A more complete view, and one that does not contradict the one that 
emerges from the election results, can be derived from various opinion 
polls that were held in the Basque Country over the last thirty years. First, 
by the end of the 1980s, there was a growing apprehension about ETA’s 
methods. In 1991 76% of respondents in a poll said that there was no need 
for Basques to use violence to achieve their political goals, compared to 
42% two years earlier. Even 67% of the 2006 voters for radical nationalist 
parties held this view.123 In the same vein, the percentage of respondents 
who felt that the Basque population had to be mobilised to express their 
opposition to the use of violence increased from 77% in 1991 to 85% in 
1997.124 Furthermore, the number of Basques who identified themselves 
with Spain was growing. Respondents who said they were ‘Basque only’, 
that is, who based their self-identity exclusively on their Basque 
background, dropped from about 40% in the early 1980s to some 25% 
from the mid-1980s on.125 While, of course, an exclusively Basque self-
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identity does not necessarily translate into support for terrorism or other 
forms of political violence, the increasing numbers of respondents who 
said they considered themselves ‘Spanish only’ or both Basque and 
Spanish do show that the reservations that many in the Basque Country 
had with regard to Spain were diminishing. Basque nationalist sentiments 
underpinned much of ETA’s popular support, and with more people 
considering themselves part of Spain, which makes it likely that they 
accept Spanish governance structures, ETA’s pool of potential supporters 
was gradually drying up. 
This latter point is also clear from polls that are more directly about ETA 
itself. People in the Basque Country have on several occasions been polled 
regarding their opinions about ETA, and have on all these occasions been 
offered the same qualifications of ETA to choose from. In 1979 13% of all 
respondents considered ETA ‘patriots’, compared to 5% in 1989 and about 
5% in the years 2003-2007. The percentage of respondents who chose to 
label ETA ‘idealists’ stood at 35% in 1979, had fallen to 18% in 1989 and, 
after a small dip in the mid-1990s, stayed at about 20% in the period 2003-
2007. The percentages of respondents that chose terms with more negative 
connotations show a strong increase. In 1979 only 11% called ETA 
‘lunatics/terrorists’ and only 7% chose ‘criminals/murderers’. The former 
percentage increased to about 40 in the 2003-2007 period, the latter 
hovered between 15 and 20. It is interesting that these numbers show the 
same spikes in 1999 as the electoral results. During the ceasefire, more 
people referred to ETA in positive terms than in the 1990s or after the 
ceasefire.126 
The expression of the Basque citizens’ disconnect with ETA was not 
limited to opinion polls. The late 1980s witnessed the first mass 
demonstrations against ETA violence.127 Several of the group's widely 
publicised violent actions were followed by mass protest marches, 
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expressing an anger that reached a boiling point in 1997, when ETA 
kidnapped and murdered municipal council member Miguel Ángel 
Blanco. A crowd of about a million people took to the streets of Barcelona 
and Madrid to demonstrate against ETA. In San Sebastian, a group of 
about a thousand anti-ETA protesters even tried to attack the building of 
Herri Batasuna.128 Anti-ETA demonstrations have since become a part of 
Spanish politics.129 The public rejection of ETA also materialised in several 
civil society organisations that organised protest against ETA violence. 
Before its dissolution in 2013, Gesto por la Paz (Gesture for Peace) was one 
of the most important anti-ETA groups. It is an umbrella organisation 
made up of some 130 smaller groups.130 With this diverse background, the 
group managed to attract many thousands of protesters to its rallies.131 A 
second major anti-ETA group was ¡Basta Ya! (Enough’s enough!), an 
organisation that united people from various backgrounds in the 
organisation of demonstrations against ETA violence.132 The organisation 
was dissolved in 2007. A third example is Elkarri (Among Us), which was 
decidedly more sympathetic to the nationalist left than Gesto por la Paz 
and ¡Basta Ya!. Before the group dissolved in 2006, Elkarri denounced the 
use of violence, and organised debating sessions and signature campaigns 
to advocate the use of dialogue to end the Basque Conflict.133  
                                                          
128 “Violence Marks 5th Day of ETA Protests in Spain,” CNN, July 15, 1997, 
http://articles.cnn.com/1997-07-15/world/9707_15_spain_1_basque-rebels-miguel-angel-
blanco-eta?_s=PM:WORLD. 
129 “Spanish Protest against Eta Violence,” The Guardian, August 10, 2000, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/aug/10/spain; E. Nash, “Thousands Protest at 
Eta Airport Bomb Attack,” The Independent, January 1, 2007, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/thousands-protest-at-eta-airport-
bomb-attack-430409.html; “Spanish Rally for Shot Policeman,” BBC News, December 4, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7128108.stm. 
130 B. Tejerina, “Protest Cycle, Political Violence and Social Movements in the Basque 
Country,” Nations and Nationalism 7, no. 1 (2001): 52. 
131 S. Chapman, Keys to Understanding the Eta’s Permanent Ceasefire (Lokarri, 2006), 13. 
132 “Basque Group Wins Peace Prize,” BBC News, October 26, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/993409.stm; Chapman, Keys to Understanding the Eta’s 
Permanent Ceasefire, 13. 
133 R. Vazquez, Politics, Culture and Sociability in the Basque Nationalist Party (Reno: University 
of Nevada Press, 2010), 114–116. 
The science of fighting terrorism 
210 
The decline of the radical nationalist vote in various elections, the 
increasing reservations among the Basques about the ways and means of 
ETA and the rise of the anti-ETA protest movements all point to the same 
flaw in ETA strategy: the group is failing to rally the Basque people 
around the view of the Basques as under siege by the Spanish state. It is 
striking that in this context harsh measures like the 2002 ban on Herri 
Batasuna met with much less resistance than they would have in the late 
1970s and the first half of the 1980s, when ETA could still somewhat 
convincingly make its case against the Spanish state. It is true that for a 
time popular rejection of ETA existed side by side with strong support for 
the group, but this polarisation gradually gave way to a consensus against 
ETA. In the long run, the Spanish state managed to assuage the animosity 
of the Basques. While it is difficult to attribute the poll results and anti-
ETA protests to one particular government policy, it is clear that the 
state’s legitimacy increased during the 1980s and 1990s to the point where 
ETA was no longer a serious political challenge. The above account 
demonstrates that the consolidation of the democratic governance 
structures, the growing of the role of the Basque Autonomous 
Community and the restraint in the use of police force discussed above 
(which together constitute the output) eroded ETA’s support base (the 
effect). In a setting where political violence was not necessary, people 
turned away from its main advocate, leaving ETA politically isolated. 
6.2.5 Offer exits 
At several stages during the government’s campaign against ETA, social 
reintegration programmes for ETA-convicts constituted an important 
pillar of Spain’s counterterrorism policy. In that period several hundred 
arrested etarras were granted amnesties and none of them went back to 
terrorism.134 To understand the success of the social reintegration 
program, it is important to take into account the split that occurred within 
ETA in the late 1970s. 
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When, shortly after Franco’s death, it was becoming clear that Spain was 
about to embark on a democratic transition process, some etarras started 
to doubt whether violent action was the best means to achieve ETA’s 
political goals. The cracks first began to show in 1975, when a group of 
young ETA-operatives kidnapped Ángel Berazadi, a factory manager 
from the Basque town of Elgoibar. At some point during the hostage 
taking, the whereabouts of the kidnappers and their victim were 
discovered, at which ETA’s leadership decided that Berazadi had to be 
killed. The leadership had been deeply divided over this order, however, 
and a faction headed by Eduardo Moreno Bergaretxe, better known by the 
nom de guerre Pertur, had strongly objected to the killing of Berezadi. This 
disagreement was a reflection of a growing divergence of views regarding 
the role of violence in ETA’s operations under Spanish democracy.135 The 
militant faction maintained its faith in violent action as the way to further 
ETA’s political agenda, and feared that political action would get in the 
way of the group's violent activities.136 The more moderate faction, on the 
other hand, became sensitive to the potentially negative consequences of 
terrorist attacks. They feared that violence would only limit stand in the 
way of the realisation of the radical nationlist agenda and took the 
position that political action was now more appropriate.137  
Tensions between the two factions rose high, especially after the militant 
faction kidnapped and killed Pertur. The factions split up and started 
functioning as two separate organisations. The militants called themselves 
ETA-militar (ETA-military, or ETA-m); the moderates took on the name 
ETA-politico-militar (ETA-political-military, or ETA-pm). As the poli-milis, 
the members of ETA-pm, were leaning increasingly towards political 
action and preferred building mass support over violent action, they no 
longer saw any need to remain underground and were willing to make 
amends with the government. ETA-pm agreed to participate in the social 
reintegration program offered by the government and dissolved itself in 
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1982.138 They had a firmer belief than the milis in the sincerity and depth 
of the democratic transition process. In the words of one poli-mili: “I had 
this feeling that things had really changed, you know, that the situation 
was objectively different than when I first became a militant. (…) 
Everything that had led me to become a member was at least starting to 
change.”139 
ETA-pm continued its political activity in Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), the 
political party it was already aligned with. Radical poli-milis who opposed 
these moves, went over to ETA-m, which, in the absence of other ETA 
factions, dropped the suffix ‘militar’ and went on under the name ‘ETA’. 
The initial contacts regarding the terms and implementation of the social 
reintegration programme were made between EE-prominent Juan María 
Bándres and Spanish Interior Minister Juan José Rosón, who agreed that 
ETA-pm would lay down their arms in return for, depending on the 
particular situation of the individuals concerned, reduction of prison 
sentences, dropping of charges and the lifting of exiles. The regulations 
applied only to those who had not killed or wounded anyone. In all, some 
two hundred poli-milis were reintegrated in society in 1983 and 1984.  
In 1984 another arrangement was made, championed by PNV Senator 
Joseba Azkarraga, who received requests from imprisoned etarras for 
further reintegration plans. This time, though, social reintegration was 
granted on somewhat harder terms than in 1982. Unlike the etarras who 
applied for reintegration in 1982, the applicants in 1984 had to sign a 
statement in which they rejected the armed struggle.140 The reason for the 
introduction of this demand may have been that the 1984 reintegration 
measures were designed not only for members of ETA-pm, whose 
rejection of armed struggle could more or less be assumed, but also for 
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members of ETA-m and the Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas 
(Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos, CAA), an autonomist-marxist 
group that had splintered away from ETA. This second round was 
wrought with a series of problems, the first of which was the inefficiency 
of the government apparatus. Instead of securing swift prisoner release 
after the statement on the rejection of the armed struggle had been signed, 
it sometimes took as long as four years before a prisoner would finally be 
set free, which fuelled scepticism among the prisoners regarding the 
government’s sincerity.  
The second main problem was ETA’s response. The group made it clear 
that it considered any etarra who made use of the amnesty regulation an 
enemy. Imprisoned ETA members were pressured by their peers to stay 
in the group and to refuse the state’s offer of a clean slate. That ETA was 
willing to make good on its threats, was made clear by the murder of 
Dolores González Catarain, nicknamed Yoyes, in 1986. Yoyes, one of the 
few women to make it to ETA’s top leadership, had left the organisation 
out of dissatisfaction with the hard line and lived in exile in Mexico. 
While in Mexico, she decided to make use of the amnesty regulation and 
returned to Spain in 1985. Her case marked a propaganda victory for the 
government, since this was the first time a high-ranking ETA leader had 
applied for amnesty. In 1986 ETA accused Yoyes of treason and had her 
shot in while she was taking a walk in the park with her baby. Another 
leading member who was killed, was Mikel Solaun, whose liquidation 
was accompanied by an ETA communiqué saying that Solaun’s death was 
“a warning to all of those who are looking for a way out”.141 These 
incidents severely weakened the resolve of many prisoners to go along 
with the government’s reintegration plans.142  
Another move ETA made against the amnesty regulations concerned the 
support of Gestoras Pro-Amnistía (Management Groups for Amnesty), one 
of the group’s front organisations. Until the organisation was banned in 
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2001, Gestoras Pro-Amnestía provided legal and financial support to 
imprisoned ETA members and their families. ETA used this support as 
leverage against etarras who were considering participation in the 
reintegration programme, cutting off those who signed the statement in 
which they rejected the armed struggle.143 In response to ETA’s 
countermeasures, family members were used as messengers between the 
prisoners and the court to disguise the contacts that were taking place. To 
diminish ETA’s capacity to exert pressure on its imprisoned members, the 
Spanish government decided in 1989 to spread the incarcerated etarras 
over prisons far removed from the Basque Country.144 This latter measure 
stirred some controversy, as it made it impossible for friends and family 
of terrorist convicts to visit their loved ones on a regular basis, but it 
reinvigorated the programme. Between 1989 and 1995 another 112 etarras 
abandoned the organisation using the amnesty regulations.145 In spite of 
these apparent successes, however, the amnesty regulations did not 
survive the hardening of Aznár’s policy towards ETA and were 
abandoned in 2002. 
The example of effective use of amnesty regulations against terrorist 
organisations that is most often cited, is Italy, but some interesting results 
were achieved in Spain as well, especially in the early stages, when ETA-
pm was steered back into regular parliamentary politics.146 The 
programmes clearly had their ups and downs, but while ETA did take 
some effective countermeasures, it is fair to say that initially the effect of 
the reintegration programmes shows a strong resemblance to the program 
theory outlined in chapter 1. What is clear from the account above is that 
the government's social reintegration measures played an important role 
in finalising the break between ETA’s moderate and militant faction. 
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Already less inclined to the use of violence, ETA-pm was encouraged by 
the reintegration measures to abandon the armed struggle. These 
measures were not the only factor at work, but their successful 
implementation (no recidivism in a sizeable group of defectors, output) 
certainly contributed to a split in ETA’s ranks (effect). In later stages, they 
did not have this effect, even when they managed to ‘turn’ groups of 
etarras. In the absence of a split between moderates and militants to be 
exploited, the effects were never as dramatic as in the early 1980s, when 
one of ETA’s wings gave up the armed struggle and, pacified by the 
reintegration measures, entered democratic politics. 
6.2.6 Offer non-violent alternatives 
As has repeatedly been explained above, Spanish counterterrorism 
became less repressive after the mid-1980s, but was even then not known 
for its accommodating approach. Nevertheless, there have been 
government attempts to settle the conflict by peaceful means. In fact, from 
very early on, the Spanish government tried to persuade ETA to lay down 
their weapons. These attempts to come to terms with ETA went through 
many twists and turns, but are easy to summarise: negotiating with ETA 
has been a long, tortuous and eventually futile process. Over the years, 
there have been several negotiation attempts, all of which faltered on 
largely the same issues. First, the two sides had very different 
expectations regarding the objective of talks. ETA only wanted to discuss 
the implementation of the KAS Alternative (see above), whereas the 
Spanish government only wanted to close an agreement on practical 
matters like ETA’s disarmament and the execution of the reintegration 
measures addressed in the previous section. The second bone of 
contention concerned ETA’s use of violence. All Spanish governments 
that dealt with ETA insisted that violence should stop before discussions 
could take place. ETA, on the other hand, made it very clear that the 
implementation of the KAS Alternative was the only way to put a stop to 
the group’s violent actions. With these two very different interpretations 
of the meaning of negotiations, it was clear from the start that it would be 
very difficult for ETA and the government to find a solution that was 
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acceptable to both parties. Nevertheless, that did not stop them from 
trying, be it at times half-heartedly. 
The first overtures took place immediately after Franco’s death in 1975, on 
the day of the Caudillo’s funeral. A representative of King Juan Carlos 
approached ETA through a bookstore in the French seaside resort of 
Biarritz. He brought the group a message requesting them to cease their 
violent activities in order to give the new government the chance to 
implement the new democratic reforms. This modest attempt at 
persuading the group to lay down their arms was the first in a line of 
failures, as ETA responded with the murder of the mayor of the Basque 
town of Oyarzun and a statement saying that the group did not believe in 
the new democracy and that any Spanish mayor could therefore be 
next.147 The mood improved little during the late 1970s and the early 
1980s, not in the least because several more conciliatory ETA-leaders, who 
were important for the success of the negotiation attempts, were 
liquidated or died under mysterious circumstances.148  
During the first half of the 1980s there were modest attempts to start a 
dialogue, but these failed as a result of the incompatibility of the agendas 
that the two sides brought to the table.149 It was not until 1986 that ETA 
first saw the necessity of seriously considering non-violent options to 
resolve the Basque Conflict. ETA was in a bad spot at the time, its 
organisational structure badly shaken by a series of arrests and the 
dismantlement of a large arms cache. In a sobering assessment of the 
group’s position, ETA leader Jon Iturbe told his associates: “If we don’t 
negotiate now, within a year the French will have dismantled everything, 
they will have decimated us, seized our weapons and money and we will 
not have anything to negotiate.”150 But even this bleak prospect was not 
enough to convince ETA’s leadership to reconsider its insistence on the 
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KAS Alternative as the starting point for the negotiations. The window of 
opportunity that was opened by ETA’s misfortunes closed with the death 
of Jon Iturbe in 1987, the man responsible for ETA’s dealings with the 
government in 1986 and 1987. He died in a car crash and was succeeded 
by Antxon Etxebeste, widely considered a hard-liner. Under the latter’s 
leadership, ETA committed the terrorist attacks against the Hipercor in 
Barcelona and the Guardia Civil barracks in Zaragoza, in both instances, as 
we have seen above, killing many innocent civilians and even several 
children.151 
The public outrage over the atrocities ETA inflicted on Spanish civilians 
made it extremely inopportune for the Spanish government to be seen 
making common cause with the terrorists. In fact, Prime Minister 
González did almost the opposite when he convinced all political parties 
in the Spanish parliament with the exception of Herri Batasuna and Eusko 
Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity) to sign the Pact of Madrid. By signing this 
agreement, the various parties promised to refuse any dealings with 
parties or actors that did not condemn ETA’s violent actions. The political 
parties in the Basque parliament, with the exception of Herri Batasuna 
signed the Pact of Ajuria-Enea, a pact similar to the Madrid Pact, thus 
completing ETA’s political isolation and ruling out the possibility of 
discussions to agree on a solution to the Basque conflict.152 In this context 
there was little opportunity for negotiation, except when, in 1989 hopes 
for a settlement were raised by the arrest of Josu Urrutikoetxea, a 
hardliner among ETA’s leadership, and by a ceasefire ETA declared to 
allow for a discussion on the implementation of the KAS Alternative. 
Talks between a delegation headed by Interior Minister José Luis 
Corcuera, representing Prime Minister González, and high-level ETA-
leaders, among whom Extebeste, took place in Algiers in early 1989, but 
failed when the Spaniards refused to grant the Basques the right to self-
determination, at which ETA stated that “all fronts are open” and started 
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a string of car bomb attacks, causing numbers of casualties that were 
unheard of since the peak in 1980.153 
The Spanish government followed a hard line against ETA in the wake of 
the collapse of the talks and the group’s failed offensive in 1992, when the 
group had planned to target the Olympics in Barcelona and the World 
Fair in Seville. It took several years before a negotiated settlement was so 
much as a remote possibility again. Unsurprisingly, given the 
government’s stance, the resumption of contacts was not the result of 
successful rapprochement attempts, but rather of ETA’s new political 
strategy. Marginalised by the social response to its brutal attacks, the 
group decided to reach out for the support of other political parties and 
actors in the Basque Country.154 In carrying out this new approach, ETA 
benefited from a certain radicalisation that had taken place among the 
nationalist political scene in the Basque Country. In 1998, twenty-three 
Basque political parties, trade unions and civil society organisations 
signed the Pact of Lizarra, stating that the Basque conflict could be 
resolved by political means but that self-determination for the Basque 
people was a necessary condition. The signatories thus clearly violated the 
Pact of Ajuria-Enea, which had stipulated that any solution for the Basque 
conflict had to be found within the limits set by the 1978 Basque 
Autonomy Statute.155 The PNV, always ambivalent towards ETA, wanted 
to involve ETA as it felt that it needed the radical militants to push the 
Basque nationalist agenda.156  
Three days after the announcement of the Pact of Lizarra, ETA declared a 
unilateral ceasefire, the duration of which would depend on the progress 
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of the ambitions laid down by the pact. This prompted Prime Minister 
Aznár in 1999 to send a representative to Zürich to meet Herri Batasuna 
representatives to see whether there was a way to get ETA to commit to a 
permanent ceasefire. After the meeting ETA signalled its willingness to 
engage in further talks. In a demonstration of his goodwill Aznár then 
decided to transfer some hundred convicted etarras to prisons closer to the 
Basque country.157 The eventual failure of this episode was due to factors 
beyond the government’s control. ETA was pushing the PNV to adopt a 
radical course and abandon participation in the Basque and Spanish 
parliaments. When the PNV proved unwilling to take these steps, ETA 
declared the Pact of Lizarra dead and resumed its violent campaign. What 
also played a role was ETA’s perception of the Northern Ireland peace 
process that was concluded around the same time. Adamant not to follow 
the example of the Provisional IRA, which ETA felt had made concessions 
that went too far, the Basque radicals refused to budge.158 
After ETA broke the armistice, Aznár’s government stepped up its 
counterterrorism efforts, going so far as to even shut down non-violent 
alternatives to terrorism, the opposite of the approach outlined in the 
program theory for the counterterrorism principle addressed in this 
section. In 2002, Aznár introduced the controversial Ley Orgánica de 
Partidos Políticos (Organic Law on Political Parties) that made it possible to 
ban political parties propagating radical or violent ideas or that were in 
any way cooperating with or linked to terrorist organisations.159 
Predictably, the law’s first casualty was Herri Batasuna, which by then had 
been renamed Batasuna and was declared illegal on the grounds that it 
was functioning as a part of ETA.160 In an attempt to isolate ETA 
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politically and create a bipartisan front against the terrorist group, 
Aznár’s PP initiated the Acuerdo por las Libertades y contra el Terrorismo 
(Agreement for Freedom and Against Terrorism). This pact, signed by the 
PP and the PSOE in December 2000, ruled out the possibility of 
negotiations and committed both parties to dealing with the Basque 
question on the terms laid down in the Basque Autonomy Statute. It also 
called on the PNV to abandon the Lizarra Agreement and return to the 
terms of the Pact of Ajuria-Enea.161 
The determination suggested by the pact proved short-lived. In 2004 
Aznár had to step down as Prime Minister after losing the elections. José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the PSOE-leader who succeeded Aznár, was 
decidedly less hawkish than his predecessor and broke the bipartisan 
agreement by opening a new round of negotiation attempts without 
consulting the PP.162 The scene for the next round of talks was set in 2004 
by Batasuna leader Arnaldo Otegi, who suggested a two tier negotiation 
track, in which Basque political parties and civil society organisations 
would prepare a proposal for a new constitutional framework that would 
be put to the vote in a referendum, while ETA would discuss the more 
technical matters regarding the group’s demobilisation with the Spanish 
and French governments.163 After Zapatero had signalled his willingness 
to talk on the condition that ETA would cease its terrorist campaign, 
preliminary talks took place to pave the way for discussions between ETA 
and the Spanish government. The peace process, although vehemently 
opposed by the PP, seemed to have potential when ETA announced a 
                                                                                                                                    
03/world/spain.batasuna_1_batasuna-eta-basque?_s=PM:WORLD. Batasuna challenged the 
ban, but the European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2009 that the decision to proscribe 
the party had been legal and legitimate. See “Affaires Herri Batasuna et Batasuna C. 
Espagne” (European Court of Human Rights, June 30, 2009), 
http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/200906/30/espana/20090630elpe
punac_1_Pes_PDF.pdf. 
161 “Acuerdo Por Las Libertades Y Contra El Terrorismo,” December 8, 2000, 
http://www.elmundo.es/eta/documentos/pacto_libertades.html. 
162 R. Alonso, “The Madrid Bombings and Negotiations with ETA: A Case Study of the 
Impact of Terrorism on Spanish Politics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 1 (2013): 124. 
163 P. Woodworth, “The Spanish-Basque Peace Process: How to Get Things Wrong,” World 
Policy Journal, 2007, 2–3. 
The long haul 
221 
ceasefire in March 2006 to give dialogue a chance, but it soon became clear 
that the talks were playing out according to a very familiar pattern. 
Unwilling to stick to the division of roles outlined by Otegi, ETA started 
pushing for political discussions, which the other side predictably 
refused.164 The negotiations broke down, and ETA ended the ceasefire by 
a bombing at Madrid’s Barajas Airport.165 
From this account of the attempts to find a negotiated settlement of the 
Basque conflict, it should be clear that the Spanish government never 
produced the output needed achieve full pacification of the Basque 
militants. While it is true that ETA did declare several ceasefires, these 
were short-lived and were always accompanied by doubts about the 
group’s intentions. For instance, during the truce of 2006, a group of ETA 
operatives broke into an arms factory in Nîmes and stole thousands of 
rounds of ammunition and 350 handguns, some of which turned up three 
years later in a police raid against an ETA cell in the French town of Le 
Corbier.166 The Basque Conflict has often been compared to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland in the hopes that a similar solution might be applied, 
but incidents like the burglary in Nîmes point to a crucial difference 
between the two cases. Unlike in Northern Ireland, there was never a 
consensus among all players involved about the need for a political 
solution to the conflict. We have seen in the preceding pages that ETA 
only wanted to talk about implementation of its demands and the Spanish 
governments, if they were willing to talk at all, only wanted to address 
practical steps towards the disarmament and demobilisation of ETA. With 
both parties acting, with varying degrees of justification, as if they were 
bargaining from a position of strength, it is not surprising that a 
breakthrough never occurred. Although a deal has never been struck, the 
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Spanish governments that have been dealing with ETA seem to have been 
proven right in not giving in to the group’s demands. The group failed to 
achieve its political goals through negotiations, but instead of stepping up 
the armed struggle, it put a stop to its terrorist campaign without asking 
anything in return. As negotiation was clearly not an option, the group’s 
fighting spirit was eroded, something that must be at least partially 
attributed to the state’s long-term commitment.  
6.2.7 Long-term commitment 
The unwillingness on the part of the Spanish government to take a more 
cooperative position in the negotiation attempts with ETA constitutes an 
important part for the long-term commitment displayed by the Spanish 
government in the fight against ETA. After the end of the Franco regime, 
the administration of Adolfo Suárez was willing to address the grievances 
of the Basque people and created a constitutional framework that gave the 
Basques an unprecedented degree of autonomy. None of the Prime 
Ministers after Suárez ever signalled a readiness to make amendments to 
this framework. While, as is clear from the fate of the Agreement for 
Freedom and Against Terrorism, the various administrations may have 
held different views on whether talks should be held at all, the only things 
they were ever willing to discuss, were the timing and the manner of 
ETA’s disarmament. 
This intransigence on the part of various governments brought some 
segments in ETA to question the feasibility of the armed struggle. The 
first cracks in the group’s commitment to violence began to show in 2004, 
when, as has been described above, a group of incarcerated ETA leaders 
wrote a letter to the central leadership arguing that it was time to 
acknowledge the failure of the armed struggle and to turn to regular 
parliamentary politics. The authors lamented ETA’s poor operational 
capabilities and asserted that it was unlikely that violent action will ever 
again help their cause: “The armed fight being carried out today is of no 
use. This is a slow death. You cannot carry out an armed campaign on the 
The long haul 
223 
basis of communiqués and threats which are then not carried out.”167 
Similarly, in 2010 Batasuna leader Rufino Etxeberria said that the radical 
nationalist agenda should be pushed by democratic means, and no longer 
by political violence. In a clear denunciation of the armed struggle, 
Etxeberria explained that “the process [of promoting the Basque separatist 
agenda, TvD] has to be done without violence, which means, of course, 
that it will have to happen without any armed activity by Eta”.168 
Etxeberria’s call for political action was followed by another letter from 
imprisoned ETA-leaders in which they argued against the violent actions 
and stated that ETA should pay compensations to the victims of their 
terrorist attacks. The letter was signed by several formerly high-ranking 
ETA leaders, including one of the planners behind the bombing of the 
Hipercor supermarket.169 The clearest admission that it was time to give 
up the terrorist campaign is of course the ceasefire announced in 
September 2010 and declared permanent in January 2011, and again in 
October 2011.  
These episodes show that, after some four decades of armed struggle, 
ETA’s will to fight was severely undermined by the simple lack of 
progress. Any terrorist or insurgent group needs a certain degree of 
success to maintain popular support and internal morale. The loss of the 
former has been extensively discussed in previous sections of this chapter, 
and the decline of the latter is well illustrated by the examples of the 
internal dissension with regard to the use of force. Over the long haul, the 
government’s non-compliance with terrorist demands (output) eroded the 
group’s willingness to engage in armed struggle (effect). Of course, other 
factors played a role in this process as well. The perceptions of the use of 
the armed struggle might have been different if ETA had better been able 
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to sustain a meaningful level of violence or if its views and methods were 
still appreciated by a sizeable part of Basque citizens. Having said that, 
the government’s unwillingness to compromise with terrorists has paid 
off in the sense that even ETA itself became convinced that political 
violence was not going to bring Basque independence any closer. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Some have argued that democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism 
because they are forced to fight it with one hand tied on their backs. 
Unlike more autocratic regimes, democracies have to observe certain 
standards regarding human rights and therefore cannot resort to the iron 
fist to crush opposition.170 This argument is countered by those who claim 
that democracies are well-equipped to deal with terrorism because of the 
wide variety of ways in which popular discontent can be canalised. The 
right to vote, to form political parties and to participate in peaceful 
demonstrations undercuts the need for violent action and make people 
less susceptible to narratives of terrorist groups that try to depict the state 
as a brutal enemy.171  
What is interesting about Spain’s fight against ETA (see figure 19 for an 
overview) is that it shows that there is something to be said for both 
positions. On the one hand, the data on ETA’s violence suggest that 
democracies allow for more freedom to plan terrorist attacks. The 
democratically elected Spanish governments were far from lenient 
towards ETA, but post-Franco Spain still provided a much more 
permissive environment than the country that was ruled by the Caudillo. 
Even the briefest glance at the numbers of ETA’s victims per year is 
enough to see that ETA’s violence did dramatically increase until after 
Franco’s death.172 This strongly suggests that ETA used the newly 
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acquired freedom to step up its armed struggle. On the other hand, 
though, the decline of both ETA’s violence and popularity cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account by the growing acceptance and 
credibility of the Spanish state as a genuine democracy. The Spanish 
government opened up channels that could be used to further the Basque 
nationalist agenda, essentially removing the need for ETA’s violence. In 
other words, the case of ETA shows that democracies indeed grant the 
liberty needed for a terrorist campaign, but it is also true that democracies 
have the means to address concerns of opposition groups, for which there 
is consequently no need to use or support violence. 
Addressing the root causes of the terrorist threat was an important factor 
the political isolation of the group that claimed to be fighting on behalf of 
all Basques. The Spanish federal government granted the Basque Country 
a degree of autonomy that is unprecedented in Europe. By doing so, it 
removed the Basque people’s incentive to support ETA. Many in the 
Basque Country were happy with the far-reaching autonomy, and were 
little inclined to push for the realisation of the KAS Alternative, the more 
radical list of demands that ETA fought for. What this shows is that 
addressing root causes can be done by meeting demands that are less 
radical than those of the terrorists. After the Franco regime had come to 
an end, many Basques felt that they deserved more independence, but 
when they realised that the state was amenable to their demands, they 
refused to follow ETA’s lead in a fight for full independence. By giving in 
to a moderate version of the terrorists’ demands, the Spanish government 
isolated ETA from its support base. 
The progress, however, was not linear. The Spanish fight against ETA also 
shows that, as many authors have argued, the use of force can be 
counterproductive. The crude manner in which ETA was fought in the 
first years of the Basque conflict, the same years in which the region’s 
autonomy were put in place, kept much of the mistrust against the 
Spanish state in place. ETA benefited considerably from the heavy-
handedness of the security forces. Gradually, however, relations between 
the state and the Basque people improved. By respecting the law, 
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becoming more prudent in the use of force and granting the Basques a 
large degree of political and administrative autonomy, Spain slowly won 
over the Basques and dissuaded them from advocating or actively 
supporting radical and violent action. The killings, shootings, arrests 
waves and protest marches discussed above testify the fact that process 
was far from easy, but the progress is undeniable. 
Another accommodating measure that was successfully applied in the 
fight against ETA was targeted specifically at the group. The reintegration 
programme convinced many in ETA’s moderate wing to leave the group 
and enter parliamentary politics. This case thus underscores the 
importance of a viable alternative to life as a member of a terrorist group. 
Under Franco it would have been impossible for the members of ETA-pm 
to re-enter Spanish society, but now that the state was willing to grant 
amnesties, wavering terrorists had a realistic alternative to membership of 
the terrorist group. After the poli-milis had left the group, however, the 
exits that were offered by the government failed to undermine the group. 
The remaining etarras quite literally stuck to their guns, and when they, 
too, began to express their doubts about the armed struggle, it was not 
because they accepted the legitimacy of the Spanish state, but because 
they realised how pointless the armed struggle had become.  
While the various Spanish governments had been willing to make 
concessions to Basque nationalism, no Spanish prime minister ever 
yielded to the temptation of ending the conflict by giving ETA what it 
wanted. Zapatero was more open to dialogue than Aznár, but even he 
demanded that ETA lay down its arms before substantive negotiations 
could take place. The government could simply not be moved, and had 
less reason to do so as the conflict progressed. Spain’s long-term 
commitment was sustained by waves of arrests and a consequent 
degradation of the ETA’s operational capabilities. In this, the cooperation 
with France, which took years to fully take off, was a crucial factor. The 
French part of the Basque Country had been very important as a place to 
hide people and weapons, but many ETA cells were dismantled in the 
1990s and the 2000s. 
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In the end the combination of long-term commitment and law 
enforcement pressure proved fatal. It is true that the unrest and violence – 
much of it ETA’s – in the Basque Country in the late 1970s was one of the 
factors that brought the government to formulate the Basque Autonomy 
Statute, but the lack of progress after the Statute had been introduced, 
eroded ETA’s fighting spirit, as did the defeats that the group suffered at 
the hands of the police. Deprived of the sympathetic environment in the 
Basque Country and their safe haven in France, ETA was badly shaken by 
the many arrests carried out by the French as well as the Spanish police. 
ETA’s violent campaign became less substantive, and its attacks became 
less effective and less sophisticated. Furthermore, several high-ranking 
members came to believe that the armed struggle stood little chance at 
realising the KAS Alternative. It took a long time, but after ETA had lost 
most of its popular support, Spain’s fight against the group was mainly 
waged by kinetic means. The effectiveness is clear from the fact that ETA 
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7 A nasty victory: the importance of force in the 
British campaign against the Provisional IRA 
With 1,822 deaths attributed to it, almost twice the number of ETA’s 
deadly victims, the Provisional IRA is by far the most lethal terrorist 
group that Europe ever knew.1 The group developed impressive 
operational capabilities and impressed experts with their ability to 
fabricate new weapons that would, if only temporarily, outwit the British 
security forces.2 Furthermore, the group had so much support of the 
population that it managed to maintain strongholds that were effectively 
no-go areas for the British police and Army. In the early years of the 
Northern Ireland conflict, the Provisional IRA practically controlled 
several neighbourhoods in Belfast and Derry, but the most important, and 
enduring, stronghold was South Armagh, a region on the southern border 
with Ireland. Even after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, which 
in retrospect can be said to have put an end to the Troubles, British Army 
units were reluctant to enter what they called the Bandit Country. 
Another factor that contributed considerably to Provisional IRA’s group’s 
notoriety, was the group’s ability to carry out ‘out-of-area’ operations. Its 
attacks were not limited to Northern Ireland, the six counties that the 
Provisionals wanted to become part of the Republic of Ireland. The group 
carried out several high profile attacks on the British mainland. The 
estimated damage of attacks in Manchester and London ran into the 
billions, and on one occasion, the group even came close to wiping out the 
British cabinet of Prime Minister John Major. Of all six terrorist actors 
examined in this dissertation, the Provisional IRA is probably the one 
with the most critical mass in terms of manpower, popular support, safe 
havens, financial resources and firepower.  
                                                          
1 See the statistical summary in M. Sutton, Bear in Mind These Dead ... An Index of Deaths from 
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Publications, 1994) at http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/book/index.html#append. 
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But what makes the British counterterrorism against the Provisional IRA 
an interesting case study for a comparative analysis of counterterrorism 
effectiveness is not only severity of the threat, but also the wide variety of 
measures that have been levelled against it. Almost all counterterrorism 
principles that have been identified in chapter 2 have at some point been 
applied by the British in an attempt to quell the Provisional IRA. But this 
does not mean that they were all effective. What is interesting about this 
case, widely hailed as a success story of dialogue and negotiation, is that 
the record of the hard line in British counterterrorism against the 
Provisional IRA is much better than that of the more accommodating 
strands. As will be explained in the second section of this chapter, the 
group suffered heavily from the application of the more kinetic 
counterterrorism principles, such as intelligence gathering and direct 
action.  
A third reason why the fight of the British government against the 
Provisional IRA is a rewarding subject for any student of 
counterterrorism concerns the richness of the available source material. 
The literature on the Northern Ireland conflict, generated by scholars as 
well as journalists, is vast and diverse. In fact, there are few terrorist 
organisations whose inner workings have been exposed as thoroughly as 
those of the Provisional IRA. It is probably no exaggeration to say that our 
knowledge about terrorist group behaviour is based to a considerable 
degree on case studies about the Provisional IRA.3 Moreover, many 
members of the Provisional IRA, senior-level as well as rank-and-file, 
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have written memoirs or have been interviewed for TV-documentaries or 
academic research projects, as have some people who acted as moles 
inside the organisation. The British government, too, contributed to the 
wide array of sources, as it published a wide array of strategy papers, 
investigative reports and review documents. While the records of Cabinet 
meetings are not yet available for the entire duration of the conflict, the 
pillars of British counterterrorism during the Troubles, as the Northern 
Ireland conflict is also called, can be clearly discerned from the available 
source material. 
7.1 The Provisional Republican Army 
7.1.1 Origins 
The Provisional IRA always asserted that their resistance against British 
rule in Ireland was part of a tradition that goes back to the 1798 rebellion 
of the United Irishmen, a group of nationalists who fought for Irish 
independence from the UK.4 While the Provisional IRA could claim this 
lineage with some justification, the group was spawned by a protest 
movement with demands that were very different from those of the Irish 
Republicans of the late eighteenth century. Theobald Wolfe Tone, the 
leader of the United Irishmen, took part of his inspiration from the French 
Revolution and Thomas Paine, and acted on Enlightenment ideals.5 The 
civil rights movement that eventually and inadvertently brought the 
Republican movement back to life, fought for causes that were altogether 
more prosaic. 
The magnitude of the problem was later disputed and their situation was 
favourably compared to South Africa, but Catholics in Northern Ireland 
                                                          
4 T. Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism (Edinburgh: 
University of Edinburgh Press, 2009), 32. 
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in the 1960s suffered several forms of discrimination.6 First of all, 
Catholics had much higher unemployment rates than Protestants, and 
Catholics who were employed often had unstable and menial jobs that 
paid poorly.7 Furthermore, Catholics were practically excluded from 
senior government jobs. There were Catholics who worked for the 
government, but they were significantly underrepresented in higher-
ranking and better paid positions in the civil service and staff of 
administrative bodies.8 Another problem was housing. Many Catholic 
families found themselves crammed together in narrow and poorly 
constructed flats. As they were discriminated against in the allocation of 
public housing as well, they generally stood little chance at finding more 
appropriate accommodation.9 But there was also a more political 
dimension to the housing issue. Concentrating the Catholic part of the 
population in relatively small areas helped the local governments 
guarantee the position in power of Protestant political parties. Elections 
for local councils in Northern Ireland were held through a district system, 
and although Catholics outnumbered Protestants in some cities, like 
Derry, their elected representatives always found themselves in the 
minority.10 These were the problems that triggered the emergence of the 
civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, which was led by the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). Inspired by the civil 
rights movement in the US, NICRA and its allies organised protest 
                                                          
6 For claims that Catholic discrimination has been exaggerated, see C. Hewitt, “Catholic 
Grievances, Catholic Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland during the Civil Rights 
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8 Ibid., 8. 
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marches to claim equal rights. At this stage, in 1967 and 1968, participants 
in NICRA’s protests did not have a Republican agenda, and merely 
wanted to redress the grievances of the Catholics.11 
Notwithstanding the relative modesty of these demands, Protestants were 
alarmed by the Catholics’ newly-found assertiveness and organised 
counter demonstrations, which often ended in violent confrontations and 
rioting. Also, this period saw the emergence of the first Loyalist12 vigilante 
groups. Afraid that the Protestants would be trampled underfoot by 
Catholic mobs, the Loyalists carried out attacks against Catholic civilians 
in an attempt to cower them back into subservience.13 Unsurprisingly, this 
only increased the level of violence. Another crucial factor in the 
escalation of protests was the performance of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) and the B Specials, the RUC’s elite unit. Dominated 
by Protestants, both forces reacted viciously to the protest marches. They 
beat up protesters, sprayed CS gas and used ammunition that was much 
too dangerous for use in densely populated cities like Belfast and Derry, 
where much of the rioting took place. This resulted in many casualties, 
and severely antagonised the Catholic population against the police.14 The 
response on the political level did not help much, either. Northern 
Ireland’s Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, tried to calm the situation 
down by introducing some reforms to the RUC and firing Protestant 
hard-liners from his cabinet. The Protestants took these measures as a sign 
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of betrayal, and O’Neill’s measures only fed the polarisation on the 
streets.15 
With the Catholic population under siege, there was a niche for an 
organisation that could provide protection, but in the early stages of the 
Troubles there was little to suggest that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
might take up such a role. The IRA scored its biggest success in 1922, 
when it took part in the War of Independence and forced the British to 
withdraw from Ireland, save the six counties that make up Northern 
Ireland.16 In the following decades, it waged some ill-fated campaigns to 
force the British out of Northern Ireland, but by the time of the Troubles 
the IRA was becoming a radical leftist political party rather than an armed 
insurgent group.17 The organisation was more interested in participating 
in elections and in forming a front with other radical leftist forces, than in 
physically protecting the Catholic population.18 The IRA’s limited role 
during the initial phase of the Northern Ireland conflict even led some 
jesters to suggest that the group’s name stood for ‘I Ran Away’.19 This 
sense of humiliation bothered some in the IRA, for instance Martin 
Meehan, who later joined the Provisional IRA: “There was a terrible, 
terrible indictment on the republican movement at that stage, because 
people were saying IRA, I Ran Away, and there was a stigma attached to 
the Irish Republican Army.”20 
Meehan and others in the IRA who wanted to throw themselves into the 
turmoil in a bid to protect the Catholics, were convinced that the IRA 
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would not return to the armed struggle. Therefore, they, a group of IRA 
veterans from Ireland and a group of young members from Northern 
Ireland, decided to leave the IRA to form a new organisation. The Irish 
veterans had experience in waging armed campaigns and could thus 
credibly claim the leadership of the new IRA branch.21 The younger 
generation accepted this, if only for the time being. The alliance would 
prove to be uneasy at times, but it did form the basis of incarnation of the 
IRA that was the nemesis of the British from 1970 until the group’s 
decommissioning in 2005. The first meetings of the new IRA were dubbed 
‘provisional’, on the assumption that more definite organisational 
structures would be set up at a later stage. The label ‘Provisional’ stuck, 
and after a while the group officially adopted the name ‘Provisional 
IRA’.22 The IRA from which the Provisionals, or Provos, had broken away, 
then became known as the Official IRA. The ‘Officials’ sporadically 
carried out attacks against British security forces, but announced a 
permanent ceasefire in 1972.23 
Meanwhile, on the streets of Derry and Belfast, the RUC was so 
overwhelmed by the rioting that O’Neill decided to call in the British 
army. The Catholics, and even some later Provisional IRA members, 
welcomed the British soldiers, but it soon became clear that they were not 
the neutral mediators the Catholics had taken them for.24 Like the RUC, 
the Army violently repressed demonstrations and protest marches, and 
quickly lost the sympathy they had when they first arrived. A particularly 
important incident was the Falls Road curfew of July 1970. In a desperate 
attempt to find those thought to be responsible for the violence and 
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rioting, British soldiers blocked and shut down the neighbourhood 
around Falls Road in Belfast to carry out house searches. Many people’s 
houses and furniture were destroyed, and Catholic symbols were 
violated. Several civilians died in the ensuing skirmishes.25 Some recent 
assessments of the Falls Road curfew downplay its importance as a 
turning point in the Troubles and put more emphasis on the weapons that 
were found and the intelligence that was gathered, but there is little doubt 
that it did much to alienate the Catholic population from the British 
Army.26 It still stands out as one of the pivotal events that drew the 
Northern Ireland conflict’s fault lines, which would remain unchanged 
throughout the next three decades. By 1970, less than two years into the 
Troubles, it had become clear that it would be the Provisional IRA against 
the police, the Army and the Loyalist militias.  
7.1.2 Ideology 
The leadership of the Provisional IRA in the first years after the 
organisation’s founding were staunch, rural Catholics with traditional 
and conservative beliefs.27 The IRA’s radical leftist leanings were one of 
the reasons why they had formed their own organisation, and they had 
little sympathy for this line of politics. Sean MacStiofáin, born John 
Stephenson, the Provisional IRA’s first Chief of Staff, expressed this 
disdain as follows: “The European communist parties were a ridiculous 
example for national revolutionaries, being completely dominated by 
another country, taking part in capitalist parliaments, and dodging the 
issues with half-hearted reformist programmes.”28 It was thus not only 
the political content, but also the methods of communist parties and their 
subordination to another country, the Soviet Union, that turned 
MacStiofáin against communism.  
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Instead, he and the other Provos started out from a fairly simple notion: 
Ireland should be an independent nation, which meant that the British 
government had to give up all territorial claims on its former colony. In 
more concrete terms, the Provisional IRA posed five demands to the 
British: first, the British government should stop all violent activities 
against the Irish people; second, it should dissolve the Stormont 
parliament, the Northern Irish parliament to which the British Crown had 
delegated some of its powers; third, it should release all Irish prisoners; 
fourth, it should make damage payments to make up for centuries of 
colonial misrule; and, fifth, it should organise elections for a Northern 
Ireland parliament that would guide both parts of Ireland through the 
transition to a fully independent and united Ireland.29 Everyone in the 
Provisional IRA agreed on these points, but views began to diverge when 
it came to the question as to what an independent Ireland would look like. 
The Irish leadership suggested a federal republic, with Ulster, i.e. 
Northern Ireland plus the three adjacent Irish counties as one of the four 
states. The Provos in Belfast rejected this plan, since they felt such an 
arrangement would give the Protestants an unduly dominant position.30 
After the Belfast-based part of the Provisional IRA had taken over the 
movement, the plan for a federal republic disappeared from the group’s 
official statements. 
Another shift that was associated with the rise of the Belfast faction, led 
by Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, later the public faces of the 
radical Republican party Sinn Féin, was the growing importance of 
socialism in the Provisional IRA’s views. During the early to mid-1970s, 
many Belfast and Derry Provos were in jail, which gave them the 
opportunity to reflect on the nature of the armed struggle.31 The Long 
Kesh prison, where the Republican inmates were kept, was disparaging 
labelled a ‘university of terrorism’, because it provided all reading 
materials and other facilities that were necessary for the Republican 
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inmates’ political education.32 From their studies and discussions, many 
Provisional IRA members drew the conclusion that their struggle was 
similar to that of, for instance, the ANC, the Vietcong and the PLO.33 Also, 
the Provisionals outside the prisons began to target Irish businessmen to 
punish them for exploiting the Irish people.34 In line with this practice, the 
1979 edition of Sinn Féin’s party programme Eire Nua (New Ireland) 
contained the following passage, a clear indication of radical leftist 
leanings: “[W]e believe that the present system of society is based upon 
the robbery of the working class and that capitalist property cannot exist 
without the plundering of labour; we desire to see capitalism abolished 
and a democratic system of common or public ownership erected in its 
stead. This democratic system, which is called socialism, will, we believe, 
come as a result of the continuous increase of power to the working 
class”.35 From this passage, however, it should not be concluded that the 
leftist views had entirely eclipsed the more traditionally Catholic views 
and values. The Eire Nua document was a compromise, and while radical 
leftist ideas had gained in importance, it is more accurate to see the two 
strands as co-existing within the Provisional IRA.36 Units in Belfast were 
more open to socialist ideas, whereas units in more rural areas, like South 
Armagh, were more likely to stick to the conservative brand of 
Catholicism they grew up with. 
A final element of the Provisional IRA’s worldview that should be 
mentioned, is its sectarianism. Whether or not the Provisional IRA waged 
a sectarian campaign, in which it targeted Protestants because they were 
Protestants, is still a matter of scholarly debate.37 IRA-spokespersons 
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always denied they were fighting against Protestants as such and claimed 
they wanted to win them over to the Republican camp. For instance, Sinn 
Féin-man Mitchell McLoughlin once wrote about the Protestants in 
Northern Ireland: “We must convince them of the rightness of our cause 
and the benefits accruing to them from advocacy of our cause.”38 
Furthermore, the majority of deadly IRA victims were either policemen or 
soldiers.39 Regarding these victims, a case can be made that they were 
targeted because of the role they played in maintaining British rule in 
Ireland.  
Against this, it has been argued that these targeting preferences 
constituted masked sectarianism. Many of the victims who were 
‘legitimate targets’ were at the same time Protestants.40 Also, to uphold its 
status as protector of the Catholic community, the Provisional IRA 
engaged in retaliatory attacks against the Protestant community.41 For 
instance, in the counties Armagh and Fermanagh, the Provisionals carried 
out attacks against Protestant retailers. The group’s official reading was 
that such attacks would raise the costs of the occupation to the British 
Exchequer, but it is difficult to deny that, with actions like these, at least 
some of the Provisional IRA’s violent actions had a decidedly sectarian 
undertone.42  
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Part of the explanation for the persistence of the scholarly debate on 
sectarianism in the IRA is perhaps that there is simply no unequivocal 
answer. Some Provos undoubtedly acted out of hatred against 
Protestants, but there were also those who protested the sectarian killings 
as an embarrassment to the Republican cause. For instance, in 1976, 
Brendan Hughes, the commander of the Provisional IRA’s Belfast 
Brigade, signed a petition to the leadership to complain about the nature 
of the Provisionals’ campaign, which was at the time being directed 
against Protestant citizens rather than against security forces.43 The 
Provisional IRA’s ambiguous stance towards the Protestants is another 
example of two contradictory tendencies that existed side by side within 
the organisation. The Provisional IRA, although held together by iron 
discipline, was by no means of one mind on several major strategic issues, 
including, as will become clear below, the ones that would eventually 
decide on the outcome of its campaign.  
7.1.3 Organisational structure and culture 
7.1.3.1 Command and control 
For a clandestine organisation, the Provisional IRA reached a remarkable 
degree of organisation. From the very beginning, it had a strict hierarchy, 
an elaborate division of labour, and a decision-making process that was – 
considering the circumstances – surprisingly formalised. The ultimate 
authority in the Provisional IRA was the General Army Convention, 
which was supposed to meet every two years, but, given the difficulties of 
organising these meetings in secret, met much less frequently. At the 
Convention meetings, representatives of the rank-and-file voted on major 
strategic issues and elected the twelve-man strong Army Executive. The 
Executive in its turn elected the seven-man Army Council, the Provisional 
IRA’s leadership and its most powerful body.44 The Army Council was 
presided by the Chief of Staff, a position held by, among others, Sean 
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MacStiofáin, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness.45 Under the Army 
Council functioned the General Head Quarters (GHQ), which had a 
separate department for each line of IRA activity, i.e. finance, security, 
intelligence, publicity, training education, logistics, operations, foreign 
operations, and engineering.46  
Particularly important for British counterterrorism efforts was the security 
department. This ‘nutting squad’, as it was ominously nicknamed, meted 
out the sentences for betrayal and other breaches of discipline, such as 
selling weapons for personal gain.47 The department was known for its 
brutal punishments and frequent resort to kneecappings and the death 
penalty. According to Provisional IRA-defector Eamon Collins, himself 
once a member of the nutting squad, “IRA members feared the security 
branch more than any enemy unit.”48 Part of the security department’s 
work was the evaluation of failed operations. Its intention was to find out 
whether the failures were deliberately caused by informers or infiltrators. 
The department was also in charge of the screenings of new members. 
With these responsibilities, the nutting squad knew all members and 
knew who had been involved in which operations. This made it a 
particularly interesting target for British infiltration efforts, a point we 
will return to later on. 
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7.1.3.2 Active Service Units 
Below the GHQ were the units that carried out the actual operations. 
These units were part of either the Northern or the Southern Command. 
The Northern Command was responsible for operations in Northern 
Ireland and the five Irish counties that border on Northern Ireland. The 
Southern Command was in charge of operations in Ireland. With much of 
the action taking place in Northern Ireland, the Northern Command 
carried more weight within the movement.49 Each of the two commands 
controlled a number of brigades and battalions, but this structure was 
reformed in the late 1970s in response to successful British infiltration 
attempts. The brigades and battalions were replaced with Active Service 
Units (ASUs), small cells of three to ten operatives. The ASUs knew 
nothing about operations carried out by other cells and had to operate in 
areas where their members were unknown. This organisational structure 
was introduced to make the organisation less vulnerable to British 
intelligence.50 It should be noted, though, that not all Provisional IRA 
units adopted the ASU-structure. In rural border areas like South Armagh 
and Tyrone, for instance, the Brigade structure remained largely intact.51 
Outside of the ASUs, there was a circle of Provisional IRA sympathisers in 
supporting roles, which are thought to have numbered into the low 
hundreds. Support to the IRA took many forms, from hiding and 
transporting weapons to signalling operatives on their way to carry out 
an attack that there were no security forces around.  
7.1.3.3 Loyalty and discipline 
The introduction of the ASUs coincided with the enforcement of more 
demanding rules of discipline, which were laid down in the Green Book, 
the Provisional IRA-manual to which members of the ASU were held. 
One of the cornerstones of the organisational discipline outlined in this 
document was secrecy. There was to be no more singing of Republican 
folk songs in well-known Republican pubs, and the Provisional IRA’s 
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operatives had to stay away from marches and parades.52 The Green Book 
also contributed to the political education of Provisional IRA members. 
Many Provos joined the organisation not primarily out of ideological 
commitment to Republicanism, but out of anger, or out of a desire to 
protect friends and family against Protestant or state violence.53 As 
Brendan Hughes observed, “Most of us at the time did not have a great 
deal of ideology. It wasn’t until later that we really began to learn what 
Republicanism meant. We were motivated by the fact that Catholic homes 
and streets had been burned down, [that] Catholics had been forced out of 
their homes.”54 With such a politically unsophisticated rank-and-file, the 
Army Council found it expedient to cultivate the history of armed 
resistance against British rule in Ireland.55 In doing so, the Provisional IRA 
effectively created a culture of violence.  
The group always claimed that the armed struggle was a necessary evil 
that was forced upon it by the British government. For instance, in their 
1984 Easter Statement, the Provisionals claimed that the violent campaign 
“result[ed] from the inescapable fact that we are left with no peaceful or 
democratic alternative by which to achieve the national rights of our 
people”.56 There is, however, more to the group’s use of violence than this 
seemingly utilitarian argument. Part of the political discipline introduced 
with the Green Book, was the cultivation of the Republican tradition. As 
Eamon Collins remembers it: “The IRA would trace their roots back 
through the 1916 Easter Rising, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the 
Fenians, Wolfe Tone and beyond, to the earliest times when Irish people 
had used violence to resist invaders. We had a whole mythology of 
resistance through violence. I would even tell my IRA comrades that the 
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people who espoused political violence were Ireland’s warrior class, the 
true aristocracy, regardless of their birth.”57 
By stressing the history of the armed struggle in Ireland and the sacrifices 
that had been made in the distant as well as the recent past, the 
Provisional IRA not only lent a sense of heroism and prestige to the 
carrying out of terrorist attacks, but also created a certain path 
dependency.58 An important reason to carry on the armed struggle, so the 
Provos were told, was that it would be unacceptable if the fallen 
movement members who had given their life to the cause would have 
done so to no avail.59 In an IRA brochure published in 1973, this point was 
made quite explicitly: “It is the duty of all to ensure that the suffering and 
losses of families and friends of the dead, injured and jailed is not in 
vain.”60 Deviation from the norm of armed struggle, for instance in the 
form of suggesting the use of non-violent political instruments, was easily 
associated with betrayal.61 
7.1.4 Support organisations  
For a full understanding of the roles and instruments that were at the 
disposal of the Provisional IRA, mention should also be made of two 
branches that operated outside of the group, but were controlled by it: the 
Auxiliary and Sinn Féin.  
7.1.4.1 The Auxiliary 
Throughout the Troubles, the Provisional IRA attracted considerable 
numbers of new recruits, but not all of them were fit for service in the 
ASUs. Aspirant members who were thought to be unruly, mentally 
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unstable, or not yet ready for participation in real operations were placed 
in the Provisional IRA’s Auxiliary. The Auxiliary units served several 
purposes. First, they were active in Republican neighbourhoods and 
carried out kneecappings and punishment beatings in order to put a stop 
to joy riding, drug dealing and other forms of crime. In doing so, they 
fulfilled a real need in poorly policed Republican areas, which were torn 
apart by drug use and where the Provisional IRA was for many people 
the only chance at getting at least a semblance of criminal justice.62 Thus, 
the Auxiliary’s work served the purpose of ingratiating the Provisional 
IRA with the local population, but their actions could also cause 
resentment. Two infiltrators who later went public with their stories both 
recount how they decided to work with British intelligence out of anger 
with the Provisional IRA over punishment beatings and kneecappings 
against their friends and family.63 
The Provisional IRA also had more selfish reasons to deploy the 
Auxiliary, an important one being the maintenance of political discipline 
in Republican areas. Informers and others who were suspected of 
collaboration with the police were brutally beaten, kneecapped or, as in 
the case of Eamon Collins, murdered by members of the Auxiliary.64 The 
Auxiliary was also used to keep potentially volatile elements in check. 
Some Republican sympathisers might be unfit for service in the ASUs, but 
barring them entirely from the organisation would create a risk that they 
might become involved in crime or become disgruntled and turn against 
the Provisional IRA.65 This latter risk was particularly relevant for 
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Provisionals who returned from prison. They were known to the police 
and would constitute a security risk to an ASU, but cutting them out of 
the organisation entirely could easily lead to hard feelings.66 
While the Auxiliary thus served several functions for the Provisionals, its 
members were being frowned upon by the rest of the organisation. Sean 
O’Callaghan, a Provo who later became an informer, called them “the 
dregs of the organisation, people who aren’t any good at anything else 
but beating people up”.67 Members of the Auxiliary were widely 
considered not good enough to become real operatives. Many in the 
Provisional IRA questioned the Auxiliary’s professionalism, and not 
entirely without reason. Members of the Auxiliary frequently boasted 
about their ties to the Provisional IRA while openly brandishing their 
guns. They had a thuggish image, partially because, in their eagerness to 
prove their worth to the Provisional IRA, they resorted to violence very 
quickly.68 Another reason for the reservations that many had about the 
Auxiliary was the grounds on which the latter selected their victims. The 
members of the Auxiliary sometimes attacked people for no clear reason, 
or to settle personal scores.69 Afterwards they would accuse the victims of 
collaboration with British intelligence, usually by spreading flyers or 
spray painting slogans on walls.70 
7.1.4.2 Sinn Féin 
While the Auxiliary was the Provisional IRA’s ugly face, the group also 
had an instrument to convey a more respectable image. This was the 
political party Sinn Féin. Until 1981 Sinn Féin was little more than a 
mouthpiece of the Provisional IRA, responsible for issuing statements 
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explaining the group’s terrorist attacks.71 The party became more 
important as a result of the hunger strikes by a group of incarcerated 
Provisional IRA members, who objected against the withdrawal of the 
‘special category status’ for IRA-prisoners. Up until 1976 IRA prisoners 
were not required to wear prison uniforms and did not have to participate 
in prison labour. When this special status was withdrawn and 
incarcerated Provos received the same treatment as non-political 
prisoners, they started a series of protests, which culminated in the 
hunger strikes of 1981. When the hunger strikers started getting national 
attention, the Army Council decided to let Bobby Sands run for a 
Westminster seat in a by-election. Sands won, and after he died in the 
hunger strike, his seat was won by a Republican candidate who ran on 
Sands’ behalf. These successes made clear that there was an electoral 
support base that the Provisional IRA could tap into.72 To make the most 
of this opportunity to demonstrate popular support for the armed 
struggle, the Army Council, pushed by Gerry Adams, decided in 1982 
that Sinn Féin should participate in all elections.73 Initially the party did 
not allow elected candidates to take their seats, as that would amount to a 
de facto recognition of British rule in Northern Ireland. Only three years 
later Sinn Féin dropped this abstentionist position and Gerry Adams 
became the first Sinn Féin MP in Westminster.74 
From then on, Sinn Féin became more and more important as a vehicle for 
Republican politics, as it was crucial for the mobilisation of community 
support and the formation of a pan-nationalist front with other parties 
who wanted to see Northern Ireland independent from the UK.75 The 
Provisional IRA expressed this shift by labelling its two-pronged 
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approach ‘the Armalite and the ballot box – strategy’.76 With its newly-
gained prominence, Sinn Féin became more independent and more 
assertive vis-à-vis the Provisional IRA. As the party had to pay the 
electoral price for accidental civilian casualties or politically inexpedient 
attacks, it began to put demands on the way the armed struggle was 
waged.77 Gerry Adams, Sinn Féin’s leader, even became openly critical of 
some botched Provisional IRA operations in which innocent bystanders 
were killed. In response to some such attacks in 1988, he told the media he 
was “considerably annoyed”, and “was unable to condone” the actions.78 
He also called on the Provisional IRA “to get its house in order”, 
something that only six years earlier would have been impossible for a 
Sinn Féin leader to say.79 
Sinn Féin became more important over the years, and even reached the 
point where the threat of force by the Provisional IRA was used to back 
up the party’s political demands.80 But although this was a striking 
turning of the tables, Sinn Féin’s dominance was never complete. Even at 
the pinnacle of the party’s power, in the late nineties, the Army Council’s 
political forays, which had to be carried out through Sinn Féin, always 
had to be explained as supportive of the armed struggle. The importance 
and prestige of the armed struggle even brought Adams and McGuinness 
to tell the militants in the organisation that Sinn Féin’s peaceful posturing 
was insincere and was only intended to deceive the enemy about the 
movement’s intentions.81 Many militant Provos who accepted this 
explanation and believed that the electoral approach was only temporary, 
felt betrayed at the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Belfast Provo 
Gerry Bradley, for instance, later said: “The best people joined the IRA 
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and were IRA operators. Then they got pushed aside for people who 
never lifted a finger. (…) I just can’t take in the betrayal – the way the 
leaders of the IRA actually pushed the IRA out of the way, for it was them 
who did it.”82 The role of the ballot box is another issue on which the 
Provisional IRA was internally divided, and the tension between the 
Armalite and the ballot box was never fully resolved. On this point, too, 
the Provisional IRA was far from a monolithic bloc. 
7.1.5 Modus operandi 
The Provisional IRA’s violent campaign had a clearly defined goal: the 
constant stream of attacks was to undermine the will of the British 
government to stay in Northern Ireland. As an anonymous Provo told 
journalist Tim Pat Coogan in the mid-1980s: “Our aim is to create such 
psychological damage to the Brits that they’ll withdraw, sick of the 
expense, the hassle, the coffins coming back to England. But we know that 
we can’t defeat them in a military sense.”83 The group was, in other 
words, waging a war of attrition. This was the strategy from the 
beginning, but in the first years of the armed struggle the Provisionals 
were more optimistic about the time it would take to fight the British to 
the breaking point. Until 1974 many in the movement believed that the 
British were about to give in, and that one big, final push would be 
enough to force them out.84 Gradually, however, it became clear that the 
British would stand their ground. In response, the Provisional IRA 
adopted the ‘Long War’-strategy. As was the case with many of the 
Provisional IRA’s strategic reversals, Gerry Adams played a crucial role in 
the movement’s adoption of this new approach.85 He argued that the 
armed struggle would be a long-term project, for which a looser and more 
secretive organisational structure was needed. The strategy would still be 
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one of inflicting as much casualties and financial and economic damage 
on the UK as possible.86 
By the time the ‘Long War’ strategy was adopted, the Provisional IRA had 
some partners it could rely on for weaponry, but this had not always been 
the case. When the Provisionals first started organising in August 1969, 
even before they became the Provisionals, they had few weapons beyond 
stones, petrol bombs and ten guns.87 As this was clearly not enough to 
take on the British Army and the RUC, there was a desperate need to 
acquire weapons. The solution was found in the Irish diaspora in the US, 
which supplied the Provisional IRA with explosives and the Armalite, the 
gun that would become a symbol of the group’s armed struggle. When 
the shipments of arms from the US started coming in, the Provisional IRA 
could launch its offensive.88 
Another problem in the early stages of the Provisionals’ campaign was the 
lack of expertise. Many Provos had little experience in handling weapons 
of any kind, and had to learn how to use guns and explosives before they 
could be of any operational use to the organisation. Tommy McKearney, 
in 1981 one of the hunger strikers protesting the withdrawal of the special 
status of Provisional IRA-prisoners, later recalled how several Provos 
died by their own hands as a result of mistakes they made while trying to 
assemble explosives.89 In 1973 the Provos lost 31 men this way, but the 
number dropped to seventeen in 1974 and to one or two in the second half 
of the 1970s, which suggests a steep learning curve.90 The group’s 
operational efficiency took a turn for the better as well. In 1970 it took the 
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Provisionals 191 attacks to kill one soldier, against eighteen in 1984.91 The 
group also learned to take into account the operating procedures of the 
British security forces. Brendan Hughes later related that, when carrying 
out a gun attack on an army patrol, he always aimed for the radio 
operator, as units whose radio operators were wounded or killed, would 
have difficulties calling for backup.92 The development of the Provos’ 
operational expertise was made possible partially by the reluctance of the 
Irish police to put a stop to Provisional IRA activity on Irish territory. The 
Republic of Ireland was a safe haven where group members could train 
and practice, and where the group’s explosives specialists could develop 
increasingly sophisticated remote-controlled explosives and automatic 
detonation mechanisms.93 
Provisional IRA violence often came in the form of shootings and 
bombings against the RUC, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR, a reserve 
regiment of the British Army stationed in Northern Ireland) and other 
army units. Car bombs were often used as well. Each ASU was to 
specialise in a particular kind of operation, the four main categories being 
sniping, execution, bombing, and robbery.94 Most attacks took place in 
Northern Ireland, but, acting on the belief that “one bomb in London is 
worth ten in Belfast”, the organisation also tried to take the fight to the 
British mainland, especially London.95 In the 1990s the Provisionals tried 
to disrupt the British capital by a constant stream of small explosives and 
false alarms in combination with so-called ‘spectaculars’, large-scale 
attacks that caused considerable damage. Examples of successfully 
executed spectaculars are the bombings of Bishopsgate in 1993 and the 
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Baltic Exchange in 1992. The former caused more than a billion pounds of 
damage, the latter some 800 million according to some accounts, and 
more than one billion according to others.96 The intention was to impose 
economic and financial costs on the British government. These costs 
would not only result from the damage of the attacks and ensuing 
disruption of daily life, but also from the security measures the City of 
London had to take and which, so the IRA hoped, would undercut the 
city’s status as financial centre of Europe.97 In 1996, there were also plans 
to attack London’s electricity grid, but they were thwarted before they 
could be executed.98 
Wherever Provisional IRA operations were carried out, the Army Council 
insisted that only ‘legitimate targets’ would be attacked. The Green Book 
stressed that operatives always had to make sure that it was clear why a 
certain target was attacked.99 The Army Council tried to maintain 
consistency between the IRA’s goals and its operations by directly 
ordering and sanctioning attacks.100 It also made sure that the GHQ was 
in charge of weapons caches and intelligence flows.101 ASUs only received 
weapons and intelligence after an attack had been ordered or sanctioned, 
and operatives had to hand in their weapons after the operation had been 
carried out. The ASUs could make suggestions for operations, but were 
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not supposed – and hardly able – to carry out attacks without permission 
from the Army Council, but this was no guarantee against mishaps. 
The Provisional IRA did on occasion kill or wound people by accident. 
Sometimes operatives acted on flawed intelligence, sometimes they were 
held up after placing a bomb and were unable to call in warnings in time, 
and sometimes bombs exploded prematurely. Particularly risky was the 
use of set timers on detonation devices. It happened that operatives were 
delayed, or got lost in neighbourhoods they didn’t know. In such cases, 
they were too late to call in a warning once the bomb was placed. 
Sometimes they were even forced to flee, leaving their bombs behind. 
When operations ended in such disarray, the operatives involved had 
little inkling as to the effect the explosion would have, and collateral 
damage was likely.102 
Operational failures of this kind could generate lots of bad publicity to the 
Provisional IRA. This happened in 1972 on the day that became known as 
Bloody Friday, when the Provisionals killed several innocent civilians in a 
string of bombings in downtown Belfast. When it became clear what 
damage the bombings had done, the Provos were reduced to accusing the 
authorities of deliberately ignoring the group’s telephoned warnings and 
purposefully failing to clear the areas where the bombs had been 
placed.103 Even years later, Sean MacStiofáin still claimed that the British 
government had not acted on the warnings because they had wanted to 
use the opportunity to discredit the Provisional IRA.104 In the 1980s and 
1990s, operational misfires like these caused considerable embarrassment 
to Sinn Féin, and particularly to Gerry Adams, who was trying to 
convince the British government of the movement’s sincere desire for 
peace. Such incidents showed that the bullet and the ballot box were not 
always easily reconcilable. 
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7.2 Counterterrorism principles and the Provisional IRA 
7.2.1 Restraint in the use of force 
At the beginning of the conflict, even before the Provisional IRA had been 
founded, the police in Northern Ireland antagonised the Catholic 
population with an overly violent and repressive response to the unrest. 
Due to the unfamiliarity of the operating environment and the lack of 
background knowledge on the Northern Ireland conflict, the Army 
initially made the same mistake. For instance, on 3 July 1970, British 
troops entered the neighbourhood around Falls Road in Belast, looking 
for weapons. As many in the Falls district were ardent Republicans, the 
Army was met with ferocious resistance. After several hours of rioting, 
Ian Freeland, the military commander in charge of the operation, imposed 
a curfew, during which some 3,000 British soldiers aggressively carried 
out house searches.105 Because of the force that was used, the property 
that was destroyed and the innocent civilians who were threatened and 
abused, this episode went down in Republican history as ‘the Rape of the 
Falls’.106 
Then, in the early morning of 9 August 1971, the Army launched 
Operation Demetrius, a wave of violent house searches in Derry and 
Belfast aimed at the apprehension of members of the Provisional IRA. The 
action was an operational failure – the Provos had been tipped off and 
had left the areas107 – as well as a political disaster. In the ensuing riots, 
twenty civilians were killed, of whom seventeen by British soldiers.108 
Another high-profile mishap occurred on Sunday 30 January 1972, when 
British troops, who later claimed they spotted protesters carrying nail 
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bombs, opened fire on a Catholic protest march, killing fourteen 
protesters.109 Bloody Sunday, as this day is now called, has been the 
subject of various government investigations, the first of which – carried 
out by the Widgery Commission – largely exonerated the soldiers, and 
only added to the anger of the Catholics.110 The latest – and probably last 
– government report, released in 2010 by the Saville Commission, was 
decidedly more critical, stating that “there was a serious and widespread 
loss of fire discipline”.111 Incidents like these cost the security forces the 
goodwill of the population, which sided en masse with the Provisional 
IRA. Many Catholics felt that the Provos were the only force on which 
they could count for protection. Furthermore, fear or a thirst for revenge 
were important factors in the motivation of new members who joined the 
Provisional IRA in the first years of the Troubles. 
The large-scale actions that badly affected the population, like the Falls 
Road curfew and Operation Demetrius, were a thing of the past by 1974, 
but the use of force by the police and the military still mobilised part of 
the population against the Provisional IRA. Although a big blow for the 
Provisional IRA and an operational success for the British, the ambush at 
Loughgall, in which a crack unit of eight Provisional IRA operatives was 
killed by the RUC, badly affected the legitimacy of the British security 
forces. Amid accusations of a shoot-to-kill policy (see the section on ‘The 
rule of law’), the funerals of the operatives killed at Loughgall were 
attended by thousands of mourners who sympathised with the 
Republican cause.112 The Loughgall ambush drew much attention because 
of the scale and the heavy blow it dealt the Provisional IRA, but there 
were more such incidents. The reputation of the security forces was badly 
tarnished by several smaller shooting incidents about which it later 
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turned out that the victims, all Provisional IRA operatives, were unarmed. 
These shootings were widely perceived as liquidations, because it was 
clear that the security forces had been lying in wait, and had shown no 
intention to make arrests. In some cases, there were eyewitness accounts 
detailing the RUC’s behaviour, in others there was forensic evidence 
suggesting physical abuse of victims just after they had been shot.113 In 
addition, the military lost much credit as a result of the mistaken killings 
that occurred occasionally. The Provisionals benefited greatly from, for 
example, the death of John Boyle, a sixteen-year-old boy who told the 
police about a weapons cache he found in a graveyard. Two Special Air 
Service (SAS)-men decided to stake out the cache, and, mistaking him for 
a Provo, killed Boyle when he came back to see whether the weapons 
were still there.114  
The security forces, especially the RUC, also used excessive force in their 
attempts to curb riots during the marching season. During the spring and 
the summer, both Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland 
commemorate important events in the history of their respective 
communities by organising marches to a place or along a route of some 
historical significance. The performance of the RUC at such events clearly 
showed a bias against Catholic marchers, who, according to Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, were often physically attacked 
and beaten, or shot at with rubber bullets. Scores of peaceful protesters 
got wounded during these confrontations, and several died from wounds 
inflicted by the RUC.115 The RUC’s distaste of Catholics is also borne out 
by numbers about its use of ammunition. Of the 6,000 rubber bullets that 
were fired during the marching season of 1995, only 500 were aimed at 
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Protestants.116 With the RUC so clearly pitted against them, the Catholic 
population was open to the alternative policing efforts of the Provisional 
IRA Auxiliary, which further undermined the police force’s legitimacy.117 
Other, lower-intensity kinds of violence caused problems as well. Human 
Rights Watch noted in 1993 and 1994 that Army misconduct was 
widespread. As one of the organisation’s reports claimed, “[c]hildren 
under 18 and adults are frequently stopped on the street, kicked, hit, 
insulted and abused by security forces.”118 Both the army and the police 
used verbal and physical violence when engaging the Catholic population 
in Northern Ireland, which obviously did not do much for the 
government’s reputation among potential Provisional IRA 
sympathisers.119 
With these instances of excessive use of force, and the memories of events 
like Bloody Sunday and Operation Demetrius still fresh, the British 
campaign was littered with violations of the rule regarding restraint in the 
use of force. The Provisional IRA owed it to the excesses described above 
that Gerry Adams had some ground to claim that “the IRA exists and 
operates with the active consent of a sufficient number of people to 
finance, arm, clothe, feed, accommodate and transport IRA volunteers 
and in every way build up around them a voluntary political 
infrastructure”.120 The estimates of the numerical strength of the 
Provisional IRA often also include estimates of the support network that 
the group had at its disposal. Like the numbers of active Provos, the size 
of the group’s support network is not estimated to have declined. During 
the period 1979-1998 the Provisional IRA had by most accounts several 
hundreds to a thousand people ready to help them wage the armed 
struggle. Furthermore, even at the end of the conflict, there were still 
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areas, like South Armagh, and several neighbourhoods in Belfast and 
Derry, with a reputation for being Republican strongholds. These were 
also the areas where the policing by the Auxiliary was the most salient. It 
was here that the Provisionals had their safe houses, could store their 
weapons and select their recruits. Given the tenacity of the support 
infrastructure, we can conclude that the insufficiently restrained use of 
force kept the support for the Provisional IRA alive. The group may not 
have regained the massive support of the early years of the armed 
struggle, but retained enough to keep its campaign going. Excessive force 
was one important factor, another was the disregard for their own rules 
that the British regularly displayed. 
7.2.2 Rule of law 
The British government made a point of conveying the impression that 
extraordinary measures were not needed to fight the Provisional IRA (see 
also the section on counter narratives), but in practice took many actions 
that were clearly beyond what was normal and legally permissible in the 
maintenance of public order. Throughout the conflict, both the RUC and 
the Army frequently violated the rules and regulations that were 
supposed to govern their campaign against the Provisional IRA, thus 
sustaining the latter’s support base. 
For one, the RUC was allowed to detain suspects for seven days before 
having to charge them with a concrete criminal offence. The RUC freely 
used this pre-charge detention to gather intelligence, and often arrested 
people not with the intention of charging them, but only to extract 
information from them. This was not only misuse of the right to arrest 
suspects went against the European Convention of Human Rights, which 
states that suspects have to be brought before a judge as soon as possible. 
Holding suspects for more than four days and six hours, a considerably 
shorter period of time than the seven days allowed in the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Emergence Powers) Act, constitutes a derogation.121  
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The rule of law was also undermined by what happened during the seven 
day-detention of Provisional IRA members or sympathisers. In the early 
seventies many accusations of torture were levelled against the RUC and 
the Army. Most of the criticism was aimed at what became known as ‘the 
five techniques’: wall-standing (detainees were made to lean with 
stretched arms against a wall for long periods of time), hooding, sleep 
deprivation, subjection to noise, and deprivation of food and drink. The 
British government set up a commission to look into the matter. In 1972 
the commission presented its report and concluded that there was no 
reason to ban or morally disapprove of the way information was being 
extracted from internees.122 But this did not put the matter to bed. 
Although both shied away from branding the application of the five 
techniques as torture, both Amnesty International and the European 
Court of Human Rights condemned the way the detainees were treated. 
Research by Amnesty International showed that prisoners were 
physically abused, whereas the European Court for Human Rights called 
the treatment of detainees “inhuman and degrading”.123 Finally, another 
government report noted that the numbers of complaints about the 
treatment of detainees were increasing, and that no one was held 
accountable.124  
In spite of these indictments of the ways detainees were treated, heavy-
handed interrogation did not abate. In the early 1990s Human Rights 
Watch wrote that “adults and children under 18 were threatened, tricked, 
insulted and on occasion physically abused by police during 
interrogation.”125 Also, many detainees were not allowed to contact their 
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lawyers, even though they were entitled to legal representation.126 When 
detainees were granted contact with their lawyers, the latter were often 
harassed and intimidated by RUC officers, a practice that was strongly 
criticised by the UN.127 
Another way in which the British chipped away at the rule of law was the 
manipulation of evidence in court cases. On several occasions evidence 
was fabricated or withheld in order to secure convictions. Practices like 
these led to travesties of justice, like the six innocent men who spent more 
than a decade in jail for the bombing of a pub in Birmingham in 1974. 
Evidence was also withheld in the case of the Guildford Four, who were 
falsely convicted for the bombing of a pub in Guildford, a town southeast 
of London. Three of the four men had alibis, but their witnesses were not 
called on during the trial. Also, it later turned out that the notes of the 
interrogations had been edited or even completely made up to make a 
conviction for terrorist offences more likely.128 A similar case concerned 
the Ballymurphy Seven, a group of boys and young men who had been 
arrested, five in 1991, two others in 1992, on suspicion of involvement in 
IRA attacks. They were charged with murder, but were released because 
the prosecution withheld evidence from the defendants, and because 
police interrogators had used physical force to get the suspects to sign 
false confessions.129 
Yet another cluster of illegal activities on the part of the security forces is 
usually referred to as collusion. Several Provos remember threats from the 
RUC that they would pass on their name, picture and address to Loyalist 
militias.130 While one can discard this as mere bluff or intimidation, there 
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are several known instances in which security forces passed on 
intelligence to Loyalist militias.131 Also, in January 1988 the UDR turned a 
blind eye on an arms delivery to the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), 
the most prominent of the Protestant militias. The delivery could have 
been intercepted, but the UDR chose not to do so to protect an informer, 
who later turned out to know very little about the operation.132 Similarly, 
there was a certain laxity among the security forces to act on intelligence 
about impending Loyalist operations. As we will see below, one of the 
cornerstones of the success of the British campaign against the Provisional 
IRA was the ability of British intelligence to uncover and disrupt the 
group’s terrorist plots. Information about plans for Loyalist attacks was 
not treated with the same sense of urgency. In several cases, the RUC 
allowed murder plans to be carried out, or later consciously failed to 
follow up on clues or information that could lead them to the 
perpetrators.133 Even more serious cases concerned active participation of 
members of the security forces in Loyalist bombings and in the killing of 
known Republican sympathisers.134  
What goes for all forms of collusion is that it is doubtful whether they 
were structural, that is, whether they were part of a secret policy of the 
Army or the RUC. Rather, it appears that such practices were the result of 
personal overlap between security forces and loyalist militias. As early as 
1973, a secret British intelligence report noted that “a fair number of UDR 
soldiers have been discovered to hold positions in the UDA/UVF [Ulster 
Volunteer Force, TvD]”.135 The incidents described above demonstrate 
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that this problem remained unsolved until long after this report was 
drawn up, making collusion one of the major sources of distrust towards 
the British government during and even after the Troubles. 
Finally, there were several forms of violence actively perpetrated by the 
security forces that amounted to breaches of the law. The most dramatic 
of these were the incidents that gave rise to suspicions that the Army was 
secretly working according to a shoot-to-kill policy. The killing of three 
unarmed Provisional IRA operatives at Gibraltar (see the section on law 
enforcement and direct action), was one such incident. The European 
Court for Human Rights ruled that the right to life had not been 
adequately protected, and that the incident amounted to a liquidation, not 
to an escalated attempt to arrest the three victims.136 The Loughgall 
ambush, too, fed suspicions that the security forces were shooting to kill, 
and not to arrest. These concerns were only aggravated by the British 
unwillingness to carry out an investigation to clear up the circumstances 
under which the eight victims had died.137 The European Court of Human 
Rights ruled in 2001 that this amounted to a violation of the operatives’ 
human rights and ordered the UK to pay £10,000 in compensation to the 
families of each of the victims.138 
The effects of the violations of their own laws by the British are hard to 
separate from the effects of the lack of restraint in the use of force. 
Probably the most important element to the illegitimate or illegal activities 
listed in this section was the partiality they suggested. The harsh 
interrogations, the ties between the security forces and the Protestant 
militias and the tampering with evidence used in criminal cases all gave 
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the impression that British counterterrorism was not about bringing 
stability and justice to Northern Ireland, but about securing the position 
of the Protestants. On some occasions, such as the ones described in the 
previous sections, the security forces clearly acted as if they were a side in 
the conflict, which obviously fuelled the mistrust of parts of the Catholic 
population towards the state. 
7.2.3 Law enforcement and direct action 
Although it can be argued that the performance of the police and the 
army resulted in ongoing support for the Provisional IRA, they were also 
instrumental in the containment of the group and the limitation of the 
Provisionals’ operational capabilities. They were crucial for the creation of 
the strategic context in which the Provisional IRA had no way out of the 
conflict except through negotiations or defeat. It is true that repressive 
measures by the police and army only exacerbated the conflict in the early 
years, but the British army started making headway in July 1972, when 
they carried out Operation Motorman. Frustrated over the pockets of 
Republican resistance in which the Provisional IRA could thrive, the 
British Army drove bulldozers into the no-go areas to remove the barriers 
that had kept the security forces at bay.139 After several years of escalation 
and setbacks, Operation Motorman was a welcome success in more than 
one way. First, British troops re-established the dominance of the security 
forces in areas that for years had been out of the reach of the police. 
During the first years of the Troubles, Republican citizens in 
neighbourhoods like Free Derry, a self-proclaimed Republican zone in 
Derry, had thrown up barricades and had organised citizen patrols to 
keep out the RUC.140 These urban Republican strongholds were now 
again within the grasp of the law.141 Second, British troops managed open 
up the no-go areas without causing many civilian casualties. There were 
civilian deaths, but overall Operation Motorman was carried out with 
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much greater restraint than Operation Demetrius, and did not generate 
the same amount of negative publicity for the British.142 Third, due to the 
hundreds of arrests that were made during Operation Motorman, the 
British now began to learn more about the Provisional IRA.143 Making full 
use of the newly acquired intelligence, the security forces manage to seize 
the initiative. In the period from May to December 1973, no less than 1,798 
Provos were arrested, including 39 men from the GHQ.144 The pressure on 
the Provisional IRA did not let off, and by 1974 the group was close to 
being defeated. During the ceasefire of 1975 (see the section on ‘Offering 
non-violent alternatives), the Provisional IRA’s leadership in prison 
decided that something had to be done, and began to think of ways to 
restructure the organisation to make it less vulnerable to infiltration and 
arrests. The result of these strategic reflections was the introduction of the 
ASUs, but it was not until 1977 that these reforms were implemented. 
Until then, the RUC kept arresting large numbers of Provisional IRA 
members. Some 3,000 arrests were made in the period 1976-1979.145 In 
1980, the Long Kesh prison alone held about 800 Provos.146  
The new structure proved to be a more sustainable organisational model 
for the Provisionals. One important shift was that the group became a lot 
smaller. Recognising the need for secrecy and stealth, and forced by the 
many arrests of the preceding years, the leadership decided to reduce the 
organisation’s membership to a core of two hundred to three hundred 
men, which later increased to five to seven hundred. Consequently, the 
group could also do with a smaller support network. With these smaller 
numbers, the Provisionals left fewer traces and could go deeper 
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underground. Furthermore, their support base was still large enough to 
replace arrested operatives.147 
But while the introduction of the ASUs was a wise move on the part of the 
Provisional IRA leadership, their organisation again suffered great losses 
in the 1980s. One widely publicised defeat occurred in 1987 in the 
Northern Irish village of Loughgall. The Provisional IRA had made plans 
for an attack on an RUC base, unaware that the British Army had been 
briefed on the operation by intelligence sources inside the group. The 
RUC knew that the Provisionals were coming, and a 25-man SAS unit set 
up an ambush. All eight Provisional IRA operatives participating in the 
attack were killed. This was a major blow to the organisation, especially to 
its East Tyrone Brigade, of which the eight operatives had been members. 
The East Tyrone Brigade was one of the Provisional IRA’s most active and 
skilled units, but was badly affected by the ambush at Loughgall. In 1986, 
21% of all Provisional IRA operations were carried out in East Tyrone, 
against only 9% in 1993. This decline is hardly surprising, given that the 
Brigade’s losses were not limited to the eight men killed at Loughgall. Of 
the 53 men from the East Tyrone Brigade that were killed or captured 
before 1993, 28 were taken out in the period 1987 – 1992.148 
Another one of the confrontations in which the Provisional IRA suffered 
heavy losses took place in Gibraltar, where the organisation lost three 
men who were preparing a terrorist attack on British military personnel. 
They were gunned down by British soldiers, even though they were 
unarmed at the time of the incident.149 The three men, like the team 
assembled to attack the RUC station in Loughgall, had been chosen 
because of their expertise, so here, too, the Provisional IRA lost some of its 
most skilled operatives.150 Another crack unit that ran into trouble prior to 
a major operation was the group’s flying column, a group of operatives 
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who would come together on an ad hoc basis to carry out complex 
operations. Shortly after it was set up, its members were arrested, after 
which this way of working was abandoned.151 The final example of direct 
action against the Provisional IRA’s top operatives was the arrest of the 
ASUs who were preparing bomb attacks against critical infrastructure in 
England in the 1990s. The Dockland Bombing in Manchester in 1996 had 
been successfully carried out, but soon afterwards, two ASUs in the UK 
were arrested. Labelled “the A-Team” by one of the police officers 
involved in the investigation, both units consisted of specially selected 
operatives with more than fifteen years of experience.152  
Apart from British success in apprehending or killing the most highly 
skilled members of the Provisional IRA, there was also a steady stream of 
arrests of ordinary Provos. Each year in the period 1984-1989, some 450 to 
650 charges for terrorism-related offences were made. Also, every year 
several hundred fire arms were confiscated, as well as several thousand 
pounds of explosives.153 These data are not broken down into separate 
numbers for Loyalist and Republican groups, but given the group’s 
prominence in the Northern Ireland conflict, a sizeable part of the charges 
and weapons confiscations must have concerned the Provisional IRA. In 
sum, one can safely say that law enforcement and direct action brought 
the British many operational successes.  
The effectiveness of these efforts, however, is less clear-cut. On the one 
hand, operational success did not lead to a decrease in the number of 
members in the Provisional IRA. As with any terrorist organisation, it is 
difficult to tell exactly how many members the Provisional IRA had, but 
most estimates put the number at two hundred to five hundred.154 There 
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are no sources that mention a significant reduction of the number of 
Provos after 1979, and one source that gives an estimate of the Provisional 
IRA’s size over time claims that the group’s size remained more or less 
constant after the 1970s.155 This would mean that the Provisional IRA 
managed to replenish its ranks in spite of the constant losses of personnel 
to the RUC and the Army. Furthermore, the Provisional IRA was able to 
carry out attacks, even in England, right up until the ceasefire that would 
lead to the Good Friday Agreement. Less than two weeks before the 
ceasefire was announced, the Provisional IRA became involved in violent 
protests in Portadown, a city in county Armagh, and showed that its 
operational capabilities were still intact. The British Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, allowed the Orange Order, a Protestant 
and unionist society, to march through the town’s Catholic areas. The 
population responded to Mowlam’s decision with violence, and during 
the first two days of the ensuing riots, the Provisional IRA launched no 
less than nine attacks against the police and the army.156 
But in spite of the Provos’ ability to muster people and resources needed 
to keep up the violent campaign, the arrests and liquidations did make 
them realise that their operational capabilities had reached their limit. As 
early as the mid-1980s, some members began to feel that they had done 
everything they could, but were not getting any closer to the group’s 
political goals. As one Provo later remembered, “[i]t wasn’t breaking the 
will of the British, no matter what you were throwing at them, they were 
standing firm.”157 In fact, as will be seen in the section on intelligence 
gathering, carrying out operations was becoming more difficult. Much of 
the organisation’s resources were spent on the preparation of attacks that 
had to be called off at a later stage. Against the pressure from the RUC 
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and the Army, the Provisionals lacked the means to escalate their 
campaign. The leadership had promised that a new offensive would be 
launched once weapon deliveries from Libya came in, but in 1987 a major 
arms shipment was intercepted, leaving the plan for an offensive in 
tatters.158 The Army Council tried to make up for the cancelling of the 
offensive by ordering ‘spectaculars’ in England. These were difficult to 
carry out, though, and, even if successful, some Provos doubted whether 
the group could ever carry out such attacks with the frequency required 
to bring the British to their knees.159 There was, in other words, not much 
the Provisional IRA could do beyond what they were already doing, 
which was clearly not enough. In the second half of the 1980s, the reality 
that the armed struggle was going nowhere, slowly began to sink in. 
For example, Danny Morrison, before his arrest in 1990 the Provisionals’ 
director of publicity, began to urge his fellow Republicans in 1992 to 
acknowledge the sobering fact that they would never get more of out of 
the British than they were able to get at that time. The armed struggle 
could be continued, but it had become a dead-end street, so Morrison 
argued. Somewhat bitterly, he went on to state that the Provisional IRA 
needed to consider other options if it was to avoid either “an unpopular, 
unseemly, impossible-to-end armed struggle” or “brave exhaustion – 
another one of the glorious defeats with which our past it littered”.160 
Gerry Adams agreed with Morrison. His position was that the 
Provisionals would do wise to strike a deal, because waiting meant that 
the group would take the risk that its bargaining position would 
deteriorate.161 
Summing up, it is clear that the law enforcement pressure on and direct 
action against the Provisional IRA contributed to the containment of the 
terrorist threat posed by the group. The arrests and killings drained the 
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Provisionals of human resources, and their campaign would doubtlessly 
have been more intensive had the Provisionals not lost so much expertise 
and manpower. The output that goes with the programme theory on law 
enforcement and direct action was certainly there, as literally thousands 
of group members were arrested during the conflict. Nevertheless, the 
Provisional IRA was never decisively defeated and maintained 
operational capabilities as well as its numerical strength in the face of 
constant law enforcement pressure and direct action. The Provisional 
IRA’s operational capabilities were not reduced, but were kept at a level 
where it was clear to the group’s members that they would not win. In 
other words, the success of the police and military operations against the 
Provisional IRA lay not in the reduction, but in the containment of the 
group’s operational capabilities. Attacks were not necessarily decreasing 
in numbers or sophistication, but the Provisionals’ inability to step up 
their campaign made it clear that the conflict was a dead-end street. The 
arrests and liquidations made the Provisional IRA realise that they had to 
run to stand still, a notion that was augmented further by the group’s 
extensive infiltration by British intelligence. 
7.2.4 Gathering intelligence and offering exits 
Initially the British troops in Northern Ireland operated from a very poor 
intelligence position. Several government officials later freely admitted 
that they lacked even the most the basic knowledge about Northern 
Ireland and the conflict that was brewing there. Frank Cooper, Deputy 
Under-Secretary for Defence and Permanent Under Secretary in the 
Northern Ireland Office, said about the initial phase of the campaign: 
“There was a fear that you were going into an unknown mire, that you 
didn’t know what was there, you didn’t know what was going to happen 
to you when you were there and how you were going to get to out of the 
other side of the bog.”162 This lack of actionable intelligence severely 
hamstrung the security forces’ operations in the first years of their fight 
against the Provisional IRA. Arrests were made on the basis of outdated 
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information, as a result of which people were mistaken for Provos and 
had to spend two or three months in jail merely because they lived in a 
house that was previously owned or rented by a Provisional IRA-man.163 
Also, the police and the army had a hard time putting faces to the names 
of the people they were after. Brendan Hughes and Gerry Adams were 
among the most wanted men in Northern Ireland, but until 1972 they 
could freely walk the streets, as no one in the security forces knew what 
they looked like.164 Valuable intelligence was gained from 1972 to 1974 
from interrogating arrestees during internment, and one former 
intelligence official claimed the Provisionals were “on their knees” by 
1974. The ceasefire of 1975 and the subsequent reorganisation saved the 
Provisional IRA, and British intelligence units had to rebuild their 
knowledge base.165 
There were three main ways in which the RUC and the British Army tried 
to learn about their enemies. The first source of intelligence was the 
interrogation of terrorist suspects, or people who were arrested because 
they might know something about the Provisionals. As we have seen 
above, the five interrogation techniques (wall-standing, hooding, sleep 
deprivation, subjection to noise, deprivation of food and drink) were 
legally questionable, but they did form the basis of this strand of 
intelligence gathering in the first half of the 1970s.  
A special category of interrogated prisoners were the ‘supergrasses’, 
Republican or Loyalist terrorist suspects who gave information about 
their organisations in return for a reward. Unable to collect evidence due 
the inaccessibility of crime scenes and people’s unwillingness to 
cooperate, the RUC had hoped to secure more convictions against 
Provisional IRA operatives by offering rewards to suspects, like 
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immunity, sentence reduction or even for new lives, new identities.166 In 
some cases, they were also offered considerable sums of money. One 
supergrass, for example, was offered £300,000 for testimonies against 
Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Danny Morrison.167  
The practice was introduced in 1978 and abandoned in 1985, the year of 
the last trial in which testimonies provided by supergrasses were used as 
evidence. In these seven years 27 suspects – of whom fifteen were 
members of the Provisional IRA – were persuaded to become 
supergrasses.168 However, the information gained from supergrasses was, 
as one government report noted, often unreliable, and many convictions 
gained through supergrass testimonies later had to be revoked.169 Also, of 
the fifteen Republican supergrasses, nine withdrew their statements and 
broke off their cooperation with the RUC.170 
The usefulness of supergrass system in court cases may have been 
questionable, but one could also view it as a way to lure Provisional IRA 
members out of the organisation. In this respect too, however, the 
supergrass system cannot be considered an unqualified success. Its 
record, although not entirely bad, does not allow for the conclusion that it 
was an effective application of the counterterrorism principle ‘offering 
exit’. It is true that the supergrasses were indeed unsettling to the 
Provisional IRA leadership171, fearful as they were of informers and 
infiltrators, but the organisation managed to draw many of the 
supergrasses back in. There was always the threat of violent retaliation, of 
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course, and one supergrass’ wife was kidnapped in order to force him to 
retract his statement.172 Interestingly, though, the Provisional IRA also 
maintained unity by issuing amnesties of their own. The group informed 
the supergrasses that there would be no penalties against them if they 
would quit cooperating with the RUC. Together, these countermeasures 
were enough to make sure that most supergrasses went back to the 
organisation.173 Thus, few Provisional IRA members were truly ‘turned’, 
let alone that the organisation fell apart as a result of the supergrass 
system. This being the case, the supergrass system, while it may have 
gained the British some useful intelligence, should be considered an 
ineffective application of the counterterrorism principle ‘offer exits’. 
But while the supergrass system drew much public attention, it was by no 
means the most important source of intelligence to the British security 
forces. Rather than count merely on the testimonies of captured terrorists, 
British police and intelligence agencies deployed an extensive network of 
informers and infiltrators. Both the RUC’s Special Branch and the Force 
Research Unit (FRU), part of the British military intelligence apparatus, 
had so-called ‘handlers’, who secretly instructed and guided their moles 
inside the Provisional IRA. Infiltrators and informers supplied their 
handlers with the intelligence needed to disrupt terrorist plots. Kevin 
Fulton, an infiltrator who made it into the Provisional IRA’s internal 
security department, recalls in his memoirs how on the basis of his 
intelligence army patrol routes were changed and intended victims would 
be transferred to jobs in other locations. Moves like these were meant to 
disrupt an operation without blowing the covers of the informers, as they 
made it seem to the Provisional IRA as if operations failed as a result of 
bad luck.174 Sometimes moles took on more pro-active roles. In such cases, 
                                                          
172 K. Sarma, “Informers and the Battle against Republican Terrorism: A Review of 30 Years of 
Conflict,” Police Practice and Research 6, no. 2 (2005): 170. 
173 Bonner, “Combating Terrorism”; Urban, Big Boys’ Rules, 135–136. 
174 Fulton, Unsung Hero, 144; McGartland, Fifty Dead Man Walking, 178 and 184; Gilmour, 
Dead Ground: Infiltrating the IRA, 117 and 121. 
A nasty victory 
273 
they removed detonation devices, or led the ASU-members to places 
where the SAS would be waiting.175  
The third source of British intelligence was surveillance, mostly through 
technological means. At first, the technological tools the British had at 
their disposal were poorly suited for use in urban environments, but the 
R&D projects that were set up to address this problem soon paid off. The 
British could now pick up signals sent by devices planted in downtown 
Belfast, and the increasing use of these new tools forced the Provisionals 
“to talk in bathrooms with the water running”.176 Rooms and weapons 
were bugged, and surveillance towers were equipped with powerful 
binoculars and other state-of-the-art surveillance equipment. Perhaps the 
most important surveillance tool was the helicopter.177 These too were 
equipped with high-tech surveillance technologies. According to Gerry 
Bradley, “they could read the newspaper over your shoulder.”178 
In the program theory for intelligence gathering, the output is measured 
by numbers of informers and infiltrators and the amounts of actionable 
intelligence that are gathered. Much of the British intelligence activity in 
Northern Ireland is still shrouded in secrecy, but the Provisional IRA was 
by all accounts heavily infiltrated. According to one estimate, between 
1976 and 1987 one in every thirty or forty Provisional IRA-members was 
working for one of the security forces involved in the conflict.179 Ian 
Hurst, a former military intelligence official who leaked information 
about army misconduct in Northern Ireland, has an even more 
spectacular assessment. Speaking from his experience as a handler in 
Northern Ireland in the late 1980s, Hurst claims that about one in every 
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four Provos and one out of every two senior Provos was working for 
British intelligence.180 While such claims are difficult to verify, it is safe to 
say, as several Provos later did, that British intelligence was well-
established within the Provisional IRA.181 Another useful indicator of the 
British ability to penetrate the Provisional IRA is the fact that it managed 
to get information from the ‘nutting squad’. As has been explained above, 
the Provisional IRA’s internal security department was a prized target for 
British intelligence because of the unit’s knowledge gained from vetting 
potential new members and evaluating failed operations. If the available 
media reports are anything to go by, attempts to get a mole into this unit 
met with success at least five times: Kevin Fulton successfully infiltrated, 
and four others (John Joe Magee, Freddie Scappaticci, Patrick ‘Mooch’ 
Blair and Terence Clarke) were ‘turned’.182 A related success was the 
arrest of Eamon Collins, who also worked in the Provisional IRA’s 
security department. He did not act as an informer while in the 
Provisional IRA, but he did become a supergrass after his arrest in 1985 
and gave an elaborate testimony, although he later withdrew it.183  
Now that we have established that the various agencies involved, 
especially the FRU and the Special Branch, managed to generate the 
output of the intelligence gathering activities in accordance with the 
program theory, we can turn to the question whether these efforts were 
effective. Here too the evidence is somewhat patchy, but it is clear that 
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British intelligence took a heavy toll on the Provisional IRA’s operational 
capabilities two main ways. First, the realisation among the Provos that 
there were informers in their midst fuelled a deep mistrust in the 
organisation.184 According to Eamon Collins, “there was a new paranoia 
afoot in the IRA as a result of the supergrass trials. Everyone suspected 
everyone else.” Others who were active in the Provisional IRA, like Kevin 
Fulton and Cathal Crumley, a Provo who in 2000 became mayor of Derry 
for Sinn Féin, also remember a distinct sense of suspicion.185 In order to 
protect itself against infiltrators and informers, the Provisional IRA spent 
much time and effort on internal security.186 The evaluation of failed 
attacks, the interrogation of suspects and the security measures that were 
introduced, some as innocuous as the wearing of ski masks in meetings 
with new members, all took up resources that otherwise could have been 
used for offensive operations against the British.187 Also, part of a 
Provisional IRA – tactic to identify moles was leaving operatives out of 
operations to see whether failures in operations could be attributed to 
them: “Everyone in turn found themselves not included in certain 
operations to see what happened in their absence.”188 
The second main effect of British intelligence gathering efforts was the 
increasing number of Provisional IRA operations that had to be called off. 
The leadership wanted to maintain the IRA’s scarce human resources, and 
sanctioned attacks only if they met certain criteria, one of which was that 
the risk to the operatives involved should be minimal.189 Plans had to be 
aborted once there were indications that the security forces knew an 
attack was coming, like increased police or army presence around an 
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intended target. Gerry Bradley recalled how difficult it was to meet this 
demand in the face of British surveillance, especially the helicopter: “The 
chopper destroyed us. If the chopper was up, you weren't allowed to 
move out of a house: army orders. You stayed in whatever house you 
were in. Op[erations]s were cancelled regularly because of it.”190 With 
such a high standard of operational security and with the FRU’s and the 
Special Branch’s ability to discover terrorist plots, fewer and fewer attack 
plans reached the stage of execution. One operative even estimated that 
nineteen out of the twenty operations had to be aborted.191 Similarly, less 
than half of the attacks that were planned as part of the Provisional IRA’s 
campaign in England reached the state of execution. In the other half of 
the cases, the attack was either thwarted or called off.192 Thus, the 
infiltration of the Provisional IRA was not merely an output, but also 
yielded the desired effect: the Provisional IRA became operationally 
crippled. This did not mean that they never successfully carried out an 
attack plan, but it does mean that it became increasingly difficult to 
maintain a level of violence high enough to break the will of the British. 
This not only limited the operational risk of the Provisional IRA, but also 
increased its susceptibility to options other than the armed struggle. 
7.2.5 Addressing root causes 
When looking for the root causes of the Northern Ireland conflict, it is 
tempting to turn to the factors that gave rise to the civil rights movement 
in Northern Ireland. As has been outlined in the first part of this chapter, 
Catholics were discriminated against. They were poorly housed, were 
more likely to be unemployed, and saw little improvement in their 
situation throughout the conflict. In the 1970s and 1980s Catholics were 
two and a half times more likely to be without work than Protestants.193 
Also, Catholics who were employed often held low or semi-skilled jobs 
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that brought them little social status.194 Even in 1998, the year in which the 
Good Friday Agreement was signed, Catholics owned fewer cars per 
capita than Protestants, were less educated, had higher premature 
mortality rates and suffered more often from chronic illnesses.195 But 
while the differences in living conditions were salient and the 
government’s attempts to solve the conflict by addressing socio-economic 
problems were ineffective, the extent to which these problems were root 
causes of the armed struggle waged by the Provisional IRA is 
questionable. 
Republican interviewees and memoirists rarely mention socio-economic 
deprivation as a reason to join the Provisional IRA. The repressive stance 
of the RUC and the Army appears to have played a much more important 
role in this respect. Many Provos and former Provos, including Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGuinness, later said that Bloody Sunday, the Falls 
Road curfew, Operation Demetrius and the repression of the civil rights 
marches in the late 1960s made them decide to take up arms against the 
British.196 This fairly anecdotal evidence can be backed up by quantitative 
research, which shows that increases and decreases in employment rates 
had little effect on the intensity of political violence in Northern Ireland. 
Politically charged events like Bloody Sunday, the Battle of the Bogside – 
a massive riot in Derry in August 1969 – and internment, on the other 
hand, clearly correlate with peaks in the numbers of shooting incidents.197 
Also, there was little overlap between the civil rights movement and the 
Provisional IRA. The group attracted a new following, and was not a 
vehicle for civil rights protesters looking for a new form of political action 
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to achieve their goals.198 Moreover, in their public statements, members of 
the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin stressed political repression as the main 
reason to fight. Much less attention was paid to socio-economic 
deprivation. The Republican movement did have an egalitarian economic 
agenda, especially after the more anti-imperialist course was adopted in 
the late 1970s, but socio-economic themes were eclipsed by the more 
political aspects of British imperialism. The rhetoric of Sinn Féin and the 
Provisional IRA was strongly focused on British state repression and the 
subservience of the Irish people.199 
This being the case, dissatisfaction with the way Northern Ireland was 
governed should be considered the root cause of the conflict between the 
Provisional IRA and the British government rather than the socio-
economic deprivation and discrimination of the Catholics. The attempts to 
address this root cause were aimed at the creation of a governance 
structure through which the Republicans could pursue their political 
ambitions peacefully. Therefore, it has been decided to discuss these 
efforts in the next section as the application of the counterterrorism 
principle ‘Offering non-violent alternatives’. 
7.2.6 Offering non-violent alternatives 
Both Margaret Thatcher and John Major claimed they would never talk to 
or negotiate with the Provisional IRA. In 1993, during a debate in the 
House of Commons, one MP asked Major about the possibility of talking 
to the Provisional IRA, to which the Prime Minister retorted that it 
“would turn my stomach over and that of most people in this House, and 
we will not do it”.200 In stating their unwillingness to talk, Thatcher and 
Major spoke the truth, but only in the narrow sense that neither Prime 
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Minister ever personally engaged the Provisionals in dialogue. Both, 
however, had people talking to the Provisional IRA on their behalf.201 In 
fact, at various stages during the Troubles, representatives of the British 
government were in touch with representatives of the Provisional IRA. 
Many of the contacts were kept secret, and were maintained through 
intermediairies, but on three occasions the British government and the 
Provisional IRA, or Sinn Féin, engaged in direct negotiations. 
The first direct contacts took place in 1972. Sean MacStiofáin gave a press 
conference in June 1972, at which he presented the organisation’s 
demands (self-determination for the Irish, amnesty for Republican 
prisoners and a British statement indicating the intention to withdraw 
from Northern Ireland). He then went on to invite Northern Ireland 
Secretary William Whitelaw to discuss them in one of the Republican no-
go areas. In return for the meeting, the Provisionals would respect a 
ceasefire.202 During this ceasefire, in July 1972, Provisional IRA and British 
government representatives met, albeit not in a Republican no-go area, to 
discuss possible ways to end the conflict. The Provisionals, however, 
refused to talk about anything but the withdrawal of the British from 
Northern Ireland. According to Frank Steele, an MI6 agent who was part 
of the British delegation, the Provisional IRA delegation was convinced 
that victory was within reach. This was especially clear in the way in the 
demeanour of MacStiofáin, about whom Steele remembers: “He 
proceeded to read out his demands. I mean, he behaved like the 
representative of an army that had brought the British to a standstill and 
that we British wanted out. He behaved like Montgomery at Lüneburg 
Heath, telling the German generals what they should and shouldn't do if 
they wanted peace.”203 As the British did not want to go along with the 
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demands of their interlocutors, the talks broke down before anything had 
been achieved.204 
While the failure of the first series of talks between the Provisional IRA 
and the British government can in part be attributed to the lack of 
experience of the Provisional IRA’s leadership, it is also important to take 
the strategic context into account. First, as a government centre, Stormont 
had collapsed, and the British were forced to take over the administration 
of Northern Ireland, which was subjected to so-called ‘direct rule’ from 
Westminster. The Provisional IRA perceived this as a great success. They 
calculated that British imperialism, now that it had to be present on the 
ground in Northern Ireland, would be forced to show its true face while 
managing the conflict. In the minds of the Provisionals there was little 
doubt that the repressive measures that the British would inevitably take, 
would turn the population further away from the government and would 
generate support for the idea of a unified Ireland.205 Furthermore, the 
numbers of RUC and Army personnel killed and wounded were on the 
rise, and showed that the Provisional IRA was capable of inflicting heavy 
damage on the security forces.206 Against this background the Provisional 
IRA, convinced that ‘one big push’ would be enough to force the British 
out of Northern Ireland, did not treat the talks as negotiations, but rather 
as meetings to discuss the terms of the British surrender.207  
When the second series of talks were initiated, the Provisionals’ tide had 
turned. By 1975 the Provisional IRA was badly affected by arrests that had 
taken place in the two preceding years. Army Council member Billy 
McKee assessed the situation of the Provos before the second series of 
talks, held in 1975 and early 1976, as follows: “You have to have 
operators, you have to have men with arms, and you have to have plenty 
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of money to keep it going. There was very little of any of it.”208 Their 
backs against the wall, the Army Council decided on a new ceasefire, 
which came into force in February 1975 and lasted until January 1976. 
Again the group sent a delegation to meet with representatives of the 
British governments. But again, it became clear that the positions taken by 
the two sides were incompatible. By September 1975, the British has lost 
faith in the initiative, and no more meetings were planned. The 
Provisionals made one more proposal to discuss “structures of 
disengagement” of the British from Northern Ireland, but the British 
rejected this plan out of hand.209 
It is true that the Provisional IRA was in a poor shape when these talks 
were held, but this time, too, there were factors in the strategic context 
that can explain why the Provisionals chose to stick rigidly to their far-
reaching demands. For one, they believed they could capitalise on the 
weariness and despair of the British government after the collapse of the 
Sunningdale Agreement.210 In May 1973 the Westminster parliament had 
adopted the Northern Ireland Assembly Bill. The proposed Bill had 
largely been based on a White Paper by Northern Ireland Secretary 
Merlyn Rees, and identified three main pillars for the future 
administration of Northern Ireland. First, Northern Ireland would be 
governed according to a power sharing arrangement, which guaranteed 
government representation of parties of both communities. This meant 
that, irrespective of the election results, nationalist and unionist parties 
had to form a government together.211 Second, Northern Ireland would 
get its own parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, to which the 
Westminster parliament would devolve some – not all – responsibility for 
the administration of Northern Ireland.212 Third, the Bill created room for 
the involvement of the Republic of Ireland in the governing of Northern 
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Ireland.213 The exact arrangements for this point were negotiated in 
December 1973, after the Northern Ireland Assembly had been elected 
and various political parties had agreed on a power-sharing arrangement. 
The governments of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the UK and a group of 
moderate political parties from Northern Ireland signed the Sunningdale 
Agreement, which contained provisions for a two-level Council of 
Ireland, the platform that would give the Republic of Ireland an advisory 
role in some policy areas. The Council’s first level was reserved for 
government representatives from the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland, the second level for parliamentarians.214 
Expectations were high, but the arrangements would prove to be short-
lived. The Loyalists and some Unionists felt betrayed and thought that the 
British government had sold out the interests of the Protestants in 
Northern Ireland. Their opposition to the three pillars of Northern 
Ireland’s governance structure was fierce and well-organised. Several 
loyalist political parties formed an umbrella organisation, the United 
Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC), to wage opposition against what they 
believed was a gradual transfer of Northern Ireland to the Republic of 
Ireland.215 In the 1974 elections for the Westminster parliament, the 
UUUC managed to win 51.1% of the vote and eleven of the twelve seats 
for Northern Ireland, which demonstrated that Northern Ireland’s 
governance structure lacked legitimacy.216 The death blow for Whitelaw’s 
vision, however, came in the form of a massive strike in May 1974, which 
brought Northern Ireland to a standstill. Under the leadership of the 
Ulster Workers Council (UWC), roads and ports were blocked, electricity 
supplies were cut off and factories were shut down. Violence frequently 
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erupted during the two weeks that the strike lasted.217 The British Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, saw no other option than to dissolve the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and reinstate direct rule from London.218 
The collapse of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Sunningdale 
Agreement was an important factor in the strategic assessments of the 
Provisional IRA. The group’s leadership estimated that, as the British 
were running out of options, they decide to withdraw from Northern 
Ireland altogether. It is this rationale that the Provisionals brought with 
them into the talks of 1975.219 It is also important to note that these talks 
took place in February 1975, before the British government had 
implemented the ‘normalisation’ strategy in the fight against the 
Provisional IRA. From then on the British treated terrorism as a form of 
ordinary crime, and accordingly gave the RUC the lead role in the fight 
against the Provisionals.220 With this approach, the British signalled that 
they were going to ride out the conflict, but they had not yet done so 
when they met with the Provisional IRA in 1975.221 Again, the Provos felt 
they were negotiating from a position of strength, and it took fifteen years 
of conflict change this. 
In the early 1990s the Provisional IRA engaged in a third series of talks 
with their British enemies. Contacts were maintained through MI5 official 
Michael Oatley and several concerned civilians, notably businessman 
Brendan Duddy and Father Alec Reid. The British position was the same 
as it had always been: any solution had to have the support of the 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland (the ‘consent-principle’), and 
disarmament of the Provisional IRA had to take place before negotiations 
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could start.222 Again, the conditions of decommissioning proved a 
stumbling block, but this time Gerry Adams and David Hume, leader of 
the nationalist Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) kept in touch to 
talk about a possible solution to the conflict they could propose jointly.223 
This initiative came to an end when Adams and Hume presented a 
proposal that struck Prime Minister Major as so overwhelmingly 
nationalist, that he refused to respond to it, saying: “I have no intention of 
doing that and the people of Ulster would not want me to do so”.224 
Nevertheless, the Irish and British government seized the initiative and 
agreed with the moderate political parties on the Downing Street 
Declaration, which had been negotiated without Sinn Féin. In it, Prime 
Minister Major and David Reynolds, his Irish counterpart, committed 
themselves to the points that had earlier led to the cessation of talks 
between representatives of the Provisional IRA and the British 
government. A solution to the conflict had to meet the consent-principle, 
and could be negotiated only by parties that rejected political violence.225 
The strength of the Declaration was thus that it made clear to the 
Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin that they ran the risk of being 
marginalized, and that a settlement could be reached without them. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, as we have seen above, it became increasingly 
difficult for the Provisional IRA to sustain the bombing campaign.226 The 
Provisionals suffered from arrests, and they saw many of their operations 
sabotaged by moles. Several Provisional IRA-leaders, especially Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGuinness, believed the armed struggle had run its 
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course and began looking for other ways to achieve a unified Ireland.227 
Responding to the increasing willingness of unionist as well as nationalist 
parties to reach a negotiated settlement, they persuaded the Army 
Council to announce a ceasefire, which went into force in August 1994. 
The statement in which the ceasefire was explained, contained a thinly 
disguised expression of the Army Council’s desire to join the peace 
process. A solution, so the statement held, could “only be found as a 
result of inclusive negotiations”.228 However, the demand for 
disarmament was still a problem, and the contacts between Sinn Féin and 
the British reached a dead end when Major introduced the Mitchell 
principles, named after the American Senator who drew them up. The 
Mitchell principles were essentially conditions that all political parties had 
to meet before they were allowed to join the negotiations of the solution of 
the Northern Ireland conflict. They demanded from all parties involved a 
commitment to the disarmament of paramilitary groups, and to the 
cessation of punishment beatings and other forms of political violence.229 
Frustrated by the lack of progress, the Provisional IRA broke the ceasefire 
in February 1996, when it carried out a ‘spectacular’ in the Canary Wharf 
district in London. Contrary to what many thought at the time, though, 
this was not a return to the armed struggle. Rather, it was the use of 
terrorist means to force the peace process ahead. In the statement 
explaining the resumption of violence, the Provisional IRA did not reject 
the peace process, but stressed again that a solution to the conflict 
“demands an inclusive negotiated settlement”.230 After Tony Blair 
assumed office, he, more explicitly than John Major had done, threatened 
to close a deal without the Republicans.231 At this point, and after a bitter 
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struggle against the hardliners in the movement, Gerry Adams and 
Martin McGuinness won the permission of the Army Convention to let 
Sinn Féin subject itself to the Mitchell principles. One of the trump cards 
they used to get the Provisional IRA membership on board, was a 
concession on decommissioning. The British had agreed on an 
arrangement that was made to let disarmament take place during – as 
opposed to before – the negotiations.232 The Provisional IRA restored the 
ceasefire in 1997, and Sinn Féin was involved in the negotiation of the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement, effectively the solution to the Northern 
Ireland conflict. 
Like the Sunningdale Agreement, the Good Friday Agreement contained 
arrangements for a power sharing executive, a Northern Ireland 
Assembly and the involvement of Ireland in several policy areas. Also, it 
was agreed that the RUC was to be reformed, and that paramilitary 
prisoners were to be released. For his part, the Republic of Ireland’s 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern pledged to drop the second and third article of 
Ireland’s constitution, which claimed Northern Ireland as Irish territory.233 
In keeping with the consent-principle, referenda were held in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. The Provisional IRA always held that the right to self-
determination only applied to Ireland as a whole, that is, to the Republic 
of Ireland plus Northern Ireland.234 They insisted that the consent-
principle amounted to “a Unionist veto”, as the population of Northern 
Ireland, where Protestants formed a majority, could block a proposal that 
had a majority in the whole of Ireland. But on this point, too, the 
Provisionals eventually gave in, allowing for the two referenda that 
decided on the ratification of the Good Friday Agreement. In Northern 
Ireland, the agreement won 71.1% of the vote, but the support was even 
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more overwhelming in Ireland, where 94.4% of the electorate voted in 
favour of ratification of the agreement by the Irish government.235 
After the Good Friday Agreement was implemented, there were still some 
problems with Provisional IRA violence. The Auxiliary kept carrying out 
punishment beatings and kneecappings, and the hunt for informers was 
clearly on, as evidenced by the murder of Eamon Collins and the 
attempted murder of Marty McGartland, both in 1999.236 Also, some 
militant defectors formed their own organisations in order to keep up the 
fight. The most important one was led by Army Council member Michael 
McKevitt, who went on to form the Real IRA.237 This splinter group, 
involved in terrorist attacks and punishment beatings as late as 2010, is 
now thought to have merged with several Republican vigilante groups.238 
Another reason for concern was the Provisional IRA’s relation with the 
Colombian insurgent group FARC. These ties came to light in 2001 and 
gave rise to fears that the Provisionals were developing new, heavier 
weapons, far away from the hospitable environment that Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland had become.239 It is not unreasonable 
to assume, as many did at the time, that the Provisional IRA wanted to 
maintain a degree of readiness for the resumption of the armed struggle, 
but it never came to this. In 2005 the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning, which was to monitor the progress of 
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the decommissioning process, declared that it was confident that the 
Provisional IRA had handed over all its weapons.240  
In terms of the programme theory formulated in the first chapter, we can 
conclude that effectiveness was achieved only the third time talks with 
the Provisional IRA were held. In the first two attempts, in 1972 and 1974, 
the British managed to bring about the output – peaceful engagement 
with the terrorists, and a ceasefire – but was nowhere near the desired 
effect, the pacification of the Provisional IRA. Several factors have been 
suggested to explain why attempts at a negotiated settlement were 
successful the third time around. Some authors, for example, have 
stressed the involvement of the US. In 1994, President Clinton invited 
Gerry Adams for a visit to the US, where Adams could lobby for the Irish 
cause among highly influential audiences like the National Committee on 
American Foreign Policy. This strengthened his position vis-à-vis the 
hardliners in the movement, who could now see what doors would open 
if the armed struggle was scaled down.241 The most important factor, 
however, was the strategic self-assessment of the Provisional IRA in the 
early 1990s. As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, the Provisional 
IRA was operationally stretched to its limits, which understandably fed 
the notion that the Provos had been fought to a standstill. The prevailing 
sense was that a negotiated settlement was the only way to avoid total 
defeat or an indefinite and pointless campaign. Unlike in 1972 and 1975, 
the Provisionals were aware that armed struggle was not going to get 
them anywhere. In an attempt to achieve at least some of their political 
goals, the Army Council decided to join the moderate Nationalist camp in 
the peace process. The parties in this camp, notably the SDLP, were less 
radical than the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin, but they were the only 
chance the Provisional IRA had left.242 This assessment was partially 
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informed by the British refusal to give in to the group’s violent pressure, 
which brings us to the next counterterrorism principle.  
7.2.7 Long-term commitment 
After some three years into the Troubles the British government went 
through a strategic reappraisal that was quite similar to the Provisional 
IRA’s shift from ‘big push’ to ‘long war’. When the British Army arrived 
in Northern Ireland, no one expected them to stay for more than a year, 
but by 1973, the British government had come to realise that they would 
not be able to end the conflict with a few reforms and short and decisive 
army deployment.243 With this came the acceptance that a certain level of 
violence would have to be accepted as normal. After 1975, the British 
approach to the Provisional IRA was one of containment. The objective 
was not so much to wipe out the Provisionals, but rather to limit the scale 
of their violence for a prolonged period of time. This, so the underlying 
conjecture went, would convince the Provisional IRA of the futility of the 
armed struggle.244 There may have been differences in the approaches of 
the various British governments, with Margaret Thatcher taking a 
considerably less accommodating stance than, for instance, Tony Blair, 
but they all stuck to this line, knowing that the conflict was indeed a 
‘Long War’. And more importantly, all British governments stuck to a 
series of principles, in spite of the Provisionals’ campaign to make them 
change their minds. 
First, it was clear to all involved that the conflict could not be ended by 
military means alone. Even bona fide hardliners like Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher and Northern Ireland Secretary Roy Mason, who in 
1977 boasted that he was “squeezing the IRA like a tube of toothpaste”, 
knew that concessions to the Catholic population were necessary to 
deprive the Provisional IRA of the popular resentment it needed to keep 
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its campaign going.245 Second, in the formulation of such a solution, 
British policy makers were always open to participation of the Republican 
camp, albeit under certain conditions, most importantly the cessation of 
violence. Already in 1972, William Whitelaw expressed the hope that 
someday the Provisional IRA would be involved in regular, non-violent 
politics.246 In 1974 Merlyn Rees legalised Sinn Féin in the hope that the 
Provisionals would join the Constitutional Convention, a meeting of 
Northern Irish political parties to discuss the future political structure of 
Northern Ireland.247 Third, any solution could be acceptable, as long as it 
had the support of the majority of the people in Northern Ireland. This so-
called ‘consent-principle’ was mentioned in all British government 
documents that put forth a solution to the conflict, including The Future of 
Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion from 1972, William Whitelaw’s 
1973 Green Paper Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals and the 
Downing Street Declaration from 1993.248 Fourth, the British were always 
willing to accept a role for Ireland in the administration of Northern 
Ireland, for instance by creating a body where Ireland and the UK could 
discuss administrative matters regarding Northern Ireland. The ‘Irish 
dimension’, too, was a constant feature of British proposals for the 
administration of Northern Ireland.249 
The consistency of the British position regarding the Northern Ireland 
conflict is also clear from the similarities between the Sunningdale 
Agreement of 1973 and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Both 
agreements proposed a Northern Irish parliament, a power-sharing 
arrangement, and the incorporation of the ‘Irish dimension’ in the form of 
consultative intergovernmental bodies where Ireland was represented. 
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While the two agreements differ in nuances, the similarities are such that 
Seamus Mallon, SDLP parliamentarian in the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
said the Good Friday Agreement was “Sunningdale for slow learners”, 
indicating that the Provisional IRA ended the armed struggle in 1998 for 
something they could have gotten in 1973. Some Provos, too, felt this way. 
Former Provisional IRA-member Marian Price was one of them. One-
upping Mallon, she called the Good Friday Agreement “Sunningdale for 
retards”.250 The one issue where the British did eventually compromise 
was the decommissioning of the Provisionals. During the peace process, 
Prime Minister John Major often expressed the demand that 
decommissioning should take place before Sinn Féin would be allowed 
into the multi-party talks. Martin McGuinness shot down this demand by 
saying there was “not a snowball’s chance in hell” that the Provisionals 
would disarm before an agreement would have been reached.251 As it 
turned out, they did not need to. In a last-ditch effort to convince Sinn 
Féin to participate in the peace talks, Tony Blair agreed to a parallel 
process, which meant that a commission would be installed to draw up a 
plan for decommissioning. The commission would have its meetings as 
the peace talks were going on.252 Other than that, the British made few 
significant concessions that it had not wanted to make twenty-five years 
earlier. 
The Provisional IRA was not impervious to the British intransigence. As 
we have seen in the paragraphs 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, the operational setbacks 
that the Provos suffered at the hands of the British security forces drove 
home the message that the British would not be moved. As the police and 
the army kept the Republican campaign in check and the British 
government seemed little inclined to compromise beyond what they had 
been willing to offer in 1972, the position of Adams and McGuinness, who 
believed that the Provisional IRA had better settle for what the British had 
                                                          
250 English, Armed Struggle, 317. 
251 “IRA Rejects British Demands over Handover of Weapons,” Herald Scotland, June 21, 1995, 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/ira-rejects-british-demands-over-
handover-of-weapons-1.674773. 
252 Smith, Making the Peace in Ireland, 192–193. 
The science of fighting terrorism 
292 
to offer, began to gain credibility. The Good Friday Agreement, though, 
was by no means a foregone conclusion, and Gerry Adams had to wage a 
hard political fight within the Provisional IRA to get the organisation on 
board.253 At many stages during the peace process, events could have 
taken another course. Therefore, there is no straight line from the long-
term commitment of the British to their campaign and the principles 
underlying it on the one hand, and the pacification of the Provisional IRA 
on the other. What we can say, though, is that it was one of the ‘push 
factors’ that contributed to the outcome of the Northern Ireland conflict. It 
made the leadership as well as some – though certainly not all – in the 
rank-and-file aware that there was not much point in carrying on the 
armed struggle. 
As for the programme theory formulated for ‘long-term commitment’, the 
output was unmistakably there. The British did not give in and made it 
clear to the Provisional IRA that it would not be swayed by violence. This 
was one of the factors that brought the Provisional IRA to the acceptance 
of an arrangement that fell short of its ultimate political goals. Moreover, 
the British refusal to be moved did eventually translate into a weakening 
of the Provisional IRA’s fighting spirit as evidenced by prominent 
members speaking out against a continuation of the armed struggle. Later 
on, this war weariness became visible in the General Army Convention, 
where a majority voted in favour of the peace process form the mid-90s 
on.  
One of the main themes in the introductory part of this chapter is that the 
Provisional IRA was divided over a number of issues. One of these issues 
was the effectiveness and expediency of the armed struggle. Up until 1997 
Gerry Adams met with fierce resistance against the abolishment of the 
armed struggle and the participation of Sinn Féin in the peace process. 
This means that for some in the Republican movement, the armed 
struggle still had enough élan to fight, recruit and join. 
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7.2.8 International cooperation 
Various British governments realised that Ireland needed to be part of the 
solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, but there was also an acute 
awareness that Ireland was part of the problem.254 Throughout the 
duration of the conflict, the Provisional IRA used the Republic of Ireland, 
created by their predecessors of the original Irish Republican Army, as a 
safe haven. The most important function of ‘the South’, as Ireland was 
known in Republican parlance, was as a base for weapons training.255 Free 
from the law enforcement pressure from Northern Ireland, the 
Provisionals could practise the use of firearms and mortars in the Irish 
counties adjacent to Northern Ireland, knowing they were in an area 
where many people felt considerable sympathy for the Republican 
cause.256 Occasionally, however, the Republic of Ireland was also used as 
a base of operations. There are several instances of British army patrols 
coming under fire from Provos who had positioned themselves just on the 
other side of the Irish border.257 Also, Lord Mountbatten, naval officer and 
cousin to Queen Elizabeth II, was assassinated while on a boat near the 
Irish port town of Mullaghmore.258 Third, there have been reports of 
collusion between the Provisional IRA and the Garda, the Irish police. 
According to these allegations, Garda officers provided assistance by 
allowing Provisionals to escape into Irish territory, or by providing 
information on the whereabouts of members of the British security forces 
in Northern Ireland.259 A recent report by the Smithwick Tribunal, set up 
by the Irish government to investigate the involvement of the Irish police 
(An Garda Síochana) in the deaths of two RUC-men in March 1989, 
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confirmed these suspicions. According to the Tribunal, Irish police 
officers informed the Provisional IRA that the two victims had planned a 
visit to a police station in Dundalk. The Provisional IRA then used this 
information to set up an ambush and kill both men.260 
The Irish government had little incentive to clear the border areas of 
Provisionals. Ireland was hardly affected by Provisional IRA activity, and 
was, at least in the 1970s, generally on bad terms with the UK. Mention 
has already been made of the court case which the Republic of Ireland 
filed against the UK over the treatment of Republican prisoners. Further, 
in 1982, Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) Charles Haughey refused to 
support European sanctions against Argentina, which was embroiled in 
the Falklands War against the UK.261 Relations improved after the signing 
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, in which both parties confirmed the 
consent-principle and agreed that Ireland should have an advisory role in 
the governance of Northern Ireland. But while Ireland may now have 
been more willing to put a stop to the use of its territory as a safe haven 
for the Provisional IRA, it was still unable to do so. There were few police 
and military units available for such operations. The army stationed only 
two infantry battalions in the border area, and even these were not 
available full-time. Also, cooperation with the British army, crucial to the 
disruption of cross-border Provisional IRA traffic, never materialised, and 
“joint Irish-British military operations along the Border, which might have 
done much to deny PIRA its safe havens in the Republic, were never 
conducted”.262 Consequently, the Provisional IRA never fully lost the 
Republic of Ireland as a resort for training purposes or a haven to flee to 
after an operation had been carried out. This suggests that the program 
theory regarding international cooperation cannot really be tested on the 
basis of this case. 
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7.2.9 Offering a counter narrative 
As the group’s name suggests, the Provisional IRA tried to portray its 
armed struggle as a military confrontation between the British and the 
Irish. This martial self-image as well as the group’s claim to be fighting on 
behalf of the Irish people were intended to lend an air of legitimacy to the 
armed struggle.263 The British government, though, was not blind to the 
contradiction between the way the Provisionals presented themselves and 
the civilian deaths they caused. With this tension in mind, Northern 
Ireland Secretary Merlyn Rees consciously set about undermining the 
image of the Provisionals as selfless soldiers fighting for the independence 
of the Irish people. As has been outlined in a previous section, the idea 
behind the normalisation of the British approach against the Provisional 
IRA, introduced in 1975, was that the group’s armed struggle would be 
treated as ordinary crime. This meant that the police would again become 
the lead actor, that terrorists had to be tried as much as possible through 
ordinary criminal law procedures and that the special status of 
incarcerated Provos would be revoked. An added advantage to this 
approach was that it also belied the notion that the conflict in Northern 
Ireland was a war.264 By treating the Provisional IRA as a group of 
criminals, Rees wanted British policy to send the message that the 
problem had been reduced to a scale where military intervention was not 
necessary. War suggests a high intensity confrontation between at least 
somewhat similar adversaries, whereas criminal justice is part of the day-
to-day business of a state and clearly suggests that the state is dominant, if 
not always successful.  
But logical as the British counter narrative may have sounded, it was 
contradicted by some clearly visible aspects of British counterterrorism 
policy. There was, for instance, the shoot-to-kill policy discussed in the 
section on the rule of law. Whether or not such a policy really existed, the 
impression that it did exist was enough to suggest that there was an 
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armed conflict going on. The wave of sympathy for the Provisionals who 
were killed in Gibraltar demonstrated that at least part of the public did 
not see the Provisional IRA as mindless criminals. Another contradiction 
between counter narrative and practice concerned the role of the army. 
Rees attempted to implement the normalisation strategy by putting the 
police in charge of the fight against the Provisional IRA, but there were 
regions where this was simply not possible. In rural Republican 
strongholds like South Armagh, the primacy of the RUC was largely a 
dead letter. The army led operations in those zones for the duration of the 
entire conflict.265 Similarly, the supposed normalisation was belied by the 
clear presence of the military in Belfast and Derry, where the army 
overlooked the city from watchtowers that were considerably higher than 
the flats that housed the local population.266 Finally, on one occasion, the 
Provisional IRA managed to win a direct confrontation with the British 
about the nature of the armed struggle waged by the Provisional IRA. As 
has been mentioned above, several imprisoned Provisional IRA men 
protested the withdrawal of the special status for Provisional IRA 
prisoners, and refused to be treated like ordinary criminals. In 1976, to 
avoid the association with crime, they took to wearing blankets instead of 
prison uniforms. In 1978 the ‘blanket protest’ turned into the ‘dirty 
protest’ when the prisoners stopped taking showers and started smearing 
excrement on the walls of their cells. The protests reached their climax in 
1980, when several prisoners went on hunger strike. Eleven hunger 
strikers died, but they were hailed as martyrs, and their fate generated a 
massive outpour of sympathy for the Provisionals, as well as a stream of 
new recruits.267 The leader of the hunger strikers, Bobby Sands, was even 
elected as a member of the Westminster parliament for Fermanagh and 
South Tyrone while on his deathbed.268 
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Shortly after Sands’ death, Sinn Féin started participating in elections. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, it scored around 10% of the vote in Northern 
Ireland. Towards the end of the 1990s, Sinn Féin’s share of the votes grew 
to some 17%.269 While elections were more than opinion polls about the 
Provisional IRA, these scores do show that there was a sizeable part of the 
electorate for which it is highly unlikely that they were swayed by British 
attempts at depicting the Provisionals as common criminals. This is also 
borne out by the few opinion polls that were held during the Troubles. In 
1978 46% of the respondents said they thought that the Provisional IRA 
“are basically patriots and idealists”. In 1998 31% of the Catholic 
respondents indicated to have at least some sympathy for the Provisional 
IRA, and 13% said they were against the decommissioning of the 
Provisional IRA.270 It is difficult to discern trends from Sinn Féin’s election 
results and a small number of different opinion polls, but it is clear that at 
least a part of the Catholics in Northern Ireland were not convinced by the 
British counter narrative, which therefore has to be considered ineffective, 
not because of any flaw in the principle itself, but because it was poorly 
implemented: the British counter narrative was contradicted in ways that 
deprived it of its credibility. 
7.3 Conclusion 
The first thing that is striking about the British campaign against the 
Provisional IRA (see figure 20 for an overview) is that it confirms the 
effectiveness of the counterterrorism principles that are on the ‘harder’ 
end of the spectrum. The intelligence gathering efforts were quite 
successful, as is clear from the above account of how deeply the 
Provisional IRA was infiltrated and how the various intelligence agencies 
successfully targeted the group’s internal security department. Also, its 
law enforcement and direct action resulted in operational successes. The 
shooting incidents at Loughgall and Gibraltar were legally questionable 
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and did little to win the trust of the Catholics in Northern Ireland, but 
certainly cost the Provisional IRA several valuable operatives.  
What is also important is that the British government, while it scored 
these successes, stuck to a set of minimum requirements to a negotiated 
solution to the conflict. In doing so, they managed to break the will of the 
Provisional IRA to carry on the armed struggle. Furthermore, the success 
of these instruments was not limited to the operational level. The effective 
application of these three principles was also crucial for the outcome of 
the conflict. By infiltrating the group, arresting its members and not 
giving in to any demands, the British made the Provisional IRA realise 
that the Republicans’ ability to wage the armed struggle was stretched to 
the limit, and that settling for what the British had to offer was the only 
workable option. In other words, the success of the negotiations 
depended on the success of law enforcement, direct action, intelligence 
and long-term commitment.  
British performance on the more ‘population centred’ aspects of 
counterterrorism was decidedly less effective. We have seen that the 
Provisional IRA could maintain its numerical strength in the face of a 
constant stream of arrests, that it had a sizeable support network up to the 
very end of its armed campaign, and that a significant percentage of poll 
respondents expressed sympathy for the group and approved of its role 
in Northern Irish politics. In addition, while it is true that Sinn Féin 
suffered electoral defeats after botched Provisional IRA attacks, the party 
could usually count on some 10% of the vote, and scored even higher as 
the peace process was nearing its end. These failures can be attributed to 
largely the same actors that were responsible for the successes that were 
scored against the Provisional IRA. 
The security forces frequently forfeited their legitimacy by getting 
involved in incidents that made it seem as if they were liquidating Provos 
instead of trying to bring them to justice. Attempts to convince Northern 
Irish citizens that the Provisional IRA were common criminals were 
blatantly contradicted by such shootings, and consequently yielded no 
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visible or meaningful effect. If anything, the shooting incidents that led to 
accusations of a shoot-to-kill policy showed that the Catholic population 
clearly sided with the Provisional IRA.  
Also, there was no improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the 
Catholic part of the population. As early as the late 1960s a government 
commission clearly stated that the Catholics in Northern Ireland were 
discriminated against, and that this balance had to be redressed. But little 
came of this, and by the end of the conflict, the available parameters 
showed that the plight of the Catholics had not improved significantly. 
Protestants were still better educated, were working better jobs for higher 
salaries, and had more adequate housing than Catholics. In this respect, 
too, the British efforts to address the root causes of terrorism – if that is 
what they were, which is questionable – was a failure. 
Which such variation in the effectiveness of the application of the various 
counterterrorism principles, it is not surprising that it is hard to tell 
whether the outcome of the conflict is an example of counterterrorism 
success or not. Judged purely by the outcome, the conclusion is clear: the 
British won, primarily as a result of the success of repressive means. This 
suggests that there are limits to the necessity of winning hearts and 
minds. The history of the Provisional IRA shows that counterterrorism 
can antagonise the population and still be successful in the long run. 
When applied with enough operational skill and for a prolonged period 
of time, pressure from law enforcement and intelligence agencies can 
bring about a desired end-state without having to win over the 
population. On the other hand, it can reasonably be argued that the 
application of the counterterrorism principles as described in this chapter 
sustained as well as contained the threat. The fact that the conflict went on 
for the better part of three decades can be considered a sign of failure. 
Nevertheless, fighting terrorist groups that are well-embedded in the 
population always takes time, even when root causes are adequately 
addressed and the hearts and minds of the population are won. At the 
very least, British counterterrorism against the Provisional IRA shows that 
The science of fighting terrorism 
300 
similar results can be achieved without the support of the population that 
is often considered crucial for success in counterterrorism.  
Outcome Explanation
Provisional Irish Republican Army




Lacks of restraint in the use of force by the Army and the RUC, especially in the early days of the 




Throughout the conflict, breaches of the rule of law (shoot-to-kill policy, mistreatment of 





The government of the Republic of Ireland lacked the means and the political will to put an end to 
Provisional IRA activities on Irish soil (training, arms development and storage) 
Long-term commitment Effective
The British government refused to give in to the Provisional IRA’s demands, which gave rise to a 




Attempts to alleviate the poverty, poor housing and poor health of the Catholic population were 
unsuccessful; at the same time, it is doubtful whether these were really root causes 
Law enforcement and 
direct action
Effective
The arrest and liquidation of several crack units, as well as an ongoing stream of arrests of regular 
Provos, contained the group’s capability for violent action
Offering a counter 
narrative
Ineffective
There have been attempts to depict the Provisional IRA as ordinary criminals, but, especially 
around the time of the hunger strikes in 1980, the Catholic population clearly disagreed
Offering exits Ineffective
Some Provisional IRA members were ‘turned’, and became supergrasses but most were ‘turned




After having fought the group to a standstill, the British government got the Provisional IRA to 
agree to a governance structure for Northern Ireland
Intelligence gathering Effective
The Provisional IRA was ridden with informers and infiltrators, which allowed the security forces 
to foil many of the group’s attacks
 
Figure 20. Counterterrorism principles as applied against the Provisional IRA
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Intermediate conclusion II: how to fight 
nationalist terrorism 
As in the first cluster, both cases have been examined to see which 
counterterrorism principles were applied and what effects were achieved. 
When we take the findings of this exercise back to the research question 
whether counterterrorism principles have similar effects when applied 
against similar terrorist groups or movements, it is safe to say that a 
relation between actor type and effectiveness may indeed exist. When 
comparing the outcomes of the various counterterrorism principles 
applied against ETA and the Provisional IRA, there are several similarities 
that hint at a relation between counterterrorism effectiveness and terrorist 
actor type. Moreover, there are counterterrorism principles that worked 
against both groups, so we may even be able to see the contours of a 
common approach that may work against terrorist groups that resemble 
ETA and the Provisional IRA. 
The first observation that can be made in this regard is that violations of 
the principles ‘restraint in the use of force’ and ‘rule of law’ in both cases 
had detrimental effects. Especially in the early stages of their campaigns, 
ETA and Provisional IRA were well-entrenched in local communities, 
where both groups were viewed as legitimate actors and champions of 
the nationalist cause. Consequently, many Catholics in Northern Ireland 
and many Basques perceived the poorly targeted police and army attacks 
against the terrorist groups as attacks against themselves. ETA and the 
Provisional IRA drew considerable strength from the popular outrage 
against state use of force, and from measures and legislation that would 
later be declared illegal. The performance of the state drove many people 
to actively support ETA or the Provisional IRA, a development that 
greatly contributed to the organisational clout that both groups could 
bring to bear against their perceived oppressors. In this sense the two 
groups confirm the reservations that many authors have about the use of 
force in counterterrorism.  
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Another point that shows that the two cases are similar is the outcome of 
the stream of arrests that the British and Spanish police managed to 
secure. The expertise and manpower of both terrorist groups were limited 
by raids by the security forces. ETA’s attacks became less and less 
sophisticated after the police in France started closing in on the group’s 
leadership in the French part of the Basque Country. The group was no 
longer able to carry out precisely targeted attacks, and the innocent 
victims who were killed in ill-conceived car bombings contributed further 
to the waning of the group’s already declining popularity. In the 1990s 
ETA had to resort to ordinary street violence and vandalism to further its 
political agenda, which did little to improve the group’s public image. 
The pace of arrests increased in the 2000s, and ETA’s operational 
capabilities were eroded to the point where the remaining etarras were 
hardly capable of committing any terrorist attacks at all. The numbers of 
attacks and victims went into a steep decline until the group announced 
the end of the armed struggle.  
The Provisional IRA, too, was badly affected by the arrest or liquidation 
of highly-qualified operatives. The group reached the limits of its capacity 
to inflict violence on the UK, and saw its plans to escalate their campaign 
fall to pieces after a weapons shipment from Libya was intercepted by the 
French police. Later the Army Council calculated that the Provisional IRA 
to force the British out of Northern Ireland by taking the fight to the 
British mainland, as the British government would be more sensitive to 
casualties and damage in England. The group successfully carried out 
some ‘spectaculars’ in London and Manchester, but when the cells that 
were waging this campaign were arrested, it became clear that this line of 
action was not sustainable. The group’s operational capabilities were 
further undermined by the extensive infiltration by British intelligence 
agencies. An increasing number of terrorist attacks had to be called off 
because the operational details had leaked to the British security forces, 
which brought some in the Provisional IRA to question whether the 
armed struggle was really going anywhere. This brings us to the next 
counterterrorism principle that worked out in much the same way in both 
cases. 
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Both groups cultivated the use of violence as an almost sacred duty for 
those who had the interests of the Basque or Irish people at heart. For 
many members, being a Provo or an etarra meant being part of a long line 
of selfless fighters who had been willing to put their lives on the line. For 
adherents of this tradition, prominent in both groups, it was unthinkable 
that the sacrifices of those who had been killed or arrested would turn out 
to be in vain. But even so, both groups eventually fell victim to battle 
fatigue. In the Provisional IRA as well as in ETA, some high-ranking 
members began to speak out against a continuation of the armed struggle. 
In spite of the sanctification of terrorist violence, a rational assessment of 
means and ends led in both cases to a cessation of the armed struggle. The 
Provisional IRA found it was forced to participate in negotiations and 
settled for a compromise in which it got only a watered down version of 
their desired end state in return for a complete decommissioning. ETA’s 
defeat was even more pronounced, as the group laid down its weapons 
without receiving anything in return. 
If we would have to derive a formula for countering groups like the 
Provisional IRA and ETA from these findings, it would centre on the 
following three points. First, the use of kinetic means can be operationally 
effective against terrorist groups that are well-entrenched in the 
population, but more importantly, will lead to strategic success in the 
longer run. Second, in order to turn operational success into strategic 
success, a state needs to keep the terrorist organisation under pressure for 
a long time and must not give in to any demands. Eventually, at least 
some in the terrorist group will come to the realisation that violence is 
going nowhere. Third, given the level of integration of groups like ETA 
and the Provisional IRA in the societies in which they are active, it is 
important to precisely target the use of force in order to avoid escalation 
of the conflict and an increase of the group’s popular support. 
It should be clear, though, that the two cases also diverge in several 
respects. The most important difference was that ETA, more so than the 
Provisional IRA, gradually became isolated from its support base as a 
result of state policies. The more discriminate use of force by the Spanish 
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police and the degree of autonomy granted to the Basque Country 
signalled to the Basque nationalists that armed struggle was not, or no 
longer, necessary. Also, the cooperation between France and Spain was a 
major factor in the dismantlement of ETA. The Provisional IRA posed a 
similar challenge, as it developed and stored arms in the Republic of 
Ireland, which it also used as a safe haven for their operatives. Ireland, 
however, did not have the resources or the stomach to put a stop to Provo 
activity in the border area, so the potentially fruitful cooperation between 
the UK and Ireland never took off. The counterterrorism principle 
‘international cooperation’ could well have had the desired effect had it 
been implemented adequately, which goes to show that the differences in 
the outcomes of in the cases of ETA and the Provisional IRA do not 
necessarily suggest that the two cases should be handled differently. It is 
possible that the similarity between the two cases would have gone 
beyond the approach that was outlined in the previous paragraph, had 
the ‘international cooperation’ principle been adequately applied in the 
fight against the Provisional IRA. However, as we have to limit ourselves 
to the evidence drawn from these two cases, a more elaborate 
counterterrorism profile than the one outlined above would have to be 
based on speculation. 
 
 







8 Misreading the enemy: successful repression 
and flawed prevention in ‘the broad approach’ 
against jihadist terrorism in the Netherlands 
Like many European countries, the Netherlands woke up to the reality of 
jihadist terrorism after the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid bombings.1 A 
whole string of countermeasures was introduced, ranging from special 
antiterrorism legislation, to the founding of a national coordinator for 
counterterrorism, and from the widening of police powers to the creation 
of the CT-Infobox, a database where government actors could share and 
access information about possible terrorists on Dutch soil. The sense of 
urgency was heightened further by the first fatal terrorist attack on Dutch 
soil since 27 May 1990, when a Provisional IRA unit mistakenly killed two 
Australian tourists in the southern town of Roermond.2 On 2 November 
2004, incidentally the day after the first National Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, NCTb) had 
assumed office, Mohammed Bouyeri killed controversial columnist and 
film maker Theo van Gogh. Several months earlier Van Gogh, known for 
his fierce criticism of Islam, had released Submission, a movie which 
criticised the way women are treated in Islamic communities around the 
world.3 On this project Van Gogh had cooperated with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a 
Somali-born politician, former Muslim and, like Van Gogh, a well-known 
Islam-critic. Hirsi Ali’s cooperation with Van Gogh was too much to bear 
for Bouyeri. He shot Van Gogh in broad daylight and then slit the film 
maker’s throat with a large knife.4 The impact of the incident was 
enormous: the Dutch public was deeply shocked by the brutality of the 
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murder, tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims rode high, and 
counterterrorism was catapulted to the top of the political agenda.5 
While Bouyeri, as far as is currently known, had little help in the planning 
and execution of the Van Gogh murder, he was not alone in wanting to 
replace the Dutch social and political order with one that was more in line 
with the fundamentalist reading of the Islamic scriptures. Bouyeri was a 
member of the so-called Hofstad Group, a jihadist cell made up of Muslim 
youths who got together to conspire against the society in which they 
grew up. Although the Van Gogh murder is to date the only jihadist 
terrorist attack in the Netherlands to reach the execution phase, several 
Hofstad Group members were dabbling with guns and explosives, and a 
judge later ruled that the group was indeed a terrorist organisation.6 Also, 
the Hofstad Group was placed on an official EU list of terrorist 
organisations.7 Together with a cell around high-school drop-out Samir 
Azzouz, the Hofstad Group was the most active jihadist cell in the 
Netherlands, but there were more. The Dutch secret service AIVD 
estimated that there were some fifteen similar cells, and stated in 2004 that 
it was following 150 suspected terrorists “day and night”.8 
Although the approach was not codified until February 2011, the guiding 
principle of Dutch counterterrorism has always been that it should be 
comprehensive. This meant that, under the so-called ‘broad approach’, 
counterterrorism had to cover all stages of the process that an individual 
has to go through before s/he commits a terrorist attack. It was, put 
                                                          
5 RTL Nieuws, “Golf van Aanslagen Sinds Dood Van Gogh,” accessed October 19, 2010, 
http://www.rtl.nl/(/actueel/rtlnieuws/)/components/actueel/rtlnieuws/2004/11_novem
ber/14/binnenland/1114_golf_van_aanslagen_1700.xml. 
6 A. Vermaat, “Hoe Hofstadgroep Toch Terroristisch Bleek,” Trouw, December 20, 2010, 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/archief/article/detail/1800797/2010/12/20/H
oe-Hofstadgroep-toch-terroristisch-bleek.dhtml. 
7 C. van Zanten, “Hofstadgroep Op Terreurlijst Europese Unie,” Elsevier, December 28, 2006, 
http://www.elsevier.nl/Europese-Unie/nieuws/2006/12/Hofstadgroep-op-terreurlijst-
Europese-Unie-ELSEVIER106174W/. 
8 “AIVD Volgt 150 Moslims Dag En Nacht,” Volkskrant, May 15, 2004, 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/705877/2004/05/15/AI
VD-volgt-150-moslims-dag-en-nacht.dhtml. 
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differently, not enough to focus on terrorist networks and their violent 
plans. The formation of radical ideas and the recruitment by jihadist cells 
had to be countered as well.9 In spite of this wide range of measures to 
counter the terrorist threat, there is a certain reluctance on the part of the 
Dutch government to talk about effectiveness, about the way in which all 
these measures impacted on the jihadist movement in the Netherlands. A 
report of a government-sanctioned evaluation of Dutch counterterrorism 
policy claims that “in this research, too, it has not been possible to 
measure the effectiveness – in the broad sense of achieving goals – of 
counterterrorism measures”.10 A similar unwillingness can be observed 
with regard to the Action Plan Polarisation and Radicalisation, a plan 
intended to keep at-risk target groups from becoming radicals or 
terrorists. The plan was evaluated in 2012, but the final report warned the 
reader that the underlying research “was not aimed at the effectiveness of 
the Action Plan Polarisation and Radicalisation”.11 
This being the case, this chapter is, as far as is known to the current 
author, the first serious attempt at an assessment of the effectiveness of 
Dutch post-9/11 counterterrorism. The arguments for the unfeasibility of 
measuring counterterrorism effectiveness have been refuted in the first 
chapter, and the case of the Netherlands has nothing that should make us 
renege on the critique of the counterterrorism literature on which this 
research project is based. It will become clear below that, on the basis of 
the publicly available information, one can make assessments about what 
worked and what did not. With the qualification that not many of the 
counterterrorism principles have been applied, the conclusion is that the 
picture is mixed. 
                                                          
9 P.H.A.M. Abels, “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland: Nut En Noodzaak van Een ‘All-
Source Threat Assessment’ Bij Terrorismebestrijding,” ed. E.R. Muller and R. de Wijk 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2008), 535. 
10 Antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland in Het Eerste Decennium van de 21e Eeuw: Over 
Totstandkoming, Toepassing, Beoordeling En Aanpassing van Antiterrorismemaatregelen in 
Nederland 2001 – 2010 (Den Haag: Rijksoverheid, 2011), 109. 
11 V.R. van Guldener and H.P. Potman, Vijf Jaar Lokale Projecten Polarisatie En Radicalisering: 
Resultaatinventarisatie over de Periode 2007-2011 (Arnhem: KplusV, 2012), 21. 
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8.1 Background 
The jihadist terrorist threat in the Netherlands emerged at a time when 
the country’s political climate was tense. In 2002 Pim Fortuyn, the 
flamboyant leader of the eponymous List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, 
LPF) had burst onto the political scene with an agenda that centred on 
criticism of the multicultural society, which he claimed was a failure. 
Following the lead of the LPF, other political parties, too, became more 
critical of the integration and immigration policies of previous decades. In 
the 1960s so-called ‘guest workers’ were brought in, initially from 
southern Europe, but later primarily from Morocco and Turkey, to fill 
labour shortages. The idea was that they would leave again, but many 
stayed in the Netherlands, forcing the government to adopt a policy on 
how to absorb them in Dutch society. Initially Dutch governments 
stressed the immigrants’ right to keep their own cultural identity12, but 
this began to change by the end of the 1990s, when opinion makers and 
political parties drew attention to the high unemployment rates among 
immigrants and their descendants, and to the disproportionally large 
share of crimes accounted for by second and third generation 
immigrants.13 As this debate was intensifying, several high-profile 
incidents, such as a 1999 school shooting that was the result of a long-
standing feud between two Turkish families, turned parts of the Dutch 
electorate against the multicultural society.14 The reservations among the 
public about Muslim communities in the Netherlands were seemingly 
confirmed by the 9/11 attacks, which according to some observers fed the 
notion that there was a link between Islam and violence.15 
                                                          
12 Q. Eijkman, D. Lettinga, and G. Verbossen, Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: 
Netherlands Background Report (Open Society Foundation and Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
2012), 6. 
13 One particularly influential essay was P. Scheffer, “Het Multiculturele Drama,” NRC 
Handelsblad, January 29, 2000, http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html. 
14 J. van den Dungen and C. Janssen, “Schutter Veghel Wilde Eer Wreken,” Telegraaf, 
December 9, 1999, 
http://krant.telegraaf.nl/krant/archief/19991209/teksten/bin.schutter.html. 
15 E. Bleich, “State Responses to ‘Muslim’ Violence: A Comparison of Six West European 
Countries,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, no. 3 (2009): 367. 
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The debate about how to deal with the problems among immigrant 
communities became heated, especially after Fortuyn had been murdered. 
According to one strand in the debate, the high crime rates and the poor 
socio-economic performance of Muslim communities were directly linked 
to the immigrants’ culture. In essence, the critics held, first, that the cause 
of the problems was an unwillingness of the immigrant communities to 
adapt to life in the Netherlands and, second, that the Islamic belief system 
kept Dutch Muslims from doing so. Prominent commentators and 
politicians like Theo van Gogh, Pim Fortuyn, Frits Bolkestein, Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali and Afshin Ellian argued that Dutch Muslims stuck to values that 
were incompatible with western democracy. They contrasted what they 
believed to be the cornerstones of Dutch society – religious tolerance, 
freedom of speech, the separation of church and state – to the religious 
bigotry, discrimination of women and hostility towards homosexuality 
that they felt were typical of Muslim communities.16 Pim Fortuyn even 
went so far as to call Islam “a retarded culture”, and claimed that he 
would, if he could find an adequate legal arrangement, make sure that not 
a single Muslim would ever be allowed to move to the Netherlands.17 The 
view that high crime and unemployment rates were the result of the 
irreconcilable differences between Islam and western democracy, 
although far from uncontested, gained the upper hand, and became the 
working hypothesis of the administrations of Prime Minister Jan-Peter 
Balkenende. In Dutch policy towards immigrants from 2002 on, 
integration in Dutch society was more important than the immigrants’ 
                                                          
16 A. Ellian, “Politieke Islam Is Vijand van Het Westen,” NRC Handelsblad, April 27, 2002, 
http://vorige.nrc.nl/opinie/article1555559.ece; Th. van Gogh, “Gebrek Aan Zelfrespect,” 
NRC Handelsblad, June 15, 2001, http://vorige.nrc.nl/krant/article1536485.ece; F. Bolkestein 
and M. Arkoun, Islam En Democratie: Een Ontmoeting (Amsterdam: Contact, 1994); F. 
Bolkestein, “Het Debat Vordert, Al Zijn de Problemen Niet Opgelost,” Volkskrant, August 31, 
2006, 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/archief/article/detail/789485/2006/08/3
1/Het-debat-vordert-al-zijn-de-problemen-niet-opgelost.dhtml; A. Hirsi Ali, “PvdA 
Onderschat Het Lijden van Moslimvrouwen,” NRC Handelsblad, October 4, 2002, 
http://vorige.nrc.nl/opinie/article1567159.ece. 
17 F. Poorthuis and H. Wansink, “Pim Fortuyn Op Herhaling: ‘De Islam Is Een Achterlijke 
Cultuur,’” Volkskrant, May 5, 2012, 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/611698/2012/05/05/Pi
m-Fortuyn-op-herhaling-De-islam-is-een-achterlijke-cultuur.dhtml. 
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right to maintain the culture from their countries of origin.18 This became 
clear in suggestions from Minister for Integration and Immigration Rita 
Verdonk, who wanted to force immigrants and their children and 
grandchildren to only speak Dutch when out in public. She also proposed 
a ban on the burqa, the traditional Islamic garment for women that covers 
their entire bodies.19 
A very small group of second and third generation immigrants, mostly 
youths, perceived the hardening of the debate and the position of the 
Dutch government as an attack on their culture and religion and linked 
them to events in very different parts of the world. They were outraged 
by the behaviour of western troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, by the 
military campaign in Chechnya and by western support for secular and 
dictatorial regimes in the Middle East.20 They connected these dots with 
the unemployment and political climate they experienced in the 
Netherlands, and came to the conclusion that a global war against Islam 
was being waged, and that the Netherlands was one of the frontlines. The 
notion of a worldwide campaign against Islam led them to see the world 
as a confrontation between Good and Evil. There was Islam on the one 
hand and the unbelievers on the other.21 In their view, it was the duty of 
every Muslim to take up arms in a holy war to protect the ummah, the 
worldwide Islamic community.22 
The most important Dutch jihadist cell to join the giant fight against the 
unbelievers was the Hofstad Group. This group, variously located in 
Amsterdam, The Hague and Schiedam, was the most dangerous cell of 
                                                          
18 “Werken Aan Vertrouwen, Een Kwestie van Aanpakken: Strategisch Akkoord Voor 
Kabinet CDA, LPF, VVD,” July 3, 2002, 13–14. 
19 F.J. Buijs, “Muslims in the Netherlands: Social and Political Developments after 9/11,” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, no. 3 (2009): 428. 
20 De Gewelddadige Jihad in Nederland: Actuele Trends in de Islamistisch Terroristische Dreiging 
(The Hague: AIVD, 2006), 33–34; Y. Kaddouri, Lach Met de Duivel: Autobiografie van Een “Rotte 
Appel”- Marokkaan (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 2011), 77. 
21 H. Moors et al., Polarisatie En Radicalisering in Nederland: Een Verkenning van de Stand van 
Zaken in 2009 (Tilburg: IVA Beleidsonderzoek en Advies, 2009), 63–64. 
22 J. Bartlett, J. Birdwell, and M. King, The Edge of Violence (London: Demos, 2010), 91. 
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the fifteen to twenty that were active at the height of the jihadist 
movement’s activity. Unlike many other cells, they had several more or 
less concrete attack plans. Other cells functioned in a similar manner, but 
failed to get as close to the execution of a terrorist attack as the Hofstad 
Group. Also, Mohammed Bouyeri was a member of the Hofstad Group. 
The involvement of other group members in the planning of the attack 
has never been established, but Bouyeri’s attack undoubtedly added to 
the group’s notoriety. But although the Hofstad Group could credibly 
claim the status of primus inter pares, there were other active jihadist cells 
in the Netherlands. It should be noted that the remainder of this chapter 
addresses the movement as a whole, not only the Hofstad Group. 
8.2 The jihadist movement in the Netherlands 
8.2.1 Ideology 
Islamic terrorist groups are often accused of using religion only as 
window-dressing.23 The belief that underlies such claims is that the 
terrorists fail to understand Islam, or even consciously misinterpret it in 
order to lend legitimacy to their violent actions. At first glance the limited 
religious and theological sophistication of the thinking that went on in the 
Dutch jihadist movement seems to corroborate the case of those who 
downplay the importance of religion as a motivating factor for terrorists. 
In fact, it can even be argued that the movement’s worldview was not so 
much a coherent ideology, but rather a rage against the social order and a 
justification for violent action couched in religious terms. This simplicity 
of the movement’s worldview can be partly explained by the way the 
movement members developed these ideas. They undertook 
opportunistic internet searches for Quran quotes that justify the use of 
violence, and often took them out of context. They mixed those with ideas 
they took from discussions with their peers, who rarely knew much about 
                                                          
23 C. Hellmich, “Al-Qaeda—terrorists, Hypocrites, Fundamentalists? The View from within,” 
Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2005): 40. For an example, see The Role of Religion and Belief in 
the Fight against Terrorism (Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
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Islam, and modern-day radical preachers.24 The AIVD captured the 
haphazard nature of the resultant ideologies by labelling them ‘cut-and-
paste Islam’.25 
This does not, however, mean that their dedication to their version of 
Islam was any less deep or sincere, and some of the sources of ideological 
and religious inspiration indeed lent credence to their claim that they 
were waging jihad. Much like their counterparts in other European 
countries, many Dutch jihadists claimed allegiance to a series of salafist 
extremist ideologues, most prominently Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, 
Muhammed Ibn Wahhab, the most prominent spokesmen of the takfiri 
interpretation of salafism that encourages violence against unbelievers. 
More recent figures that were frequently quoted, include the British 
controversial preachers Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza (see the chapter on 
jihadist terrorism in the UK), as well as Osama bin Laden and his 
ideological mentor Abdullah Azzam.26 The influence of these men is clear 
in, for instance, the writings of Mohammed Bouyeri, who frequently used 
the slogan ‘jihad by the rifle alone’, first coined by Abdullah Azzam.27 
What the Dutch jihadist movement took from these ideologues was, first, 
a vehement rejection of any institutions that were man-made, such as 
courts and parliaments. Dutch jihadists believed that those who created, 
maintained and used these institutions, put their own views on how to 
run a society above those of the Quran. When questioned about his beliefs 
during the trial that led to his conviction as a terrorist, Dutch jihadist 
Samir Azzouz spoke with disgust about “[t]he fact that people think they 
have the right to make laws: ‘I, man, know better than Allah.’ ”28 Anyone 
                                                          
24 M. Sageman, “Hofstad Case and ‘Blob’ Theory,” in Theoretical Frames on Pathways to Violent 
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25 Jaarverslag 2005 (The Hague: AIVD, 2006), 27. 
26 C.J. de Poot and A. Sonnenschein, Jihadistisch Terrorisme in Nederland: Een Beschrijving Op 
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27 Bartlett, Birdwell, and King, The Edge of Violence, 87. 
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involved in such an institution was an enemy of Islam, and deserved to be 
killed.29 The second main tenet that Dutch jihadists derived from their 
readings of their ideological predecessors was their claim to the right to 
declare other Muslims apostates. Once it could be argued that a Muslim 
had strayed from Islam, jihadists had the right to kill him and take his 
possessions.30 In other words, any Muslim who was active in a man-made 
institution or who was perceived to have slandered Islam, was a target. 
The views espoused by the Dutch jihadist movement were very action-
oriented, meaning that much of the movement’s thinking concerned 
considerations about the legitimacy of violent actions. For instance, 
Hofstad Group member Jason Walters was at some point involved in a 
debate about whether robbing a bank to finance jihad was halal, i.e. in 
accordance with Islamic scripture.31 Similarly, many discussions were 
held about whether or not jihadists were allowed to carry out attacks in 
their home countries. Some held that such a campaign would violate the 
Islamic duty to always respect one’s host, whereas others, like the 
members of the Hofstad Group, argued that the Dutch government and 
people, as they had voted the government into office, had become a party 
in the war against Islam. Therefore, they were legitimate targets. 
While the ‘rules of engagement’ were thus widely debated, the movement 
had considerably less to say about the new social order that would be 
introduced after the overthrow of the old one. There were no clear ideas 
about what the caliphate, the supposed ultimate goal of the struggle that 
tied the members of the movement together, would entail.32 This lack of 
vision and the shallowness of the ‘cut-and-paste Islam’ make it tempting 
to dismiss the ideology of the Dutch jihadist movement as a mere veneer 
to hide destructive urges. This, however, would be underestimating the 
                                                          
29 R. Peters, De Ideologische En Religieuze Ontwikkeling van Mohammed B., 2005, 3–4. 
30 E. Bakker, “Islamism, Radicalisation and Jihadism in the Netherlands: Main Developments 
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importance of ideology in other respects. The role of religious ideas was 
not so much to commit members to an ultimate goal, but rather to create a 
common identity. 
Movement participants derived a sense of heroism from their 
identification with radical Islamism and the creed of Al Qaeda, which 
instilled in them the idea that they were all part of a larger movement. In 
the words of Yehya Kaddouri, the first to be convicted under Dutch post-
9/11 counterterrorism laws: “My new identity was very special, that’s 
how I felt it. I was part of something big. A big community that would 
rise.”33 The use of religiously-sanctioned violence further added to 
Kaddouri’s self-esteem: “The idea that I could make a bomb gave me an 
enormous sense of power. Power over the lives of lots of people, over 
whether or not to leave a building up, over whether or not to influence 
politics.”34 In choosing radical Islamism, movement members took 
advantage of the notoriety of these ideas after the 9/11 attacks. As a result 
of their association with Al Qaeda, they were feared by the society they 
wanted to rebel against.35 The movement’s religious ideas and the status 
that members derived from their dabbling in the jihadist creed thus 
offered a direction and meaning to frustrated immigrant youths who were 
looking for empowerment, a way to express their rage, and a group to 
belong to. 
8.2.2 Organisational structure and culture 
The jihadist movement in the Netherlands underwent rapid changes in 
the period 2001-2003. At the time of the 9/11 attacks most jihadists in the 
Netherlands were part of larger, transnational networks and were 
scouting Muslim communities for potential recruits for jihad in the Arab 
world.36 That the Netherlands was a logistical base rather than a 
                                                          
33 “Mijn nieuwe identiteit was zeer bijzonder, zo voelde het. Ik was onderdeel van iets 
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34 Ibid., 41. 
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3, no. 3 (2010): 18. 
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battlefield was clear from the activities of two cells that were dismantled 
in Rotterdam shortly after 9/11. In both cases the cell members were not 
planning attacks in the Netherlands, but were involved in financing and 
making travel arrangements for European jihadists who want to go to 
Afghanistan.37  
But the dominance of recruiters on the Dutch jihadist scene came to an 
end around 2003. Gradually the jihadist movement in the Netherlands 
came to be dominated by young men who rallied around the ideas 
described in the previous paragraph and formed autonomous cells, that 
is, cells that had little to no contact with transnational networks. There 
were some international contacts, especially by the Hofstad Group, which 
led some to believe that the Dutch jihadist movement was plugged into a 
pan-European jihadist network. First, some members of the Hofstad 
Group travelled to Barcelona for a meeting with one of the perpetrators of 
the bombing in Casablanca in 2002. This contact, however, was never 
resumed afterwards.38 Another indicator of the supposed international 
nature of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands was the training that 
some members of the Hofstad Group underwent in a training camp in 
Pakistan. Jason Walters, one of the movement members who went there, 
later boasted that he had learned how to fire a gun while doing a 
somersault and how to dissemble a Kalashnikov while blindfolded.39 It 
should be noted, though, that he went there only twice, and once he was 
there for only ten days before he noticed he was being followed. As he did 
not want to expose his contacts in Pakistan, he felt forced to go back to the 
Netherlands.40 By and large, the movement was clearly nationally 
embedded. Instead of seeking access to international jihadist networks, 
the new generation of Islamist radicals operated on their own accord. In 
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this, they were truly ‘home grown’: they consisted for a large part of 
Dutch citizens, reacted to perceived ills in Dutch society and, as we have 
seen above, created their own belief system. The recruiters, who often 
acted as religious mentors and strove to exploit the recruit’s anger for 
jihad in faraway places like Afghanistan, thus lost their control over the 
direction taken by Dutch jihadists. As a result of several post-9/11 arrests 
and expulsions, they even disappeared from the Dutch jihadist scene 
altogether.41 
The total membership of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands was 
estimated at some 150 to 200, divided over fifteen to twenty networks. 
The estimates from the period 2004-2005 have been consistent, but it is 
true that the size of the movement is difficult to gauge, given the loose 
structure of the movement. Indeed, the most prominent characteristic of 
jihadist movements all over Western Europe is a lack of a clear, formal 
organisational structure. In this respect it is interesting to note that none 
of the cells in the Dutch jihadist movement ever adopted a name for itself. 
The most famous cell is the Hofstad Group, but that cell’s name was a 
label that the AIVD came up with, and was never used by the group 
members themselves.42 In the same vein, members did not have official 
titles or roles, and drifted into and out of the movement, so it was not 
always easy to tell who was a member, and who was in charge of what.43 
In the absence of any formalised procedures, people got in touch on an ad 
hoc basis, and contacts were taken up as easily as they were abandoned 
later on.44 
It was, nevertheless, possible for movement members to carve out a role 
for themselves. The various cells did have cores with more or less 
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accepted roles for certain individuals. Redouan al Issa, perhaps more 
widely known as Abu Khaled, for instance, was a Syrian who acted as a 
religious guide and mentor to members of the Hofstad Group.45 Similarly, 
Mohammed Bouyeri had a reputation as a propagandist and writer, 
which is part of the explanation of the AIVD’s failure to acknowledge the 
possibility that he might one day use violence himself. Under his nom de 
guerre Abu Zubair, he published inflammatory calls for jihad and ranted 
against Dutch society, but his true ambition was to gain the status of a real 
fighter, as opposed to someone who merely contributed words.46  
In vesting their roles as ideological or operational leaders within the 
movement, its members had various means through which they could 
achieve such status. Knowledge of Arab and Islamic theology and 
especially practical experience with jihad were definitely assets for 
aspiring movement leaders. Also, close ties to other movement leaders 
helped movement members in the assumption of leading roles.47 But 
powerful and influential as these figures might be, their authority never 
translated into a formal position.  
The fluid nature of the movement was also a reflected in the way its 
members were recruited. There was no clear break in a movement 
member’s life between the periods before and after he or she joined the 
movement. Instead, participation in the jihadist movement was often an 
extension of one’s regular social life. It often grew out of normal social 
contacts, which meant that cells were made up of people who were 
friends or frequented the same mosques.48 One member would approach 
a friend or an acquaintance to see whether the potential new recruit 
would be open to radical interpretations of Islam. The new recruit would 
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then be invited to one of the movement’s many meetings, often held in 
one member’s living room. At such gatherings, the participants would 
initially discuss religious ideas. Later, when it was clear that the recruit 
was susceptible to more radical views, they would watch jihadist 
propaganda material, such as operational instruction videos or footage of 
the suffering of Muslims in conflicts in Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The recruitment process of the Dutch jihadist movement and the gradual 
hardening of the views that were being imposed on new recruits, were 
richly illustrated by two female peripheral members of the Hofstad Group 
who decided to make compromising statements about the Hofstad Group 
to the police. They told the police how Nouredine el-Fathni, a leading 
member of the Hofstad Group, first browbeat them for hours on end to 
turn them against apostates, including the two young women’s parents, 
and against unbelievers like Theo van Gogh. After they had been won 
over, the two were made to watch footage of beheadings. Also, they were 
forced to accept the necessity of violent action. In online chat sessions 
with Jason Walters, the latter pressed the two women not to care about 
their victims: “You can shed their blood. Their blood is halal. In other 
words, killing is permitted.”49 In some cases the new recruit stuck around. 
In other cases he or she dropped out. This example concerns recruitment 
by face-to-face contact, but equally gradual recruitment processes took 
place online. After a certain bond of trust was created in online chat 
sessions in open forums, new participants would be invited to face-to-face 
meetings.50 Here too, some were drawn into the movement, whereas 
others chose to stay away. 
The informal nature of the recruitment process has been characteristic of 
the jihadist movement ever since the emergence of the autonomous cells 
in 2002/2003. The Hofstad Group attracted new members this way, as 
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did, some ten years later, the groups of Dutch jihadists who planned to 
travel to Syria to join jihadist groups in the fight against the ‘godless’ 
government forces of dictator Bashar al-Assad. In March 2013, it turned 
out that some hundred Dutch jihadists were fighting in the Syrian civil 
war.51 Many of them got to know each other in the peripheries of 
mainstream mosques, and were drawn to each other by their radical 
views. The importance of digital media appears to have increased, but the 
aspiring Syria-veterans, much like the Hofstad Group, meet in living 
rooms and garages to discuss religious ideas and watch footage from 
various conflicts in the Middle East.52 Also, the new generation appears to 
draw part of its inspiration from charismatic, leading figures who act as 
recruiters and convince radical youths of the righteousness of jihad in 
Syria.53 
But while the Dutch jihadist movement was and is an informal network 
with a low degree of organisation, there were certainly mechanisms that 
the movement applied to tie its members to the cause. First, peer influence 
easily turned into peer pressure. Movement members did not want to be 
found wanting as a faithful Muslim, much less did they want to be 
branded an apostate. Jason Walters, for instance, claimed that his 
behaviour in the Hofstad Group stemmed from a desire to impress his 
fellow movement members by showing off his radical ideas and his 
eagerness to use violence.54 But this peer pressure could take more 
extreme forms as well. There have been instances of force and 
intimidation of cell members to get them to do the bidding of the group. 
Several peripheral members of the Hofstad Group, for example, claimed 
that they feared retaliation, according to one of them in the form of “a 
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bullet in the head”, that would have befallen them had they refused to 
cooperate.55 The second way in which the movement tried to cement the 
ties between its members, was through intra-group marriages. The Dutch 
jihadist movement had a remarkable degree of female participation when 
compared to similar movements in other European countries, which 
made this strategy all the more feasible.56 Given the ideologically inspired 
revulsion with Dutch government institutions, these were not marriages 
that were recognised under Dutch law, but they were considered valid 
and binding by movement members. 
A third element that deserves mentioning is the conspiratorial nature of 
many of the movement’s dealings, which contributed to the formation of 
a collective identity and the identification of a common enemy. Cell 
members talked to each other on a need-to-know basis, used public 
computers when possible in order to avoid leaving digital evidence that 
could be traced back to them, and, when communicating online, used 
encrypted channels. They also had to observe a necessary level of 
vigilance in their use of mobile phones. Many used pre-paid phones, 
which were often exchanged and replaced, again to keep the police and 
the AIVD from linking phone calls to movement members.57 The 
advantage of this way of working, except that it enhanced the 
movement’s operational security, was that it fed the notion that 
movement members were brothers in arms engaged in a fight against a 
common enemy.58 
The activities of the cells in the Dutch jihadist movement fell into four 
main categories. First, there was religious training and indoctrination, 
which, as we have seen above, took place in online forums and in the 
homes of movement members. Then there were the activities that were 
intended to keep the movement afloat. This took many forms, including 
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forging passports for jihad travel or committing robberies and engaging 
in illicit trade to finance the movement’s operations. Another important 
task was recruitment, something in which many women in the movement 
were involved. But the most important task of all, was the actual jihad, the 
carrying violent actions that were supposed to lead to the overthrow of 
the Dutch social order. 
8.2.3 Modus operandi 
Given the limited number of attacks that were actually carried out and 
given the decentralised nature of the jihadist movement, it is difficult to 
discern one modus operandi that applies to the entire movement. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some categories of attacks on the 
basis of an analysis of the known attack plans.  
First, there were plans for indiscriminate attacks against organisations 
that were perceived to play an important role in the fight against Islam. 
Although he was initially acquitted for this charge, Samir Azzouz, high 
school drop-out, friend of Mohammed Bouyeri and prominent member of 
the jihadist movement, appeared to have considered attacks on the 
buildings of the AIVD and the Ministry of Defence. He had maps of the 
surrounding areas of both buildings lying around in his apartment and 
was once spotted measuring distances around the AIVD head office in 
Leidschendam.59 Moreover, at some point Azzouz he tried to recruit a 
Belgian jihadist for a suicide bombing on the premises of the secret 
service.60 Another example of an attack in this category was the plan that 
Yehya Kaddouri had in mind. He was collecting materials for a bomb that 
he was planning to use in an attack on the Israeli embassy in The Hague. 
The strategic rationale behind actions like these may not have been very 
clear, even to the perpetrators themselves. In a TV-interview Kaddouri 
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later said that his intention was to spark “some kind of revolution”, in 
which Muslims would “rebel against the rest”.61 
The second category was the targeted assassination of prominent public 
figures who were thought to slander Islam. The most important case was 
the murder of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri. As has been 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Bouyeri shot and murdered 
Van Gogh on the morning of 2 November 2004.62 On Van Gogh’s body, he 
left a letter to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, with whom Van Gogh had cooperated on 
the controversial film Submission. In this letter, strangely devoid of 
references to Theo van Gogh, Bouyeri accused Hirsi Ali of waging a 
crusade against Islam.63 Although Bouyeri did not explicitly threaten 
Hirsi Ali in his letter, it was widely believed that the VVD-politician 
might well be the Hofstad Group’s next victim.64 Another attack plan 
against public figures was drawn up by Samir Azzouz. He kept a list of 
prominent Dutch politicians from all over the political spectrum, and 
appears to have wanted to kill them in an attack in which he planned to 
use firearms. Shortly after arresting Azzouz, the police found guns and 
ammunition in his house, and there was evidence that Soumaya Sahla, a 
member of the Hofstad Group, tried to get the addresses of several well-
known politicians through her sister, who worked at a pharmacist where 
some of the intended victims were customers.65 Another planned attack, 
although the details are still sketchy, was to be carried out in Portugal, 
where three members of the Hofstad Group were arrested in 2004, shortly 
before the European Championship football. The AIVD suspected that the 
group was planning an attack on the Portuguese Prime Minister Manuel 
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Barosso and tipped off the Portuguese police. The three were 
subsequently arrested and deported back to the Netherlands. Portuguese 
authorities later claimed that some twenty jihadists were planning an 
attack against Barroso, but they did not have enough evidence to charge 
the Hofstad Group members with terrorist or other offences.66 
Third, there have been some plans to carry out attacks on infrastructure. 
In these cases the targets were not so much chosen because of a symbolic 
value or a clear association with a perceived enemy of Islam, but rather 
because of the social disruption the attacks would cause. Samir Azzouz 
appears to have considered attacks against such targets as Schiphol 
Airport and the nuclear reactor near the southern town of Borssele.67 As 
goes for many of Azzouz’s plans, however, it is hard to tell whether he 
was really serious, or whether it was more a matter of mere posturing to 
impress other movement members, and possibly himself. In any case, the 
court ruled, after an initial acquittal, that Azzouz had terrorist intentions 
and sentenced him to four years in prison.68 
What is striking about the planned attacks in all three categories is that 
they display a strong focus on domestic politics, which is quite typical for 
the Dutch jihadist movement.69 Almost all jihadist terrorist attacks in 
Europe in the period 2004-2011 were carried out in attempts to punish 
national governments for military presence in Iraq or Afghanistan or to 
protest against slanderous depictions of Mohammed, most prominently 
the drawings of the Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard.70 Among Dutch 
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jihadists, such internationalist motives appeared to have played less of a 
role in the selection of targets. Exceptions were the planned attack on 
Barroso and the scheme hatched by Kaddouri. The latter considered an 
attack on the Israeli embassy because he wanted to punish Israel for the 
way they treated the Palestinians.71 Barroso is believed to have been a 
target because of his support for the western military presence in Iraq.72 
8.3 Counterterrorism principles and jihadist terrorism in 
the Netherlands 
8.3.1 Law enforcement and direct action 
After the Van Gogh murder the police quickly moved in on the Hofstad 
Group. As the AIVD knew the Hofstad Group well (see also the section 
on gathering intelligence), identifying and arresting its members was 
relatively easy. The only operational obstacle the police encountered, was 
the fight put up by Jason Walters and Ismail Akhnikh. About a week after 
the Van Gogh murder, a police unit sent out to arrest Walters and 
Akhnikh tried to force their way into the house in The Hague where the 
two lived. Walters and Akhnikh, however, fought back and entrenched 
themselves. Walters even threw a hand grenade. After a siege of some 
fourteen hours, a special forces unit raided the apartment and arrested the 
two men.73 
But while apprehending the core members of the Hofstad Group and the 
cell around Samir Azzouz was easy, securing convictions proved 
decidedly more difficult. As for the Hofstad Group, the public prosecutor 
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had difficulty getting the fourteen group members convicted for 
membership of a terrorist organisation. In the first court case, the judge 
ruled that nine of the fourteen members had indeed formed a terrorist 
organisation, but this verdict was overturned in January 2008, when the 
Court of Justice in The Hague ruled that the Hofstad Group was not an 
organisation as understood under Dutch law.74 It was not until late 2010, 
after the Supreme Court had ruled that the definition of ‘organisation’ 
that had been used, was too narrow and that the case had to be brought 
before a court again, that the conviction for membership of a terrorist 
organisation was finally secured.75 
There were also hiccups in the trials of Samir Azzouz, even though he 
was probably the most prolific member of the Dutch jihadi movement (he 
even tried to plan an attack while in prison).76 The first time he was 
arrested, in 2003, he was released soon afterwards because of a lack of 
evidence.77 He was arrested a second time in 2004, for involvement in an 
armed robbery of the supermarket where he worked. But when the police 
searched his house, they found evidence of more sinister plans. Azzouz 
had purchased bomb making materials and had printed maps of what 
were thought to be targets for a terrorist attack.78 He was charged with 
preparation of a terrorist attack, but was not found guilty because of the 
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rudimentary nature of his plans and resources.79 Only after an appeal by 
the public prosecutor in 2007, and after he had been arrested for the third 
time and had been tried for another terrorist plot, was he convicted of 
preparing a terrorist attack with an improvised explosive device.80 The 
third time he was arrested, he was charged and found guilty of plotting 
the murder of several prominent Dutch politicians. In this so-called 
Piranha-case, several of Azzouz’s accomplices received jail sentences as 
well.81 All in all, some fifteen of the most active members of the Dutch 
jihadist movement were in jail by 2006, even though in some cases their 
conviction was not yet final. 
Another important branch of Dutch counterterrorism aimed at removing 
members of the jihadist movement from Dutch society was the 
deportation of several foreigners who played leading roles as religious 
mentors.82 Details are hard to come by, but between 2006 and 2012, 31 
foreigners were deported to their countries of origin because the AIVD 
deemed them a threat to Dutch national security.83 Together with the 
arrests mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the expulsions dealt a 
heavy blow to the jihadist movement in the Netherlands. 
As early as 2006 the jihadist movement started to fall apart. The Hofstad 
Group as well as other cells were torn apart by leadership crises and 
conflicts about the direction the movement should take.84 As we have seen 
above, authority figures in the Dutch jihadist movement often had 
                                                          
79 “Terreurverdachte Samir A. Opnieuw Vrijgesproken (video),” Nu.nl, November 18, 2005, 
http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/628140/terreurverdachte-samir-a-opnieuw-vrijgesproken-
video.html. 
80 “Hof Veroordeelt Samir A. Tot 4 Jaar Met Aftrek van Voorarrest” (Ressortsparket 
Amsterdam, September 17, 2007), 
http://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/@127768/hof_veroordeelt/. 
81 “Negen Jaar Cel Voor Terrorist Samir A.,” Nu.nl, oktober 2008, 
http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/1771027/negen-jaar-cel-voor-terrorist-samir-a.html. 
82 Lokale Jihadistisch Netwerken in Nederland: Veranderingen in Het Dreigingsbeeld (The Hague: 
AIVD, 2010), 7. 
83 Samenvatting Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 28 (The Hague: NCTV, 2012), 6. 
84 Jaarverslag 2006 (The Hague: AIVD, 2007), 33. 
Misreading the enemy 
329 
religious expertise or practical experience in waging jihad. A sizable part 
of them were foreigners, and their expulsion left a power vacuum in the 
movement that has never been adequately filled. In many cases the 
expelled foreigners were older, leading cell members who played roles 
similar to that of Redouan al Issa in the Hofstad Group. They were 
religious mentors and authority figures that kept the movement together, 
and their removal from the scene severely undermined the movement’s 
cohesion. Some movement members reportedly tried to claim a leadership 
role, sometimes through force and intimidation, but these attempts were 
generally unsuccessful. With the leading members imprisoned or 
expelled, there was no one left to mobilise the movement’s resources for 
violent actions, and no one to settle the many conflicts about religion, and 
strategy and tactics.85 Deprived of the actors that had the authority to give 
direction to the movement’s activities, many contacts between movement 
members returned to what they had entailed before. Instead of interacting 
with each other as members of a jihadist cell, movement members now 
interacted as friends, family members or acquaintances. In a way, the 
networks were still there, but its members no longer acted on a common 
political or religious agenda.86 
The lack of political direction quickly translated in a decrease of the level 
of jihadist activity in the Netherlands. The AIVD initially made mention 
of a second generation of Hofstad Group members87, but as it turned out, 
the successors to Bouyeri and Azzouz lacked the wherewithal to plan, let 
alone carry out, even one terrorist attack. The pattern of decreasing 
jihadist activity continued into 2007, and by 2008, the AIVD was ready to 
speak of the “neutralisation” of autonomous networks in the 
Netherlands.88 In 2010, the AIVD stated that jihadist terrorism was no 
longer a priority.89 Whatever jihadist activity that was left, was aimed at 
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facilitating jihadist travel to the Arab world, instead of at committing 
attacks on targets in the Netherlands.90 The notion of a decrease in jihadist 
activity is corroborated by what is known about terrorist plots, or the 
absence thereof, in the Netherlands after 2006. First, no jihadist attacks or 
attack plans have come to light since 2006. Second, the convictions for 
terrorism-related offences after 2006 all concerned suspects who were in 
some way linked to the Hofstad Group or the Piranha-case, which means 
that they committed their terrorist offences in 2006 at the latest. 
Furthermore, of the 106 terrorism-related police investigations that were 
initiated in the period 2007-2011, many were dropped after it turned out 
that there was no evidence for terrorist activity. In other cases there was 
indeed a political motive, but certainly not all of these cases had to do 
with jihadism. Animal rights extremism, threats to politicians and the 
royal family, and racism and right-wing extremism account for a 
considerable part of the 106 investigations.91 
Given the Dutch jihadist movement’s inability to plan even one attack, it 
is clear that their operational capabilities were eroded under the pressure 
of the arrests. In 2005, there was a serious chance that the Netherlands 
would be struck by a terrorist attack from a home grown jihadist. In 2007, 
this threat was no longer a priority for the AIVD. As this decline can be 
linked to the repressive counterterrorism interventions mentioned in this 
section, we can consider the fate of the Dutch jihadist movement a 
validation of the programme theory about law enforcement and direct 
action. But the police and judicial action against the Hofstad Group 
cannot be considered in isolation. A crucial element in the arrests and the 
convictions of the Hofstad Group was accurate intelligence. 
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8.3.2 Gathering intelligence 
The arrests mentioned and the previous section, and the consequent 
decline of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands, would not have been 
possible without the intelligence gathered by the Dutch intelligence and 
security service AIVD. From very early on, much was known about the 
Hofstad Group and the cell around Samir Azzouz, and in many arrests, 
the police acted on information provided by the AIVD. It is true that the 
Dutch jihadist movement was larger than just the Hofstad Group, which 
overlapped with the cell around Azzouz, but much less is known about 
intelligence efforts directed at other cells, perhaps because their attack 
plans were not as numerous and serious as those of the Hofstad Group. 
The argument made in this section is mostly built around the results of 
the intelligence gathering regarding the Hofstad Group and the cell 
around Samir Azzouz. This does suggest a bias, but as there were hardly 
any serious attack plans by other cells, these were also less important as 
intelligence targets. 
The AIVD first caught sight of what it would call the Hofstad Group in 
2002. The first arrests occurred in October 2003, but the suspects had to be 
released, as there was not enough evidence to charge them with terrorist 
offences. The Hofstad Group now knew they were being watched, and 
started behaving in a more conspiratorial manner, which made it harder 
for the AIVD to follow them. In the course of 2004, however, the secret 
service regained its hold on the movement.92 It was known where the 
group met, and by staking out the homes that were most frequently used 
for gatherings, the AIVD learned about the group’s membership. It also 
knew the roles played by various members. For instance, the AIVD knew 
that Redouan al Issa was a religious mentor and that Mohammed Bouyeri 
was a propagandist and a facilitator, who allowed other group members 
to use his house and car for the network’s activities.93 The secret service 
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also knew about the jihadist travels of Jason Walters and Ismail 
Akhnikh.94 Also, even though they fatally misjudged the threat that 
emanated from Bouyeri, the AIVD had detailed information about the 
radicalisation process that the man who would later murder Theo van 
Gogh had been going through.95  
As for Samir Azzouz, he had been an intelligence target since 2003, when 
the then sixteen-year-old was trying to make his way to Chechnya to join 
the jihad against the Russian army.96 From then on Azzouz was on the 
intelligence service’s radar. He even claimed that one day, as he was 
riding on the subway, an investigating officer sat next to him, identified 
himself and said: “We’re watching you.”97 This may have been an attempt 
on Azzouz’s part to embellish his record as a jihadist, but it is true that he 
was under constant surveillance, not only of the AIVD, but also of the 
Criminal Intelligence Unit (Criminele Inlichtingeneenheid, CIE).98 Also, it is 
known that the government did have a policy of following terrorist 
suspects in such a way that the suspects would be aware that they were 
being followed, which would make it impossible for them to participate in 
terrorist plots.99 Another prominent intelligence target was Nouredine el-
Fathni, an associate of Azzouz’s. He fled the country after the Van Gogh 
murder, but was closely followed after he returned. By not immediately 
calling for el-Fathni’s arrest, the AIVD was able to learn about the 
involvement of Martine van den Oever, a Dutch convert, and Soumaya 
Sahla, el-Fathni’s wife in an Islamic marriage that was not recognised 
under Dutch law. The AIVD then tapped Sahla’s phone, and learned 
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about her attempts to get the home addresses of the victims on the hit 
list.100 
How exactly the AIVD knew all this, is, of course, not entirely clear, but it 
appears that, besides the phone taps and the stakeouts, the agency had a 
mole in the Hofstad Group. Samir Azzouz had his suspicions, and 
claimed the Hofstad Group was compromised by an AIVD infiltrator, and 
that it was someone with whom he worked closely. There were only two 
people, other than himself, who knew about the maps of potential targets 
he kept. Azzouz accused Saleh B., a little-known member of the Dutch 
jihadist movement and one of the two people who knew about the maps, 
of briefing the AIVD.101 Jason Walters, too, claimed that Saleh B. worked 
for the AIVD. According to Walters, B. got in touch with a jihadist group 
in Pakistan that would train Walters and Akhnikh and bought the plane 
tickets. It is hard to find irrefutable evidence that Walters was right, but 
the presence of an informer would explain how it was possible that the 
AIVD knew Walters’ flight schedule. When Walters arrived at Schiphol 
after his second trip to Pakistan, he was immediately whisked away by 
the AIVD for interrogation.102 In 2006 a report of the Commission for 
Oversight on the Intelligence and Security Services (Commissie van Toezicht 
op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD), the government 
organisation that oversees the activities of the AIVD, indicated, although 
without mentioning Saleh B. by name, that there had indeed been a mole 
in the Hofstad Group.103  
Another important source of intelligence was a recording device that was 
placed in the living room of the house where Jason Walters and Ismail 
Akhnikh lived. While it gained the AIVD a treasure trove of information 
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that was later used in the group members’ court cases, the bugging also 
brought the AIVD some disrepute. The police later claimed that the AIVD 
had learned from the recorded conversations that Walters and Akhnikh 
were armed and dangerous, and were prepared for a police raid. Instead 
of sharing this vital piece of information with the police, the secret service, 
according to accusations by the police, kept it to itself.104 As a result, the 
police unit that came to arrest the two on 10 November 2004 
underestimated the risks involved in the operation, and were 
overwhelmed by the use of firearms and a hand grenade.105 The plot 
thickened further when several media reported that Saleh B. had supplied 
Walters with the grenade that wounded three police officers during the 
siege that preceded his arrest.106 
This incident and the underestimation of Bouyeri severely dented the 
image of the AIVD, which was blamed for Van Gogh’s death as well as 
the casualties resulting from the operation against Walters and Akhnikh. 
Nevertheless, as the examples listed in the preceding paragraphs should 
have made clear, the AIVD had lots of detailed information about the 
Hofstad Group. And what is more, it not only managed to find 
intelligence sources, such as the informer and the recording device in the 
house in the Antheunisstraat in The Hague, it also passed this information 
on to the police, which arrested many Hofstad Group members before 
any attack plans could be carried out. It was intelligence about their trip 
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to Portugal in 2004 that led to the arrest of the Hofstad Group members 
suspected of having planned an attack against Barroso. Similarly, it was 
on the basis of AIVD intelligence about Azzouz’s plans and about the 
phone calls by Sahla that their plot could be thwarted. El-Fathni, too, was 
arrested on illegal possession firearms after he had been followed by 
intelligence officers. In other words, the output did lead to the desired 
effect: the Hofstad Group’s capacity for violence was undermined by the 
AIVD’s ability to keep the cell under surveillance. 
8.3.3 Addressing root causes 
The notion of root causes played an important role in Dutch post-9/11 
counterterrorism. Many in the Netherlands believed that factors like 
discrimination and the lack of a clear cultural identity, or rather the 
incompatibility of two cultural identities, drove disenfranchised Muslim 
youths to terrorism. This idea that underlying socio-economic factors 
acted as drivers of a terrorist threat and therefore needed to be addressed, 
was the basis of the Action Plan Polarisation and Radicalisation (Actieplan 
Polarisatie en Radicalisering), which ran from 2007 to 2011. The idea behind 
the Action Plan was that social exclusion was the root cause of 
radicalisation and eventually of terrorism.107 Giving potential radicals a 
stake in society, i.e. a job, a house, an education, would remove the 
incentive for radical action. As a result, potential radicals would turn 
away from radical ideas, and would not support, let alone join, jihadist 
networks.108 The objectives of the Action Plan were threefold.109 First, 
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potential radicals had to be drawn back into society, meaning that they 
had to be convinced that participation in mainstream society had 
advantages over a life at the radical fringes. Second, the Action Plan set 
out to teach professionals involved how to recognise radicalisation. Police 
officers, teachers, social workers and other professionals who were likely 
to encounter radicalising youths were instructed on how a radicalisation 
process evolved and what behavioural characteristics are displayed by 
someone who is going through such a process.110 The third main objective 
was the marginalisation and isolation of actors spreading radical 
messages. This was a more repressive strand, and included the shutting 
down of websites with radical content. 
The implementation of the Action Plan took the form of projects that were 
carried out under the auspices of local governments. The projects under 
the Action Plan were financed by the Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, which had to approve of each project before 
allocating the Action Plan’s financial resources.111 Some of these projects 
took a more collective approach to countering polarisation and 
radicalisation. Several cities, for example, organised cultural 
manifestations and hosted public debates about religious issues. Other 
projects were targeted at individuals and helped at-risk youths getting a 
home and a job or an education. In some cases these approaches included 
a mentor to talk the subject out of any radical ideas.112 By and large the 
projects that were completed under the aegis of the Action Plan 
Polarisation and Radicalisation, achieved their targets, but this should not 
be mistaken for effectiveness. The targets that are meant here are the 
direct results that the projects set out to produce. For instance, an 
outreach programme could meet its target by bringing its message to the 
attention of the number of high school students that the project plan had 
stipulated should take note of the project’s message. Similarly, 
professionals who received training could be observed to be more 
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knowledgeable about radicalisation, and more aware of its indicators. 
Also, there are indications that high school students who participated in 
one of the projects thought and spoke in a more nuanced way about 
sensitive issues regarding culture and religion.113 Whether or not this 
eliminated a root cause of a terrorist threat is an entirely different matter. 
That the effect of the Action Plan on the jihadist cells was negligible, is 
clear from the chronology of events. It will be recalled that the AIVD 
claimed to have neutralised the threat from local, autonomous jihadist 
networks in 2008. Given the fact that the Action Plan was presented in late 
August 2007 and no funding had yet been assigned to projects until 2008, 
there is no reason to assume that the decline of the jihadist movement had 
anything to do with the Action Plan. The decline of the jihadist movement 
was brought about by repressive means, not by measures on the ‘softer’ 
end of the counterterrorism spectrum. One could still argue that the 
projects under the Action Plan possibly kept some people from adopting 
radical views, but this is unlikely given the flawed assumptions on which 
the Action Plan was based. 
First, at least going by what is known about the Hofstad Group, the focus 
on socio-economic deprivation as the driving force behind radicalisation 
was misguided. Many in the Netherlands thought that factors like 
discrimination and the lack of a clear cultural identity drove 
disenfranchised youths to terrorism114, but this analysis is not borne out 
by the profiles of the country’s best-known terrorists. In some cases, most 
prominently that of Mohammed Bouyeri, the problem was not so much 
that he was socially excluded, but rather that he was a deeply disturbed 
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individual. He had an education and had been active in a community 
centre in the neighbourhood where he lived, but this did not keep him 
from frequently getting into fistfights, on more than one occasion with the 
police.115 What is more, his writings of the same period were permeated 
with cruelty and blood thirst. Addressing the King of Morocco, for 
instance, Bouyeri once wrote: “Know that it is my biggest wish to see how 
your chest is cracked open and your raw, beating heart is torn out of your 
body and then to see how death seizes your rotten soul to drag it to Hell 
while you’re screaming and struggling”.116 CD-ROMs found in his 
apartment after the Van Gogh murder contained scenes of torture, genital 
mutilation, and necrophilia.117 Other members of the Hofstad Group may 
have been less extreme, but the group as a whole did display a certain 
fascination for gore. Several members, especially Bouyeri and Nouredine 
el-Fathni, possessed large amounts of footage of beheadings, torture and 
rape.118 Group members often watched such materials during sessions in 
living rooms, at which they also discussed religion and jihad.119 
These living room sessions bring us to another element that was 
overlooked by the Action Plan Polarisation & Radicalisation. As has been 
argued above, peer pressure was an important factor in the development 
of the willingness to commit terrorist attacks. The sense of belonging to a 
group played a role in keeping members in the Hofstad Group. As former 
Hofstad Group member Nouredine el-Fathni explained after his release 
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from jail: “It wasn’t just faith that tied us together. It’s a feeling of unity, 
sociability, solidarity.”120 There was also a competitive element to the 
group dynamic. Cell members did not want to be outdone by their peers, 
and pushed themselves, and consequently the group, to degrees of 
radicalisation that they may never have reached individually. In the 
previous sections we have seen that Jason Walters explained after his 
arrest that he had wanted to impress the other group members with his 
radical ideas.121  
The Action Plan Polarisation and Radicalisation was a mismatch with the 
radicalisation that took place in the Dutch jihadist scene, as it addressed a 
large group of people, yet failed to take into account the importance of 
group dynamics in radicalisation. The idea was that one’s socio-economic 
position determined the way a potential radical saw the world. Once any 
problems in this regard were fixed, a given individual would not fall for 
radical ideas. As the experiences of the members of the Hofstad Group 
show, however, radical ideas can also form as a result of peer pressure 
and the desire to belong to a group. The Dutch counter-radicalisation 
policy ignored this dimension of radicalisation and gave little thought to 
the importance of social context in the formation of one person’s radical 
views. The preceding paragraphs have shown that views may change 
under the influence of other people, which can also explain why members 
of the Dutch jihadist movement did not meet the profile of the deprived, 
poor outcast who could be expected to hold a grudge against society. It is 
true that many in the movement were unemployed and had little 
education, but there were also many who did have a job and who had 
attended higher vocational training or a university.122 Samir Azzouz, for 
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instance, was enrolled in a programme to become a laboratory assistant, 
and Jason Walters’ brother Jermaine worked at a bakery.123 
But the government’s misunderstanding of jihadist radicalisation in the 
Netherlands was not limited to the nature of the problem. The scale was 
misread as well. The Action Plan was based on the fear that there was a 
fertile ground for radical ideas among Muslims in the Netherlands. The 
polarisation between Muslims and non-Muslims would make the former 
more susceptible to radical ideas and more supportive of terrorism, so the 
logic went. By 2008, however, it had become clear that this was simply not 
true. Polarisation had not diminished, but neither had it bred terrorism. In 
mosques there was a non-violent discourse, and even the salafist ones, 
spoke out against violence and refused radicals and extremists access to 
their gatherings. Also, after mutual trust had been built, heads of mosques 
or Islamic schools alerted local police officers to possible cases of 
radicalisation.124 Particularly instructive was the reaction of Muslim 
communities to Fitna, a documentary made by Geert Wilders in which he 
criticised Islam for what he felt was its inherent inclination to violence. 
The country braced itself for a fierce reaction to what Muslims would 
consider outrageous blasphemy, but the response from the Dutch Muslim 
communities was remarkably moderate. While they showed little 
sympathy for Wilders’ project, several Muslim organisations called on 
their constituencies to defend Islam only by peaceful means. There was 
little violent protest upon the documentary’s release, and there was no 
visible increase in the support for jihadist networks.125 
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That the jihadist movement stood alone in its acceptance of violence is 
also clear from the position taken by salafist mosques. Even 
fundamentalist imams who warned their followers against integration 
into Dutch society, were not supportive of terrorism. Before 2007, salafist 
mosques had turned a blind eye to recruitment of jihadists among their 
constituencies, but around 2007 and 2008 they began to put a stop to such 
practices.126 Furthermore, they invested in a new, younger generation of 
preachers, some of whom preached in Dutch and could thus reach the 
second and third generation immigrants, who rarely spoke Arab. They 
also agreed with the AIVD and the NCTb to keep a low profile after Fitna 
so as not to provoke a violent backlash from their congregations. 
Although this shift towards a less accommodating stance vis-à-vis 
jihadism was probably informed by the assessment that allowing 
recruitment and the spreading of extremist messages would generate bad 
publicity, later research showed that the majority of salafists in the 
Netherlands do not propagate or advocate the use of violence.127 
What this brief survey of attitudes of Dutch Muslims shows, is that the 
jihadist movement was a small and isolated minority without any 
political leverage. There were no demonstrations for the jihadist cause, 
and no political party or mosques, perhaps with the exception of the As 
Sunnah mosque in The Hague and the Al Tahweed mosque in 
Amsterdam, that could be used as a vehicle for jihadist politics. There was 
very little openly expressed support for the jihadist movement, and few 
propounded even a moderate version of the jihadist creed. Also, the swift 
collapse of the jihadist movement after the arrests or expulsion of some 
fifty people (see the section on direct action) shows that the movement 
was not deeply embedded in a supportive social environment. All this 
suggests a major flaw in the logic underlying the Action Plan Polarisation 
and Radicalisation. Contrary to what the makers of the plan assumed, 
there was no fertile ground for supporters and recruits for the jihadist 
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movement. Not all who were in some way socially excluded, were 
potential radicals, let alone potential terrorists. This being the case, the 
Action Plan could never have been effective, because it was targeting a 
potential terrorist support base that did not exist. This notion was not lost 
on the Dutch government. The Action Plan ended in 2011 and was not 
extended, also because of the budgetary constraints that the economic 
crisis had imposed on government spending.128 
8.3.4 Restraint in the use of force 
We have seen above that intelligence and arrests played a crucial role in 
the quelling of the jihadist terrorist threat in the Netherlands. The post-
9/11 period, however, also saw a series of embarrassing mishaps that 
discredited Dutch counterterrorism. In 2004, for instance, the police in the 
city of Utrecht arrested an entire family on suspicion of involvement 
terrorist activities. The arrests were made in plain view of the entire 
neighbourhood, which made the outcome – the whole thing was a 
misunderstanding and all arrestees were released without charges – all 
the more uncomfortable.129 A somewhat similar false alarm occurred in 
2009, when the AIVD had information that pointed to a terrorist attack on 
an IKEA branch near Amsterdam. The area around the alleged target was 
closed off, and seven men from Moroccan descent were arrested, only to 
be released the next day.130 A third example of a widely publicised misfire 
was the arrest of twelve Somalians on Christmas Eve 2010. The AIVD 
claimed to have information that the twelve were planning a terrorist 
attack, but in this case, too, it soon transpired that there was no evidence 
of a terrorist attack. Unfortunately, this became clear only after the police 
had done considerable damage during a raid in the store of one of the 
twelve men.131  
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These are just some examples of overreaction on the part of the police, 
which in some cases acted on inaccurate intelligence from the AIVD. 
Overviews by the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad and Onjo, a 
collective of Dutch broadcasting companies, show that in the vast 
majority of cases, terrorism suspects who were arrested were not 
convicted. Many were not even charged. According to Onjo, only 2.5% of 
the 274 people who were arrested on suspicion of terrorist offences were 
convicted. The NRC Handelsblad, which analysed the outcomes of the 
arrested terrorist suspects between 2001 and 2009, stated that two thirds 
were released without charges. Also, the conviction rates for terrorist 
suspect were significantly lower than the overall average for other 
crimes.132 As most of the arrestees were second or third generation 
immigrants, the false alarms fit a pattern, perceived by Dutch Muslims, of 
discriminatory application of counterterrorism measures.133 Indeed, polls 
show that Muslims in the Netherlands, especially second generation 
immigrants, are considerably more distrustful of the police than Muslims 
in other European countries.134 On the local level, the often fragile ties 
between the police and Muslim communities were indeed strained by 
false alarms.135 What is interesting, though, is that the resentment over the 
misplaced applications of force by the Dutch police never took the form of 
anything resembling support for jihadist terrorism. They were perceived 
as discriminatory, but the Dutch jihadist movement failed to capitalise on 
the widespread discontent about the performance of the police. 
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The responses to incidents like the ones described above are quite 
informative in this respect. With regard to the IKEA incident, some 
speculated that it could lead to a backlash, as it would confirm the 
jihadists’ notion that they were at war with the state.136 Although there 
was a response from the Muslim community, there is no evidence that 
this played into the hand of the jihadist movement. In a moderate 
response, the Coalition of Dutch Moroccans (Samenwerkingsverband van 
Marokkaanse Nederlanders, SMN) criticised the police for mentioning the 
suspects’ ethnic background to the media.137 There was, in other words, 
public indignation, but none of the responses suggested support for 
radical ideas or for the jihadist movement. The same goes for the arrests 
of the twenty Somalians. There were protests from the Somalian 
community in the Netherlands, but these were limited in scope.138 A final 
example of the way Muslim communities responded to police force 
occurred in the Amsterdam neighbourhood of Slotervaart, incidentally 
also the neighbourhood where Mohammed B. had lived. This case is not 
related to counterterrorism, but is nevertheless instructive as to the way 
police force is perceived in Muslim communities in the Netherlands. In 
October 2007 Bilal Bajaka, a mentally unstable 22-year-old, ran into a 
police station and assaulted two police officers with a knife. One of the 
two police officers shot and killed him in self-defence.139 When the news 
of Bajaka’s death came out, riots ensued. But even in this violent response 
to perceived heavy-handedness on the part of the police, nothing 
indicated support for jihadist creed or cells. Rather, it appeared that the 
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vandalism was perpetrated by petty criminals who were known to the 
police.140 
What these examples show, is that the cases in which the police failed to 
observe the counterterrorism principle of restraint in the use of force did 
not feed a radical narrative about a giant clash between the ummah and 
the unbelievers. Some in the Muslim communities in the Netherlands may 
have taken the false alarms as discriminatory, but that did not lead them 
to the conclusion that they should take up arms to overthrow the existing 
order and replace it with a caliphate governed exclusively according to 
rules laid down in the Quran. That police heavy-handedness did not lead 
to a strengthening of the jihadist support base, is also clear from the 
timing of the events. The misguided arrests and the false alarms coincided 
with a weakening of the jihadist movement, which makes clear that 
collateral damage in counterterrorism does not automatically lead to 
support for the foe that is being fought. The Dutch case can thus be taken 
as a refutation of the program theory regarding violations of the 
counterterrorism principle ‘restraint in the use of force’, although perhaps 
with the reservation that the cases in which excessive force were used, 
were relatively modest in comparison to, for example, the overreaction of 
the British army after it was first deployed in Northern Ireland to fight the 
Provisional IRA (see section 7.2.1). The counterterrorism literature is rife 
with claims that lacks of restraint in the use of force will increase the 
support for terrorist entities, but the Dutch fight against jihadist terrorism, 
in which some instances of unnecessary police force did occur, does not 
provide any evidence to this effect. 
8.3.5 International cooperation 
An active member of international organisations like the EU, the UN, 
NATO, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Netherlands was 
                                                          
140 M. Verburg, “Welten Attent Op Parijse Toestanden,” Algemeen Dagblad, October 18, 2007, 
http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1012/Nederland/article/detail/2288722/2007/10/18/Welten-
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involved in a host of international responses to the emergence of the 
terrorist threat after 9/11.  
The most important forum for counterterrorism cooperation was the EU. 
After 9/11 the heads of government of the EU Member States agreed 
relatively quickly on a common definition of terrorism and drew up the 
EU Terror List, which obliged all Member States to impose sanctions on 
all people and organisations that were on it.141 Also, as the transnational 
character of jihadist terrorism was widely recognised, the exchange of 
terrorism-related intelligence between the Member States was intensified. 
The Council of the European Union decided to found the Joint Situation 
Centre (SitCen), which was mandated to make European threat 
assessments, partially on the basis of information provided by the 
intelligence services of the Member States.142 While technically not an EU-
organ, Europol too, was given a considerably more important role in the 
exchange of terrorism-related information. Law enforcement agencies of 
the signatory states of the Europol Convention, which includes the 
Netherlands, have representatives at Europol to keep each other abreast 
of important incidents and developments.143  
Much of the EU response to the Madrid bombings, however, concerned 
law enforcement in general rather than counterterrorism. Using the 
window of opportunity that was offered to them by the widespread fear 
of terrorist attacks, the heads of government of the Member States seized 
the opportunity to boost the European law enforcement cooperation they 
ad been trying to get off the ground for years. The flagship of these 
attempts was the European Arrest Warrant, which would allow police 
                                                          
141 Council of the European Union, “Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the 
Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism,” December 27, 2001, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:0093:0096:EN:PDF; Council of 
the European Union, “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating 
Terrorism,” June 13, 2002, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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142 E.R. Hertzberger, Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union (Turin: 
UNICRI, 2007), 66. 
143 Ibid., 74–75. 
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forces to arrest suspects who are wanted in other EU Member States. In a 
similar vein, this period also witnessed the introduction of the Joint 
Investigation Teams (JITs), in which police forces of different countries 
could investigate cross-borders crimes. 
Another forum in which the Netherlands was involved in international 
counterterrorism cooperation was the UN. One of the UN’s pièces de 
resistance in the fight against terrorism is Security Council Resolution 
1373, adopted in September 2001. The resolution obliges the signatory 
states to freeze the financial assets of individuals involved in the 
preparation of terrorist attacks. Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot later 
appealed to this resolution to justify the freezing of the financial assets of 
several members of the Hofstad Group.144 More specifically with regard to 
the financing of terrorism, the Netherlands adopted the so-called Fourty 
Recommendations and the Nine Special Recommendations as formulated 
by the Financial Action Task Force. These two sets of recommendations 
were partially drawn up to make it harder for terrorists to gather the 
financial resources needed to carry out their attacks.145 
But farranging and consequential as these forms of international 
cooperation may have been, it is far from clear that they had much of a 
bearing on the jihadist movement in the Netherlands. First, the 
international cooperation described in the previous paragraph was aimed 
at the creation of a framework within which terrorism can adequately be 
countered. In other words, it concerned the creation rather than the 
application of counterterrorism instruments, and it is the latter kind of 
government action that is relevant for the current study.  
Second, for those forms of international cooperation that did constitute an 
application of policy instruments, such as cross-border criminal 
                                                          
144 A. Olgun, “Hofstadgroep: ‘Voor Deze Jongens Is Het Nu Echt Afgelopen,’” NRC 
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investigations or the exchange of intelligence, they did not affect the 
Hofstadgroup and the cell around Samir A. As has been mentioned in the 
introduction, the Dutch jihadist movement was only marginally plugged 
into the wider jihadist movement, and the AIVD gathered most of the 
intelligence on the Hofstad Group and the cell around Samir Azzouz by 
itself. It is, of course, not known to what extent they acted on information 
and intelligence from other European police agencies or intelligence 
services, but the information that is available does not suggest a deep 
involvement of police or intelligence agencies outside of the Netherlands. 
It is true that the Portuguese police tipped off the AIVD about an alleged 
plan to kill Manuel Barosso, but other than that, there is no reason to 
suppose that the fight against the Dutch jihadist movement was 
transnational teamwork. 
Given the limited extent to which the Dutch jihadist movement was 
affected by international cooperation, there is no way to argue that it had 
the effect that was outlined in the programme theory for ‘international 
cooperation’. As the preceding paragraphs have shown, international 
cooperation was certainly applied, as the Netherlands was – and is – part 
of a wide range of international organisations that contribute to the fight 
against terrorism. However, since the nature of the Dutch jihadist 
movement was such that none – or very few – of these efforts were in 
practice directed at them, we will consider this principle ‘not applied’ in 
this case. 
8.4 Conclusion 
As we have seen in the introduction to this chapter, the Dutch 
government prided itself on its ‘broad approach’, which took not only 
terrorism, but also radicalisation into account. The irony of the assessment 
about the effectiveness of the various counterterrorism principles (see 
figure 21 for an overview) is that the Dutch government has been much 
more successful in the traditional elements that are part of any 
counterterrorism policy, namely policing and intelligence. The AIVD 
knew a lot about the Hofstad Group and the cell around Samir Azzouz, 
by all appearances the most aggressive elements of the Dutch jihadist 
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movement. The intelligence about the activities of these individuals was 
helpful in thwarting the terrorist plots that Azzouz and the others in the 
Hofstad Group were working on. Also, the arrests of Azzouz, Walters, el-
Fathni and Bouyeri, and the expulsion of 31 foreigners who played a role 
in the Dutch jihadist milieu were followed by a steep decline in jihadist 
activity. The movement essentially flatlined, and never came back. It is 
true that the jihadist cells whose members travelled to the Syrian civil war 
constituted a resurgence of jihadism in the Netherlands, but they should 
be considered a different movement. There was no personal overlap 
between the two generations, since some in the most recent wave were 
only ten years old at the time of the Van Gogh murder. 
It was only after the Dutch jihadist movement was dismantled that the 
Action Plan Polarisation and Radicalisation was introduced. It is true that 
some counter radicalisation measures were in place before the Action 
Plan, as some municipalities in major cities had already carried out their 
own projects to dissuade people from adopting radical views. However, 
the Action Plan was the government’s major effort, in financial resources 
and geographical scope as well as in the numbers of people that were 
exposed to the measures. By the time the projects of the Action Plan were 
carried out, the terrorist threat had already been reduced, so it is highly 
unlikely that the efforts to address the root causes of terrorism did much 
to undermine the threat emanating from the jihadist movement. It is 
possible that the projects under the Action Plan’s aegis kept some at-risk 
youths from joining radical cells, but this is mere speculation. What we do 
know, is that there is no reason to assume that the Action Plan 
contributed to the decline of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, the swift collapse of the Dutch jihadist movement shows 
that the threat was perhaps not as severe as the Action Plan suggested. 
Terrorist organisations or movements with any degree of popular support 
can weather the removal of some of their members, but the jihadist scene 
in the Netherlands did not have this level of resilience. The fact that it fell 
apart after one series of arrests suggests that there were few sympathisers 
who were willing to take the place of the arrestees, and few authority 
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figures to steer the movement in the right direction. The lack of support is 
also clear from the response of Dutch Muslims to the arrests of innocent 
civilians and other incidents they could perceive as discriminatory, such 
as the release of Fitna and the shooting of Bilal Bajaka. The accepted 
reading in the counterterrorism literature is that overreliance on the use of 
force strengthens the support base of the terrorists. The Dutch jihadist 
movement, however, is an exception to this rule, as it did not draw any 
support from these incidents. There were, to be sure, protests, but neither 
Geert Wilders’ movie nor the arrests of innocent Muslim civilians were 
seen as confirming a radical or jihadist reading of the world. Given this 
lack of popular support, it is not unfair to say that the Action Plan was 
based on a misreading of the potential of the jihadist movement. In most 
cases, government overreaction to a terrorist threat takes the form of 
excessive use of force. The Dutch government is an interesting deviation 
from this pattern, as it overreacted in the use of a ‘soft’ approach, which it 
deployed against a terrorist threat that had already been contained by 
repressive means. 
Outcome Explanation
Jihadist movement in the Netherlands




Lacks of restraint in the use of force in the fight against jihadist terrorism in the Netherlands did 
not lead to increases of support for the jihadist movement




The Netherlands did engage in international cooperation, but these efforts were not clearly or 
explicitly targeted against the largely domestically oriented Dutch jihadist movement




The efforts to address the root causes of the Dutch jihadist threat were implemented only after 
the threat had been reduced by kinetic means and were based on an overestimation of the 
jihadists’ potential support base
Law enforcement and 
direct action
Effective
The arrests of the most active jihadists and the expulsion out of the country of leading 
movement members contributed significantly to the “neutralisation” of the threat
Offering a counter 
narrative
Not applied





The Dutch secret services knew much about the attack plans of the most active jihadist cells in 
the Netherlands and were able to foil almost all these plans
 
Figure 21. Counterterrorism principles as applied against the Dutch jihadist movement
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9 Fighting Qutb’s children: repression, 
prevention and the importance of world view 
in the jihadist movement in the UK 
No European country in the twenty-first century faced a more severe 
threat from jihadist terrorism than the UK. The casualty rate of the 
London Bombings of 7 July 2005 were second only to the 2004 Madrid 
Bombings, and several of the most ambitious post-9/11 jihadist plots in 
Europe were planned in the UK. For instance, two weeks after the London 
Bombings, the British capital narrowly escaped a similar attack on its 
public transport system. The attack was very similar to the first London 
Bombing, except that this time the explosives failed to detonate.1 Another 
major plot was dismantled in 2006, when MI5 found that a jihadist cell 
around ringleader Abdullah Ahmed Ali was working on a plan to 
simultaneously blow up a series of transatlantic flights.2 It was not until 
May 2013 that the UK suffered its first fatal terrorist victim since the 7/7 
Bombings, but one should be careful not to read this as a sign that the 
terrorist threat has been neutralised.3 Stuart Osborne, Senior National 
Coordinator for Counter Terrorism and Head of the Counter Terrorism 
Command at the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) claimed in March 
2013 that “[o]n average we’ve probably had about one potential attack 
planned with an intent to create something similar to July 7 every year”.4 
In a speech in 2007, MI5 director Jonathan Evans estimated the numerical 
strength of the British jihadist movement at some 2,000 people.5 
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The operational ambition level and size of the jihadist movement in the 
UK cannot be fully understood without a reference to the role London 
played in the international jihadist movement. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
London became a favoured refuge for jihadists from the Arab world and 
Central Asia. As the governments in the region started to crack down on 
the jihadist movements that were plotting their overthrow, many fighters 
were forced to leave their home countries. Their preferred safe haven was 
the UK, primarily because the British government followed a policy of 
limited intervention in the affairs of ethnic and cultural minorities, paid 
generous social benefits and was quick to grant asylum to political 
dissidents.6 By the late 1990s, the UK had attracted members from a wide 
variety of jihadist groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the 
Algerian Groupe islamique armée (Armed Islamic Group, GIA), the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and the Egyptian Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI).7 
Most of the jihadist refugees chose to live in London, which became home 
to a vibrant jihadist scene that acted as a logistical hub for the 
international jihadist movement. Because of the level and scope of jihadist 
activity, the British capital was disparagingly labelled ‘Londonistan’. 
Jihadists in London engaged in a wide variety of activities that 
contributed to the holy war in their home countries. They could openly 
claim their allegiance to jihadist groups and spread propaganda material. 
This was possible even after 9/11, when groups around extremist 
preachers distributed flyers that praised the perpetrators of 9/11 as 
heroes.8 But the Londonistani networks provided more substantial 
support as well. They raised funds for their brothers in arms in the 
Middle East and Central Asia, made travel arrangements for volunteers 
who wanted to join the fight in the Muslim lands and brought new 
recruits in touch with groups that ran training camps or religious schools 
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in Pakistan or Afghanistan.9 In 2002, media reports revealed that some 
training in the use of AK-47s took place in a London mosque.10  
For a long time, the British government turned a blind eye towards 
jihadist activities on its own soil. The notorious ideologue Abu Hamza 
even suggested that there was a security covenant of sorts, claiming that 
MI5 officers had told him with regard to his support for jihad: “Well, it’s 
freedom of speech. You don’t have to worry as long as we don’t see blood 
on the streets.”11 This changed, of course, after 9/11. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair often stressed the unprecedented nature of 
jihadist terrorism, beginning on 9/11, when he called Al Qaeda-style 
terrorism “the new evil in our world today”.12 It was on these grounds 
that he in later years defended the expansion of the legal apparatus that 
was in previous decades brought to bear on the Provisional IRA. For 
instance, the pre-detention trial period for terrorist offences was extended 
on the grounds that terrorist plots had to be disrupted at an early stage, 
which means that investigation has to take place on a slimmer evidence 
base than crimes that have actually been committed.13 Various kinds of 
new legislation were adopted to penalise not only acts of terrorism, but 
also membership of terrorist organisations and the making of public 
statements that were supportive of terrorism. Police powers were 
widened and potential targets were hardened against terrorist attacks. 
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Legal scholars and civil rights organisations protested many of the legal 
instruments that the government had acquired in the fight against 
terrorism, but the Labour government kept insisting that jihadist 
terrorism was an extraordinary threat that called for extraordinary 
measures. 
This chapter will address the effectiveness of the British government 
response to jihadist terrorism after 9/11. In this, it will differ from the 
government counterterrorism reviews that are regularly published. The 
government appointed an independent reviewer to monitor the 
implementation of counterterrorism legislation, and the coalition 
government launched a review of the counterterrorism strategy that the 
Labour government adopted in 2003 and adapted in 2009.14 The Prevent 
pillar of the strategy, which contains measures to keep people from 
becoming terrorists, was reviewed separately in 2010.15 Although useful 
in assessing the way in which measures are implemented and used, 
including the identification of negative side effects these assessments 
rarely address the effects on the terrorist movement itself. Put differently, 
they do not address effectiveness in the way the term is used by the 
current author. The same goes for the scholarly literature about British 
counterterrorism, which has much to say about what British 
counterterrorism does to the position of ethnic minorities in the UK and to 
the country's human rights record, but not about its impact on the 
terrorists it is supposed to fight. Given the wealth of the available 
material, it should nevertheless be possible to make a first assessment 
whether British counterterrorism is doing what it set out to do. 
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9.1 The jihadist movement in the UK 
9.1.1 Ideology and strategy: from the near to the far enemy 
Jihadist terrorists in the UK are representatives of the takfiri branch of 
political Islam. Characteristic of the takfiris, or “those who accuse others 
of apostasy”, is their claim to the right to declare other Muslims 
apostates.16 Other strands of Islam respect certain procedures in labelling 
someone an apostate. Only a select group of Islamic scholars have the 
right to issue a takfir, and they generally use this instrument with caution, 
careful as they are not to undermine the unity of the ummah. The takfiris 
are decidedly less restrained in this regard, and need little more than their 
own judgment to state that someone has strayed from true Islam to the 
extent that he or she has to be expelled from the Islamic community.17 
The hostility towards other views is partially a reflection of the extreme 
standards by which the takfiris judge other Muslims. In essence, the 
takfiris want the ummah, the worldwide Muslim community, to live in 
accordance with Islam as practiced and explained by Mohammed and his 
direct associates. They reject all other political views and governance 
structures as man-made and therefore impure and profane.18 A crucial 
element in takfiri thinking is that Islam should be saved from policies, 
laws and practices that were invented in the centuries after Mohammed. 
Modern-day takfiri ideologues, most prominently Sayyid Qutb, claim that 
large parts of the ummah have strayed from the righteous path centuries 
ago by changing their lifestyles, by rallying behind secular nationalist 
political agendas, and by opening the Muslim lands to western influences, 
both cultural and political.19 They view the history of the Islamic people 
as a descent into decadence, subservience and apostasy, and believe that 
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only a return to the Islam of the days of Mohammed can revitalise the 
ummah. As Qutb explained in his seminal work Milestones, “[i]f Islam is 
again to play the role of the leader of mankind, then it is necessary that 
the Muslim community be restored to its original form. It is necessary to 
revive that Muslim community which is buried under the debris of the 
man-made traditions of several generations, and which is crushed under 
the weight of those false laws and customs which are not even remotely 
related to the Islamic teachings, and which, in spite of all this, calls itself 
the ‘world of Islam’.”20 
What is important with regard to jihadist terrorism in the UK is that “the 
debris of man-made traditions” is, at least partially, brought on the 
ummah by the West. The Islamic world, according to Qutb and other 
takfiris, is being held back by Western countries, which support secular 
regimes in the Middle East, are allies of Israel, and maintain military 
presence on Muslim lands. In order to restore Islam in its pure form, these 
forces must be removed from the Muslim world.21 Originally, this fight 
was to be waged in the Muslim lands. According to ‘classical’ jihadists, 
which for quite a while included Al Qaeda chiefs Bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri, the oppression and deception of the ummah had to be fought 
where it occurred.22 Furthermore, some jihadists in the western world 
respected a covenant with the countries where they lived. They 
considered themselves guests in the West, and felt that it was not allowed 
to carry out attacks against countries that were effectively their hosts.23 
This view was underpinned further by a more tactical consideration, 
derived from the experiences of the Algerian GIA, which had paid dearly 
for taking the fight against the French to Paris. In the mid-1990s, the 
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French capital was rocked by a series of terrorist attacks on the subway. 
Eight were killed and more than hundred were wounded. In the police 
crackdowns that were launched in response to the attacks, the GIA’s 
support networks in several Western European countries were 
dismantled, and the group’s campaign fizzled. From this, the jihadist 
community drew the lesson that it was better not to provoke the wrath of 
their host countries.24 Some, however, changed their minds after 9/11 and 
the US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003. Several prominent Islamist extremists 
in the UK now agreed with Osama bin Laden that ‘the far enemy’ – that 
is, western countries on their own soil – was no longer off limits. 
The first one was Abu Qatada, the Palestine-born Jordanian who is a 
wanted man in his country of birth for his alleged involvement in terrorist 
attacks on American and Israeli tourists.25 He fled to the UK in 1993, 
where he became a central actor in the international jihadist network.26 
Soon after his arrival in the UK he became a preacher at the Finsbury Park 
mosque, widely known as a hotbed of Islamist extremism. He was known 
for his ultra-orthodox speeches, in which he applauded the killing of 
Jews, Americans and Brits.27 The first time he gained some public 
attention in the UK was in 1995, when he held a sermon in which he 
approved of the killing of the wives and children of Algerians who had 
turned away from Islam.28 At this point he was still advocating and 
materially supporting jihad in the Muslim world. After 9/11 he switched 
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sides and supported Al Qaeda and its attacks against the ‘far enemy’.29 He 
had close ties with Richard Reid, who in December 2001 tried to blow up 
a plane with explosives that were hidden in his shoes, and Zacarias 
Moussaoui, suspected of involvement in the 9/11 attacks. These 
connections prompted government officials and media to label him “the 
most significant extremist preacher in the UK” and “Bin Laden’s right-
hand man in Europe”.30  
A similar volte-face regarding jihadist strategy was made by another 
prominent jihadist preacher in Londonistan. Omar Bakri Mohammed’s 
career as an Islamic scholar started at the age of fifteen, when he joined 
the Muslim Brotherhood in his native Syria.31 Later he left the 
Brotherhood to join Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), an organisation 
that he would have a turbulent relationship with, mainly because he 
favoured a more radical course than the leadership. He was ousted from 
the movement after he tried to launch a Hizb ut-Tahrir branch in Saudi 
Arabia against the wishes of the leadership, which felt this was too bold a 
move.32 He went on to form the radical jihadist group al-Muhajiroun (The 
Emigrants), but was expelled from the country and had to flee to the 
UK.33 Here he went back to Hizb ut-Tahrir, but soon clashed with the 
leadership, which failed to appreciate Bakri Mohammed calling on Queen 
Elizabeth to convert to Islam and claiming that the ummah would carry on 
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the fight until “the black flag of Islam flies over Downing Street”.34 
Undeterred by his falling out with Hizb ut-Tahrir, he formed a new 
incarnation of al-Muhajiroun. This latter group would gain him 
prominence in the British jihadist community, as he now called on his 
followers to carry out attacks in the UK. For instance, the organisation 
was linked to a terrorist plot in the UK involving a fertiliser bomb that 
was assembled to kill hundreds of British citizens.35 
Abu Hamza walked a path that was very different from that of his two 
peers. Born in Egypt, he first came to the UK on a student visa to study 
civil engineering. Later on he held jobs as a bouncer at a night club and as 
a bell boy in a hotel.36 He became interested in Islam only in his late 
twenties, after his then wife found out that he was cheating on her and 
pressed him to change his ways.37 He turned to Islam and started 
mingling in the radical jihadist community in London. In 1991, some four 
years after his conversion, he travelled to a training camp in Afghanistan 
to learn how to assemble explosives. During one session the device he 
was working on exploded, and he lost a hand and an eye.38 As a result of 
this incident, he was forced to sport the glass eye and hook hand that 
became pivotal to his public image. Some have doubted the theological 
sophistication of Abu Hamza’s sermons, but he appealed to the second 
generation immigrants who visited the Finsbury Park mosque, a logistical 
hub and meeting point for jihadists from all over Europe.39 After a 
campaign in which he slandered the older generation that made up the 
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mosque’s board and accused them of corruption, he became the Finsbury 
Park mosque’s leading figure.40 Like his mentor Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza 
was at first primarily interested in supporting jihad in the Muslims lands, 
especially Algeria, but his position changed after 9/11. Gradually, 
however, he came to support the global jihad as propounded by Al 
Qaeda.41 
The significance of these men for the terrorist threat in the UK is that they, 
by making this strategic shift and reconsidering the strategic priorities of 
the jihadist movement, managed to mobilise second and third generation 
immigrants in the UK to open a front in the West. They had the 
credentials and the charisma to appeal to radicalising local young men, 
and used their position to gain recruits for the implementation of the new 
course, the fight in – as opposed to merely against – the West. As a result, 
their networks in, primarily, Afghanistan and Pakistan were now open to 
local radicals who wanted to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK. This 
meant that the latter had access to training camps, networks for 
transportation and paper forgery, and financial resources that were 
originally intended for use in the fight against western or apostate forces 
in the Muslim lands. What thus emerged, was a peculiar mixture of 
international and ‘home grown’ terrorism. 
On the one hand, the jihadist movement in the UK started planning 
attacks that were supposed to be carried out in the UK by British citizens. 
But at the same time, the perpetrators of these attacks were embedded in 
an international network that provided inspiration and operational 
support. Also, the goals of the ‘home grown’ terrorists were largely 
similar to those of previous generations of jihadists. With only a few 
exceptions, the perpetrators of terrorist plots against the UK made clear 
that their actions were intended to make the British government pay the 
price for military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.42 This suggests that 
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their strategy – attacking the enemy on its own soil instead of only in 
Muslim lands – may have been different from the strategy of ‘classical’ 
jihadist groups, but their objectives were the same: the liberation of 
Muslim lands from western domination. 
9.1.2 Organisational structure 
Jihadist terrorism has often been described as a form of leaderless 
resistance, consisting of autonomous cells that operate without outside 
assistance and guidance from other terrorist groups.43 After the London 
Bombings of 7 July 2005, and especially after it had become clear that the 
attacks had been the work of British citizens, the terrorist threat to the UK 
was viewed this way as well. Experts and government officials alike 
believed that the 7/7 bombings were a manifestation of a new threat, 
namely that of independent, autonomous terrorist cells that were not or 
only marginally plugged in to the wider jihadist movement.44 But while 
the label ‘home grown’ terrorism is possibly appropriate for the jihadist 
movement in other European countries, it fails to grasp the essence of the 
British jihadist scene, at least in the first years after 9/11.  
Contrary to what one would expect when viewing the jihadist movement 
as a collection of autonomous, independent cells, the radical scene in the 
UK showed a remarkable degree of integration, meaning that members of 
the scene were in touch with a large number of other members. This point 
can be illustrated by the interactions of the terrorists involved in various 
plots. Mohammed Siddique Khan, the ringleader of the cell that 
committed the London Bombings of 7 July 2005, knew Omar Khyam and 
Mohammed Qayyum Khan, both of whom were involved in the fertiliser 
bomb plot that was thwarted in 2004.45 Similarly, it is now known that 
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Abdullah Ahmed Ali, leader of the plot to carry out a series of 
simultaneous terrorist attacks on transatlantic flights in 2006, had been in 
touch with Mukhtar Ibrahim, ring leader of the cell that carried out the 
failed attack in London on 21 July 2005.46 Siddique Khan and Mukhtar 
Ibrahim may also have met, as they were at the same time in Pakistan to 
undergo training, and their respective cells’ explosives, in both cases 
home-made, showed a striking resemblance.47 Furthermore, both 
Siddique Khan and Mukhtar Ibrahim received terrorist training in the 
Lake District, near the Scottish border, from a man named Mohammed 
Hamid, who assigned himself the nickname ‘Osama bin London’. 
Furthermore, Siddique Khan, Ibrahim and Ali all gained access to Al 
Qaeda’s training facilities through the same man, Rashid Rauf, who 
helped them escape the Pakistani intelligence service ISI and introduced 
them to core Al Qaeda members.48 Finally, even the jihadist cyber activist 
Younes Tsouli, often portrayed as a loner, turned out to have an extensive 
network of contacts in the groups around the famous preachers.49 What 
these examples of contacts and shared acquaintances show, is that the 
jihadist movement was far from fragmented. Rather than a group of cells 
operating independently of each other, it was a vibrant scene, where 
members of terrorist cells frequently made use of the spiritual guidance 
and operational support offered by actors in the heart of Londonistan. 
What held the movement together was the social infrastructure made up 
by the networks around Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri 
Mohammed.50 In the mosques and bookstores that were run by these 
networks, as well as in the members’ homes, militants could interact with 
fellow believers, discuss religious and political ideas and gain access to 
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facilities to develop terrorist skills. One particularly important meeting 
point was the Finsbury Park mosque, effectively the headquarters of the 
network around Abu Hamza. The mosque was not just a platform to air 
extremist views, but also a logistical hub for the jihadist movement, as can 
be seen from the list of known jihadist terrorists that often came by. Shoe 
bomber Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and several members of a cell 
that was planning a bioterrorist attack on the London Underground were 
reportedly frequent visitors.51 Three of the four perpetrators of the 
London bombings also attended services in the Finsbury Park mosque, as 
did Mohammed Hamid, who acted as a mentor to the cell that carried out 
the London bombings of 21 July.52 Another example is Parviz Khan, the 
ringleader of a plot to kidnap and behead a British soldier. Khan was an 
admirer of Abu Hamza, and regularly went to the Finsbury Park mosque 
to listen to the hook-handed cleric’s sermons.53 In the Finsbury Park 
mosque, these men were groomed as jihadist terrorists. They were vetted 
by the radical preachers and their associates, who also made 
arrangements for recruits to go to Afghanistan or Pakistan to visit a 
training camp.54  
In these training camps, the recruits learned terrorist skills, such as 
making explosives and using firearms. Also, much time was spent on 
religious schooling. The training was provided by experienced fighters, 
who tolerated little contradiction, as Omar Khyam told Mohammed 
Siddique Khan in March 2004: “The only thing I will advise you, yeah, is 
total obedience to whoever your emir is. Whether he is Sunni, Arab, 
Chechen, Saudi, British – total obedience. I tell you, up there you can get 
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your head cut off!”55 While it is difficult to tell exactly what went on 
inside the training camps, it appears that the planning of the terrorist 
plots took place there as well. From a message he left his wife, it appears 
that Siddique Khan thought that he was going to Pakistan to carry out a 
suicide mission. Only after he returned to the UK did he start working on 
the London Bombings, which suggests that there had been a change of 
plan while he was in the training camp.56 The plan for the 7 July 
Bombings was probably thought up in the camp, and the training that 
Siddique Khan underwent was tailored to the mission he was instructed 
to carry out. After he left Pakistan, he stayed in touch with his instructors 
to keep them up to date regarding the plot’s progress.57 Some other British 
jihadists who went to training camps in Pakistan also underwent training 
that was specific to the attack they set out to commit after they got back to 
the UK.58 In these cases too, core Al Qaeda not only helped British 
jihadists acquire terrorist skills, but was probably also involved in the 
decision making processes regarding the nature of the attacks. 
The networks around the radical preachers and the training camps in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan were thus crucial elements of the British 
jihadist movement, but this is not to say that jihadist terrorism in the UK 
was entirely a top-down affair. The group dynamic within jihadist cells 
was an important driver behind many terrorist plots. The radicalisation of 
these cells often started with small groups of young men, who knew each 
other from a mosque or from the neighbourhood they lived in. Before 
there was ever a plan for a terrorist attack, they got together in gyms, 
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mosques and Islamic bookstores to discuss religion and politics.59 The cell 
members rallied around a ringleader, who was usually older than other 
cell members. Mohammed Siddique Khan is a case in point. Some ten 
years the senior of the other 7/7 bombers, he acted as a mentor to 
troubled youths in the Leeds neighbourhood of Beeston, which made him 
something of an authority figure to some in the community.60 Together, 
members of British jihadist cells watched propaganda materials and held 
group discussions to steel the cell members’ convictions as well as their 
willingness to carry out a terrorist attack. During this process, they also 
engaged in what can be described as ‘male bonding’, which included 
karate lessons, survival trips, paintballing and other activities that involve 
physical exercise.61 As cell members isolated themselves from the social 
circles they were part of before, their views hardened, and they became 
more and more committed to the terrorist attack they were to carry out 
eventually.  
Over the years the cohesion and degree of integration of the British 
jihadist movement decreased. Until about 2007 there were, roughly 
speaking, two levels to the jihadist movement in the UK: the international 
jihadist networks that reached all the way to the training camps in 
Pakistan, and the cells made up of local, ‘home grown’ fighters. The two 
levels drew on each other in the fight against the occupation of Muslim 
lands. The international networks recruited locals to take the fight to 
British soil, and the locals used the international networks to gain the 
inspiration and skills needed for a terrorist attack. After the arrest of Abu 
Hamza, the expulsion of Bakri and the dismantlement of the Finsbury 
Park mosque as a radicalisation hotbed and international jihadist hub, the 
British jihadist movement began to move towards a structure more in line 
with the conventional wisdom that jihadist terrorism is scattered and that 
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jihadist cells operate with little direct top-down guidance. The most 
salient illustration of this trend was the emergence of the so-called lone 
wolves, jihadist terrorists who radicalised and planned an attack without 
having had direct contact with other jihadists. In 2008, Andrew Ibrahim 
was arrested before he could use the suicide belt he was making to blow 
himself up in a shopping mall in Bristol.62 A few weeks later, Nick Reilly 
tried to commit a suicide attack on a restaurant in Exeter, but the quality 
of the explosives he used was such that he injured only himself.63 The 
third lone wolf was Roshonara Choudhry, a successful 22-year-old 
student who in 2009 tried to stab Stephen Timms, MP to punish him for 
his support for the invasion in Iraq.64 The smaller cells that planned or 
committed attacks from 2009 onwards were also less connected to the 
larger jihadist community. For instance, the four men who were involved 
in the 2010 Christmas Bomb Plot acted fully on their own accord. They 
had made a list of targets, had been carrying out reconnaissance missions 
and had experimented with incendiary explosives, but at no stage did 
there seem to be any guidance from other terrorist groups. They had not 
been instructed to carry out their attack, nor had they received training in 
a training camp.65 The same went for the cell that was arrested in 2013 for 
planning an attack against a rally by the English Defence League (EDL), a 
right-wing extremist organisation. At least at the time of writing (June 
2014), there was no evidence that any of these men had been in a training 
camp in Pakistan.66 
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The radicalisation of this new generation of British jihadists, took place 
on-line instead of in the Finsbury Park mosque. One particularly 
important source of inspiration was Anwar al-Awlaki. This US-born and 
Yemeni-based radical preacher already had some standing in the British 
jihadist movement before 2007, as he could count Mohammed Hamid, 
who brought together the perpetrators of the 21 July bombings in London, 
and Abdullah Ahmed Ali, the leader of the cell that wanted to bring 
down eight to ten transatlantic flights in 2006, among his followers.67 He 
came to the attention of the US Government after a series of terrorist 
attacks by perpetrators who said they were inspired by his sermons. 
Nidal Hasan, who killed thirteen men in a shooting at a military base in 
Fort Hood, Texas, and Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian who 
tried to detonate an explosive on an airplane bound for Detroit, were both 
followers of Awlaki, as were the members of the cell that tried to detonate 
a car bomb on Times Square in New York in 2010.68 Awlaki’s role in 
British terrorist attacks after 2007 is typical for the way the jihadist 
movement has evolved. Roshonara Choudhry, the perpetrators of the 
Christmas Bomb Plot and the cell that was dismantled in Birmingham in 
2012 all radicalised under the influence of Awlaki’s sermons. Even though 
they never met the man in person, they were deeply impressed by his 
worldview and answered his calls for attacks in the West.69 This practice 
constitutes a marked difference from the way previous jihadists were 
inspired and convinced of the need for a terrorist attack. But while the 
ways in which British jihadists were egged on, had changed, the strategy 
was essentially similar: mass casualty attacks against the West to break 
their will to stay in the Muslim lands. 
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9.1.3 Modus operandi 
The attacks by which British jihadists tried to force the British and their 
troops out of the Muslim lands show some salient patterns. First, the 
jihadist movement’s preferred means of attack is clearly the improvised 
explosive device (IED). The majority of the terrorist plots involved 
explosives that the perpetrators themselves had put together from 
ingredients that were freely available and that were completely harmless 
as such, like hydrogen peroxide and fertiliser. In one case, the planned 
attack on the transatlantic flights of 2006, the perpetrators had to put the 
explosives together as they were in the process of carrying out the attack, 
but in most cases the plan was quite straightforward. The attackers 
assembled the explosives in the apartment of one of the cell members, 
took it to the place they wanted to attack and tried to detonate them.70 
Working with IEDs allows a cell to acquire weapons without drawing 
suspicion, but this way of working by no means guarantees operational 
success. There are plenty of manuals available on the internet, but even if 
the one that is used is accurate, working with freely available materials is 
not easy, and there is much that can still go wrong. Ingredients of home-
made explosives are generally unstable, and the shelf time of bombs that 
are assembled this way is short. Furthermore, it is not easy to accurately 
time an explosion when using such devices.71 Factors like these explain 
the operational failures that occurred in some instances, such as the 21 
July bombings and the attacks on the night club in London and Glasgow 
Airport in 2007. The second characteristic that was shared by most jihadist 
terrorist plots in the UK concerns target selection. The intended targets of 
jihadist terrorists include public transport systems, a night club, a rally of 
the EDL, a restaurant, a shopping mall, and an airport terminal, which 
shows that there was a clear inclination towards attacks that were 
unlikely to be foiled, and would result in many casualties.  
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Attacks that display these two characteristics – mass casualty IED-attacks 
against ‘soft’ targets – account for the majority of jihadist terrorist attacks 
in the UK, but there have been plots that were very different in nature. 
The most elaborate one was the plan by the cell around ringleader Parviz 
Khan. In order to frighten British Muslims out of joining the British Army, 
Khan and his associates wanted to lure a British Muslim soldier out of a 
bar to kidnap and then behead him. Afterwards, a video of the beheading 
would be published to show British Muslims the fate that awaited them if 
they joined the Army.72 The four perpetrators were willing to invest 
weeks of their time trying to win the trust of the intended victim, but 
were arrested before they could put their plan into action. Roshonara 
Choudhry, whose attack was another exception to the rule, took a more 
direct approach. She made an appointment with Stephen Timms, MP, and 
tried to stab him as he was about to shake her hand. She was 
overpowered by a security guard, and Timms suffered only non-life-
threatening wounds.73  
Whereas the government consistently labelled it one of the most 
important security threats to the UK, the British jihadist movement made 
only one deadly victim in the eight years after the 7 July Bombings. This 
modest body count has to be ascribed to good luck and the incompetence 
on the part of terrorists, but also to some aspects of British 
counterterrorism, to which we shall now turn. 
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9.2 Counterterrorism principles and jihadist terrorism in 
the UK 
9.2.1 From the Provisional IRA to Al Qaeda: continuity or 
discontinuity? 
The jihadist threat to the UK may have been one of the gravest in Europe, 
the UK also has a long history of non-jihadist terrorism and, consequently, 
counter-terrorism. During the course of the fight against the Provisional 
IRA, the British government had a developed a legal framework and 
police and intelligence apparatus to deal with terrorism. Whether or not 
this means that there was continuity in the British policy against the 
Provisional IRA and on jihadist terrorism, however, is far from clear. As 
we have seen above, Tony Blair stressed the novelty of the jihadist 
terrorist threat, and argued that new tools were required. Charles Clarke, 
the head of the Counter Terrorism Command at the Metropolitan Police 
Service shared Blair’s assessment: “Colleagues from around the world 
often say to me that the long experience that we have in the United 
Kingdom of combating a terrorist threat must have stood us in good 
stead. That the experience gained during some 30 years of an Irish 
terrorist campaign would have equipped us for the new challenges 
presented by Al Qaeda and its associated groups. To an extent that is true 
– but only to an extent. The fact is that the Irish campaign actually 
operated within a set of parameters that helped shaped our response to 
it.”74  
That the British government felt that jihadist terrorism required different 
countermeasures is also clear from the legislation that was adopted after 
the campaign of the Provisional IRA had come to an end. Even before 
9/11, the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act, the legal framework that was 
brought to bear on the Provisional IRA, was replaced by the Terrorism 
Act 2000. This latter set of laws contained some clauses that the Blair 
administration considered necessary to counter what was called 
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‘international terrorism’, a term that referred to jihadist terrorism. The 
definition of terrorism was broadened, and the police was granted the 
authority to make arrests in the absence of sufficient evidence to press 
charges. They also got the legal mandate to cordon off areas in case of a 
terrorist threat.75 Soon after 9/11 the British government decided that 
Terrorism Act 2000 was not enough. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 was adopted in December 2001 to plug the perceived 
gaps in the Terrorism Act 2000.76 It contained, among a wide variety of 
other things, legislation to counter the financing of terrorist activities as 
well as legal possibilities to indefinitely detain foreign terrorist suspects 
who could not be deported or, for lack of evidence, charged and tried.77 In 
subsequent years, counter-terrorist legislation was amended and 
expanded further. Participation in a terrorist organisation, presence in a 
terrorist training camp and glorification of terrorism were penalised. 
Furthermore, the maximum pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects was 
expanded from 14 to 28 days and the maximum penalties for some 
terrorism-related offences were increased.78  
This expansion of the legal arsenal demonstrates that the fights against 
the Provisional IRA and jihadist terrorism were waged with very different 
weapons. This discontinuity applies to non-legal instruments as well. The 
Prevent strategy, the British attempt to address the root causes of 
terrorism (section 9.2.6), had no equivalent in the British campaign against 
the Provisional IRA. It is true that intelligence played a role in both 
counter-terrorist policies, but in this field there are salient differences, too, 
especially regarding the intelligence tools that were used. The Provisional 
IRA was extensively infiltrated, and was crippled as a result of the work 
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of informers and infiltrators (see section 7.2.4). MI5 lacked the capabilities 
and human resources, however, to successfully apply this approach 
against jihadist cells.79 Also, we will see below that MI5’s manpower was 
drastically increased after 2004, and that the new personnel was hired 
specifically to counter the jihadist terrorist threat. This means that 
intelligence efforts against jihadist terrorism in the UK were implemented 
by different people and with different skills.  
Given this overhaul of British counterterrorism, the remaining paragraphs 
in this chapter will display few parallels between British counter-
terrorism against the Provisional IRA and against jihadist terrorism. From 
a methodological point of view, it is important to take note of this ‘fresh 
start’, since it can be argued that previous experience with the use 
counter-terrorism tools enhances their effectiveness, and that this would 
set this case apart from the ones discussed in the chapters 4 to 8. 
However, given that 9/11 clearly triggered a break with previous counter-
terrorism practices, it is safe to discount previous experience as a factor 
that might determine the outcomes of the application of the counter-
terrorism principles discussed below. 
9.2.2 Law enforcement and direct action 
The French intelligence services, who are said to have coined the term 
‘Londonistan’, had long been annoyed by British leniency regarding 
Islamist extremism, but after 9/11, when the US launched the War on 
Terror, a crackdown was inevitable. One of the first important moves was 
the raid on the Finsbury Park mosque in January 2003. The police made 
seven arrests, and confiscated firearms, a stun gun, protective suits for use 
in CBRN-environments, hunting knives and hand cuffs, as well as large 
numbers of forged and stolen passports.80 The mosque was closed down, 
which left Abu Hamza, who was not arrested during the raid, without a 
place to spread his message. Ever eager for opportunities to show his 
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defiance, Hamza took to preaching outside, on the square in front of the 
mosque. He kept this up until he, too, was arrested in August 2004.81 The 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) failed to get him convicted for 
terrorism-related offences, but he was nevertheless convicted on eleven 
charges, including six counts of soliciting to murder and one count of 
possession of a document containing information likely to be useful to a 
person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.82 Several of Abu 
Hamza’s associates were arrested and convicted as well, among them 
Abdullah al-Faisal, an extremist preacher famous for calling on Muslim 
women to give their young children toy guns so they could practise for 
jihad, adding that “[t]his is the Jihad of a woman, to bring up her sons 
with a Jihad mentality not to be wimps but to be Mojahedeen.”83 
Around the same time when the Finsbury Park mosque was shut down 
and the screws were being tightened on Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada was 
having his own problems with the law. In the 1990s, the authorities had 
sought his advice on how to deal with troubled youths in Muslim 
communities, but from 2002 on Abu Qatada was going in and out of jail 
while waging a legal battle against his deportation to Jordan, where he 
claimed he would be tortured.84 Omar Bakri Mohammed, Londonistan’s 
third major ideologue, did not wait for his arrest. He left the UK in 
August 2005, shortly after several media reported rumours that the UK 
government wanted to prosecute him for treason. He claimed he would 
return to the UK in a matter of weeks, but he was barred from entering 
the country by Home Secretary Charles Clarke, who explained his 
decision by saying that having Bakri in the UK was “not conducive to the 
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public good”.85 In October 2004, Bakri had made another pre-emptive 
move when, acting on rumours that the organisation was about to be 
banned, he dissolved al-Muhajiroun. The organisation continued under 
two new guises, the Saved Sect and al-Ghurabaa (The Strangers), both of 
which were banned in 2006.86 It then went on to become Islam4UK, which 
was banned in 2010.87 In 2008, two leading members of the successor 
organisations to al-Muhajiroun were arrested and convicted for 
fundraising for terrorism and supporting terrorism overseas.88 
Furthermore, out of the 52 control orders (curtailments of the freedom of 
terrorist suspects, see the section on the rule of law) that were imposed in 
the period 2004-2011, 28 concerned foreigners, which indicates that the 
disruption of international networks was a priority in the use of this 
instrument.89 
The arrests, deportations, control orders, and bans clearly took their toll. 
By 2006, the jihadist scene could no longer function the way it had in the 
1990s. The role of Londonistan as a hub for the international jihadist 
movement, where members could finance jihadist groups and 
organisations, acquire false passports and make travel arrangements for 
trips to training camps in the AfPak region, was played out.90 During 
Londonistan’s heyday, support for jihad could be practiced and preached 
quite openly, but now had to take place in living rooms and small 
community centres, and on websites and other online forums. Some 
segments in the movement came up with creative ways to evade British 
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law, like having sermons read out to the congregation by minors, who 
cannot be prosecuted for spreading extremist views. Nevertheless, the 
government crackdown severely limited the jihadist movement’s 
capabilities, which is clear from the nature of the attacks that were plotted 
against the UK. 
The biggest, most complex and – had they all been successfully carried 
out – most deadly plots that were planned in the UK, were planned in the 
period 2001-2006. The 7 and 21 July bombings, the plan to blow up 
transatlantic flights in 2006, the foiled shoe bombing in 2001, and the 2004 
ricin plot included elements that displayed operational skills and 
ambitions. In some cases, the delivery of the explosives was original (ricin 
would be put on door handles, explosives were hidden in shoes), whereas 
in others the simultaneous execution of a series of attacks would 
maximise the shock value as well as the body count. Also, in all these 
cases, at least one cell member travelled to a training camp in Pakistan to 
acquire the skills and expertise needed to carry out the attack. Now that 
the international infrastructure in the UK was heavily damaged as a result 
of government repression, British jihadists had a harder time getting 
access to training camps. An external factor that played into this was the 
decreasing ability of core Al Qaeda to provide training and instructions to 
European recruits. Chased down and losing leading operatives in drone 
strikes, the group around Osama bin Laden was no longer able to play the 
role it had played previously.91 
The decline of Londonistan was reflected in the terrorist attacks in the UK 
after 2007. They were smaller in scale, prepared in isolation and easier to 
carry out, although this latter characteristic was no guarantee for 
operational success. The car bombing in London in 2007 failed, as did the 
attack on Glasgow Airport by the same perpetrators the next day. Also, 
none of the three lone wolves reached their operational objectives. More 
recently, the police disrupted several attacks that would have amounted 
to a single bomb attack against a soft target (see the section on gathering 
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intelligence). It seems, thus, that the jihadist movement in the UK is no 
longer able to plan large-scale, complex attacks. In other words, the 
fragmentation of the jihadist movement in the UK forces cells to plan 
attacks without the assistance of a larger – let alone international – 
network. This has diminished the jihadist movement’s operational 
capabilities. In this sense the direct action of the British government has 
achieved some success, and testifies to the effectiveness of the 
counterterrorism principle ‘law enforcement and direct action’. 
The crackdown on Londonistan has contributed to the reduction of the 
jihadist threat to the UK, but it is as yet doubtful that the jihadist 
movement has been fully eliminated. As late as 2013, some eight years 
after the 7 July Bombings, MI5 is still disrupting – and missing – terrorist 
plots. The most prominent radical preachers may have been removed 
from the scene, but others, often reaching out to their audiences through 
digital media, have taken their place. Anwar al-Awlaki even does so after 
his death. Also, the news that Omar Bakri Mohammed influenced the 
Michael Adebolajo, one of the suspects of the beheading of British soldier 
Lee Rigby in May 2013, shows that there are ways for the older generation 
of preachers to inspire a sympathetic audience.92 The most salient fact that 
suggests that jihadist terrorism is not defeated yet, is the willingness of 
some hundred British Muslims to travel to Syria to join radical Islamist 
groups in their struggle against the government forces of President Assad. 
Direct action has definitely played a role in the containment of jihadist 
violence, but it should be noted that, at least so far, it failed to eradicate 
the jihadist movement entirely. This is no reason to refrain from viewing 
British counterterrorism policing as effective, but it does show that this 
struggle, more so than in any of the other five cases, is still ongoing. 
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9.2.3 Restraint in the use of force 
Although the government response to the jihadist threat has so far been 
largely devoid of violent overreactions on a large-scale, there are 
nevertheless two elements in British counterterrorism that can be 
considered violations of the counterterrorism principle ‘restraint in the 
use of force’. First, there is the low conviction rate for arrests on suspicion 
of terrorism-related offences, which suggests that many of the arrests of 
terrorism suspects are made, were unnecessary or otherwise ill-conceived. 
The second element concerns the stop and searches to which British 
citizens can be subjected in certain designated areas. 
In the period 2001-2012 the British police made 2,174 terrorism arrests, 
that is, arrests of suspects who were thought to have been involved in 
terrorism or a related offence. Charges were pressed against 784 of these 
arrestees (36%). In 464 cases, 21% of the 2,174 arrests, the arrestees were 
charged for terrorism-related offences.93 379 of these 464 were prosecuted, 
and 283 were eventually convicted.94 Information on the outcomes of the 
trials of suspects who were initially arrested for terrorism but 
subsequently charged with non-terrorism-related offences, is not 
available. Nevertheless, it is clear that only a small portion, some 13%, of 
those arrested for terrorism-related offences was convicted. Moreover, in 
the majority of cases (64%), there was not enough ground to press any 
charges at all.95 The British government, supported by independent 
counterterrorism reviewer Lord Carlile, has defended these numbers on 
the grounds that the police cannot take any chances when they suspect 
that a terrorist attack is being prepared, meaning that arrests are 
sometimes made before enough evidence is collected to successfully 
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prosecute the perpetrators.96 Regardless of the validity of such arguments, 
the numbers point to a large number of cases in which force was used 
without a desirable result. 
Furthermore, these terrorism-related arrests were disproportionately 
made against ethnic minorities. The 2011 census established that about 
7.5% UK citizens fell in the ethnic category ‘Asian’, but this same category 
accounted for 35% of the terrorism-related arrests. Similarly, the ethnic 
category ‘Black’ accounted for 3.3% of the British population and 10% of 
the terrorism-related arrests.97 Against this background, many Muslims 
felt discriminated by the way the police handled the terrorist threat. Also, 
the police raids that accompanied many arrests brought the families of the 
arrestees in disrepute, as they felt they were being stigmatised in their 
communities as guilty of or involved in terrorism. Finally, the low 
conviction rate of the arrests gave them an air of randomness, from which 
many Muslims drew the conclusion that it could happen to them, too, 
even though they never had anything to do with terrorism or extremism.98 
In a response to the unrest caused by police repression, the Association of 
Muslim Lawyers released the Information Guide for Muslim Communities 
Dealing with Anti-Terror Arrests / Raids, explaining what can happen 
during a raid, why the government carries out such actions and how to 
deal with the consequences.99 
The second counterterrorism instrument which suggested an overreliance 
on the use of force on the part of the British government was the use of 
stop and search powers. The most important regulation in this regard was 
section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which gave the police so-called stop 
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and search powers. If a certain area had been declared to be at risk of a 
terrorist attack, the police could stop and search all individuals and 
vehicles in that area, regardless of whether or not there was any reason to 
believe that that individual or vehicle could be linked in any way to a 
terrorist plot. The police were granted similar powers around ports and 
airports. Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 gave the police the legal 
mandate to carry out searches on individuals around these transport 
hubs. 
The stop and search powers inscribed in section 44 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 were used more than five hundred thousand times in the period 
2001-2009. In the first years after the stop and search powers were 
introduced, the numbers of applications increased sharply, from some 
10,000 in 2000/01 to 50,000 in 2005/06 and 210,000 in 2008/09.100 The 
numbers declined again after the stop and search powers had been 
discredited and declared illegal by the European Court for Human Rights 
(see the section ‘Rule of law’). There are fewer statistics available for stops 
and searches carried out under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, but 
going by the available numbers, it appears that these powers, too, are 
used tens of thousands of times per year. Some 82,000 examinations were 
reported for 2009/10, and a little over 60,000 for 2010/11 and 2011/12.101 
The hundreds of thousands of stops and searches that have been carried 
out before section 44 was annulled, have yielded negligible results. First 
of all, since 9/11 the numbers of arrests made after stops and searches has 
never accounted for more than 1.5% of the annual number of stops and 
searches. Interestingly, this percentage is considerably lower than the 
equivalent percentages for other legal regulations that grant the police 
stop and search powers, such as the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
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Act.102 What is more, none of the 283 arrests made after a stop and search 
in the period 2001-2012 resulted in a conviction for terrorism-related 
offences.103 On the basis of these observations, counterterrorism reviewer 
Lord Carlile suggested on several occasions that the annual numbers of 
applications of the stop and search powers could be halved without 
compromising the UK’s national security.104 He was critical about stops 
and searches around ports and airports, as well, asserting that these, too, 
could be scaled down at no cost to the security of the British citizens and 
interests.105 
Much like the arrests for terrorism-related offences, the use of stop and 
search powers, from section 44 as well as from Schedule 7, 
disproportionately affects ethnic minorities. For instance, in the year 
2007/08, 54 out of every 100,000 British citizens who are categorised as 
ethnically ‘white’ had to undergo a stop and search. This number lies at 
179 for people in the category ‘Asian’, and at 186 for people categorised as 
‘black’. Similarly, in 2011/12, 27% of the people examined under Schedule 
7 were ‘Asian’, a category accounting for 7.5% of the British population. 
People in the category ‘black’ accounting for 8% of the examinations 
under Schedule 7 and 3.3% of the British population. The numbers for 
2010/11, the only other year for which these data are available, are 
roughly similar.106 Many British Muslims claim that interrogation at 
airports has become a fact of life for them, but this has not kept them from 
expressing annoyance over the kinds of questions that are being asked. 
Customs officials inquire about Muslim passengers’ political views, 
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religious beliefs and positions on jihadism and terrorism. Also, some 
British Muslims have reported interrogations that appeared to be about 
people or organisations they have personal contacts with. In some cases 
they were even asked whether they were willing to act as informers for 
MI5.107 In 2010 the government recognised the widespread perception that 
section 44 and Schedule 7 were being used in stigmatising and 
discriminatory ways, and issued a Home Office Circular containing 
guidelines for the use of these powers in order to soften their impact on 
ethnic minorities.108 
Given these numbers about the arrests and stop and search powers, it 
should come as no surprise that polls show that British Muslims feel that 
counterterrorism legislation is applied unfairly in and discriminatory 
ways.109 The willingness among Muslim communities to cooperate with 
police forces is affected by such practices. This was tellingly illustrated in 
2012, when a group of Birmingham men with a Pakistani background 
discovered a terrorist plot in their community. Rather than informing the 
police, they took action themselves. With the help of relatives in Pakistan, 
they tried to intercept cell members whom they knew to be on their way 
to a training camp.110 The police are worried about such instances of 
disregard of the authorities and are aware of the role that 
counterterrorism plays in bringing about tensions in the relations between 
local police forces and Muslim communities.111 As Metropolitan Assistant 
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Commissioner Ghaffur said, “the impact of this will be that just at the 
time when we need the confidence and trust of these communities, they 
may retreat inside themselves”.112 This is, however, something very 
different than support for the jihadist movement. 
In counterterrorism, the importance of restraint in the use of force is 
argued from the belief that overreliance on the use of force will antagonise 
the population and drive them into the arms of the terrorist movement. 
What is recognised less often, is that the step from antagonising the 
population to support for a terrorist group is far from a foregone 
conclusion. A 2009 poll showed that 78% of British Muslims identify 
themselves with the UK, a percentage considerably higher than among 
non-Muslims in the UK (50%). This loyalty to the British state also far 
exceeds that of Muslims in Germany (49%) and France (23%) to their 
respective states. Also, British Muslims appear to have more confidence in 
the media, the courts, the electoral system and financial institutions than 
non-Muslims in the UK.113 Furthermore, many British Muslims live in 
communities without cultural, familial or religious ties to the jihadist 
movement.114 When asked in 2005 whether they had ever encountered an 
extremist preacher, 69% of the Muslim respondents answered that they 
had not, 22% that they had only once or twice, and 5% said they regularly 
encountered radical preachers.115 These numbers show that, in spite of 
some practices that can be considered violations of the counterterrorism 
principle ‘restraint in the use of force’, the UK did not offer fertile ground 
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for the jihadist creed, nor are there any indications that new recruits have 
flocked into the jihadist movement because of the heavy-handedness with 
which the government tries to keep the UK safe from terrorist attacks. 
It is nevertheless true that violent responses to repressive 
counterterrorism measures have occurred. In August 2011 a police officer 
in the London neighbourhood of Tottenham fatally shot 29-year-old Mark 
Duggan, according to the police during an operation to fight gun crime in 
London’s black communities. Duggan’s friends and family organised a 
peaceful protest march, but matters spiralled out of control after a 
skirmish between police and protesters in front of the Tottenham Police 
Station. The next four days London and other major British cities were 
confronted with riots and looting on a scale and intensity that in recent 
years was only matched by the 2005 riots in the banlieues of Paris. Five 
died, and the estimated material damage amounted to more than £200 
million.116 Interviews with participants showed that the riots were to a 
considerable extent a form of protest against the way second and third 
generation immigrants were treated by the police.117 It turned out that 
particularly the discriminatory use of the stops and search powers in the 
Terrorism Act 2000 created much bad blood between immigrant youths 
and the police.118 But while the riots were partially triggered by political 
factors, they were essentially a-political. There was no clear set of 
demands that the rioters wanted to force on the government. What this 
shows is that even violent backlashes from repressive counterterrorism do 
not necessarily take the form of terrorist attacks. British counterterrorism 
bred resistance, but not terrorism. 
Another important point that needs to be taken into account when 
assessing the effects of repressive government actions in the UK, is that 
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they do not appear to play a large role in the motivations of those that did 
join the British jihadist movement. It is important to realise that the 
jihadist movement in the UK wages a fight to fulfil the vision of Sayyid 
Qutb, whose main preoccupation was bringing change to the Muslim 
lands. There is little to suggest that British jihadists engage in violent 
action to improve the plight of Muslims in the UK. That the liberation of 
the Muslim lands was the overriding concern for the jihadist movement in 
the UK is clear from the pronouncements of the perpetrators themselves, 
who in most cases left little doubt about the reasons for their attacks. 
Mohammed Siddique Khan, for instance, said in his martyrdom video, 
released a year after the 7/7 Bombings: “The lands and interests of the 
states that took part in the aggression on Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan 
are considered targets for us, so anybody who seeks peace should stay 
away from these states.”119 The ring leader of the cell that was planning 
the attacks on transatlantic flights in 2006, Abdullah Ahmed Ali, 
expressed a similar motivation for the terrorist plot he was involved in: 
“We’ve warned you so many times get out of our lands, leave us alone, 
but you have persisted in trying to humiliate us, kill us and destroy us.”120  
Other British jihadists who committed or were planning terrorist attacks 
to punish the British government for the military presence Muslim soil, 
include Hussein Osman, one of the members of the cell that committed 
the 21 July bombings. During his trial he even claimed that the conflict in 
Iraq was more important to the cell than the shared religious experience: 
“More than praying we discussed work, politics, the war in Iraq ... we 
always had new films of the war in Iraq ... more than anything else those 
in which you could see Iraqi women and children who had been killed by 
US and UK soldiers.”121 He may have been overstating this point to 
downplay his extremist convictions during his trial, but the emphasis of 
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the cell’s motivation on Iraq is clear. Bilal Mohammed, the physician who 
committed a failed car bomb attack in London and drove a car filled into 
the terminal of Glasgow Airport similarly stressed the invasion in Iraq as 
a motivating factor: “My political views changed dramatically towards 
the [British] government. (…) They shared in murdering my people. It 
was the British government and American government. Without Blair, 
Bush couldn’t have invaded Iraq.”122 The lone operatives Nick Reilly, 
Andrew Ibrahim and Roshonara Choudhry, too, claimed to have acted 
out of rage over the western military presence in Iraq.123 Similarly, in a 
meeting in 2010 between British government officials and radicalising 
youths, one of the latter reportedly said “he was angered by the death of 
women and children in Afghanistan and if given half a chance he would 
go abroad to fight British soldiers in Afghanistan. Another member of the 
group intervened and said, why do you want to go abroad when you can 
kill them here.”124 
Further evidence for the importance of western foreign policy vis-à-vis 
the Muslim world are the suggestions by some suicide bombers that 
terrorist attacks would cease once the government would withdraw 
British forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. In his martyrdom video 
Mohammed Siddique Khan said: “Until we feel security, you will be our 
targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and 
torture of my people we will not stop this fight.”125 His fellow-perpetrator 
Shezhad Tanweer was even more explicit on this point. In his martyrdom 
video, he came close to tabling a demand: “What you have witnessed now 
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[the 7/7 Bombings, TvD] is only the beginning of a string of attacks that 
will continue and become stronger until you pull your forces out of 
Afghanistan and Iraq and until you stop your financial and military 
support to America and Israel.”126 Abdullah Ahmed Ali made a similar 
point in his martyrdom video: “Leave us alone. Stop meddling in our 
affairs and we will leave you alone.” The martyrdom videos of Ali’s 
fellow cell members Umar Islam and Waheed Zaman also contained 
statements to this effect.127 A final example concerns Nick Reilly, the 
Islamic convert who, acting on instructions from two unknown men in the 
Middle East, tried to carry out a suicide bombing in a restaurant in Exeter 
in 2008. In a suicide note he had left at home, he called on Western 
governments to pull their forces out of Iraq and Afghanistan and to stop 
supporting Israel, adding that violence would go on “until wrongs had 
been righted.”128 
Only in later years have new kinds of motivations emerged. The cell that 
was dismantled in Birmingham in 2012 was planning to carry out a 
terrorist attack to revenge the cartoons of Mohammed by the Danish 
cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. Talking about his martyrdom video, one cell 
member told the others that he had recorded the following warning to the 
unbelievers: “You people think that by making these cartoons of the 
Prophet, peace be upon him, you are going to defame him. No, you’ll 
never achieve this.”129 Another plot that was not about western military 
presence in the Muslim world is the plan of the three-man cell that 
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wanted to carry out an attack on a gathering of the EDL.130 In a written 
statement they had with them in their car when they were arrested, the 
three explained the action they were about to carry out as follows: “What 
we did today was a direct retaliation of your insulting of the Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon Him) & also in retaliation of your crusade 
against Islam/Muslims on a global scale.”131 From these words, one can 
speculate that may have had geopolitical factors in mind as well, but they 
were not specific about this, and their target selection suggested a focus 
on domestic politics. But while the plans of the Birmingham cell and the 
plot against the EDL constitute something of a deviation from an 
otherwise fairly consistent pattern, a recent trend again underscores the 
international orientation of the British jihadist movement. In 2012, it was 
estimated that some 50 British citizens had travelled to Somalia to join the 
fundamentalist militant group al-Shabaab (The Youth). This gave rise to 
some unease about the risk that such fighters would pose after their 
return to the UK.132 These concerns became more pressing in early 2013, 
when the news broke that some hundred British jihadists had travelled to 
Syria to join Al Qaeda-affiliated, Islamist extremist militias in their fight 
against the ‘godless’ regime of Bashir al-Assad.133 Thus, instead of 
focussing on the troubles of British Muslims, such as the discriminatory 
use of stop and search powers and the arrests of innocent terrorism 
suspects, the movement again gives precedence to the liberation of 
Muslim lands.  
Showing little interest in domestic British counterterrorism and its impact 
on Muslims, the jihadist movement prefers to focus on what goes on 
outside the UK. This mindset explains why the violations of the 
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counterterrorism principle ‘restraint in the use of force’ did not provide 
significant boosts for the jihadist movement. They did have negative side 
effects in other areas, but reasoned purely from a counterterrorism 
perspective, one can say that the rule that lacks of restraint in the use of 
force strengthens terrorist groups does not apply to the British fight 
against jihadist terrorism. 
9.2.4 Rule of law 
The discriminatory application of stop and search powers and the large 
numbers of arrests of innocent civilians were not the only aspects of 
British counterterrorism that deviated from the principles described in the 
first chapter. There were also several instances in which the British 
government was successfully challenged on the legality of such measures. 
The previous section concerned the way certain powers were used, but in 
several cases the British government had to concede that they were not 
allowed to have certain powers in the first place. The first major legal 
difficulty concerned Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001. According to the provisions laid down in this Act, foreign nationals 
suspected of terrorism could be detained indefinitely without trial. This 
rule was introduced to enable the government to deal with foreign 
terrorist suspects who could not be deported, either because no country 
was willing to receive them, or because the suspect was likely to face 
torture in the receiving country.134 This practice did not last long, as the 
Law Lords, the UK’s highest judicial body, ruled in 2004 that it was a 
violation of the right to liberty as enshrined in article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.135 
In response to the decision of the Law Lords, the British government 
resorted to another policy that would also turn out to be a breach of the 
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rule of law. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 allowed the so-called 
control order, which could be imposed on terrorist suspects against whom 
there was too little evidence to press charges with a reasonable chance of 
success. Essentially, control orders restricted the freedom of suspects in 
order to keep them from engaging in terrorist activity. In concrete terms, 
control orders could forbid terrorist suspects from meeting certain people, 
accessing certain websites, visiting certain places and getting in touch 
with certain organisations. A control order could also include a house 
arrest for sixteen hours of the day, as well as a ban on the possession of 
certain objects and substances.136 By 2010 some fifty people had been 
subjected to a control order.137 
The most fundamental objection that opponents levelled against the 
control orders was that they restricted the liberty of people who had not 
been sentenced, or even charged. In early 2011 an international group of 
human rights organisations even went as far as to say that the use of 
control orders was “the trademark of despots”.138 But what made the 
control orders untenable was not to only the notion that they entailed the 
exacting of a penalty in the absence of a crime, but also the withholding 
from the suspects of the information on the basis of which the decision to 
impose a control order was made.139 The government defended this 
practice by saying that the UK’s national security would be put at risk if 
such information, often supplied by MI5, was shared. The measure’s 
opponents found some vindication in an April 2006 ruling of the High 
Court, which stated that the control orders were a violation of article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.140 This article holds that 
citizens cannot be curtailed in their freedom without “a fair and public 
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hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.”141 Another heavy blow to the control orders 
came in 2009, when the Law Lords ruled that the control orders were 
illegal as long as they did not respect the principle of open evidence. The 
suspect’s right to know why s/he was put under a control order could not 
be ignored in the name of national security.142 Home Secretary Alan 
Johnson appealed against the High Court’s decision, but the Court of 
Appeal upheld the High Court’s ruling in July 2010.143 In the face of this 
legal defeat, and under the pressure of the Liberal Democrats, who were 
longstanding opponents of control orders, the coalition government that 
took power in 2010 decided to reform the control order.  
In the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Bill, 
which outlines the new version of the control orders, some forms of 
restriction of a suspect’s freedom are dropped. A terrorist suspect under a 
control order can, for instance, no longer be forced to relocate, and can no 
longer be barred from phone and internet use. Also, the Bill stipulates that 
a TPIM can last no longer than two years.144 At the time of writing (June 
2013), various human rights organisations and legal scholars still question 
the Bill’s legality, claiming that the changes have not addressed the 
fundamental problems of the control orders, such as the use of 
information that is routinely being kept from the suspect.145 
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Another instrument which constituted a violation of human rights was 
the right of the police to stop and search any person and any vehicle in 
areas where permission for such actions was granted by the Home 
secretary. As we have seen above, these powers could be used even if 
there was no reason to suspect a person of a crime. Soon after its 
introduction, section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, in which the stop and 
search powers were formulated, was unsuccessfully challenged. The High 
Court ruled in November 2003 that the stop and search powers were 
compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and were 
proportionate in relation to the terrorist threat to the UK. The Law Lords 
upheld this ruling in 2006.146  
But this did not put matters to rest, as the police were widely criticised for 
discriminatory use of stop and search powers. Several human rights 
groups pointed out that the powers granted to the police in section 44 
were used disproportionately against ethnic minorities.147 Furthermore, 
interviews and polls showed that there was a widespread feeling among 
ethnic minorities that the police, in the application of stop and search 
powers, had a tendency to single out people who were clearly 
recognisable as Muslims.148 The powers were discredited further by the 
fact that, as we have seen above, it failed to result in a single terrorism-
related conviction, even though it was applied tens of thousands of times 
per year.149 Also, several areas turned out to have been designated for 
stop and searches without permission from the Home Secretary. As a 
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result of these errors, thousands of people had been stopped and searched 
illegally.150 
In 2010, after a legal battle that had started in 2003, the European Court of 
Human Rights declared the stop and search powers illegal. According to 
the Court, the stops and searches constituted a violation of the right to 
privacy.151 In its judgment the Court also noted that “the risks of the 
discriminatory use of the powers against such persons is a very real 
consideration”, pointing out that “[t]he available statistics show that black 
and Asian persons are disproportionately affected by the powers”.152 In 
response to the ECHR ruling, the coalition government replaced section 
44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 with a section that formulated a more 
circumscribed set of powers. Under the new law, a senior police officer 
could still designate an area for the application of stop and search powers, 
but only if s/he suspected that a terrorist attack was about to take place. 
The Secretary of State for Home Affairs now has to confirm a designation, 
and the maximum duration for stop and search powers in a given area 
was put at fourteen days.153  
As was explained in chapter 1, many authors have emphasised the 
importance of the state’s adherence to national and international law in 
countering terrorism, as breaches would strengthen the case of a terrorist 
organisation or movement. Breaking the law would, first, confirm 
terrorist claims about the state lacking legitimacy, and second, signal that 
the terrorists are a real threat. The preceding paragraphs have made it 
clear that there violations of international law did occur during the British 
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government’s fight against jihadist terrorism, but it is doubtful that this 
has contributed to the terrorist threat in a meaningful way. 
Given the low numbers of people being affected by control orders, 
opposition to this instrument was largely limited to human rights 
organisations and political parties. Amnesty International, Liberty and 
Human Rights Watch published reports that were highly critical of the 
control order regulations.154 The Liberal Democrats were critical as well, 
although they accepted a revised version of the control order regulations 
when they became part of the coalition government in 2010.155 In terms of 
popular resistance or dissent, control orders did not attract much 
attention. Lord Carlile of Berriew, QC, the UK’s independent reviewer of 
counterterrorism legislation, also consults the wider public during his 
assessments and noted in a review of the control order regulation that he 
“received far more correspondence concerning stop and search under 
counter-terrorism powers, detention periods before charge, and activity at 
ports of entry”.156 This, too, suggests that the breach of the law constituted 
by the control orders has not given rise to a deep-seated mistrust of the 
British government, let alone an increase in the sympathy for jihadist 
groups. 
The response of Muslim minorities to the stop and search powers has 
been described in the section ‘Restraint in the use of force’ and need to be 
repeated here, except to stress that the objections that people raised 
against it, were not framed in a jihadist narrative. Ethnic minorities may 
have felt a sense of discrimination, and they may be distrustful of, or even 
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hostile to, the police, but such sentiments have not moved them to take 
the side of jihadist terrorists. On their part, the jihadist movement does 
not seem to have seized on the British violations of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to underscore the lack of legitimacy of the 
British state or its anti-Muslim bias. None of the terrorist plots were 
intended as a protest against counterterrorist legislation and its alleged 
illegality, nor can they be understood as ways to force the British 
government to change its ways in this regard. Much like the instances 
where the British government violated the principle of restrained use of 
force, the breaches of the rule of law did not have an inflammatory and 
counterproductive effect on the British jihadist movement, and there is no 
evidence that they have drawn sympathizers to the movement. 
9.2.5 Gathering intelligence 
Intelligence gathering has been a thorny subject in debates on British 
counterterrorism ever since it transpired that MI5, the British security 
service, knew that 7 July plotters Mohammed Siddique Khan and 
Shezhad Tanweer were active in radical circles. Several official reviews of 
the performance of MI5 around the time of the 2005 London Bombings 
noted that Siddique Khan and Tanweer had been caught on tape having a 
conversation with several members of the cell that was working on the 
fertiliser bomb plot. Also, Siddique Khan appeared on camera 
surveillance footage from 2001, showing him participating in a jihadist 
training session in the north of England, organised by Osama bin 
London.157  
For a variety of reasons – Siddique Khan’s name was spelled differently in 
various databases, in some intelligence reports he and Tanweer were 
unidentified or had been identified under a wrong name – MI5 failed to 
connect the dots and did not have as adequate a picture of the London 
Bombers’ activities as it could have had. While a high-ranking MI5 officer 
(identified only as Witness G) admitted as much during the Coroner’s 
inquest into the London Bombings, a report from the Intelligence and 
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Security Committee claimed that, even if all available pieces of 
information had been integrated, there would not have been indications 
that Siddique Khan and Tanweer were planning an attack themselves.158 
Another factor that played a major role in the decision not to follow up in 
the clues about Siddique Khan and Tanweer was the lack of resources. 
After 9/11 the number of investigative targets – individuals whom MI5 
deemed dangerous enough to follow – increased from 250 in 2001 to 800 
in July 2005.159 This meant that difficult choices had to be made about the 
allocation of resources and manpower. The vast majority of MI5’s 
capacity in 2004 was taken up by Operation Crevice, especially after the 
ringleader of the cell that was under investigation started mentioning 
targets. Then, shortly after the cell that was planning the fertiliser bomb 
attack had been dismantled, MI5 discovered another cell that was nearing 
the execution of a terrorist plot. Operation Rhyme, which would end in 
August 2004 with the arrest of the members of this second cell, took up 
about as much resources as Operation Crevice. In other words, so MI5 
claimed, there was little capacity left for the investigation of other cases, 
let alone those in which there were no concrete indications of an attack.160 
In a response to what was still widely considered an intelligence failure, 
the Labour government under Blair introduced several reforms to MI5. 
The British security service started operating regional branches in order to 
improve the organisation’s understanding of the local circumstances. 
Also, the agency started working with so-called ‘legacy teams’, groups of 
intelligence officers that would investigate individuals who, like Siddique 
Khan and Tanweer, had been seen in the periphery of dismantled jihadist 
cells but were not directly relevant for the plot under investigation.161 The 
most important government response to the reviews of the intelligence 
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apparatus, however, was the drastic increase of the resources that came 
available to MI5. The British intelligence community’s budget (in publicly 
available documents not broken down into separate budgets for MI5, MI6 
and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)) doubled to 
almost £2 billion in the period 2001/2002 – 2011/2012. The number of MI5 
staff increased from 1,500 before 9/11 to 4,000 in 2011.162 The newly-
acquired resources were invested primarily in manpower, to the point 
where any more spending would have gone beyond MI5’s capability to 
absorb new staff.163 Some 75% of MI5’s capacity was now deployed 
against jihadist terrorism in the UK.164 Exact numbers are not available, 
but MI5 reported a strong increase of the number of investigative suspects 
that could be covered.165 
Intelligence agencies and security services are often pitied for their 
inability to publicly claim their successes. As a result of the secrecy that 
surrounds much of their work, so the reasoning goes, only the failures of 
the secret services, which become clear after terrorist attacks, are meted 
out in the press.166 If this is the case for most secret services, MI5 is 
certainly an exception, as it is clear from publicly available information 
that they were involved in almost all foiled plots that occurred in the UK 
after the 2005 London Bombings. The first such instance occurred in 2006, 
when the cell that was planning an attack on a series of US-bound flights 
was dismantled. The cell’s ringleader Abdullah Ahmed Ali was put under 
surveillance after he returned from a training camp in Pakistan. After the 
police had spotted him and other cell members dispose of hydrogen 
peroxide bottles, MI5 secretly searched Ali’s apartment. They found a 
bomb factory, and decided to leave a camera and a microphone to keep 
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track of the cell’s progress.167 Parviz Khan, who wanted to kidnap and 
behead a British soldier to deter other Muslims from joining the Army, 
was bugged as well. Little information is available about MI5’s role in the 
disruption of this plot, but it is known that some 8,500 man hours were 
spent on the processing of conversations that were recorded by a 
microphone that MI5 officers had planted in Khan’s apartment in 
Birmingham.168 
In other cases microphones were hidden in cars rather than in apartments. 
The cell that was arrested around Christmas 2010 came to MI5’s attention 
when its members were involved in skirmishes with right-wing extremist 
youths in Stoke. Afterwards, they carried on preparing a terrorist attack, 
unaware that MI5 was listening in on conversations they had in their 
cars.169 The plans of four Luton men, convicted for preparation of a 
terrorist attack using a remote controlled toy car laden with IEDs, were 
foiled in a similar manner.170 After MI5 had noticed that the cell was 
recruiting new members and that two of the men had travelled to a 
training camp in Pakistan, intelligence officers planted listening devices in 
the cars of two of the four men.171 A final example of a cell that MI5 had 
bugged, was the Birmingham Cell, a group of three men who were 
arrested in 2012 for preparing a terrorist attack. After two cell members 
had come back from Pakistan, they came to the attention of MI5, who 
found that the apartment of one of the cell members was used as a bomb 
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factory. Convinced that the plot was serious, the secret service planted 
bugs in the apartment as well as in one cell member’s car. The recordings 
that were made, were an important source of evidence in the cell 
members’ trial.172 
Against these successes, one can pit a list of attacks that British 
intelligence did not pick up on. First, the planning of the three jihadist 
lone wolf attacks had gone unnoticed by MI5. Roshonara Choudhry and 
Nick Reilly failed, but were able to carry out their attack, and Andrew 
Ibrahim was only caught when people who visited the same mosque 
alerted the police when they suspected that the 19-year-old convert was 
radicalising and planning an attack.173 The 2007 car bombings in London 
and Glasgow came as a surprise as well, although one of the two 
perpetrators, Bilal Abdullah, had been seen interacting with a group of 
radicals. At the time though, much like in the case of Siddique Khan and 
Tanweer, there was no reason to believe that Abdullah was involved in 
the planning of a terrorist attack.174 More recently, as has been mentioned 
above, three British jihadists were caught on their way to carry out an 
attack against a rally of the EDL. They would have gone undetected if not 
for a routine check that revealed that there was something wrong with 
their car insurance. In the subsequent inspection of the vehicle, the police 
found the weapon, and the attack plan came to light.175 At the time of 
writing (June 2013), the latest terrorist attack that MI5 missed out on, 
occurred in May 2013. Two men of Nigerian origin, both of whom were 
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known to MI5 as radicals, attacked and beheaded 25-year-old soldier Lee 
Rigby in broad daylight in a street near an Army base in London.176  
Overall, the record of British intelligence against jihadist terrorism is 
mixed. Before the 2005 London Bombings, two major attack plans were 
foiled, but this proved such a burden on MI5’s the capabilities that two 
other large plots (the 7 and 21 July Bombings) were missed. After the 
increase of the intelligence budget, the grasp of MI5 on the jihadist 
movement seems to have increased, but only for a certain type of cell. 
There were several instances where MI5 managed to penetrate a cell, 
mostly through technological means, which constitutes the output that 
goes with the programme theory for intelligence gathering as formulated 
in chapter 1. Furthermore, in all these cases, the intelligence thus 
gathered, helped in disrupting the plot and securing convictions against 
the perpetrators. For these cases the effectiveness of British 
counterterrorism is clear. 
On the other hand, a sizable – almost equal – number of plots went 
undetected. When taking into account the differences between the 
detected and the undetected plots, it becomes clear that the effectiveness 
of British counterterrorism intelligence after 2005 is limited to larger cells 
of which at least one member went to Pakistan to undergo terrorist 
training (see figure 22).177  
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Figure 22. Perpetrator characteristics of terrorist plotters in the UK after 2005 
This finding confirms the widely shared notion that terrorist cells that are 
smaller and less integrated in a wider network leave fewer traces and are 
therefore more difficult to track down.178 But what the British case also 
shows, is that this operational security comes at a price. Many of the post-
7/7 plots that go undetected, displayed a certain amateurishness and did 
not cause many casualties. Mobilising resources for a large-scale attack is 
more difficult for small groups or lone operatives, which suggests that 
operational security goes at the expense of operational capabilities. Thus, 
while the MI5’s intelligence gathering efforts were only effective against 
one segment of the jihadist movement, it is important to note that this 
segment is also the most dangerous one. 
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9.2.6 Addressing root causes and offering counter narratives 
The first comprehensive counterterrorism strategy published by the 
British government already recognised the need for a more preventive 
strand. The 2003 document Countering International Terrorism: the United 
Kingdom’s Strategy, which was kept classified until 2006, mentioned the 
importance of “the battle of ideas” and stressed that it was necessary to 
address “structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute 
to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination”. It listed Prevent 
as one of the four main pillars of British counterterrorism, next to Pursue 
(arresting and trying terrorists), Protect (harden potential targets) and 
Respond (crisis management).179 An important development that drove 
the adoption of the Prevent strand was the increasing flow of British 
citizens travelling to jihadist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
after 9/11. But while officially on a par with the other three strands from 
the start, Prevent only gained prominence after the 7 and 21 July 
Bombings, which made it clear that the UK faced a ‘home grown’ as well 
as an external threat. Indeed, the revised counterterrorism strategy that 
came out in 2009 admitted that the root causes of the jihadist threat in the 
UK had not been given due attention.180 
In response to the 2005 attacks on the London subway, the government 
assembled a series of working groups to formulate recommendations on 
preventive policies against the ‘home grown’ jihadist threat. The final 
report of this exercise was published in October 2005, and provided input 
for Preventing Violent Extremism Together: winning hearts and minds, the 
action plan that was launched in April 2007.181 In essence the action plan 
entailed the financing of projects against extremism that were to be 
carried out by local governments. It stressed the promotion of shared 
values as one of the strategic priorities, and gave local actors – both 
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governmental and non-governmental – the responsibility for the 
implementation of the action plan. The nature of the projects that were 
financed, varied widely, and included the development of educational 
materials against Islamophobia, English language courses in mosques, 
mentor programmes for Somalian youths who had been engaged in petty 
crime, sports events, cultural and culinary festivals, training courses for 
imams, and initiatives for the emancipation of women.182 The overall 
budget for projects carried out by local governments and their partner 
organisations amounted to some £65 million for the period 2007-2011.183  
From the outset the Prevent programme suffered from a series of rather 
fundamental flaws. First, Prevent was strongly associated with terrorism, 
which gave many in the British Muslim communities the impression that 
they were being distrusted and treated as a suspect community. In a 
response to the programme, the Islamic Society of Britain said: “The term 
‘Prevent’ lends itself to the idea that there lies a dormant terrorist within 
Muslims; that somewhere, entwined in their instincts and licensed by 
their religious beliefs, there is the possibility that, albeit very rarely, will 
turn to terrorism against the state. And so we must do everything to 
‘prevent’ that from happening.”184 This characterisation of Prevent was 
lent credence by the strong correlation between the size of the Muslim 
community in a certain area and the amounts of Prevent funding that area 
received.185 The practice of spending more Prevent money in areas with 
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larger Muslim communities suggested that the government strongly 
associated the terrorist threat with Islam.  
The suspicions of among Muslim communities were fanned further by 
instances in which Prevent projects were perceived primarily as part of 
the government’s security policies.186 Several participating organisations 
claimed that they had been approached by the police with requests for 
information, for example regarding the political views and social contacts 
of certain individuals. Some youth workers involved in Prevent projects 
even claimed that they were asked by MI5 to act as informers. They also 
related stories about how they had been harassed by the authorities when 
they refused to cooperate.187 Regardless of the validity of these claims and 
the frequency of such incidents, the spying allegations did little to 
enhance the credibility of the Prevent programme among Muslim 
communities. In fact, as many felt that Prevent was merely, in the words 
of a Muslim public sector worker, “Pursue in sheep’s clothing”, there was 
a certain reluctance among Muslim civil society as well as among Muslim 
youths to participate in projects that were financed with Prevent 
money.188 This prompted one respondent to euphemistically suggest 
during the review of the Prevent strategy that it “could be more effective 
in the future without the stigma of association with a security policy”.189 
The second major problem was that local governments were not familiar 
with the problem at hand, and received little concrete guidance about 
what the Prevent programme should entail and achieve.190 Consequently, 
much funding was spent on projects that were only very remotely, if at 
all, related to fighting terrorism or extremism. Examples include rap 
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workshops, funding for basketball and cricket clubs, multicultural food 
festivals, lectures on ‘prophetic medicine’ (the pronouncements of 
Mohammed on sickness and treatments) and camping gear for a Muslim 
scouting branch in Bristol.191 Equally ineffective but more damaging were 
the projects in which funding was unwittingly granted to extremist 
organisations by government officials who had no intimate knowledge 
about extremist groups.192 In one such case the Cordoba Foundation 
received Prevent funding for a debate on integration in which members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the pro-jihadist Hizb ut- Tahrir organisation 
were taking part. Unsurprisingly, 78% of the audience agreed afterwards 
with the statement that “political participation had failed Muslims.”193 
Third, Prevent also strained the relations of the government with other 
religious minorities, who felt that Muslim communities were being 
rewarded for generating a terrorist threat. In an open letter, the Sikh 
Community Action Network took the government to task for a policy 
which “dedicated £80 million for the Muslim sector”, while “the rest of 
the population remains ignored, excluded and forgotten”.194 Another Sikh 
civic organisation lambasted the government for feeding “victimisation 
among Muslims and a growing sense of resentment and marginalisation 
in other religious communities”.195 
The first two of these three difficulties also hamstrung the more 
individually targeted strand of the Prevent strategy. The Channel Project, 
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initiated in 2008 and still in place at the time of writing, was developed as 
a way to keep at-risk individuals from becoming involved in radical or 
terrorist activities. First-line professionals, such as police officers, social 
workers, youth workers and teachers, can report on individuals who they 
believe are vulnerable to terrorist or violent extremist groups. Such 
individuals are then subjected to a risk assessment by a panel of local 
stakeholders, including the police, and if they are considered potential 
terrorists or violent extremists, they are subjected to a Channel 
intervention.196 The intervention is tailored to the specific situation of the 
individual involved, and may include various forms of therapy and 
counselling as well as activities aimed at the improvement of the 
individual’s housing situation, job market prospects and social life.197 
Much like the Prevent projects addressed above, the Channel Project too, 
has been criticised for serving intelligence purposes. Participants in the 
implementation of Channel interventions have been approached by the 
police for details about the individuals involved198, and the strong 
connection between Channel and counterterrorism caused British 
Muslims to stay away from the Channel project altogether.199 Moreover, 
the referrals to the Channel Project were made by professionals who knew 
little about radicalisation, leading to situations in which teachers referred 
high-school students expressing strong pro-Palestinian views to the 
Channel Project. Another testament to the apparent risk-aversity of the 
first-line professionals is the fact that dozens of the individuals referred to 
the Channel Project were no more than twelve years old. So as the 
government called on first-line professionals with no expertise in 
terrorism or extremism to recognise radicalisation, a phenomenon about 
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which even MI5 admitted that it is hard to spot200, there is no real way of 
knowing whether the people who went through the Channel Project 
represented genuine risks. 
In the face of the difficulties of the Prevent strategy Theresa May, Home 
Secretary for the coalition government of the Conservative Party and the 
Liberal Democrats, announced a review of the Prevent policy of the 
Labour government. The findings of this review, which were presented in 
2011 and confirmed the problems discussed above, were incorporated in a 
new Prevent strategy. The coalition government decided to focus Prevent 
more specifically on terrorism. Unlike its previous incarnation, the new 
strategy was not aimed at extremism per se, but only against cases where 
there was a real risk that extremism might veer into terrorism. Also, 
initiatives that smacked of community and cohesion building were taken 
out of the Prevent programme, so as to avoid the impression that the 
government was interested in such matters, not out of commitment to the 
well-being of Muslim communities, but only inasmuch as they 
contributed to national security. Another major shift was that funding 
was to be monitored more carefully to make sure, first, that resources are 
allocated to projects that clearly contribute to the goals of the Prevent 
Strategy goals and, second, that no extremist organisation receives 
government funding.201 
If we take the history of the Prevent programme back to the question of 
effectiveness, it should be noted that the implementation was so botched – 
poorly targeted interventions that alienated religious communities from 
the government – that it is hard to see how it could have contributed to 
the curbing of the jihadist movement in the UK. There is no evidence that 
it has, whereas recent jihadist plots and the British radicals travelling to 
Syria show that the jihadist creed still has some appeal, at least enough to 
sustain a terrorist threat. 
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However, the shortcomings of Prevent go beyond matters of 
implementation. Even for the projects that did not suffer from the flaws 
described in the preceding paragraphs, there is little reason – let alone 
evidence – to assume that they worked. While it is theoretically possible 
that the projects carried out under the aegis of the Prevent agenda have 
dissuaded some potential radicals from joining extremist groups, the case 
histories of known British jihadist terrorists make it clear that this is 
unlikely. Drawing mainstream civil society organisations into Prevent 
policies may have been helpful in improving the relations between the 
government and Muslim communities, but is not a feasible way to halt 
radicalisation processes that are characterised by a withdrawal from these 
very same civil society organisations.202 The perpetrators of the 7 and 21 
Bombings, for instance, adopted their extremist views as they established 
contacts in radicalisation hotbeds, like the Iqra bookstore and the Finsbury 
Park mosque. The hold that authority figures in the jihadist scene – 
ringleaders, preachers, Afghanistan veterans, core Al Qaeda members – 
had over aspiring jihadists in the UK – and elsewhere – was much more 
powerful than that of mainstream mosques and educational 
institutions.203 Another collective that plays an important role during a 
radicalisation process is the terrorist cell itself. In the UK, radical jihadist 
ideas are often formed by contact with peers. From several cells involved 
in plotting terrorist attacks in the UK, it is known that they engaged in 
intense discussions of their religious views and the importance of jihad in 
private settings. They discussed the situation in Iraq, and cemented their 
commitment to the cause by watching footage of US or British soldiers 
mistreating Iraqi citizens. In the cases of the lone wolves, the 
radicalisation process takes place in isolation, not in a setting where views 
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can be challenged and counter arguments can be inserted in an 
individual’s thought process. For these cases, too, it is hard to believe that 
Prevent projects have had a major impact. 
The point here is that the Prevent agenda – both before and after the 
review – located its counter-radicalisation efforts in places and 
organisations where radicalisation did not take place. In this sense, the 
assumptions on which the Prevent agenda was based, were unsound. 
Given that the radicalisation of British jihadists takes place in living 
rooms, radical mosques and bookstores, and behind personal computers, 
there is little chance that the message that was supposed to be spread by 
the Prevent projects have reached or convinced those that were truly at 
risk of becoming terrorists.204 Furthermore, the Prevent strategy focused 
on the situation in the UK, and did so on the assumption that jihadist 
terrorism was a politically radical spin-off of tensions between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in the UK. As has been argued in the sections on 
restraint in the use of force and ideology and strategy, however, most 
jihadist attacks served the purpose of liberating the Muslim lands, and 
had little to do with the inter-faith relations in the UK. The British 
jihadists fighting in Syria for jihadist militias demonstrate that the 
occupation of the Muslim lands by unbelievers is still one of the main 
drivers behind British jihadism. The Prevent agenda did not acknowledge 
this, since it left foreign policy largely unaddressed, which makes it all the 
less likely that the Prevent projects have been effective. 
9.2.7 International cooperation 
Like the Netherlands (see paragraph 8.3.5), the UK was very active in 
post-9/11 international counterterrorism cooperation. It played a 
prominent role in organisations like the EU, the UN, the FATF and the 
OSCE, but, as has been established in the case study on the Netherlands, 
many of these efforts concerned the creation of counterterrorism 
instruments rather than their actual application against terrorist threats. 
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This made it hard to treat these forms of international cooperation as 
instances of the counterterrorism principle ‘international cooperation as 
defined in paragraph 3.3.3. Where the UK differs from the Netherlands is 
in its active contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom, in which British 
armed forces worked with the US to take out Al Qaeda cells and to 
destroy the training camps from which Bin Laden and his associates were 
planning their attacks against targets elsewhere in the world.205 As this 
was clearly an attempt to eliminate a foreign base, or safe haven, for 
terrorists in the UK and elsewhere in the West, we can see it as an 
application of the counterterrorism principle ‘international cooperation’. 
When assessing the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan vis-à-vis the British jihadist movement, the first thing that 
should be noted, is that most terrorists who underwent training and went 
on to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK had receiced their training in 
Pakistan, not in Afghanistan.206 Al Qaeda’s main camps in Afghanistan 
were destroyed, and the organisation was forced to move to smaller 
camps in the Pakistani border region, where they could still exert their 
influence on foreign militants.207 The problem had been removed rather 
than solved. As has been observed above, the British jihadist movement 
lost contact with extremist networks in the AfPak region, but that was at 
least partially the result of the dismantlement of Londonistan. Lacking the 
contacts and the infrastructure get access to extremist training camps in 
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the AfPak region, British jihadists largely began to strike it out on their 
own after 2006.  
At the same time, though, what also may have contributed to stopping the 
influx from Western jihadists to the training camps is the controversial 
drone campaign in Pakistan. British involvement in the drone strikes has 
not been officially acknowledged at the time of writing (June 2014), but it 
appears that the GCHQ, the British signals intelligence service, is 
supplying intelligence to help the US locate the targets that need to be 
eliminated.208 Often criticised for causing civilian casualties and collateral 
damage, the drone strikes forced – and are still forcing – extremist groups 
to move around their training facilities, or hide them in caves. Also, afraid 
that their location will be betrayed to the US armed forces, Al Qaeda and 
likeminded organisations in the region are wary of newcomers who apply 
for training. In the old days, they could recruit fighters through trusted 
networks in Europe, but now that Londonistan has been dismantled and 
they have to spend much of their timing splitting up and regrouping to 
avoid being hit by drones, they are not as welcoming to foreign recruits as 
they used to be.209 
As the drone strikes are making the Pakistan less hospitable for terrorist 
training camps, the cooperation with the US can be assumed to have 
made some contribution to the British jihadist movement’s ability to tap 
into the resources and expertise of the jihadist groups in Pakistan. In this 
sense, the counterterrorism principle has been applied effectively, 
although the cutting-off of the British jihadist movement from the 
extremist support base in the AfPak region must at least partially 
attributed to domestic counterterrorism measures. 
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war-crimes-drones. 
209 J. Jordán, “The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case 
Study,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 (2014): 4–29. 
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9.3 Conclusion 
For an accurate understanding of the nature of the jihadist threat to the 
UK, it is important to take into account the mismatch between the beliefs 
of the jihadist movement and the disenfranchised Muslims who were 
thought to be the support base of the jihadist movement. The former was 
made up of followers of Sayyid Qutb, and wanted to expel the US, or the 
West in general, from the Muslim lands. The latter had very few Islamist, 
let alone jihadist, sympathies, if any. In fact, it is far from clear that they 
were on the jihadist movement’s radar. It is true that the British jihadist 
movement was fighting on behalf of the ummah, which would include 
Muslims in the UK, but their priorities lay overwhelmingly in the Arab 
world. They did not pick up on themes that could have made them more 
popular among moderate or a-political British Muslims, such as 
unemployment and discrimination. The expressed motivations behind 
their attacks and the give us little reason to think that jihadists in the UK 
were deeply concerned about the problems of Muslim communities in the 
UK.  
This is an important observation with regard to the effectiveness of the 
various counterterrorism principles that were applied under Prime 
Ministers Blair, Brown and Cameron. First, it explains why the policies 
that constituted lacks of restraint in the use of force and legislation that 
was later declared illegal did not lead to an increase of support for the 
jihadists. British Muslims who felt discriminated against by the police, or 
by the government in general, did not see the jihadists as the champions 
of their cause. The jihadists, in their turn, displayed little desire to take up 
such a role. Consequently, Muslim youths expressed their disgruntlement 
over stops and searches and an overly strong focus on Muslims in 
counterterrorism policing in a variety of ways, but not in support for 
terrorist groups. The counterterrorism literature usually argues against 
overreliance on the use of force from a narrow counterterrorism 
perspective. The argument is that overreliance on the use of force plays 
into the hands of the terrorists, as it confirms the narrative they use to 
justify terrorist attacks. The same goes for violations of the rule of law. 
These, too, are believed to provide rhetorical ammunition to terrorist 
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groups, which are thought to attract recruits and other forms of support 
by pointing out the dictatorial or hostile nature of the state. The case of 
the jihadist movement shows that matters are not always this simple. We 
have seen above that the British government did act in ways that could 
easily be incorporated in radical narratives, and the London riots showed 
that there certainly was considerable resentment against the police. It is 
far from clear, however, that this has strengthened the jihadist movement 
in a meaningful way.  
The explanation for the deviation of the rule propounded in the 
counterterrorism literature lies in the international roots of the jihadist 
movement in the UK. ‘Londonistan’, the network of jihadist ideologues 
and operatives that was formed in the 1990s, was an extension of the jihad 
as it was waged in Algeria, the Middle East and Afghanistan. Jihadist 
groups had to move their activities to the UK, but the Muslim lands were 
still very much on their minds. The networks were initially not interested 
in the UK as a target, and when they did turn against their country of 
residence, their political goals had not changed. Violations of the rule of 
law and excessive use of force by the police against Muslims were not 
themes that carried much importance in the jihadist rationale for the 
terrorist attacks. 
The international dimension of the British jihadist movement, or in this 
case rather the British government’s failure to grasp the importance of the 
international dimension, also played a role in the outcome of the attempts 
to address the root causes of the jihadist threat. The Prevent strategy was, 
at least until 2011, based on the assumption that terrorism could be 
prevented by creating community cohesion and by providing the right 
counterarguments. As some have rightfully pointed out, it had little to say 
about the effects of British foreign policy. Apart from poor 
implementation, programmes to alleviate inter-faith tensions and to 
promote notions of British citizenship were based on a misreading of the 
political agenda of the jihadist movement in the UK. This being the case, 
the fight against jihadist terrorism in the UK demonstrates the limits of 
the common wisdom that harsh responses to terrorist threats feed 
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terrorism. British government policy worked from the premise that 
jihadism in the UK was about what was going on in the UK, but the 
movement’s priorities lay elsewhere. This explains why British jihadists 
did not cash in on the government’s missteps in ways that other terrorist 
groups have. 
But the importance of the international orientation of the jihadist 
movement for counterterrorism effectiveness does not end here. An 
important element of the embeddedness in the wider, international 
jihadist movement was the use of training camps, primarily in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. Networks in Londonistan used their connections in the 
AfPak region to improve the terrorist skills of British recruits. The obvious 
advantage of this way of working was that British recruits could be 
groomed for the mission they were to carry out, but it also created a flaw 
in the movement’s operational security. As we have seen in the section on 
intelligence, almost all plots that were foiled, involved at least one cell 
member who travelled to Pakistan or Afghanistan. As none of the 
perpetrators of terrorist attacks that did make it to the execution stage had 
been to a training camp, it is safe to say that the international link made 
plots vulnerable to British intelligence. So in this sense, too, the 
international orientation of terrorist groups makes for different 
counterterrorism outcomes, an assertion that strengthens the case that can 
be made about the importance of a group’s intentions for the 
counterterrorism policies that can best be deployed against it. 
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Outcome Explanation
Jihadist movement in the UK




Lacks of restraint in the use of force on the part of the British police (e.g. the stop-and-search 




Several laws were declared illegal by the ECHR, but this did not translate into support for the 
jihadist movement
International cooperation Effective
US-UK cooperation in Operation Enduring Freedom and the drone campaign in the AfPak
region made it harder for British jihadists to access extremist training camps




Civil society organisations and the participants withdrew from the Preventing Violent 
Extremism Together programmes because they were deemed discriminatory and were 
suspected of being fronts of intelligence gathering operations
Law enforcement and 
direct action
Effective
The crackdown on Londonistan pushed the jihadist movement further underground and made 
it more difficult for jihadists to access training camps in the AfPak region, which undermined 
their ability to carry out large-scale attacks
Offering a counter 
narrative
Not applied





Intelligence gathering was effective with the reservation that only larger scale plots that could 
be linked to training camps in the AfPak region were foiled
 
Figure 23. Counterterrorism principles as applied against the British jihadist movement
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Intermediate conclusion III: how to fight jihadist 
terrorism 
Of the three clusters, the jihadist cluster is the most consistent one, both in 
counterterrorism principles that were applied and in their outcomes. The 
application of the research design to the two cases in this cluster showed 
that the counterterrorism principles that were used in these two cases 
were largely the same, and that the effects were very similar. With regard 
to the research subquestion about the relation between counterterrorism 
effectiveness and terrorist actor type, this comparison clearly generated 
findings on the basis of which one can argue that such a relation indeed 
exists. Given the research results, it is possible to discern a 
counterterrorism approach that may work against terrorist movements 
that resemble the Dutch and British jihadist movements. What should 
certainly be taken into account when drawing up such an approach, is 
that both the UK and the Netherlands put much effort into addressing the 
root causes of the jihadist threat, but were most successful in the 
application of counterterrorism principles that are clearly located towards 
‘harder’ end of the counterterrorism spectrum. 
First, both movements saw their violent actions thwarted by intelligence 
services. MI5, the British security service, disrupted several plots by 
bugging the cars and homes of suspected terrorists who were thought to 
be close to the execution of a terrorist attack. It is true that some plots 
escaped the attention of MI5, but many – though not all – of these 
displayed a certain amateurism and were generally small in scale. It is 
true that we can only speculate about the plots that were foiled, but the 
Christmas Bomb Plot, the 2006 liquid bomb plot and the plan to kidnap 
and kill a British Muslim soldier, were more professional and would 
almost certainly have had a bigger impact that many attacks that did 
reach the execution stage. The Dutch intelligence and security service 
AIVD, too, was well-informed about the attack plans that were being 
hatched by the country’s most dedicated and resolute terrorists. Samir 
Azzouz’s attack plans were known before he could carry them out, as 
were the Hofstad Group’s plans for a terrorist attack in Portugal. The 
AIVD made a fatal miscalculation with far-reaching consequences when it 
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underestimated Mohammed Bouyeri’s willingness to commit a terrorist 
attack. Nevertheless, this one instance, fateful as it may have been, should 
not distract us from the overall record of the AIVD’s knowledge of the 
Hofstad Group and the cell around Samir Azzouz.  
The second counterterrorism principle that contributed to the fight 
against the jihadist movements that have been examined in the chapters 8 
and 9 was ‘law enforcement and direct action’. In the UK as well as in the 
Netherlands, the jihadist movement was weakened by the arrest and 
expulsion of terrorist cell members and their inspirators. In the 
Netherlands the arrests of the Hofstad Group members and the expulsion 
of some thirty men, most of whom were authority figures of the cells in 
which they were active, dealt the jihadist movement a blow from which it 
never recovered. After these arrests the Dutch jihadist movement fell 
apart and failed to make a single serious attack plan. The impact of the 
arrests of jihadist movement members in the UK was less detrimental, but 
still considerable. The British jihadist movement was a lot larger than its 
Dutch counterpart and was thus better able to absorb the losses. 
Nevertheless, British jihadists moved underground and had a harder time 
making elaborate attack plans that involved large groups of contributors 
and training missions to Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
Another striking similarity between the two cases concerns two 
counterterrorism principles that did not apply. On various occasions, the 
Dutch and British governments violated the rule of law and displayed a 
lack of restraint in the use of force. But contrary to the common wisdom in 
counterterrorism studies, there was no backlash in the form of growing 
active support or sympathy, for the jihadist movement. The overreaction 
and heavy-handedness by the state were perhaps not as violent as in 
other cases, but Muslims in both countries did feel they were unduly 
targeted by counterterrorism legislation and police actions. Interestingly, 
though, there were no escalations of the terrorist campaigns, as the 
Muslim communities in both countries did not take the step from 
discontent over police performance and discriminatory counterterrorism 
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to the idea that political violence was necessary to bring about the 
introduction of a fundamentalist version of sharia law. 
In the outcomes of the applications of these three principles, the lack of 
popular support was a decisive factor. The arrests undermined the 
movements because there was, unlike in cases where terrorist groups can 
count on the support of the population, no one who was willing to take 
up the role of arrested movement members. In neither case was there was 
a popular response that allowed the jihadist movements to keep their 
operational capabilities up to par. If we would try to turn these findings 
into a generalisable counterterrorism profile, kinetic means would be the 
profile’s cornerstone, as the evidence from this cluster suggests that 
terrorist actors that are isolated from the population can effectively be 
fought with repressive tools such as law enforcement pressure and 
various intelligence gathering methods. Also, on the basis of these two 
cases we can hypothesise that, when applying such kinetic tools, there is 
less risk the situation might be exacerbated, since the chances that the 














10 Counterterrorism: art or science?  
The legendary military strategist Carl von Clausewitz held that “war is 
the realm of coincidence”.1 Understanding war this way, he had little faith 
in preconceived notions about how military campaigns should be waged 
on the strategic level. Instead, he believed that, given the wide variety of 
actors and developments that determine the course of a war, a military 
commander has no choice but to go by his intuition to overcome the chaos 
of the battlefield. Rather than clinging to fixed rules, the military 
commander must be able to recognise the essence of what was going on 
around him, and use that understanding to lead his army to victory.2 
According to Von Clausewitz, it was crucial that a military commander 
was able to understand the unique dynamic that underlies an armed 
conflict. While Von Causewitz did acknowledge the value of science in 
some respects, his work has given rise to the perception of warfare as an 
art. The appeal of this notion stems in large part from its 
acknowledgement of the complexity of the battlefield and the factors 
impacting on it. The idea is that war is so complex that there are no 
general guidelines that can be used wherever war occurs. As George S. 
Patton once said, “war is an art and as such is not susceptible of 
explanation by fixed formula”.3 One could make a similar case regarding 
counterterrorism. Perhaps confrontations between states and terrorists are 
so complex that security policy makers must use their intuition to try to 
grasp the conflict’s unique dynamic. If this is the case, experiences from 
other conflicts are of little use, as every instance requires a different and 
unique approach. Perhaps, as Von Clausewitz says, the leader of a 
counterterrorist campaign must be ready for situation in which “practice 
contradicts theory”.  
Against this view, it can be argued that there are regularities in social life. 
Social science is based on the assumption, frequently borne out in 
                                                          
1 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1980), 65. 
2 M.I. Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 
145–146. 
3 Quoted in B. McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA, 
and London: Harvard University Press, 2009), 6. 
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research results, that similar causes will have similar effects when they 
occur in similar circumstances. This view allows for more optimism about 
the possibilities of finding patterns in the outcomes of strategies, whether 
they are applied in war or in counterterrorism. This dissertation is an 
attempt to give the ‘scientific’ approach to counterterrorism a chance. If 
there is evidence of a relation between the nature of a terrorist actor and 
the outcome of the application of counterterrorism principles, there may 
be laws that govern counterterrorism effectiveness. Counterterrorism 
outcomes then have a certain predictability that could be substantiated, 
specified and qualified by systematic scientific research. 
In order to gauge whether we should view counterterrorism as an art or 
as a science, we set about answering the following main research 
question: Is there a relation between the type of terrorist organisation and the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism approaches that are applied against it? In order 
to find out whether there are regularities in the outcomes of 
counterterrorism interventions, a list of counterterrorism principles was 
drawn up. Care was taken to cover the ‘harder’, more repressive, as well 
as the ‘softer’, more accommodating end of the counterterrorism 
spectrum. For each of the principles, a programme theory was 
formulated. The programme theories spell out how the various 
counterterrorism principles are supposed to lead to effectiveness, and 
thus allow for empirical tests. The collection of data to answer the main 
research question was gathered by doing these tests for all six cases that 
were selected (the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, ETA, 
the Provisional IRA, the jihadist movement in the Netherlands and the 
jihadist movement in the UK). For all cases, it was examined which of the 
counterterrorism principles have been applied and, if they were applied, 
whether they were effective.  
10.1 Towards counterterrorism profiles? 
As was explained in the introduction, the first way to discover whether 
there is some regularity in the outcomes of the counterterrorism principles 
is to compare the outcomes within the clusters. In order to do this, we set 
out to answer the following research subquestion: do counterterrorism 
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measures and policies have similar effects against similar types of terrorist 
actors? The intermediate conclusions about the various clusters suggest 
that such similarities do exist, though in some clusters more so than in 
others.  
The clearest case is the jihadist cluster, where the outcomes are 
remarkably alike. What worked against the jihadist movement in the 
Netherlands, also worked against the jihadist movement in the UK. Both 
jihadist movements saw their operational capabilities affected by arrests, 
and both movements, decentralised as they may have been, failed to hide 
their attack plans from the intelligence agencies involved. In the case of 
the Netherlands, the jihadist movement was badly shaken by a series of 
arrests, many of which involved the most dangerous cells in the country 
at the time, i.e. the Hofstad Group and the cell around Samir Azzouz. The 
Dutch intelligence service AIVD knew a lot about the activities of the 
Hofstad Group and Azzouz and his associates, which made it difficult for 
Dutch jihadists to successfully carry out their attack plans. Another 
repressive measure that contributed to the reduction of the threat was the 
expulsion of leading figures, which threw the Dutch jihadist movement in 
a leadership crisis that it never got over. In the UK the effects of law 
enforcement and intelligence gathering against the jihadist movement 
were similar, if less detrimental. Here, too, the secret service undermined 
the jihadist movement’s ability to carry out attacks. Some small collectives 
and individuals managed to stay under the radar and carried out their 
attack plans, but all large-scale attack plans, such as the transatlantic 
airline bomb plot, were foiled by MI5. 
Another interesting similarity between the two cases in this cluster is that 
the excessive use of force and the introduction of questionable legislation 
were not counterproductive and did not fan the flames of the terrorist 
threat. Both the British and the Dutch police arrested many innocent 
members of their Muslim communities in their respective countries. In the 
Netherlands, and even more so in the UK, there was a clear resentment 
among Muslim communities over the discriminatory application of 
counterterrorism measures. In both countries, several Muslim civil society 
organisations expressed indignation about the way the government 
The science of fighting terrorism 
422 
appeared to view all Muslims as potential terrorists, as evidenced by, for 
example, the disproportionate application of stop and search powers on 
people from non-European descent. At no point, however, did the 
Muslim communities in either country actively support jihadist cells. It is 
true that several polls showed that sizeable parts of the British Muslim 
community believed that the London Bombings were justified or could 
understand the “motives and feelings” of the perpetrators4, but from what 
we know about the functioning of jihadist cells in the UK, there was no 
sea of popular support for the jihadists to swim in. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, British jihadists could count on the support of the 
international jihadist movement, but made little use of popular support 
during the preparation or execution of their plans. They planned and 
carried out their attacks by themselves, and there was no network of 
sympathisers similar to the ones ETA and the Provisional IRA relied on. 
The same went for the Netherlands. Although the results differed 
dramatically, two polls held in the Netherlands shortly after 9/11 
suggested a degree of sympathy, or at least understanding, for Al Qaeda5, 
but this did not mean that jihadist cells received much material support 
from Muslim communities in the Netherlands. As in the UK, instances of 
overly heavy-handed counterterrorism did little to change this. It is often 
assumed that overly repressive counterterrorism measures play into the 
hands of terrorist groups, but the fights against jihadist terrorism 
examined in the chapters 8 and 9 tell a different story. 
Another parallel between the two cases is the futility of the attempts to 
address the root causes of the jihadist threats. Much has been made of the 
need to address the root causes of jihadist terrorism, but in neither case 
did these efforts contribute much to the containment of the threat. In the 
Netherlands the national government’s counter radicalisation efforts were 
implemented only after the jihadist threat had been curbed by repressive 
                                                          
4 P. Henessy and M. Kite, “Poll Reveals 40pc of Muslims Want Sharia Law in UK,” Telegraph, 
February 19, 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1510866/Poll-reveals-40pc-
of-Muslims-want-sharia-law-in-UK.html; Muslim 7/7 Poll (London: Populus, 2006), 
http://www.populus.co.uk/the-times-itv-news-muslim-77-poll-050706.html. 
5 Publieke Opinie En de Multiculturele Samenleving in Nederland – Fact-Sheet (Rotterdam: Art. 1), 
accessed May 11, 2014, http://www.art1.nl/nprd/factsheets/opinie.pdf. 
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means. Also, the Dutch Action Plan Polarisation and Radicalisation was 
based on the idea that large sections of the Muslim population were 
susceptible to radical ideas and had to be drawn out of the influence of 
the jihadist discourse. As was clear from the response of the Muslim 
communities to discriminatory and heavy-handed counterterrorism 
measures, this assumption was deeply flawed. In the UK, the anti-
radicalisation initiative Preventing Violent Extremism Together was based 
on a similarly misguided perception of the problem. Here, too, the 
assumption was that large segments of the British Muslim population 
might at some point adopt jihadist ideas, and here, too, the responses of 
Muslims communities to the mistaken arrests and discriminatory 
application of stop and search powers showed no sign of sympathy for 
jihadist cells. Furthermore, the British attempts to address the root causes 
of the jihadist threat overlooked the most important grievance of the 
jihadist movement: British foreign policy in the Middle East. 
In sum, the analyses of the Dutch and British fights against jihadist 
terrorism show that there are obvious parallels between the two cases. 
This suggests that it could be worth hypothesising that the 
counterterrorism principles that were successfully applied against jihadist 
terrorism in the Netherlands and the UK might also be effective against 
similar terrorist movements elsewhere. As for the root cause approach, 
the most salient failure, it should be noted that the implementation was 
flawed, which means that the lack if effectiveness cannot be attributed to 
the counterterrorism principle per se. 
In the nationalist cluster the similarities are less striking, but significant 
nonetheless. One of the most salient similarities is the impact of repressive 
means. On several occasions, the first one in the mid-1980s, the French 
and Spanish police managed to deal ETA heavy blows by arresting the 
group’s leading figures. The pace of the arrests accelerated in the 2000s 
and eventually undermined the group’s ability to wage a violent 
campaign. In later years, the frequency, scale and sophistication of ETA’s 
attack suggested a loss of operational capabilities, much of which was due 
to the ongoing stream of arrests. As for the Provisional IRA, the 
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infiltration by British intelligence as well as the liquidation of several 
crack units played an important role in the containment of the group’s 
operational capabilities. The Provos were not wiped out as thoroughly as 
ETA, but they, too, were unable to increase the intensity of their violent 
campaign, and were made to realise that they were doing everything they 
could without getting any closer to their political goal. This brings us to 
the next similarity between the two cases in this cluster, which concerns 
the effect that operational defeats – foiled attacks, arrests, dismantlement 
of arms caches – had on the morale in the two groups. In both cases, the 
combination of operational defeats and the government’s unwillingness 
to make meaningful concessions gave rise to doubts about the potential of 
the armed struggle. The Provos as well as the etarras began to understand 
that the level of violence they were capable of was not enough to bring the 
enemy states to their knees. Consequently, morale sagged, and both 
groups lost the willingness to keep up the fight. Thus, in both cases the 
government’s long-term commitment paid off. 
Furthermore, both cases clearly show how excessive force can be 
counterproductive. In the early stages of the conflict, when both groups 
were at the peak of their popularity, the British and Spanish security 
forces generated a lot of hostility through mass arrests and other heavy-
handed attempts to restore orders. The police in Northern Ireland reacted 
viciously to Catholic protest marches and demonstrations, with wide-
spread rioting as a result. Then the British Army was deployed to quell 
the unrest. They were initially welcomed by the Catholics, but relations 
soured after the Army carried out mass arrests and got involved in 
shooting incidents. In the Basque Country the effects of the poorly 
targeted use of force were very similar. Mass arrests and accusations of 
torture spoiled relations between the security forces and the population, 
which sided en masse with ETA. In both regions, people began to believe 
that liberation from imperialist state power was the way forward, or 
simply hoped that ETA or the Provisional IRA would protect them 
against the onslaughts by the army and the police. They flocked to the 
terrorist groups, which greatly benefited from the various forms of 
support they received from the communities in which their members 
were born and raised. 
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As for the revolutionary cluster, it provides little evidence that there is a 
combination of counterterrorism principles that would work against all 
groups that resemble the RAF and the Weather Underground. The 
potential for comparison of the two cases is limited, mostly because 
different principles were applied against each of the two groups. Still, 
both cases do underline the risks involved in lacks of restraint in the use 
of force. Harsh and repressive measures antagonised the support base of 
both groups as well as harden the resolve and radicalisation of those 
within the groups. In the case of the Weather Underground, the harsh 
way the police dealt with protests by the student movement contributed 
considerably to the group’s radicalisation, as did the FBI’s illegal 
campaigns against political dissent, which included the murder of two 
well-known Black Panthers. The radicalisation of members and the 
constituency of the RAF was similarly fed by heavy-handed policing. In 
Germany, too, student protests were repressed, and the commune 
movement, in which the RAF partially had its roots, bore the brunt of the 
arrest waves that the police initiated in an attempt to quell the unrest. 
State repression gained both organisations considerable support, if only 
for a while.  
Also, both cases illustrate the value of counterterrorism policing, albeit in 
different ways. In the case of the RAF, the arrest of the group’s leadership 
diverted the group from the pursuance of its political goals. Pressured by 
the BKA, the group felt that its existence was at stake, and started using 
violence to secure their survival, not to help its constituency. As a result, 
the RAF’s acts of violence, which grew more callous as the years went on, 
only served the group’s own purposes, and could no longer be 
understood by the group’s potential constituency as painful but necessary 
steps toward the liberation of the working class or nations that suffered 
under the yoke of Western imperialism. Thus, the RAF became detached 
from its support base, and from the late 1970s on lived a marginal 
existence before it dissolved in 1998. The Weather Underground was 
diverted from its political cause, too, but in a different way than the RAF. 
Unlike the RAF, the Weathermen were under so much pressure from the 
police and the FBI that they had to put all their effort in staying out of the 
hands of the law. Consequently, they had to live deep underground, and 
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were unable to stay in touch with their support base. Isolated and with 
little chance at triggering a proletarian revolution, the group withered 
away. 
Overall, the evidence drawn from the three clusters does allow for the 
conclusion that there is a relation between type of terrorist actor and 
counterterrorism effectiveness. To some extent, counterterrorism 
principles have similar outcomes when applied against similar terrorist 
actors. More research is needed to further substantiate the findings 
summarised in this section, but at the very least the research results offer 
some clues as to how various types of terrorist actors should be fought. If 
inclusion of other cases would confirm the findings described in the 
previous paragraphs, it might indeed be possible to identify a series of 
effective counterterrorism principles against for the various types of 
terrorist organisations or movements. 
10.2 Applicability of counterterrorism principles 
The previous section discussed similarities between the outcomes of 
counterterrorism principles as applied against similar terrorist actors. We 
will now turn to the second way in which one can establish a relation 
between type of terrorist actor and counterterrorism effectiveness. In this 
section we will see against which types of terrorist actors the various 
counterterrorism principles can be effectively applied. In order to be able 
to see whether there are any patterns, we have made an overview that 
shows the outcomes of the counterterrorism principles as applied against 
the terrorist groups discussed in the chapters 4 to 9. Figure 17 contains the 
names of the terrorist actors on the left and the counterterrorism 
principles at the top. Each cell refers to a counterterrorism principle as 
applied against one of the six terrorist groups or movements. The score 
‘n.a.’ stands for ‘not applied’ or ‘not applicable (if it was applied, but not 
targeted against the terrorist actor under consideration).  
On the basis of the findings presented in figure 17, we can distinguish 
counterterrorism principles that work across the board from, first, 
principles whose effects can be related to characteristics of terrorist 
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groups, second, principles whose effect appears to depend on factors 
other than the nature of the terrorist group, and, third, principles whose 
effectiveness cannot be proven on the basis of the six case studies carried 
out in the chapters 4 to 9.  
10.2.1 Widely applicable principles 
One of the salient findings that can be derived from figure 24 is the 
effectiveness of the ‘law enforcement and direct action’ principle. Many 
authors have expressed their reservations about the use of repressive 
counterterrorism tools, but our findings show that arresting members of 
terrorist groups can be effective against a variety of terrorist actors, 
irrespective of which other counterterrorism principles have been applied 
at the same time.  
It should be noted that the results can be gained on the political level as 
well as on the operational level, and that political success does not 
necessarily follow from operational success. Faced with law enforcement 
pressure, the RAF and the Weather Underground focused on group 
survival rather than on politics. They were successful on the former 
aspect, but did very poorly on the latter. In the other cases, the utility of 
‘law enforcement and direct action’ was more straightforward. Depriving 
groups of manpower, leadership and expertise disrupts terrorist actors 
and affects their operational capabilities, even if it does not immediately 
put a stop to their activities altogether.  
With regard to this latter point, the research results show a connection 
between the way the counterterrorism principle worked out and the 
nature of the terrorist actor. Repressive means have been effectively 
applied against the Provisional IRA and ETA, but these groups have 
never been entirely eradicated. Their organisational clout and close ties to 
the population allowed them to maintain their operational capabilities 
until the very end of their campaigns. The effectiveness of the ‘law 
enforcement and direct action’ principle was visible in both cases, but 
took longer to materialise. Also, the cessation of the campaign in these 
cases was not purely the result of law enforcement and direct action. The 
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Figure 24. Overview of counterterrorism outcomes
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gradual weakening and sinking morale of the two groups were also 
brought about by government intransigence regarding terrorist demands. 
In this respect, the Provisional IRA and ETA differ from the Dutch and 
British jihadist movements. The latter, especially the Dutch jihadists, were 
less embedded in the population and lacked the resources to keep their 
campaigns going. In these two cases, law enforcement and direct action 
had devastating effects at an earlier stage. This being the case, the 
observation that law enforcement and direct action are effective should be 
complemented with the observation that it is effective in different ways 
against different kinds of terrorist actors. 
A final remark that must be made here concerns the nature of the 
successes that were scored through law enforcement and direct action. In 
one case (the Dutch jihadist movement) collapsed under the pressure of 
the police and intelligence agencies, but in other cases, such as the RAF 
and the Provisional IRA, the limitation of the terrorist group’s operational 
capabilities amounted to containment rather than elimination. Regarding 
containment, one could argue that it is not a real solution, as the terrorist 
group can still occasionally sow panic and the government still must 
spend precious resources on maintaining the state of containment. At the 
same time, containment constitutes a strategic success in the sense that it 
keeps the terrorist group or movement from achieving its political goals. 
After all, as long as the terrorist group does not win, the state does, so 
seen as a part of a battle of the wills, containment is not ideal, but it is 
certainly a success. The dissolution of the terrorist actor may be the ideal 
outcome, but outcomes that fall below this gold standard can still be 
considered successes.  
10.2.2 Counterterrorism principles and the nature of the terrorist 
actor 
It is true that, as many authors have argued, there is a risk involved in the 
use of repressive tools. When used in an insufficiently discriminate 
manner, the use of force can indeed exacerbate the problem. Our findings 
bear this out, since in four of the six cases violations of the ‘rule of law’ 
and ‘restraint in the use of force’ principles were counterproductive and 
strengthened the terrorist support base. However, these results also 
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suggest that the risk of escalation is tied up with a terrorist actor 
characteristic. In the six cases, escalation as a result of the use of force only 
occurred when groups were well-embedded in their social environment, 
and did not occur when the terrorist actors were isolated from their social 
environment. The escalation effect was very clear in the cases of the RAF, 
the Weather Underground, ETA and the Provisional IRA, but completely 
absent in the cases of the Dutch and British jihadist movements. This 
suggests that the risk of escalation is much more pressing in 
confrontations against terrorist groups that have a movement or a 
community that backs them up.  
One may counter this claim by pointing out that the absence of terrorist 
backlashes may have had to do with the relatively small scale and low 
intensity of the overreaction by the state in the cases of the Netherlands 
and the UK after 9/11 compared to the other cases. Indeed, it is true that 
wrecking people’s houses, imprisoning hundreds of innocents and 
imposing curfews, all of which happened in Northern Ireland, is not the 
same thing as carrying out illegal stop-and-searches and occasionally 
arresting innocent terrorist suspects. This is not to denigrate the fate of 
those who suffered the latter kind of state maltreatment, but few will 
claim that state overreaction in the Netherlands and the UK after 9/11 
was as intense and widespread as in Northern Ireland during the 
Troubles. This means that, theoretically, it is possible that British and 
Dutch counterterrorism, had they been less restrained, would have 
generated support for the jihadist movement. However, this is pure 
speculation, as we simply do not know what happened had the lacks of 
restraint in the Netherlands and the UK been more frequent and dramatic. 
Moreover, as has been argued in the sections 8.3.4 and 9.2.3, the kind of 
opposition that did occur, had nothing to do with terrorism, which makes 
it more likely that stronger overreactions would have led to more intense 
protests of the kind described in these two sections. Some of it may have 
been violent, but there is nothing to suggest that less restraint in the use of 
force would have led to terrorism or support for jihadist cells. 
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Another principle the effectiveness of which appears to depend on 
terrorist actor characteristics is intelligence gathering. The Provisional IRA 
as well as the jihadist movements in the Netherlands and the UK were 
debilitated by secret services, and failed to generate the levels of violence 
they desired. Organisational structure is often thought to be the decisive 
factor that determines a terrorist actor’s vulnerability to infiltration and 
spying. The three cases in our selection against which the ‘gathering 
intelligence’ principle was effectively applied, however, do not bear this 
out. The Provisional IRA was, at least in its early years, a hierarchical 
organisation, one of the type about which it is often argued that they are 
most vulnerable to infiltration and other intelligence gathering activities, 
but intelligence gathering was also successful against jihadist terrorism. 
The case studies in the chapters 8 and 9 show that, contrary to what 
several authors assumed, the low degree of organisation and the lack of a 
formal hierarchy do not make jihadist movements immune to intelligence 
gathering efforts. If the six case studies point to a factor that inhibits the 
effectiveness of intelligence gathering efforts, it is not organisational 
structure, but rather the degree to which a group has physically 
withdrawn itself from society.  
The Provisional IRA maintained a clear presence in society, and was 
relatively easy to locate. There were people who were widely known as 
sympathisers to the Republican cause, and they would get together in 
well-known Republican bars. It was also widely known in which 
neighbourhoods and areas the group had its strongest support bases. All 
of this made it possible for British secret services to collect leads that 
could be followed up to get inside the Provisional IRA. The movements in 
the jihadist cluster were much less dominant in the areas where they were 
based, but they still constituted a visible presence. Movement members 
were still moving around in society, and had regular home addresses. 
This made it possible for the security forces to observe – or to let other 
people observe – what the Provos did, where they went, and who they 
interacted with. The Weather Underground, the one terrorist actor in the 
set of six against which intelligence gathering did not work, was a 
different case. True to its name, the group was really in hiding, which 
made it difficult for the FBI to follow the group in its tracks. As we have 
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seen in chapter 4, the FBI even failed to generate the output (placing 
infiltrators, informers, listening devices, etc.) required to achieve the 
desired effect (disruption of attack plans). Given the Weathermen’s 
isolation in the underground, attempts at infiltration would immediately 
be spotted, and the group’s constant switching of cars and houses, many 
acquired under false names, left the Bureau with few opportunities to 
place microphones. The case of the Weather Underground does not 
provide any ground to claim that intelligence gathering is not an effective 
way to disrupt a terrorist actor’s attack plans, but it does show that it can 
be hard to achieve results against group that have withdrawn to the 
underground. 
10.2.3 Counterterrorism principles and other explanatory factors 
For some counterterrorism principles, the evidence derived from the six 
case studies points to the role of other factors that determine or influence 
their effectiveness. For instance, in the two cases that provide evidence for 
the effectiveness of the principle ‘addressing root causes’ (ETA and the 
Weather Underground, two very different terrorist groups) both hint at 
the importance of the radicalisation of the terrorist group’s support base 
rather than that of the terrorist group itself. ETA became isolated when 
the vast majority of the Basques were satisfied with the degree of 
autonomy that the Spanish federal government had been willing to grant 
the region. Similarly, the Weather Underground wanted to overthrow the 
capitalist system, but became isolated when the end of the Vietnam War 
deprived the protest movement of its most important rallying point. 
There was hardly anyone who was willing to follow the Weather 
Underground all the way to the proletarian revolution. The general lesson 
from these two cases is that the decisive factor that determines whether 
‘addressing root causes’ has the desired effect is the position of the 
population. Going by these two cases, it seems that if what the state is 
willing to offer, is enough for the population, this counterterrorism 
principle will indeed isolate the terrorists, who are more radical in their 
demands, from their support base. 
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‘Offering exits’, too, is a strand whose effectiveness is influenced by 
factors other than the nature of the terrorist actor. In the case of ETA, the 
offering of exits was effective partially because of a particular strategic 
context. In the early 1980s, ETA-pm, ETA’s moderate wing, felt that the 
Spanish political system had undergone significant changes that made the 
armed struggle obsolete. An important reason for the poli-milis to abandon 
the armed struggle was that helping the Basque nationalist cause by 
participation in the revamped Spanish democratic system was a serious 
option. This made leaving the group an attractive option. After the more 
moderate etarras had left and after ETA found an effective way to 
dissuade prisoners from accepting the deals they were offered, the 
programmes lost their effectiveness. In this regard, it is interesting to note 
that the Provisional IRA, which was not internally divided at the time 
when the ‘offering exits’ principle was applied, was able to avoid a split, 
and even managed most of the supergrasses to return to the fold. As for 
the Weather Underground, the third case in which this principle applied, 
group members decided to surface in the mid-1970s when the 
opportunity to do so without facing charges presented itself. One of the 
reasons why the prospect of life aboveground won out over dedication to 
the violent campaign was that it had become clear to the Weathermen that 
their attempts to spark a revolution were going nowhere. In other words, 
the group’s bleak prospects were a major factor in the effectiveness of the 
‘offer exits’ principle. In sum, it appears that the ‘offering exits’ principle 
is most likely to be effective when applied against terrorist actors in which 
group members have begun to doubt whether membership of the terrorist 
organisation will get them what they want. 
Another possibility is that the effectiveness of the application of a 
counterterrorism principle depends on another counterterrorism 
principle. The cases of ETA, the Provisional IRA and the RAF show that 
‘long-term commitment’ depends on ‘law enforcement and direct action’. 
The fighting spirit of these three groups was undercut by the combination 
of repressive measures and the intransigence of the various governments 
vis-à-vis the terrorists’ demands. In the cases of the Provisional IRA and 
ETA, this notion that the state would not give in, contributed to the 
decision to give up the armed struggle. In the case of the RAF, the group 
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was deeply demoralised after the German Autumn had been a colossal 
failure that cost them a lot and gained them nothing. It is true that second 
generation took over, but only after a period of confusion and stagnation. 
10.2.4 Ineffective and non-conclusive principles 
Finally, there are three counterterrorism principles whose effectiveness 
cannot, or only very tentatively, be substantiated by the six case studies. 
There were two cases in which the government clearly offered a counter 
narrative to convince the population of the criminal nature of the terrorist 
groups involved, i.e. the RAF and the Provisional IRA. In neither of the 
two cases a clear effect, desirable or not, could be established. In both 
cases, the public response to the government’s counterterrorism policies 
was determined by the government’s actions rather than by their words.  
‘Offering a non-violent alternative’ is another example of a 
counterterrorism principle about which the six cases provide little 
evidence. It is, of course, true that the Provisional IRA was represented in 
a peace process that led to a widely shared agreement on a governance 
structure for Northern Ireland as well as to the group’s decommissioning. 
The only other terrorist actor in the set against which it was tried, was 
ETA, which eventually laid down its arms, but was never pacified by a 
negotiated agreement. José Maria Aznár and José Luis Zapatero, unlike 
Tony Blair, rigidly stuck to their demand that the terrorists must lay down 
their arms before any talks could start. Perhaps it was easier for the 
Spanish Prime Ministers to unwaveringly keep this position, because after 
the 1990s ETA was a mere shadow of its former self. The Basque militants 
were weakened to the point where Aznár and Zapatero had little 
incentive to negotiate. These two cases point at the very tentative 
conclusion that negotiations are more useful in dealing with terrorist 
organisations that are not quite defeated yet. 
As for international cooperation, one of the cases in which it played a 
significant role was, somewhat ironically, Spain’s fight against ETA, 
probably the least internationalist terrorist actor in the set. Also, British-
US cooperation in destroying jihadist training camps in Afghanistan and 
Counterterrorism: art or science? 
435 
Pakistan probably contributed to the British jihadist movement’s ability to 
tap into the resources of the international jihadist movement, although the 
British case also shows that eliminating contact points in the 
government’s home country is important as well. International 
cooperation could have played an important role in the debilitation of the 
Provisional IRA, but the Irish government was unable to be a valuable 
partner to the British.  
10.3 Implications 
10.3.1 Policy 
So, given the research results described in the two previous sections, 
should we consider counterterrorism an art or a science? Is it a 
Clausewitzian exercise in which the commander has to develop a feel for 
a unique situation and tailor his strategy accordingly, or is there a body of 
past experiences that are of some relevance? The examination of the 
counterterrorism principles applied against the three terrorist clusters 
gives us several reasons why we should side with the ‘scientific’ approach 
to counterterrorism. 
First, and most importantly, the six case studies demonstrate that the 
application of counterterrorism principles yields, at least to some extent, 
similar results against similar terrorist actors. The suggested approaches 
have been summarised in the second section of this chapter and need not 
be repeated here. The main point is that they show that not every conflict 
between a state and a terrorist group is unique in every way, and that 
there is indeed evidence of a relation between counterterrorism 
effectiveness and the type of terrorist organisation. Second, as is clear 
from the discussion in section 10.2, at least some of the outcomes of the 
various counterterrorism principles can be explained by taking into 
account the nature of the terrorist actor. This means that the 
characteristics of a terrorist group are important variables to take into 
account when devising a counterterrorism policy. In other words, 
counterterrorism strategies should be evidence-based in the sense that 
they are informed by the empirical record of what works against similar 
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types of terrorist threats. A thorough knowledge of the history of 
counterterrorism will enable policy makers to recognise the dynamics that 
are at play, and should inform their decision on which counterterrorism 
principles to apply. 
But taking into account the empirical record also means letting go of some 
preconceived and self-righteous notions about how terrorism is fought. 
Democratic governments should be straightforward about what they are 
doing when they are fighting terrorism, and not lead themselves and their 
audiences to believe that they are curbing security threats in altogether 
benign ways, for instance by stimulating people to participate in society, 
or using arguments to convince them that their interpretation of Islam is 
mistaken.1 Especially in a conflict with a movement or organisation that 
questions the legitimacy of state power, it is comforting to think that 
constitutional democracies are run through open debate, compromise and 
active citizenship. When it comes to security policy, however, this is 
simply not true. As the preceding chapters have made clear, constitutional 
democracies, too, are sustained by force. They are by no means reluctant 
to use it, and have in fact depended on it on several occasions to ward off 
severe internal security threats.  
Whether this was the right way to go is hard to tell with absolute 
certainty. As was explained in section 3.7 (‘Limitations’), we cannot rule 
out the possibility that the confrontations that have been examined in the 
previous chapters would have played out differently if different 
counterterrorism policies had been applied. What is nevertheless striking 
is that the hard line can achieve success in the absence of effective 
applications of any of the softer approaches. Many have argued that 
counterterrorism should be comprehensive, and that only a combination 
of ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ approaches could work, but the fights against the 
RAF and the Dutch and British jihadist movements show that it is indeed 
possible to curb or contain terrorist threats with a policy centred on the 
tools through which the state asserts its monopoly on violence. In the case 
                                                          
1 Actieplan Polarisatie En Radicalisering 2007-2011, 21; Prevent Strategy, 63–65. 
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of the Provisional IRA, the effectiveness of the ‘soft’ approach 
(negotiations) even depended on sustained success in the application of 
the hard line. In this sense, Mao Tse-tung’s adage that “political power 
grows out of the barrel of a gun” is perhaps not an iron law, but certainly 
a possibility.2  
10.3.2 Research  
This study has generated several highly relevant findings for policy 
makers, but this is by no means the end of the road. Much more research 
is needed to further substantiate the relation between terrorist actor type 
and counterterrorism effectiveness. As yet, the field of counterterrorism 
studies has generated too few empirical evaluations to be able to draw up 
a counterterrorism profile for every government that needs to fight a 
terrorist threat. First, the empirical basis of the findings outlined in this 
chapter should be broadened. It was decided to do six case studies to 
generate a serious evidence base, but there are, of course, many more 
counterterrorism campaigns that could be used to draw evidence from. 
Examining other cases will also help us get a firmer grasp of the 
effectiveness of some of the counterterrorism principles that have not 
been extensively applied in the six case studies in the chapters 4 to 9. 
Principles like ‘Offering exits’ and ‘Offering a counter narrative’ could do 
with evidence drawn from a wider variety of cases. A further avenue for 
research into counterterrorism effectiveness could be more specific 
assessments of the relation between effectiveness and the way a principle 
was implemented. There are many ways in which a government can offer 
a counter narrative – e.g. it can send the message itself, or it can get a 
trusted and credible third party to send the message – and this may well 
have a bearing on the outcome. The question, in other words, is whether 
some ways of implementing the counterterrorism principles are more 
effective than others. Finally, it might be worthwhile to try gauge the 
importance of contextual factors, an obvious example of which could be 
the regime type of the state implementing the counterterrorism principles. 
                                                          
2 Mao Tse-tung, “Problems of War and Strategy,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. II 
(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 224. 
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The six cases studies that have been examined above, all concerned 
counterterrorism campaigns by full democracies. One could legitimately 
ask oneself, however, if the effects of the application of the various 
principles are different when applied by less democratic states. The six 
case studies in this dissertation did show some regularities, and thus 
yielded hopeful results, but this does not change the fact that they are 
only a first start. Only when they have been followed up and a more 
substantial body empirically-based literature has been accumulated, will 
we truly be able to treat counterterrorism as a science. 
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11 Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
11.1 Inleiding 
Hoewel wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar terrorisme vaak als doel heeft 
bij te dragen aan de bestrijding van het fenomeen, is er nog maar weinig 
onderzoek gedaan naar de effectiviteit van terrorismebestrijding. Waar 
ruimschoots aandacht wordt besteed aan deelonderwerpen als de 
definitie van terrorisme of de ethische en juridische problemen die 
terrorismebestrijding op kan roepen, blijven de effecten van de 
maatregelen die worden genomen vaak onderbelicht. Dit mag gerust 
merkwaardig heten gezien de het vele – voor een belangrijk deel door 
overheden gefinancierd – onderzoek dat na 9/11 naar terrorisme is 
gedaan. 
Er is dus geen sterke empirische basis om te beoordelen welke 
contraterrorismemaatregelen de gewenste resultaten bereiken, een 
probleem dat nog wordt verergerd door het gebrek aan goede indicatoren 
waar de weinige onderzoeken naar de effectiviteit van 
contraterrorismemaatregelen mee te kampen hebben. Het succes van 
terrorismebestrijding wordt in deze onderzoeken vaak afgemeten aan 
aantallen aanslagen en slachtoffers. Deze twee indicatoren zijn om 
grotendeels dezelfde redenen problematisch. In de eerste plaats kunnen 
toe- en afnames worden veroorzaakt door andere factoren dan 
overheidsoptreden, bijvoorbeeld een verandering in de modus operandi 
van de terroristische organisatie. Een tweede probleem is dat niet altijd 
vanzelf spreekt of een toe- of afname van aantallen slachtoffers als een 
succes geïnterpreteerd moet worden. Bijvoorbeeld, de aanslagen van de 
Provisional IRA waarbij de meeste slachtoffers vielen, waren operationele 
mislukkingen. De bedoeling was om een bepaalde persoon of kleine 
groep personen te liquideren, maar door fouten in de uitvoering kwamen 
er veel meer mensen om dan was gepland. In dergelijke gevallen heeft een 
piek in de slachtofferaantallen dus eerder te maken met de afname van de 
operationele capaciteiten van een terroristische organisatie, wat kan 
duiden op succesvolle ondermijning van deze capaciteiten door de 
overheid. 




Een andere stroming in het contraterrorisme-onderzoek richt zich op het 
einde van terroristische organisaties als indicator van effectiviteit. Veel 
van deze onderzoeken gaan na of terroristische organisaties uit elkaar 
vallen of imploderen nadat hun leiders geliquideerd zijn. Ook hier geldt 
echter dat de factor waar het succes van de antiterrorismemaatregelen aan 
afgelezen wordt (het al dan niet voortbestaan van de groep), ook door 
hele andere zaken beïnvloed kan worden. Als een leider van een 
terroristische organisatie geliquideerd of gearresteerd wordt en enige tijd 
later zijn groep ophoudt te bestaan, is nog niet gezegd dat er meteen een 
oorzakelijk verband tussen deze twee gebeurtenissen bestaat. Verder is 
het zo dat het voortbestaan van een terroristische organisatie zeker niet 
per se betekent dat het contraterrorismebeleid gefaald heeft. De Rote 
Armee Fraktion, een linkse terroristische organisatie, hief zichzelf pas in 
1998 op, maar was de laatste vijftien jaar van haar bestaan nauwelijks een 
serieuze bedreiging voor de nationale veiligheid van Duitsland. 
Gegeven deze tekortkomingen heeft de literatuur over de effectiviteit van 
terrorismebestrijding dringend behoefte aan een nieuwe impuls. Het doel 
van deze studie is daarom om aan de hand van een nieuwe manier van 
effectiviteitsmeting uitspraken te doen over wanneer 
antiterrorismemaatregelen het door de staat beoogde effect bereiken. 
Deze nieuwe benadering is gestoeld op twee uitgangspunten. Ten eerste 
moet worden afgestapt van het idee dat de effectiviteit van 
terrorismebestrijding, dat vaak uit veel verschillende onderdelen bestaat, 
aan één enkele indicator afgelezen kan worden. Door de verschillende 
onderdelen van het antiterrorismebeleid afzonderlijk te beoordelen, is het 
mogelijk om tot een gedifferentieerd beeld te komen. Dit is van belang 
omdat het goed denkbaar is dat een antiterrorismebeleid in sommige 
opzichten succesvol is en in andere niet. Ten tweede is het van belang om 
de oorzaak-gevolg keten tussen beleid en effect inzichtelijk te maken. Op 
deze manier kan op zijn minst aannemelijk worden gemaakt dat een 
bepaald effect het gevolg is van het beleid, en niet van iets anders. 
Omdat het onrealistisch is om te verwachten dat alle 
antiterrorismemaatregelen onder alle omstandigheden dezelfde effecten 
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hebben, is ervoor gekozen om in dit onderzoek na te gaan of er een 
verband bestaat tussen de effectiviteit van antiterrorismemaatregelen en 
één bepaalde, zeer belangrijke omstandigheid, namelijk de aard van de 
terroristische organisatie of beweging waar de maatregelen tegen gericht 
zijn. Verschillende auteurs benadrukken dat het van belang is om 
antiterrorismebeleid af te stemmen op de aard van de dreiging, maar de 
vraag welke maatregelen tegen welke soort dreiging zouden moeten 
worden genomen, is nooit beantwoord op basis van empirisch onderzoek. 
Om deze leemte op te vullen, is in dit onderzoek de volgende 
onderzoeksvraag beantwoord: 
Is er een verband tussen het type terroristische organisatie en de effectiviteit van 
de antiterrorismemaatregelen die er tegen zijn gericht? 
Het verband tussen de aard van de dreiging en effectiviteit van 
maatregelen is onderzocht door een lijst antiterrorismemaatregelen en 
bijbehorende indicatoren voor succes op te stellen en vervolgens voor drie 
clusters van twee gelijkaardige terroristische organisaties te onderzoeken 
welke van tien antiterrorismemaatregelen zijn toegepast en of deze het 
gewenste effect hadden. De drie clusters zijn nationalistisch terrorisme, 
revolutionair terrorisme en jihadistisch terrorisme. Voor het eerste cluster 
zijn de ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) en de Provisional IRA (Irish 
Republican Army) onderzocht, voor het tweede cluster de RAF (Rote 
Armee Fraktion) en de Weather Underground, en voor het derde cluster 
de jihadistische bewegingen in Nederland en Engeland van na 9/11. In 
onderstaande paragrafen zal eerst worden uitgelegd welke 
antiterrorismemaatregelen en indicatoren van succes zijn geselecteerd. 
Vervolgens zullen per cluster de onderzoeksresultaten worden 
besproken. 
11.2 Contraterrorisme-principes 
Na grondige bestudering van de academische literatuur over 
terrorismebestrijding is een lijst van de tien meest besproken 
antiterrorismemaatregelen opgesteld. De maatregelen zijn geformuleerd 
als strategische antiterrorisme-principes. 




1. Terughoudendheid in het gebruik van geweld. Staten die terrorisme 
bestrijden, doen er volgens veel auteurs en analisten goed aan om niet te 
veel geweld te gebruiken, dit om te voorkomen dat de bevolking hiervan 
het slachtoffer wordt en zich daarom achter de terroristen schaart. Of dit 
principe geldt, zal worden afgemeten aan de gevolgen van excessief 
geweld in de strijd tegen terrorisme. Als de materiële steun van de 
bevolking voor de terroristische organisatie als gevolg van dit soort 
excessen toeneemt, zal dit worden beschouwd als bewijs dat 
terughoudendheid in het gebruik van geweld inderdaad geboden is. 
2. Respecteren van de wet. Voor schendingen van de wet geldt in grote 
lijnen hetzelfde als voor het overmatig gebruik van geweld. Door in de 
strijd tegen terrorisme internationale afspraken en verdragen over 
bijvoorbeeld de behandeling van gevangenen of de rechten van 
verdachten te schenden, roepen staten weerstand onder de bevolking op, 
en dat kan leiden tot een toename van de steun aan terroristische 
bewegingen of organisaties. Omdat dergelijke schendingen vaak 
samenhangen met een gebrek aan terughoudendheid in het gebruik van 
geweld, zal de geldigheid van dit principe worden bepaald door te 
bekijken of schendingen van de wet door de staat leiden tot een toename 
van materiële steun voor de terroristische organisatie. 
3. Internationale samenwerking. Vaak wordt gesteld dat staten terrorisme 
alleen met medewerking van andere staten kunnen bestrijden. Veel 
terroristische organisaties plegen aanslagen in het ene land, maar hebben 
uit veiligheidsoverwegingen een deel van hun activiteiten (bijvoorbeeld 
wapenopslag, training en financiering) naar andere landen verplaatst. De 
effectiviteit van het contraterrorismeprincipe ‘internationale 
samenwerking’ zal worden vastgesteld door na te gaan of pogingen om 
de buitenlandse activiteiten van een terroristische organisatie of beweging 
plat te leggen, inderdaad leiden tot het ontmantelen van schuilplaatsen, 
wapendepots en trainingscentra.  
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4. Committeren voor de lange-termijn. Veel auteurs benadrukken dat 
terrorismebestrijding een kwestie van de lange adem is. Zij menen dat de 
wil van terroristen gebroken wordt als de gewelddadige campagne lange 
tijd geen effect sorteert en het plegen van aanslagen zinloos lijkt. Om te 
zien of dit inderdaad zo is, zal worden gekeken naar de effecten van 
onbuigzaamheid van de overheid op het moreel van terroristische 
organisaties. Wat gebeurt er met terroristische organisaties als duidelijk 
wordt dat de overheid hun eisen niet in gaat willigen?  
5. De voedingsbodem wegnemen. Terrorisme kan worden bestreden met 
maatregelen tegen terrorisme, maar het is ook mogelijk om de 
zogenoemde grondoorzaken van het terrorisme aan te pakken. De 
aanname bij dit principe is dat er onder de bevolking bepaalde grieven 
leven die reden zijn om steun te verlenen aan een terroristische 
organisatie of beweging. Door het wegnemen van deze grieven, zou de 
terroristische organisatie of beweging geïsoleerd raken. Voor alle zes 
terroristische organisaties en bewegingen is onderzocht of er pogingen 
zijn ondernomen om de voedingsbodem weg te nemen en, zo ja, of dat 
geleid heeft tot een afname van de steun voor de terroristische campagne. 
Bij dit soort steun valt bijvoorbeeld te denken aan demonstraties voor de 
terroristen en hun zaak of aan stemmen voor aan terroristische 
organisaties gelieerde politieke partijen. 
6. Wethandhaving en directe actie. Een van de meest voor de hand liggende 
en meest gebruikte manieren om terrorisme te bestrijden is repressie. Alle 
staten die met terrorisme geconfronteerd worden, proberen de dreiging 
weg te nemen door terroristen te arresteren of – in meer uitzonderlijke 
gevallen – zelfs te liquideren. Op deze manier hopen staten dat het 
voorbereiden en uitvoeren van terroristische aanslagen bemoeilijkt wordt 
en de dreiging wordt geëlimineerd. Of het inderdaad zo werkt, zal 
worden vastgesteld door te bezien of er een verband bestaat tussen 
arrestaties en liquidaties enerzijds en een vermindering van de 
operationele capaciteiten van een terroristische organisatie of beweging 
anderzijds. 




7. Inzetten van een tegenboodschap. Terroristische organisaties verwerven 
hun aanhang niet alleen door het gebruik van geweld, maar ook door dit 
geweld onderdeel te maken van een boodschap. De meeste terroristische 
organisaties leggen aan hun beoogde achterban uit waarom de staat de 
vijand is en waarom geweld de enige manier is om de belangen van de 
achterban te verdedigen. Verschillende staten hebben ervoor gekozen om 
deze boodschap te beantwoorden met een tegenboodschap waarin ze de 
argumenten van de terroristische organisatie proberen te ontkrachten. 
Voor alle cases zal worden nagegaan of de staat een tegenboodschap heeft 
ingezet en of dat ertoe heeft geleid dat de publieke opinie zich tegen de 
terroristische organisatie of beweging heeft gekeerd. 
8. Uitwegen bieden. Antiterrorismebeleid kan zich ook op de individuele 
leden van de terroristische organisatie of beweging richten. De staat kan 
leden van terroristische organisaties strafvermindering en 
reïntegratieprogramma’s aanbieden om hen ertoe te bewegen de 
terroristische organisatie of beweging te verlaten. Op deze manier wordt 
de cohesie van de organisatie of beweging aangetast. Twijfelende leden 
zullen afhaken, en degenen die door willen gaan met de strijd weten niet 
wie er binnen de organisatie of beweging open staat voor het aanbod van 
de staat en weten dus ook niet meer wie ze kunnen vertrouwen. Idealiter 
leidt de inzet van deze maatregelen dus tot scheuringen en tweespalt in 
de organisatie. Voor alle zes cases zal worden onderzocht of gepoogd is 
om terroristen uit de organisatie of beweging weg te lokken, en of dat de 
eenheid in de terroristische gelederen heeft ondermijnd. 
9. Niet-gewelddadige alternatieven bieden. Omdat terrorisme een vorm van 
politiek activisme is en omdat politieke middelen op verschillende 
manieren verwezenlijkt kunnen worden, hebben sommige staten 
geprobeerd om terroristische organisaties over te halen om hun politieke 
doelen op geweldloze wijze na te streven. Hierbij valt te denken aan 
pogingen om met de terroristische organisatie te onderhandelen of om 
terroristische organisaties ertoe te bewegen om via een politieke partij aan 
het reguliere democratische proces deel te nemen. Om te bepalen bij 
welke soorten terroristische organisatie deze benadering kans van slagen 
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heeft, is voor alle zes cases vastgesteld of er pogingen tot pacificatie zijn 
ondernomen en, zo ja, of die uiteindelijk geslaagd zijn. 
10. Inlichtingenverwerving. Alle staten die met terrorisme worden 
geconfronteerd, zetten hun geheime diensten in om inlichtingen in te 
winnen over de plannen van de terroristische organisatie of beweging. 
Daarom zal voor de zes cases worden nagegaan of staten door 
communicatie te onderscheppen en door informanten en infiltranten in te 
zetten in staat zijn om aanslagen te verijdelen. 
11.3 Clustering 
De zes terroristische organisaties en bewegingen die voor dit onderzoek 
zijn geselecteerd, hebben gemeen dat ze voldoen aan de definitie van 
terrorisme van de Amerikaanse terrorismedeskundige Bruce Hoffman. 
Hij definieert terrorisme als geweld, of de dreiging daarvan, dat: 
 een politiek doel dient; 
 ingezet wordt voor het tot stand brengen van psychologische 
repercussies voor personen die niet direct het slachtoffer van het 
geweld zijn; 
 gepleegd wordt door organisaties met een celstructuur of een 
duidelijk waarneembare commandostructuur; 
 gepleegd wordt door niet-statelijke actoren. 
Omdat de onderzoeksvraag gericht is op de relatie tussen de effectiviteit 
van terrorismebestrijding en de aard van terroristische organisaties of 
bewegingen, is het van belang om vast te stellen in welke opzichten de 
verschillen tussen de zes organisaties en bewegingen van elkaar 
verschillen. Daarom zijn de zes organisaties en bewegingen verdeeld in 
drie clusters van twee groepen of bewegingen die vergelijkbaar zijn op de 
volgende karakteristieken: 
 Omvang: hoeveel leden had de organisatie of beweging en hoe groot 
was het ondersteunende netwerk? 




 Verhouding met de bevolking: was de organisatie of beweging ingebed 
in de sociale omgeving of moesten de terroristen in een sociaal 
isolement opereren? 
 Rol van de bevolking in de strategie: had de organisatie of beweging de 
actieve medewerking van de bevolking nodig om de politieke doelen 
te bereiken, of werd er namens de bevolking geopereerd? 
 Mate van centralisatie: werden de eenheden van de organisatie 
aangestuurd vanuit een centrum of opereerden ze zelfstandig? 
 Relatie tot de bestaande bestuursstructuur: wilde de organisatie of 
beweging de bestuursstructuur behouden, aanpassen of omver 
werpen? 
Uit een vergelijking van de zes organisaties en bewegingen op deze vijf 
karakteristieken volgt een clustering waarbij elk cluster bestaat uit twee 
organisaties of bewegingen die sterk op elkaar lijken. Als er inderdaad 
een relatie bestaat tussen de aard van de terroristische organisatie en de 
effectiviteit van antiterrorismemaatregelen, dan zullen de maatregelen 
tegen organisaties of bewegingen in hetzelfde cluster dezelfde effecten 
hebben. 
11.4 Bevindingen per cluster 
11.4.1 Cluster 1: revolutionair terrorisme 
Het eerste cluster bestaat uit twee links-radicale organisaties, te weten de 
Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) en de Weather Underground. Beide 
organisaties waren actief in de jaren ’70 (de RAF ook daarna nog, maar 
met veel minder impact) en probeerden het kapitalisme omver te werpen. 
Ze wilden hun doel bereiken door middel van een strategie die bekend 
staat als ‘de propaganda van de daad’. Door het plegen van aanslagen 
tegen symbolen van het kapitalisme en het imperialisme wilden ze de 
bevolking laten zien dat verzet mogelijk was. Ze hoopten met hun 
aanslagen het anti-kapitalistische verzet aan te wakkeren en uiteindelijke 
de proletarische revolutie zou ontketenen. Hoewel beide groepen een 
sterke afkeer van het heersende gezag hadden, waren ze weinig 
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democratisch georganiseerd. Zowel de RAF als de Weather Underground 
stond onder leiding van een kern van leden tegen wie in de rest van de 
organisatie hoog werd opgekeken. Deze kern stuurde de cellen van de 
organisatie aan, en was als enige op de hoogte van alle activiteiten die 
binnen de organisatie werden ondernomen. De cellen werkten op ‘need-
to-know’ basis en wisten niet waar de andere cellen mee bezig waren. 
Aanvankelijk werden beide groepen nog ondersteund door netwerken 
van sympathisanten, maar gaandeweg raakten beide groepen vervreemd 
en geïsoleerd van hun achterban. 
Hoewel het beantwoorden van de vraag of antiterrorismemaatregelen 
tegen de RAF en de Weather Underground dezelfde effecten hebben 
gehad, wordt bemoeilijkt door het gegeven dat er weinig maatregelen zijn 
die tegen beide groepen zijn toegepast, zijn er niettemin enkele patronen 
te onderscheiden. In de eerste plaats zijn beide cases goede illustraties van 
het risico van escalatie als gevolg van te hard ingrijpen. Zowel de Duitse 
als de Amerikaanse politie trad eind jaren ’60 hard op tegen de 
studentendemonstraties, met als gevolg dat veel linkse studenten, de 
beoogde achterban van beide bewegingen, zich achter de RAF en de 
Weather Underground schaarden. Het harde politieoptreden droeg ook 
bij aan de radicalisering van de organisaties zelf. Zij zagen zich bevestigd 
in het idee dat de staat in wezen dictatoriaal was en omver geworpen 
moest worden. Het staatsgeweld was dus voor beide organisaties een 
legitimering van de gewapende strijd. 
De tweede overeenkomst betreft het effect van directe actie en 
wethandhaving. In beide gevallen leidde de pogingen van de politie om 
de zelfbenoemde guerrilla’s aan te houden niet tot het einde, maar wel tot 
de politieke marginalisering van de organisatie. De RAF werd door de 
druk van de Duitse politie afgeleid van zijn oorspronkelijke politieke 
doelstellingen. De groep begon gaandeweg aanslagen te plegen om 
gevangen leiders te bevrijden en om te protesteren tegen vermeende 
mishandeling van gevangen leden, en gaf daardoor de indruk vooral voor 
de eigen belangen te strijden. De campagne van de RAF kreeg steeds meer 
het karakter van een persoonlijke vete met de politie en ging aan het einde 




van de jaren ’70 nog maar voor een klein deel om de politieke zaak waar 
het allemaal om begonnen was. Ook beging de groep in de pogingen om 
zijn leiders vrij te krijgen allerlei wreedheden die voor de achterban 
onverteerbaar waren. De RAF raakte daardoor geïsoleerd van zijn 
aanhang en hoewel de groep nog tot 1992 incidenteel een aanslag pleegde, 
was er geen sprake meer van een serieuze bedreiging van het gezag van 
de staat. 
Ook de Weather Underground betaalde een politieke prijs voor de druk 
van de politie. De FBI is er nooit in geslaagd om de groep op te rollen, 
maar door de vele tijd en moeite die de Weathermen, de leden van de 
Weather Underground, moesten steken in het regelen van auto’s, valse 
paspoorten, en schuilplaatsen waren er weinig mogelijkheden om contact 
te houden met de achterban. De groep was alleen nog maar bezig met 
overleven en was niet meer in staat om een coherente politieke campagne 
te voeren. Af en toe pleegde de groep nog wel een aanslag, maar dit 
waren geïsoleerde incidenten die geen onderdeel uitmaakten van een 
bredere campagne tegen het Amerikaanse imperialisme. 
11.4.2 Cluster 2: nationalistisch terrorisme 
De Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) en Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(de ETA) vertonen in verschillende opzichten treffende overeenkomsten. 
In de eerste plaats streefden beide organisaties de emancipatie van een 
culturele minderheid na. De ETA wilde Baskenland bevrijden van wat 
werd gezien als Spaanse overheersing en de Provisional IRA wilde 
Noord-Ierland onderdeel van Ierland maken, wat inhield dat de zes 
Noord-Ierse provincies zich los moesten maken van het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk. Ook waren de Provisional IRA en de ETA met enkele 
honderden leden voor een terroristische organisatie vrij groot en waren ze 
op een vergelijkbare manier georganiseerd. Beide groepen stonden onder 
leiding van een centrum dat bestond uit een kleine kern en een reeks 
afdelingen die elk een deel van het werk van de organisatie (inlichtingen, 
financiën, propaganda, logistiek etc.) voor hun rekening namen. Onder de 
centra zaten de cellen die de aanslagen uitvoerden. Een andere 
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overeenkomst was dat beide organisaties, zeker in de eerste jaren van hun 
campagne, diepe wortels in hun sociale omgeving hadden. Zowel de ETA 
als de Provisional IRA dreven voor een deel op de steun en actieve 
medewerking van de bevolking. ETA- en Provisional IRA-strijders 
konden vaak rekenen op mensen die buiten de organisatie stonden maar 
toch bereid waren om wapens of strijders te verstoppen, informatie door 
te spelen of financiële steun te verlenen. Bij beide organisaties was de 
strijd echter voornamelijk een zaak van de organisatie zelf. De bevolking 
bood ondersteuning, maar het waren uiteindelijk de ETA en de 
Provisional IRA zelf die de wil van respectievelijk Spanje en het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk zouden breken. Beide groepen hoopten dat de regering waar 
ze tegen streden, zou besluiten dat de schade van het terroristisch geweld 
niet opwoog de voordelen van het handhaven van het territorium. 
Gezien de sterke overeenkomsten tussen beide groepen, is het weinig 
verwonderlijk dat er ook overeenkomsten zijn in de effecten van de 
tegenmaatregelen. De belangrijkste overeenkomst is het effect van de 
combinatie van directe actie en wethandhaving toegepast door een 
regering die wist dat de strijd een kwestie van de lange adem was. Ook in 
dit cluster heeft repressie niet geleid tot de eliminatie van de terroristische 
organisaties waar de repressie tegen gericht was, maar heeft het niettemin 
een belangrijke bijdrage geleverd, in dit geval door de wil van de 
terroristische organisaties te breken. In het geval van de Provisional IRA 
moet dit effect ook worden toegeschreven aan het Britse inlichtingenwerk, 
aangezien de Britse geheime diensten in Noord-Ierland veel aanslagen 
hebben verijdeld en zo het moreel van de strijders van de Provisional IRA 
hebben ondermijnd. In beide gevallen was de combinatie van succesvolle 
repressie en de weigering om in te gaan op de terroristische eisen cruciaal. 
De ETA en de Provisional IRA maakten lange periodes van arrestaties en 
ontmantelingen van wapendepots door zonder dat daar strategisch succes 
tegenover stond. Beide groepen, de Provisional IRA weliswaar meer dan 
de ETA, waren tot aan hun pacificatie nog tot aanslagen in staat, maar 
veel – niet alle – leden zagen na enige tijd het nut van de campagne niet 
meer in omdat de regeringen waar ze tegen streden geen centimeter 
toegaven. Dit was de reden dat de ETA in 2011 definitief de wapens 
neerlegde en de Provisional IRA in 1998 akkoord ging met een voorstel 




dat niet wezenlijk verschilde van een voorstel dat het in 1973 had 
afgewezen. 
Maar hoewel repressie dus zeker een deel van de oplossing was, was het 
ook deel van het probleem. De escalatie van het geweld van de ETA na de 
dood van Franco is voor een groot veroorzaakt door het harde optreden 
van de Spaanse politie tegen pro-nationalistische activisten in Baskenland. 
De huiszoekingen, arrestatiegolven en mishandeling van gevangenen 
zetten veel kwaad bloed en gaven veel Basken het idee dat de ETA gelijk 
had en actieve steun verdiende. Pas in de loop van de jaren ’80 keerden de 
Basken zich en masse af van de ETA. De Britse regering had eerder in 
Noord-Ierland dezelfde fout gemaakt als de Spaanse regering. Om een 
einde te maken aan de onrust in Noord-Ierland werd in 1969 het leger 
ingezet, maar de spertijden, gewelddadige huiszoekingen en 
arrestatiegolven wakkerden de vijandigheid van de bevolking alleen maar 
aan en leverden de Provisional IRA veel steun en nieuwe rekruten op. In 
beide gevallen was het probleem voor de regering dat de repressie 
onvoldoende gericht werd toegepast. Degenen die te lijden hadden onder 
de repressie hadden vaak geen banden met de terroristische organisatie in 
kwestie en gingen deze pas steunen nadat ze slachtoffer van het harde 
optreden van leger en politie waren geworden. 
11.4.3 Cluster 3: jihadistisch terrorisme 
In tegenstelling tot de vier andere organisaties, hebben de jihadistische 
bewegingen in Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk geen duidelijk 
leidend centrum. Er zijn wel leidende figuren, maar zij bekleden geen 
officiële posities in een duidelijk uitgewerkte organisatiestructuur. In 
beide landen zijn de bewegingen los georganiseerd, en is het lang niet 
altijd duidelijk wie er nu precies lid van is en wie niet. Beide bewegingen 
bestaan uit los van elkaar opererende en zelfvoorzienende cellen. Bij geen 
van de uitgevoerde en verijdelde aanslagen in Nederland en het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk was er sprake van grootschalige medewerking van de beoogde 
achterban. Nederlandse en Britse jihadisten regelen hun eigen wapens, 
zetten hun eigen explosieven in elkaar en zorgen voor hun eigen 
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financiering. Van een taakverdeling zoals bij de Provisional IRA en de 
ETA, die speciale afdelingen hadden voor financiering en 
wapenleveranties, is dus geen sprake. Ook maken jihadistische cellen in 
Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk geen gebruik van hand- en 
spandiensten van een netwerk van sympathisanten. Het ideaal van de 
Britse en Nederlandse jihadisten is het vestigen van een staat die bestuurd 
wordt door volgens een strenge, fundamentalistische interpretatie van de 
sharia, maar in beide landen hadden de aanslagen concretere doelen. In 
Nederland ging het vaak om het afstraffen van gepercipieerde 
beledigingen van de Islam, terwijl veel Britse jihadisten geweld 
gebruikten om de Britse regering tot terugtrekking van Britse troepen uit 
Irak en Afghanistan te bewegen. 
Een belangrijke overeenkomst in de bestrijding van jihadisme in 
Nederland en Engeland is dat in beide landen de operationele 
capaciteiten van de jihadistische beweging zijn ondermijnd door 
inlichtingenwerk en arrestaties. In Nederland werd de jihadistische 
beweging een zware slag toegebracht door de arrestatie van de leden van 
de Hofstadgroep en de cel rond Samir A. en door de uitzetting van een 
aantal buitenlandse sleutelfiguren. Ook in het Verenigd Koninkrijk heeft 
wethandhaving het de jihadistische beweging moeilijk gemaakt. Door 
harder op te treden tegen ‘Londonistan’, de kern van de jihadistische 
beweging in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, konden Britse jihadisten minder 
middelen voor hun aanslagen mobiliseren. Het gevolg was dat de 
aanslagen kleiner werden, minder slachtoffers maakten en minder schade 
aanrichtten.  
Opmerkelijk is dat ook inlichtingenwerk heeft bijgedragen aan de 
verzwakking van de jihadistische bewegingen in Nederland en het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk. Vaak wordt aangenomen dat het infiltreren van los 
georganiseerde bewegingen minder effect heeft omdat de afzonderlijk 
cellen alleen van hun eigen activiteiten op de hoogte zijn, en niet van die 
van de andere cellen. Hoewel het inderdaad zo is dat leden van cellen in 
los georganiseerde bewegingen minder weten dan leden van strak en 
hiërarchisch georganiseerde organisaties, laten de twee cases in dit cluster 




zien dat dit geen beletsel voor de effectiviteit van inlichtingenwerk hoeft 
te zijn. Zowel de AIVD als MI5, de Britse veiligheidsdienst, slaagden erin 
om jihadistische cellen af te luisteren en wisten op deze manier 
verschillende aanslagen te voorkomen. Hierbij moet wel worden 
aangetekend dat er nog vraagtekens bestaan bij het optreden van de 
AIVD rond de moord op Theo van Gogh en dat MI5 moeite bleek te 
hebben met het opsporen van jihadistische eenlingen, individuen die 
zonder inbreng van anderen radicaliseren en een aanslag voorbereiden. 
Een andere belangrijke overeenkomst tussen de twee cases is het 
uitblijven van escalatie en toename van steun voor de jihadistische 
bewegingen als gevolg van slecht gerichte repressieve maatregelen, die er 
wel degelijk waren. De Britse politie paste de bevoegdheid om mensen 
aan te houden en te fouilleren onevenredig vaak voor op personen van 
niet-Westerse komaf, en zowel in Nederland als in het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk werden moslims ten onrechte gearresteerd op verdenking van 
het beramen van terroristische aanslagen. Deze aanpak leidde tot wrevel 
en verontwaardiging in moslimgemeenschappen, maar niet tot een 
toename van de actieve en materiële steun voor jihadistisch terrorisme. Er 
is nooit een ondersteunend netwerk geweest dat leek op dat van de ETA 
en de Provisional IRA. 
Tot slot moet worden opgemerkt dat pogingen om de voedingsbodem 
van het terrorisme weg te nemen, in geen van beide gevallen hebben 
bijgedragen aan het indammen of wegnemen van de terroristische 
dreiging. In Nederland was de jihadistische dreiging al gereduceerd door 
arrestaties en uitzettingen op het moment dat het nationale anti-
radicaliseringsbeleid van de grond kwam, en in het VK werd weinig 
gedaan met het Britse defensiebeleid, terwijl juist de Britse militaire 
aanwezigheid in Irak en Afghanistan voor veel Britse jihadisten reden 
was om tot aanslagen over te gaan. Ook was het Britse 




11.5 Naar contraterrorismeprofielen? 
Idealiter zou het op basis van de onderzoeksresultaten mogelijk zijn om 
voor elke soort terrorisme een ‘contraterrorismeprofiel’ op te stellen. Uit 
een dergelijk profiel zou dan kunnen worden afgelezen hoe een bepaalde 
terroristische organisatie of beweging het beste aangepakt kan worden, en 
welke maatregelen beter achterwege gelaten kunnen worden. Hoewel de 
in de vorige paragraaf beschreven bevindingen onvoldoende zijn voor het 
opstellen van dergelijke profielen, maken ze ook duidelijk dat sommige 
antiterrorismemaatregelen dezelfde effecten hebben als ze tegen dezelfde 
soort terroristische dreigingen worden ingezet. Zo hangen het effect van 
wethandhaving en directe actie en het risico van escalatie als gevolg van 
te hard optreden en schendingen van de wet door de staat duidelijk af 
van de aard van de dreiging. Wethandhaving en directe actie werkten in 
alle gevallen, maar in elk cluster op een andere manier. Ook de geldigheid 
van het beginsel van terughoudendheid in de toepassing van geweld 
hangt af van de aard van de terroristische organisatie: het risico van 
escalatie is groter als de terroristische organisatie of beweging al een 
groep sympathisanten om zich heen heeft verzameld. 
Voor sommige principes lijkt het er echter op dat het effect bepaald wordt 
door andere eigenschappen dan de vijf die in paragraaf 11.3 zijn 
besproken. Zo werkte het aanbieden van uitwegen aan leden van de 
organisatie op enig moment wel tegen de ETA, maar niet tegen de 
Provisional IRA, twee organisaties die op de vijf gekozen variabelen 
sterke gelijkenissen met elkaar vertonen. In het begin van de jaren ’80 
werd met succes geprobeerd om ETA-strijders uit de organisatie te lokken 
door hen strafvermindering en sociale reïntegratieprogramma’s aan te 
bieden. Het succes van deze maatregel kan worden verklaard door het 
gegeven dat de ETA op dat moment verdeeld was over de voortzetting 
van de gewapende strijd. De radicale, militante vleugel wilde doorgaan 
met het plegen van aanslagen, maar er was ook een vleugel die de 
gewapende strijd wilde staken en wilde proberen om de politieke 
doelstellingen te bereiken via de nieuwe, democratische kanalen die in de 
jaren na de dood van Franco waren opengegaan. Leden die tot deze 
laatste vleugel behoorden, toonden zich ontvankelijk voor het aanbod van 




de Spaanse regering. Dezelfde maatregel had echter een stuk minder 
effect toen deze enkele jaren later nog een keer werd toegepast. De ETA 
was toen niet verdeeld over de te volgen tactiek en was in staat om 
overlopers zwaar te bestraffen. Hetzelfde gold voor de Provisional IRA 
ten tijde van de zogenoemde ‘supergrasses’, verdachten die die 
strafvermindering en een nieuwe identiteit in het vooruitzicht werden 
gesteld in ruil voor belastende verklaringen. Deze maatregel had weinig 
effect omdat de organisatie op dat moment nog volledig achter de 
gewapende strijd stond en kon garanderen dat er wraak zou worden 
genomen op uittreders. De les van deze twee gevallen is dus dat het van 
interne cohesie en de operationele slagkracht van de terroristische 
beweging of organisatie afhangt of het bieden van uitwegen het door de 
staat gewenste effect heeft. 
Een andere eigenschap van een terroristische organisatie of beweging die 
niet in paragraaf 11.3 is opgenomen, maar mogelijk wel het effect van een 
antiterrorismemaatregel mede bepaalt, is de mate van isolement. Uit de 
zes cases blijkt dat infiltratie en de onderschepping van communicatie 
tegen zeer verschillende terroristische organisaties (de Provisional IRA 
ende jihadistische bewegingen in Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) 
effectief kan zijn. Echter, infiltreren en afluisteren is niet altijd mogelijk. 
De Weather Underground opereerde zo diep ondergronds dat 
vreemdelingen meteen werden opgemerkt, waardoor de FBI er slechts 
één keer in is geslaagd om een mol in de organisatie te plaatsen. Iets 
vergelijkbaars geldt voor de jihadistische beweging in het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk. MI5 heeft verschillende aanslagen voorkomen, maar had 
moeite met het opmerken van jihadistische eenlingen. Deze bevindingen 
wijzen erop dat een terroristische beweging of organisatie een bepaalde 
mate van zichtbaarheid, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van contact met andere 
leden of cellen, moet hebben succesvolle infiltratie en interceptie van 
communicatie mogelijk te maken. 
Hoewel het voor een aantal contraterrorismeprincipes dus mogelijk is om 
te beargumenteren dat de effectiviteit mede afhangt van de aard van de 
terroristische dreiging, is het ook zo dat dit onderzoek voor een aantal 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
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principes te weinig resultaten heeft opgeleverd om uitspraken in deze 
richting te kunnen doen. Het aanbieden van niet-gewelddadige kanalen 
Internationale samenwerking, committeren voor de lange termijn werken 
tegen verschillende soorten terroristische organisaties, maar zijn in te 
weinig gevallen toegepast om te kunnen zeggen waar de effectiviteit door 
wordt bepaald.  
Hetzelfde geldt voor het wegnemen van de voedingsbodem. De in 
Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk ondernomen pogingen om de 
voedingsbodem van het jihadisme weg te nemen, waren gebaseerd op een 
verkeerde inschatting van de aard en ernst van het probleem, maar de 
strijd tegen de ETA heeft laten zien dat dergelijke maatregelen wel 
degelijk effect kunnen hebben. De mate van autonomie die de Baskische 
regio tegen het midden van de jaren ’80 had bereikt, was voor veel Basken 
genoeg, wat leidde tot het teruglopen van de steun voor de ETA. De casus 
van de Weather Underground liet een vergelijkbare dynamiek zien: het 
beëindigen van de Vietnamoorlog was geen antiterrorismemaatregel, 
maar zorgde er wel voor dat veel voormalige aanhangers geen reden 
meer zagen om de Weather Underground te steunen. Het wegnemen van 
de voedingsbodem werkte dus tegen twee verschillende soorten 
organisaties, maar dat is te weinig om te kunnen zien in hoeverre de aard 
van de organisatie bepalend is voor het effect.  
Wel is het zo dat er uit deze twee gevallen een belangrijke les valt te 
trekken, namelijk dat het bij het wegnemen van de voedingsbodem gaat 
om de grieven van de bevolking, en niet die van de terroristen. Zowel de 
aanhang van de Weather Underground als die van de ETA trok hun steun 
aan de terroristen in nadat de staat was ingegaan op eisen die minder 
radicaal waren dan die van de organisaties. De ETA wilde 
onafhankelijkheid, maar de Baskische bevolking nam genoegen met 
autonomie binnen Spanje, en de Weather Underground wilde het 
kapitalisme omverwerpen, maar de Amerikaanse linkse protestbeweging 
nam genoegen met het beëindigen van de oorlog in Vietnam. 





Voor sommige contraterrorismeprincipes geldt dat de effectiviteit afhangt 
van de aard van de terroristische dreiging waar ze tegen worden 
toegepast. De onderzoeksvraag kan dus bevestigend worden beantwoord, 
maar niet zonder dat daarbij wordt aangetekend dat deze constatering 
slechts een eerste stap is op weg naar een empirisch onderbouwd begrip 
van de effectiviteit van terrorismebestrijding. Zoals boven reeds is 
geconstateerd, is het voor enkele contraterrorismeprincipes moeilijk om 
op basis van de in deze dissertatie geselecteerde cases vast te stellen of 
hun effectiviteit afhangt van de aard van de terroristische dreiging. 
Hiervoor is verder onderzoek nodig. Verder moet worden bedacht dat in 
dit onderzoek alleen is gekeken naar effecten die vrij direct gerelateerd 
zijn aan de terroristische organisatie of beweging, en dat meer sociale 
effecten van terrorismebestrijding, bijvoorbeeld de militarisering van de 
samenleving, buiten beschouwing zijn gebleven. Ook in dit opzicht moet 
de empirische basis van onze opvattingen over terrorismebestrijding 
worden versterkt.  
Volgens de legendarische strategische denker Carl von Clausewitz is 
oorlog eerder een kunst dan een wetenschap. Clausewitz stelde dat de 
legerbevelhebber niet moet vertrouwen op algemene principes, maar 
eerder op zijn intuïtie af moest gaan om de essentie van de situatie op het 
slagveld te bevatten. Geldt deze stelregel ook voor terrorismebestrijding, 
of kunnen we daar onze hoop vestigen op algemene principes? De 
bevindingen van dit onderzoek laten zien dat het wel degelijk mogelijk is 
om een realistische inschatting te maken van hoe een bepaalde maatregel 
zal uitwerken tegen een bepaalde soort terroristische organisatie. Er is 
nog veel onderzoek nodig om de relatie tussen aard van de terroristische 
dreiging en de effectiviteit van tegenmaatregelen verder inzichtelijk te 
maken, maar deze dissertatie laat zien dat we verder kunnen komen door 
terrorismebestrijding niet als kunst, maar als wetenschap te beschouwen. 
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